MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS vs. DR. PAULO C. CAMPOS G.R. No. 232675

THIRD DIVISION
MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS, Petitioner vs. DR. PAULO C. CAMPOS, SUBSTITUTED

BY HIS CHILDREN JOSE PAULO CAMPOS, PAULO CAMPOS, JR., AND ENRIQUE
CAMPOS, Respondents July 17, 2019 G.R. No. 232675; NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Petitioner vs. DR. PAULO C. CAMPOS, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS CHILDREN JOSE PAULO
CAMPOS, PAULO CAMPOS, JR., AND ENRIQUE CAMPOS, Respondents G.R. No. 233078
REYES, A. JR., J.
NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which challenge the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC).
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of Dasmariñas is a local government unit, while co-petitioner NHA is a
government instrumentality. Respondent, the late Dr. Campos, substituted by his children-heirs was the
former registered owner of the property subject of the case.
Dr. Campos, an owner of a parcel of land, executed a Deed of Donation (First Deed of Donation) in favor
of the NHA On July 1976. Under the Deed, the donee NHA was to construct a 36-meter-wide access road
from Highway 17 to the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project. It was also stipulated that should the Donee
fail to use the area or part of it for the 36 meter access, Donee is in a position to use the said parcel of
properties.
The NHA constructed a 20-m-wide access road, in lieu of the stipulated 36-m-wide access road. It
reasoned that the volume of the traffic at that time did not justify the outright construction of the 36-m-
wide access road, and that it had reserved the remaining 16 m for road widening purposes. On June1993,
without any notice to Dr. Campos, the NHA donated the subject property to the Municipality of
Dasmariñas (Second Deed of Donation). This was done allegedly pursuant to PD No. 957.
.
On November 2001, Dr. Campos filed an action for Revocation of Donation against the NHA with the
RTC due to the failure of the NHA to fully comply with the Deed despite the long lapse of time, and due
to the foregoing transaction between the petitioners, on November 2001.
The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation and Acceptance dated 1993 is declared without legal effect to
the extent of the area of the property not included in the 20-meter wide access road; that Dr. Camposis
declared the rightful owner of the area of the property not included in the 20-meter wide access road and;
reconveyance of the said area is hereby ordered.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA held that since the donation was onerous, any
action for the revocation of the same should be brought within 10 years from accrual of the right of
action. It held that this was timely effected by Dr. Campos. The CA found that the NHA violated the
terms of the Deed and failed to fulfill its obligation to build a 36-m-wide access road. Also, NHA's
omission was not merely a casual breach as advocated by the petitioners, but a substantial one. Not to
mention that the second donation to the Municipality was unjustified. P.D. No. 957 refers to the transfer
of a condominium or a subdivision project, it does not apply to the Dasmariñas which is not classified as
either a condominium or a subdivision project.
Petitioners now file the instant consolidated Petitions.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Respondent’s cause of action has already Prescribed? – (NO)
(2) Whether or not there is substantial breach of the Deed of Donation as to result to the revocation same:
despite there being a construction of an access road yet only 20-M wide as opposed to the 36-M agreed
upon; and that the construction of the remaining 16-M was still reserved to be completed? – (YES)
RULING:
(1) The first donation between Dr. Campos and the NHA was a donation of an onerous nature, as it
contained the stipulation to build the 36-m-wide access road. Jurisprudence, including the C-J Yulo &
Sons, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc. case cited by the petitioners themselves, is
clear that donations of an onerous type are governed by the law on contracts, and not by the law on
donations. Being as such, under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, all actions upon a written
contract shall be brought within 10 years from accrual of the right of action, and herein, the
respondents-heirs' right of action only accrued when the NHA donated the subject property to the
Municipality of Dasmariñas, as this transfer effectively removed not only NHA's ability to complete
the access road based on the stipulation, but also precluded any move on the part of the NHA to
compel the transferee to finish the same.
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand, each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court and its application is controlled by equitable considerations.
Jurisprudence, however, has set established requisites for laches, viz.:

(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;
(2) Delay in asserting the complainant's right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice
of defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his claim; and
(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief accorded to the complainant, or the suit
is not held barred.
In this case, it cannot be said that Dr. Campos slept on his rights and is guilty of laches, as the
second requisite of delay is factually and legally absent. Dr. Campos had shown patience in allowing
the NHA the time to finish its obligation despite the long period that was starting to elapse, and filed the
case only when it was clear that the NHA could no longer fulfill its obligation.
In addition, the fact that the case was filed within the prescriptive period of 10 years aptly removes the
case from the clutches of possible laches.
(2) The general rule is that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the
contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of
the parties in making the agreement. Substantial breaches, unlike slight or casual breaches of contract,
are fundamental breaches that defeat the object of the parties in entering into an agreement, and the
question of whether the breach is slight or substantial is largely determined by the attendant
circumstances.
The object of the agreement is clearly the construction of a 36-m-wide access road from Highway 17 to
the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project, which was reiterated no less than three times in the Deed of
Donation. There was no allowance for any deviation from that number, as stipulated or in the nature of
the undertaking. The failure to construct the access road with the expressly mentioned specifications is
unmistakably a breach of the same. A substantial breach of contract was committed by the NHA when it
only built a 20-m-wide access road, and not a mere casual breach which the petitioners allege would
render nugatory the revocation of the donation.
The Court does not agree with the contention of the petitioners that the condition pertaining to the
construction of the access road was complied with because the unpaved 16-m portion was still
reserved to be completed. The stipulation in the Deed of Donation is clear that the entire 36-m
property must be used for actual construction of the access road, and non-usage of even a portion
would constitute contravention of the Deed of Donation, especially in this case when a substantial
portion of the property ultimately remained unused for the stated purpose and object of the donation. Law
and jurisprudence consistently hold that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
NHA's contention that outside factors, such as the volume of traffic at that time, were to blame for any
apparent breach do not offer a semblance of validity. Even assuming that this was true, almost two
decades had lapsed from the time the property was donated. The contemporaneous and subsequent
actions of the NHA and the Municipality of Dasmariñas exacerbate the breach committed, and take
it firmly out of the realm of slightness. The act of transferring the subject property to the Municipality
of Dasmariñas, in effect, decimated any opportunity for the NHA to comply with the condition stated in
the Deed of Donation and, as such, the NHA will never be in a position to utilize the property. The Court
takes particular notice of the fact that nothing in the subsequent transfer agreement between the
petitioners reiterates the condition that the access road be completed according to the specifications laid
out in the original Deed of Donation, which means that there is no legal obligation on the part of the
Municipality of Dasmariñas to complete the road, nor a way for the NHA to compel the same. As the
condition can no longer be completed, the trial court's act of revoking the donation was proper.

MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS vs. DR. PAULO C. CAMPOS G.R. No. 232675

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MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS vs. DR. PAULO C. CAMPOS G.R. No. 232675

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THIRD DIVISION

MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS, Petitioner vs. DR. PAULO C. CAMPOS, SUBSTITUTED

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Petitioners now file the instant consolidated Petitions.

Jurisprudence, however, has set established requisites for laches, viz.:

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