ADMIN7 | LDCS

BANTOLINO V. COCA COLA

GR NO 153660

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ordered
respondent to reinstate complainants to their former positions and to pay their full back wages. On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the finding of the NLRC, but agreed
with the respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants should not have been given
probative value for failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a
consequence, the CA dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. Hence, this petition.

HELD:

Supreme Court ruled that administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in suppletory
character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that an affidavit not testified
to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the
present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that
of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the
discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even
required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and
their affidavits.

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 ADMIN7 | LDCS

FIRST LEPANTO V. CA

237 SCRA 519

FACTS:

Petitioner's contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded Art. 82 of the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino
promulgated in the exercise of legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress
defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, while the circular is a
rule of procedure which this Court promulgated pursuant to its rule-making power under Art. VIII, Sec.
5(5). Petitioner questions the holding of the Second Division that although the right to appeal granted by
Art. 82 of the Code is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless,
questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of
procedure which this Court has the power to regulate

HELD:

There is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly appealed to this Court. As
already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of Sec. 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide
uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies,
with the exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987 the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the Constitution, had
not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final orders of the BOI directly to the
Supreme Court.

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 ADMIN7 | LDCS

PATEROK V. BOC

193 SCRA 132

FACTS:

In March 1986, petitioner shipped from Germany to the Philippines two containers, one with used
household goods and the other two used automobiles (one Bourgetti and one Mercedes Benz). The first
container and the Bourgetti car were released by the BOC, but not the Mercedes Benz, which remained
in custody of the Bureau. Petitioner then received a notice of hearing, informing him that seizure
proceedings were being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz. While this case was pending,
petitioner received a letter from the District Collector of Customs, informing her that a decision ordering
the forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been rendered. Petitioner did not know that the same
Mercedes Benz was subject to two different forfeiture proceedings. He only found out later that the
Notice of Hearing for the forfeiture proceedings before the District Collector was posted on the bulletin
board of the BOC, at Port Area, Manila.

HELD:

The petitioner invokes Sec. 2307 of the TCCP, as amended by Executive Order No. 38, dated August 6,
1986, which provides an alternative in lieu of the forfeiture of the property in question, that is, the
payment of fine or redemption of the forfeited property. But the last paragraph of the said section, as
amended, categorically states that redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case
where the importation is absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the person
offering to redeem the same would be contrary to law. Inasmuch as it would be contrary to law, i.e., B.P.
Blg. 73, to allow the petitioner to redeem the Mercedes Benz in question, there is therefore no
alternative, as correctly claimed by the public respondents, but to forfeit the same

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 ADMIN7 | LDCS

LUMIQUED V. EXEVEA

GR NO. 117565

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by herein petitioners praying for the reversal of the
Investigating Committee's report recommending the dismissal or removal from office of Former Regional
Director, DAR-CAR Arsenio Lumiqued (deceased), without prejudice to the filing of appropriate criminal
charges against him. Records reveal that three complaints were filed against Arsenio Lumiqued charging
him of malversation through falsification of official documents, violation of Commission on Audit rules
and regulations, and for oppression and harassment. After the investigation, the Committee rendered a
report finding him liable for all the charges. Thereafter, acting on the report and recommendation,
President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 52 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty and dismissing him from the service with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits.
Lumiqued filed a petition for appeal in the Office of the President, but said appeal was subsequently
denied. A second motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was likewise denied. It was during
the pendency of this motion that Arsenio Lumiqued died. On appeal before the Court, petitioners, as
heirs of the late Arsenio Lumiqued, fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued
of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintained that his right to counsel could not be waived
unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel.

HELD:

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,
the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel. In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as
Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of
Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987

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 ADMIN7 | LDCS

CASIMIRO V. TANDOG

GR 146137

FACTS:

Petitioner Haydee Casimiro began her service in the government as assessment clerk in the Office of the
Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon. In August 1983, she was appointed Municipal Assessor. Administrative
Officer II Nelson M. Andres, submitted a report 2 based on an investigation he conducted into alleged
irregularities in the office of petitioner Casimero. The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax
Declarations. Immediately thereafter, respondent issued Memorandum Order No. 13 placing petitioner
under preventive suspension. 3 days later respondent issued another MO directing petitioner to answer
the charge of irregularities under his office. Petitioner denied the alleged irregularities. Another MO was
issued extending the preventive suspension of the petitioner and another one directing the petitioner to
answer in writing the affidavit complaint. Petitioner answered and submitted a letter. Respondent not
satisfied conducted investigation and issued AO No. 1 finding petitioner guilty. The latter appeal to CSC
which affirmed the decision. Petitioner appealed hence this petition.

HELD:

In administrative proceedings, no less than substantial proof is required. Mere allegation is not
equivalent to proof. 24 Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard evidence to
prove it, as well as manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or
some other basis. Thus, in the case at bar, there must be convincing proof to show that the members of
the fact-finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of one party over the other. In addition to
palpable error that may be inferred from the decision itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish
bias. The petitioner miserably failed to substantiate her allegations. In effect, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty prevails.

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 ADMIN7 | LDCS

GLOBE TELECOM V. NTC

GR 143964

FACTS:

Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect the
interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Globe
pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed out
that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without prior NTC approval. The
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both Smart and Globe were “equally
blameworthy” and issued an Order penalizing both on the ground of providing SMS under Value Added
Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the NTC Order.

HELD:

Judicial review of actions of administrative agencies is essential, as a check on the unique powers vested
unto these instrumentalities. Review is available to reverse the findings of the specialized administrative
agency if the record before the Court clearly precludes the agency's decision from being justified by a
fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its
special competence, or both. Review may also be warranted to ensure that the NTC or similarly
empowered agencies act within the confines of their legal mandate and conform to the demands of due
process and equal protection

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