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125 CHUA V PEOPLE
125 CHUA V PEOPLE
PEOPLE (Nami)
G.R. No. 216146
August 24, 2016
REYES, J
BEFORE THE SC: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari challenging the
Resolutions dated September 23, 2014 and January 6, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 36764. The assailed resolutions affirmed the Decision dated March 27, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 107079 and
Judgment dated November 23, 2012 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 43, which sentenced herein petitioners Alfredo L. Chua (Alfredo), Tomas L. Chua
(Tomas) and Mercedes P. Diaz (Mercedes) (collectively referred to as the petitioners) to suffer
the penalty of thirty (30) days of imprisonment for violation of Section 74, in relation to Section
144, of the Corporation Code.
PETITIONER: ALFREDO L. CHUA, TOMAS L. CHUA AND MERCEDES P. DIAZ
RESPONDENT: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUMMARY:
Joselyn invoked her right as a stockholder pursuant to Section 74 of the Corporation Code to
inspect the records of the books of the business transactions of the corporation, the minutes of
the meetings of the board of directors and stockholders, as well as the financial statements] of the
corporation. She hired a lawyer to send demand letters to each of the petitioners for her right to
inspect to be heeded. However, she was denied of such right to inspect.
Whether the conviction for alleged violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144, of the
Corporation Code was proper. YES
Despite the expiration of CTCM's corporate term in 1999, duties as corporate officers still
pertained to the petitioners when Joselyn's complaint was filed in 2000.
While a cloud of doubt is cast upon the existence of criminal intent on the part of the petitioners,
it is jurisprudentially settled that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential
in offenses punishable by special laws, which are mala prohibita.
In the case at bar, the petitioners were charged with violations of Section 74, in relation to
Section 144, of the Corporation Code, a special law. Accordingly, since Joselyn was deprived of
the exercise of an effective right of inspection, offenses had in fact been committed, regardless of
the petitioners' intent. The Corporation Code provides for penalties relative to the commission of
offenses, which cannot be trivialized, lest the public purpose for which they are crafted be
defeated and put to naught.
FACTS:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) aptly summed up the antecedents leading to the filing
of the Complaint-Affidavit of Joselyn Chua (Joselyn) against the petitioners:
[Joselyn] was a stockholder of Chua Tee Corporation of Manila. [Alfredo] was the president and
chairman of the board, while [Tomas] was the corporate secretary and also a member of the
board of the same corporation. [Mercedes] was the accountant/bookkeeper tasked with the
physical custody of the corporate records.
On or about August 24, 2000, Joselyn invoked her right as a stockholder pursuant to Section 74
of the Corporation Code to inspect the records of the books of the business transactions of the
corporation, the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors and stockholders, as well as the
financial statements] of the corporation. She hired a lawyer to send demand letters to each of the
petitioners for her right to inspect to be heeded. However, she was denied of such right to
inspect.
Joselyn likewise hired the services of Mr. Abednego Velayo (Mr. Velayo) from the accounting
firm of Guzman Bocaling and Company to assist her in examining the books of the corporation.
Armed with a letter request[,] together with the list of schedules of audit materials, Mr. Velayo
and his group visited the corporation's premises for the supposed examination of the accounts.
However, the books of accounts were not formally presented to them and there was no list of
schedules[,] which would allow them to pursue their inspection. Mr. Velayo testified that they
failed to complete their objective of inspecting the books of accounts and examine the recorded
documents. (Citations omitted)
In the Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Quezon City Prosecutors' Office, Joselyn alleged that
despite written demands, the petitioners conspired in refusing without valid cause the exercise of
her right to inspect Chua Tee Corporation of Manila's (CTCM) business transactions records,
financial statements and minutes of the meetings of both the board of directors and stockholders.
In their Counter Affidavits, the petitioners denied liability. They argued that the custody of the
records sought to be inspected by Joselyn did not pertain to them. Besides, the physical records
were merely kept inside the cabinets in the corporate office. Further, they did not prevent Joselyn
from inspecting the records. What happened was that Mercedes was severely occupied with
winding up the affairs of CTCM after it ceased operations. Joselyn and her lawyers then failed to
set up an appointment with Mercedes. Joselyn, through counsel, then sent demand letters to
inspect the records. Not long after, Joselyn filed two cases, one of which was civil and the other,
criminal, against the petitioners. On July 4, 2001, an Information indicting the petitioners for
alleged violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code was filed
before the MeTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 107079, raffled
to Branch 43.
METC Convicted Petitioners: On January 30, 2002, the petitioners filed before the MeTC a
Motion to Quash the Information filed against them. They argued that CTCM had ceased to exist
as a corporate entity since May 26, 1999. Consequently, when the acts complained of by Joselyn
were allegedly committed in August of 2000, the petitioners cannot be considered anymore as
responsible officers of CTCM. Thus, assuming for argument's sake that the petitioners actually
refused to let Joselyn inspect corporate records, no criminal liability can attach to an omission to
perform a duty, which no longer existed. The MeTC, however, denied the petitioners' Motion to
Quash.
Arraignment, pre-trial and trial then ensued. The prosecution offered the testimonies of Joselyn
and Abednego Velayo (Velayo). On the other hand, the petitioners neither presented witnesses,
nor filed any documentary evidence.
On November 23, 2012, the MeTC rendered its Judgment convicting the petitioners as charged,
sentencing them to surfer the penalty of 30 days of imprisonment, and directing them to pay the
costs of suit. The MeTC cited Ang-Abaya, et al. v. Ang to stress that in the instant case, the
prosecution had amply established the presence of the elements of the offense under Section 74
of the Corporation Code, to wit: (a) a stockholder's prior demand in writing for the inspection of
corporate records; (b) refusal by corporate officers to allow the inspection; and (c) proofs
adduced by the corporate officers of the stockholder's prior improper or malicious use of the
records in the event that the same is raised as a defense for the refusal to allow the
inspection. Further invoking Gokongwei, Jr. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,the MeTC
explained that a stockholder's right to inspect corporate records is based upon the necessity of
self-protection.Thus, the exercise of the right at reasonable hours during business days should be
allowed.
MeTC denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
RTC denied Petitioner’s Appeal: The petitioners filed an appeal, which the RTC denied in the
Decision rendered on March 27, 2014. The RTC agreed with the MeTC's ruling and stated that
the petitioners should have presented their evidence to contradict or rebut the evidence presented
by the prosecution that has overcome their constitutional right to be presumed innocent, before
the lower court. RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On October 15, 2014, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to which they appended
their belated compliance with the formal requirements pointed out by the CA. Pending resolution
of the motion, Rosario Sui Lian Chua (Rosario), mother of the now deceased Joselyn, filed an
Affidavit of Desistance dated December 11, 2014, which in part stated that:
3. After taking stock of the situation of the [petitioners] in the above-captioned case,
and considering moreover that [Alfredo and Tomas] are both uncles of [Joselyn],
and are brothers of my now also-deceased husband, I and the rest of my family,
have decided to condone any and all possible criminal wrongdoings attributable to
[the petitioners], and to absolve the latter of both civil and criminal liabilities in
connection with the above-captioned case;
4. In any event, we have reason to believe that the filing of the instant criminal case
was merely the result of serious misunderstanding anent the management and
operation of [CTCM], which had long ceased to exist as a corporate entity even
prior to the alleged commission of the crime in question, rather than by reason of
any criminal intent or actuation on the part of the [petitioners].
CA issued the second assailed Resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the conviction for alleged violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144, of the
Corporation Code was proper. YES
Ruling:
The Court affirms the conviction but directs the payment of fine, in lieu of the penalty of
imprisonment imposed by the, courts a quo.
Despite the expiration of CTCM's corporate term in 1999, duties as corporate officers still
pertained to the petitioners when Joselyn's complaint was filed in 2000.
[T]he corporation continues to be a body corporate for three (3) years after its dissolution for
purposes of prosecuting and defending suits by and against it and for enabling it to settle and
close its affairs, culminating in the disposition and distribution of its remaining assets. x x x The
termination of the life of a juridical entity does not by itself cause the extinction or diminution of
the rights and liabilities of such entity x x x nor those of its owners and creditors.
Further, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, Sections 122 and 145 of the Corporation Code
explicitly provide for the continuation of the body corporate for three years after dissolution.
The rights and remedies against, or liabilities of, the officers shall not be removed or impaired
by reason of the dissolution of the corporation. Corollarily then, a stockholder's right to inspect
corporate records subsists during the period of liquidation. Hence, Joselyn, as a stockholder,
had the right to demand for the inspection of records. Lodged upon the corporation is the
corresponding duty to allow the said inspection.
It is beyond the ambit of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to recalibrate the
evidence considered in the proceedings below. However, the Court notes circumstances
justifying the modification of the assailed resolutions.
The Court notes that in the course of the trial, the petitioners presented neither testimonial nor
documentary evidence to prove their innocence. The MeTC rendered a judgment of conviction,
which the RTC and the CA affirmed in toto.
It is settled that "a re-examination of factual findings is outside the province of a petition for
review on certiorari," especially in the instant petition where the MeTC, RTC and CA concurred
in convicting the petitioners of the charges against them.
Be that as it may, the Court takes exception and notes the following circumstances: (a) during
cross-examination, Joselyn admitted that permission was granted for her to see the documents,
but she was unable to actually view them as she was represented by her accountant; (b) Joselyn
lacked personal knowledge as to whether or not the petitioners in fact allowed or denied the
checking of the records she had requested; (c) Velayo stated that the letter requesting for the
examination of CTCM's records was addressed to the Accounting Department, and he and his
colleagues did not have personal dealings with the petitioners.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that a complete examination of CTCM's records did not occur
resulting to an effective deprivation of Joselyn's right as a stockholder. However, from Joselyn
and Velayo's testimonies, it can be inferred that permission to view the records was granted,
albeit not fully effected. The petitioners, on their part, explained in the Counter-Affidavit filed
before the Quezon City Prosecution Office that they never prevented Joselyn from exercising her
right of inspection, but when the latter made her request, Mercedes was too occupied in winding
up the affairs of CTCM.
While a cloud of doubt is cast upon the existence of criminal intent on the part of the petitioners,
it is jurisprudentially settled that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential
in offenses punishable by special laws, which are mala prohibita.
In the case at bar, the petitioners were charged with violations of Section 74, in relation to
Section 144, of the Corporation Code, a special law. Accordingly, since Joselyn was deprived of
the exercise of an effective right of inspection, offenses had in fact been committed, regardless of
the petitioners' intent. The Corporation Code provides for penalties relative to the commission of
offenses, which cannot be trivialized, lest the public purpose for which they are crafted be
defeated and put to naught.
No exceptional grounds exist justifying the reversal of the conviction previously rendered by the
MeTC, RTC and CA. However, in lieu of the penalty of 30 days of imprisonment, the Court finds
it more just to impose upon each of the petitioners a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
considering the reasons below. First. Malicious intent was seemingly wanting. Permission to
check the records was granted, albeit not effected. Second. Joselyn had predeceased Alfredo
and Tomas, her uncles, who are in their twilight years. Third. Joselyn's mother, Rosario, had
executed an Affidavit of Desistance stating that the filing of the complaint before was "merely
the result of [a] serious misunderstanding anent the management and operation of [CTCM],
which had long ceased to exist as a corporate entity even prior to the alleged commission of the
crime in question, rather than by reason of any criminal intent or actuation on the part of the
[petitioners]."