MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C.

CHAN

Facts: Petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Meanwhile,
respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial
Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275
(A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in
the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them
before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Gamboa alleged that
the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance
operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to
the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s right to privacy was violated when the Philippine National Police in
Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides
and whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data will prosper.

Ruling: No. The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a
constitutional right. With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not
every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In
Sabio v. Gordon, the Supreme Court held that the right of the people to access information on matters of
public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case,
the Court declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to
privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and
compelling.

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The Constitution explicitly
mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted
authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission. Taking into account these
constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to the
Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity
to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself
admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards
were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy. It is
clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged
intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas
data must be denied.

FELIPE NAVARRO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and
Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one
Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing the nude dancers.
After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage
and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and
took a picture. At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco,
approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture. A heated exchange took place and
when Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his
companions.

Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Sioco and Liquin were met by
petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards, petitioner
Navarro turned to Jalbuena confronted him. At this point, Lingan intervened and the two then had a
heated exchange. As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol
above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. Unknown to petitioner
Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased. The Trial
Court convicted petitioner which the Court of Appeals later affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the recording is admissible as evidence.

Ruling: Yes. Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made. It may be asked
whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wiretapping. The answer is in
the affirmative. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is
authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the
tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the
voice recording; that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the
tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of
the tape presented by the prosecution.
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA

Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of
her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. Petitioner vigorously argues, as her
"main and principal issue" that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping
of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely
refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication

Issue: Whether or not the recording is admissible as evidence for claims for damages.

Ruling: No. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides: It shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent
to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any". Additionally, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are
the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200.
CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the documents seized may be used for evidence in a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine against petitioner’s husband.

Ruling: No. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent,
Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty.
Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court.

Indeed, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable"  is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO

Facts:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc.
10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is only P320 per unit.
Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640.  YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a
“refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of
Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to
the immunity of one's person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals.

Ruling: Yes. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find
no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as
counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and
as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
LOURDES T. MARQUEZ vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO

Facts: Petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29,
1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various
accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the
branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270, 240-020718, 245-30317-3
and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al. The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in
camera inspection of the accounts is a trail of managers checks purchased by one George Trivinio, a
respondent in OMB-0-97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman.

It would appear that Mr. George Trivinio, purchased fifty-one (51) Managers Checks (MCs) for a total
amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank, United Nations Avenue branch, on May 2 and 3, 1995.
Out of the 51 MCs, eleven (11) MCs in the amount of P70.6 million, were deposited and credited to an
account maintained at the Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection
set on June 3, 1998. However, on June 4, 1998, petitioner wrote the Ombudsman explaining to him that
the accounts in question cannot readily be identified and asked for time to respond to the order. The
reason forwarded by petitioner was that despite diligent efforts and from the account numbers presented,
we cannot identify these accounts since the checks are issued in cash or bearer. Having surmised that
these accounts have long been dormant, hence are not covered by the new account number generated by
the Union Bank system. Thus, there is a need to verify from the Interbank records archives for the
whereabouts of these accounts. Thus, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing
petitioner to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in issue.

Issue: Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned
account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R. A. No. 1405).

Ruling: No. The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with
the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office
of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g)
relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. The Court
rules that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, the following requisites my occur: 1) there
must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction, 2) Further, the account must be clearly
identified 3) the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent
jurisdiction, 4) the bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection, 5) and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In Union
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy
of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be absolutely confidential except: (1) In an
examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically
authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a
bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the
deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, (2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired
by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the
results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank, (3) Upon written permission of the depositor, (4)
In cases of impeachment, (5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or (6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is
existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman
would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank
account for inspection.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. This also includes the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act. Thus, the Court granted the petition ordering the Ombudsman to cease and desist from
requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order.
BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES

Facts: A .O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 which reads:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM. Petitioner
Ople prays that the Supreme Court invalidates Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:
one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.

Issue: Whether or not A.O. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy.

Ruling: Yes. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering
basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this
identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without
the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality,
the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand. The essence of privacy
is the "right to be let alone." The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to
provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is
debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But
what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our
antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning”. This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but
the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed. Pursuant
to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN every time he deals with a government
agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will
necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets
and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN,
the better the chance of building a huge formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the
files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast
reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too
great for some of our authorities to resist. The right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual
privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling
interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and
well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. The Court reiterates that any law or order
that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.