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Bioethics, The Science of Survival
Bioethics, The Science of Survival
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BIOETHICS, THE SCIENCE OF SURVIVAL*
127
science alone, and I therefore propose the term "bioethics" in order to
emphasize the two most important ingredients in achieving the new wis-
dom that is so desperately needed: biological knowledge and human
values.
In this age of specialization we seem to have lost contact with the daUy
reminders that must have driven home the truth to our ancestors: man
cannot live without harvesting plants or killing animals. If plants wither
and die and animals faU to reproduce, man will sicken and die and fail to
maintain his kind. As individuals we cannot afford to leave our destiny in
the hands of scientists, engineers, technologists, and politicians who have
forgotten or who never knew these simple truths. In our modern world we
have botanists who study plants and zoologists who study animals, but
most of them are specialists who do not deal with the ramifications of
their limited knowledge. We need biologists today who respect the fragüe
web of life and who can broaden their knowledge to include the nature of
man and his relation to the biological and physical worlds. We need
biologists who can teU us what we can and must do to survive, and what
we cannot and must not do ifwe hope to maintain and improve the quali-
ty oflife during the next three decades. The fate of the world rests on the
integration, preservation, and extension ofthe knowledge that is possessed
by a relatively smaU number ofmen, who are onlyjust beginning to realize
how inadequate is their strength, how enormous the task. Every coUege
student owes it to himselfand his chüdren to learn as much as possible of
what these men have to offer, to chaUenge them, to meld biological knowl-
edge with whatever additional ingredient they are able to master, and to
become, iftheir talents are adequate, the leaders of tomorrow. From such
a pooling of knowledge and values may come a new kind of scholar or
statesman who has mastered what I have referred to as "bioethics." No
individual could possibly master aU of the components of this branch of
knowledge, just as no one today knows aU of zoology or aU of chemistry,
but what is needed is a new discipline to provide models of life styles for
people who can communicate with each other and propose and explain
the new public policies that could provide a "bridge to the future." The
new disciplines wiU be forged in the heat of today's crisis problems, aU of
which require some kind ofa mix among basic biology, social sciences, and
the humanities.
Biology is more than botany and zoology. It is the foundation on which
129
and now we are beginning to hear that man may be endangered by some of
the very chemicals that were said to be his salvation [5]. From many
uninformed quarters we now hear demands for a moratorium on science,
when what we need is more and better science. We need to combine
biology with humanistic knowledge from diverse sources and forge a
science ofsurvival that wUl be able to set a system ofpriorities. We need to
start action in the areas where knowledge is already avaUable, and we need
to reorient our research effort to get the necessary knowledge if it is not
available.
The age-old questions about the nature of man and his relation to the
world become increasingly important as we approach the remaining three
decades in this century, when political decisions made in ignorance of bio-
logical knowledge, or in defiance of it, may jeopardize man's future and
indeed the future of earth's biological resources for human needs. As
individuals we speak ofthe "instinct for survival," but the sum total ofall
our individual instincts for survival is not enough to guarantee the survival
of the human race in a form that any of us would wiUingly accept. An
instinct for survival is not enough. We must develop the science ofsurvival,
and it must start with a new kind of ethics—bioethics. The new ethics
might be caUed interdisciplinary ethics, defining "interdisciplinary" in a
special way to include both the sciences and the humanities, but this term
is rejected because the meaning is not self-evident.
As a discipline, traditional biology has reached the stage where it can be
taught in terms of principles, recognizing that it is impossible for any
individual to become familiar with all the avaUable examples that iUustrate
the principles. Bioethics can serve no useful ends if it is to be merely a
watered-down version ofcontemporary biology. Therefore, I will present
in this chapter twelve fundamental biological concepts that seem important
to me as a mechanistic biologist, because of my conviction that bioethics
must be based on modern concepts of biology and not on unsupported
introspection.
Before presenting the mechanistic concepts, it may be desirable to first
mention the nature of the scientific revolution and some of the major
historical polarizing views of mechanism versus vitalism and reductionism
versus holism which in my opinion have delayed the development of a
broad and unified biologically oriented value system. Reductionism and
mechanism are the aspects ofbiology that push the dissection ofthe living
131
theless, these advances had to overcome the previous and persisting ideas
that had been arrived at by men whose ideas came from within and were
reinforced by a euphoria that was personaUy convincing. Many of the
deep-rooted ideas remaining in the world today—not only in science but
in aU fields—were originated by individual men who were convinced
that they knew truth from within (or by a proclaimed revelation from an
outside source) and who by strength of personality were able to gain
momentum enough to sUence their possible critics. Obviously some ideas
have been helpful, whUe others (for example, those of Hitler) have been
the source of much trouble in the world.
The chief feature which distinguishes the scientific approach to a prob-
lem from the nonscientific approach (whatever that is caUed) is the reali-
zation that an idea is not necessarily validjust because it seems right to its
possessor and makes him feel good. When a scientist gets an idea, he, too,
has a pleasant reaction, but he starts looking for a way to test the idea,
charging with it into his peer group, suggesting an experiment, referring
to previous work (caUed "the literature"), and occasionally crossing the
disciplinary boundaries. In suggesting a new discipline caUed bioethics and
specifying that we look outside the traditional sciences, I am not suggesting
that we abandon the traditional treatment for a new idea, but rather that
we cross the disciplinary boundaries more freely and look for ideas that are
susceptible to objective verification in terms ofthe future survival of man
and improvement in the quality of life for future generations [6]. In
general, we can only learn by hindsight, but even this is impossible if we
do not keep adequate records and ifwe rely only on our individual impres-
sions. In the humanities the only test ofan idea is its acceptance by society,
and if society chooses on the basis ofconventional but iU-founded wisdom
or individual short-term gratifications, it may perpetuate an idea that might
better have been buried. We need to reexamine our premises and look for
better ways to reach a consensus among disciplines, based insofar as possible
on objective verification and adequate monitoring of the trends in envi-
ronmental quality.
One of the most important aspects of the scientific revolution is the
recognition that ideas can no longer be based on introspection or logic
alone; furthermore, as a general proposition, they cannot be based on a
single proof, though they can be rejected on the basis of a single experi-
133
known is caUed the Central Dogma, which has been remarkably produc-
tive. It simply states that biological information passes from nucleic acids
to protein. In more detaü, it holds that the linear sequence ofDNA infor-
mation bits (base pairs) specifies not only the template for its own repli-
cation but also the template for the linear sequence of RNA information
bits, which in turn specifies the linear sequence ofprotein buUding blocks,
which in turn determines the three-dimensional folding. No exceptions
have been established up to now, and there is nothing in the Dogma that
denies the possibility that the information in one DNA subsection may be
modulated by products from some other subsection of DNA. Nor is it
implied that DNA molecules replicate themselves or transcribe themselves
to RNA as some critics have charged. The replications and transcriptions
are brought about by proteins whose structure is specified by a specific sub-
section ofthe DNA complement. It is not assumed that these details can be
understood without considerable chemical background and preparation.
But these details of the Central Dogma do not exhaust the possibUities
for its continued articulation by molecular biologists. The Central Dogma
has been paraUeled by another paradigm that has been described by Piatt as
epitomizing the approach of the molecular biologists. This is the method
of strong inference and multiple alternative hypotheses [7] . According
to this approach even the Central Dogma cannot be proved; it can only
survive by faUing to be disproved, and, like the whole ofscience in this era,
conclusions must be considered as tentative and subject to disproof.What
is meant is that a theory can only encompass the available facts, and the
possible dimensions of future experiments cannot be foreseen. A theory is
not necessarily disproved but frequently may be enlarged or modified to
accommodate new knowledge. The acceptance ofthis new paradigm ofthe
uncertainty ofhuman knowledge has led to a new breed ofscientists who
enjoy science as a game of wits in which parry and thrust are the order of
the day. Students are conditioned to chaUenge their mentors and to be able
to relinquish their fondest beliefs. WhUe it is conceivable that a whole
generation could be misled into accepting the Central Dogma as a universal
truth rather than as an expedient operating premise, there are enough
rewards for dissent to insure that minority views wiU be heard.
Ofall the dissenting views elicited by molecular biology, one ofthe most
frequent is the complaint that the new biologists are reductionists who
believe that ceUs can be explained solely in terms ofmolecules, that animals
135
government agencies, who can scarcely avoid a charge ofunderreaction or
overreaction in many instances that are judged with the benefit of hind-
sight. There can be no doubt that neither our medical experts nor the
administrative officers with whom they must cooperate can possibly have
as much information and insight as they need for decisions on any given
occasion, or as much public understanding of their predicament as they
deserve.
It is clear that in the face of our actual needs the arguments of reduc-
tionism versus holism become absurd. The intact organism is more than
a simple sum ofits parts, but the organism arises by virtue ofthe communi-
cation between ceUs. This communication is in terms of molecules and is
best understood by the reductionists, but at the same time it forms the
feedback network and structural integration that makes holistic mecha-
nisms a reality. Thus each hierarchical level is formed by the feedback con-
nections that link its subunits into a higher organization. We must com-
bine biological reductionism and holism and then proceed to an ecological
and ethical holism if man is to survive and prosper. But this integration
may be impeded by a tendency to equate reductionism with the mechanis-
tic view of life and holism with the vitalistic view of life, which will now
be discussed.
137
ma of science and technology—to tamper or not to tamper—I have con-
cluded that we have to proceed on the basis of the mechanistic premise,
but we must place greater emphasis on human values and ethics. We have
to proceed as ifwe believed that the solution to man's major problems in-
cludes nothing that is not "available to the minds of men," with just the
added ingredient ofhumUity ("fear ofthe Lord") that admits the possibil-
ity that natural forces may elude our attempts to build the kind of utopia
we can imagine. Whether a beliefin a deity is required is less important to
me than the question of whether we proceed with humUity or with
arrogance, whether we respect the forces of nature or whether we assume
that science can do anything, whether we look at our ethical heritage or
whether we ignore it.
It seems to me we have no choice other than to try to deal with dan-
gerous knowledge by seeking more knowledge. We have already decided
to tamper with the system; now we can do no less than to proceed with
humUity, respect the forces ofNature, and, in terms ofour ethical heritage,
"prove all things; hold fast that which is good." The situation is urgent.
In the opinion of many, some aspects of our ecological problem may al-
ready have reached a point of "no return" as far as man's purposes are
concerned. We need to discover rather quickly the weakest links in our
environmental complex and begin to correct our past mistakes.
Man as an Error-prone Cybernetic Machine
The concept of life as a cybernetic machine has been admirably dis-
cussed by Reiner in the publication [13] referred to earlier, and ifthis is a
correct image, the humanistic biologist will have to adjust to it. I have only
to add one more ingredient that was not stressed by Reiner, namely, the
quality of disorder. I would agree with Reiner that man can be described
as an adaptive control system, but I would insist that it is not enough to
assume that the quality of disorder is implicit in that definition. I would
insist that it be explicit. Thus I would postulate that man is an adaptive con-
trol system with elements of disorder built into every hierarchical level. Reiner
has emphasized the description of machines or control devices in terms of
the "mode of operation" and the "mode of control," each of which may
be fixed or variable. By this approach we come up with the foUowing
categories and my own modification shown in the table on page 139.
The modification that I have proposed can be iUustrated by Reiner's
139
trophs) were simple cells, but with the discovery that these ceUs contained
all the compounds most characteristic of higher forms of life, it was re-
alized that aU ceUs have a long list of substances that are required for their
ongoing life processes, caUed essential metabolites. Some cells make these
substances themselves and do not need them as nutrients. Other cells are
unable to make some of the compounds, and for such ceUs we can draw
up a list of essential nutrients. For man the list of essential nutrients is fairly
long and includes a number ofvitamins, amino acids, minerals, and addi-
tional substances (see [17] and 176 references therein).
2.CATALYSIS OR, MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE CHEMISTRY OF ENZYME ACTION
141
But obviously a rather simple machine could be devised to do the job of
sensing energy status and acting appropriately, and the point is that any
cell that could not perform in this way never survived to be observed by
us, and so all successful living organisms behave purposefully in terms of
their own or their species' survival.
6. INFORMATION STORAGE
Paradigm.—A cell or a hierarchy ofcells that has the ability to cope with
its environment must pass this information on to its progeny if life is to
persist, and it does so by replicating the necessary information in ultra-
143
different molecules, evolution probably never would have occurred. But
with a tendency toward a nearly but not quite perfect replication abUity,
novelty (mutation: copy errors) was guaranteed whüe gains were con-
servatively maintained. SimUarly, cultural evolution would have been
very slow were it not for the tendency of men to introduce novelty by
sheer inability to learn exactly what they are taught. This is not to say that
the trick of creativity cannot be accomplished deliberately once we get
the significance of it. Man undoubtedly has a higher capacity for storing
abstract information than any other form oflife, but this fact is inevitably
accompanied by man's greater tendency to introduce error or deliberate
variance into his memory bank than any other form oflife, and hence his
greater opportunity to introduce novelty into his life. This set ofopinions
is highly relevant to the ancient problem of determinism versus free wiU.
Because man can make mistakes or deliberately introduce novelty into his
life and in either case learn by hindsight, his behavior can never be auto-
mated; he is less determined by fate and has more opportunity to depart
from the established norm. To this extent he has more opportunity for the
exercise of individual free wiU than other life forms.
9. FEEDBACK MECHANISMS
11.ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
145
Compounds in living tissue, they are not completely specific; that is, they
cannot discriminate between substances nature patterned them to act upon
and substances that are very simUar but toxic for them. It is one of the
tenets of modern chemotherapy that if an enzyme exists and its specific
substrate is known, organic chemists can build a molecule that will
inhibit the enzyme, albeit not on the first try, as a rule. Various forms of
life also produce substances that are toxic to other forms of life, and it is
widely accepted that by suitable tests plant extracts and fermentation
liquors can be assayed for their abüity to kUl infectious bacteria or to kill
cancer ceUs. Thus the sulfa drugs were made by organic chemists, while
peniciUin was isolated from mold cultures. More recently powerful agents
have been synthesized for the purpose of acting as nerve gases, or insecti-
cides, or pesticides, or herbicides (weed kiUers or crop kUlers). Just as
cancer-kiUing drugs are not without action on normal cells, the insecticides
and the plant kUlers are not totaUy innocuous to other forms oflife, and the
complete range oftheir biological activity can obviously never be checked
out on every species in advance. Yet they have been deliberately dis-
seminated in the natural environment on the basis of tests on what were
felt to be representative species. EspeciaUy in cases where agents are toxic
in very small quantities, it is axiomatic that they act by combining with a
special type of enzyme or with hereditary material. In addition to the
environmental hazards that act more or less specifically, there are ofcourse
many that act nonspecificaUy. Among these are the radiations including
X-rays, radioactive fallout, cosmic radiation, and even sunlight; all have
the capacity to produce mutations in the hereditary substance and to dam-
age cells in other ways.
12. PHYSIOLOGICAL ADAPTATION
147
more emphasis than adaptation, although an individual's heredity is pres-
ently fixed by acts beyond his control in contrast with his adaptive level.
Heredity sets limits on our powers of adaptation and the special kinds of
adaptation that we are best suited for, but few people ever develop their
adaptive powers to the fuUest, and we stiU have much to learn about the
benefits and costs of adaptation. What we do know is that adaptation can
best be understood by combining the inputs from both the reductionist
and holistic points of view.
The adaptation that I have been referring to is adaptation by individuals,
which is properly caUed physiological adaptation. It involves a variety of
hormones and a realignment of many ceUular processes in aU parts of the
body. Physiological adaptation occurs in every one of us every day. The
shifts in body chemistry may be minimal or they may approach the limits
ofour capacity in response to the stressors that we encounter. Each ofus is
forced to make some adaptations every time we get out of bed in the
morning, and as we proceed through the day we may encounter heat or
cold outside the limits that we prefer. We may need to run to catch a bus,
we may climb a flight of stairs, breathe some automobile exhaust, take a
tranquilizer, smoke a cigarette, drink a cocktail, eat an unusuaUy large
meal or one that is high in protein, carbohydrate or fat, go hungry, travel
to a higher altitude, face darkness or bright lights, shiver in sUence or
cringe at loud noises, and so on. Most of the stressors are not continuous.
They wax and wane, they occur in cycles, they are repetitive in some kind
ofa daüy, weekly, or seasonal rhythm, and we are able to cope with them
because they do not occur all at once or continuously. We do not know
the optimum level and optimum cycle frequency for the various stressors
that we are exposed to, and we know too little about the physiological
cost ofmaking an adaptation to any given stressor. Nor do we know enough
about the cost ofhaving no adaptational demands. But it is clear that this is the
part of biology that each of us needs to know more about because it is
something that affects us personaUy. Adaptation is something we can do
something about, given a little more knowledge in our school system and
acceptance of the task of acquiring more knowledge as a lifetime process.
Moreover, knowledge about adaptation is something that wUl affect the
way we choose to bring our offspring through chUdhood and adolescence.
How much should we shield and how much should we expose our chil-
dren?
ilo
ceptive measures or by facüitating the ease with which women can secure
medicaUy safe and competent abortions. Cultural adaptation seems to
impinge on evolutionary adaptation and physiological adaptation in
virtually every instance that can be imagined.
Biology, Philosophy, and Cultural Adaptation
The idea that disorder is built into biological and cultural systems at aU
levels came to my attention most forcibly from two different sources
at about the time that I was beginning to ask myself, Why cancer? One
source was A. F. C. Wallace,2 whom I have quoted elsewhere. Almost
simultaneously (1961) a book entitled Darwin and the Modern World View
by John C. Greene [24] appeared. Greene quotes many conflicting views
on chance versus design in the purposefulness of nature. I was especial-
ly impressed with his citation of a passage by Nogar, whose later work
[15] has already been cited above. Nogar observed [26, p. 66] that phi-
losophers tend to fail to understand that "when the Darwinist asserts
openly that chance is the sufficient reason for the organization of the
world, and denies outright the existence of intrinsic finality among or-
ganisms" or asserts "that organic agents simply do not act for any purpose
or end, he is calmly saying what is intrinsic to his biological theory of the
evolution of species. This is not an unwarranted extrapolation, an in-
ferential extension of Darwinian theory; it is inherent in the very theory
itself and has been all along."
In a curriculum designed around bioethics, the ideas of Wallace and of
Greene ought to be included among readings in philosophical biology,
and the role of disorder in biological and cultural evolution should be
fully explored. Disorder is a force to be utilized, the raw material for
creativity. The problem is to harness it and keep it within the bounds of
reason, that is, to be rational about irrationality. A thorough study of
biological disorder would reveal that it is normal, not pathological, al-
though it can appear in the form of pathology when extreme. The study
of the nature and role of disorder in biology and in cultural evolution
would do much to help interpret the supposed conflict between "hu-
manism" and "science" as iUustrated by the coUection of eighteen essays
entitled The Scientist vs. the Humanist [27]. The editors comment that
"among the classic debates ofhistory, none has more relevance to our age
2 Bioethics, the Science ofSurvival.
I5I
be a more widespread knowledge ofthe nature and limitations ofall kinds
of adaptation.
Bioethics, as I envision it, would attempt to generate wisdom, the
knowledge of how to use knowledge for social good, from a realistic
knowledge ofman's biological nature and ofthe biological world. To me,
a realistic knowledge of man is a knowledge that includes his role as an
adaptive control system with buüt-in error tendencies. This mechanistic
view, which combines reductionist and holistic elements, would be totally
incapable of generating wisdom unless supplemented with both a hu-
manistic and an ecological outlook [28-30].4 The concepts and viewpoints
expressed may be examined in relation to the books by Teilhard de Char-
din, especially The Phenomenon ofMan [31] and The Future ofMan [32],
which were written nearly thirty years ago. Although the approaches
differ, the aim is the same: to combine the science of biology with a
preservation ofhuman values and to strive to make man's future come up
to what it could conceivably be. The present world is dominated by
military policy and by an overemphasis on production ofmaterial goods.
Neither of these enterprises has given any thought to the basic facts of
biology. An urgent task for bioethics is to seek biological agreements at
the international level.
Summary
Man's natural environment is not limitless. Education should be de-
signed to help people understand the nature ofman and his relation to the
world. The subject matter should include both the reductionist view and
the holistic view of biology and should be broader than both together.
Man is considered as an error-prone cybernetic machine, and twelve
categories of relevant knowledge and their corresponding paradigms are
presented. Man's survival may depend on ethics based on biological
knowledge, hence bioethics.
REFERENCES
i. N.J. Berrxll. Man's emerging mind: man's progress through time—trees, ice, flood,
atoms and the universe. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955.
2.Rachel Caeson. Silent spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962.
3.William and Paul Paddock. Famine—1975! Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.
4 Reference [30] is a collection of twenty-one papers and comments which bear on the problems
of reductionism vs. holism, molecular biology vs. organismic biology, definition of life, and many
others, in greater philosophical depth than has been possible in this chapter.
153