Global Economic Prospects: JUNE 2020
Global Economic Prospects: JUNE 2020
Flagship Report
JUNE 2020
Global
Economic
Prospects
JUNE 2020
Global
Economic
Prospects
© 2020 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
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DOI: 10.1596/978-1-4648-1553-9
Box 1.1 How deep will the COVID-19 recession be? ...............................................13
Box 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries (LICs)...............24
Box 1.4 How does informality aggravate the impact of COVID-19? ..........................36
Box 3.1 How do deep recessions affect potential output in EMDEs?........................ 146
Chapter 4 Adding Fuel to the Fire: Cheap Oil During the Pandemic .....................................181
Box 4.1 Reforms after the 2014-16 oil price plunge ............................................... 193
iii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................xi
Foreword....................................................................................................................................... xiii
Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... xv
Abbreviations................................................................................................................................ xvii
v
Chapter 2 Regional Outlooks ............................................................................................. 67
East Asia and Pacific .......................................................................................... 69
Recent developments........................................................................................ 69
Outlook.......................................................................................................... 70
Risks .............................................................................................................. 73
Europe and Central Asia ..................................................................................... 75
Recent developments ...................................................................................... 75
Outlook ........................................................................................................ 76
Risks............................................................................................................. 78
vi
Chapter 3 Lasting Scars of the COVID-19 Pandemic .........................................................131
Introduction .................................................................................................... 133
Spread of the pandemic ..................................................................................... 134
The economics of the pandemic: Shocks and spillovers ......................................... 136
Initial impact: Economic activity, financial and commodity markets....................... 137
Global activity and trade ............................................................................ 137
Global financial conditions ......................................................................... 138
Commodity markets .................................................................................. 138
Short-term growth impact ................................................................................. 139
Spillovers.................................................................................................. 140
Vulnerabilities: Magnifying the short-term impact ........................................ 141
Long-term growth effects ................................................................................... 144
Implications for potential output ................................................................ 145
Implications for productivity ...................................................................... 150
Unique nature of the pandemic: Magnifying the long-term impact ................. 150
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 158
Box 3.1 How do deep recessions affect potential output in EMDEs? ................... 146
Box 3.2 How do disasters affect productivity?................................................... 151
Annex 3.1 The macroeconomic effects of pandemics and epidemics:
A literature review............................................................................................. 160
Annex 3.2 Bayesian vector autoregression model .................................................. 170
Annex 3.3 EMDE vulnerability index ................................................................. 170
Annex 3.4 Long-term implications of recessions: Data and methodology................. 171
References........................................................................................................ 172
Chapter 4 Adding Fuel to the Fire: Cheap Oil during the Pandemic .................................... 181
Introduction.....................................................................................................183
Drivers of the oil price plunge ............................................................................185
Comparison with previous periods of disruptions .................................................187
Implications of oil price plunges for the global economy........................................188
Past oil price plunges..................................................................................188
The 2014-16 oil price plunge......................................................................190
The 2020 oil price plunge...........................................................................192
Box 4.1. Reforms after the 2014-16 oil price plunge .............................................193
Conclusions .....................................................................................................198
Annex 4.1. Methodology: Decomposition of oil price movements ..........................199
Annex 4.2. Oil price plunges since 1970 ..............................................................199
Annex 4.3. Methodology: Impact of oil price plunges on output ............................200
References ........................................................................................................201
vii
Statistical Appendix ....................................................................................................................... 205
Data and Forecast Conventions....................................................................................................... 211
Selected Topics .............................................................................................................................. 212
viii
Figures 2.1.3 EAP: Outlook and risks...................................................................... 72
2.2.1 ECA: Recent developments................................................................. 76
2.2.2 ECA: Outlook and risks ..................................................................... 77
2.3.1 LAC: Recent developments................................................................. 82
2.3.2 LAC: Outlook and risks ..................................................................... 83
2.4.1 MENA: Recent developments ............................................................. 88
2.4.2 MENA: Outlook and risks.................................................................. 89
2.5.1 SAR: Recent developments ................................................................. 94
2.5.2 SAR: Outlook and risks...................................................................... 95
2.6.1 SSA: Recent developments.................................................................100
2.6.2 SSA: Outlook and risks .....................................................................101
SF.1 COVID-19 outbreaks .......................................................................113
SF.2 Regional vulnerabilities and economic impacts.....................................115
SF.1.1 The impact of COVID-19 on GVCs ..................................................118
SF.1.2 Simulation results .............................................................................120
SF.3 Policy measures ................................................................................122
SF.4 Prospects for growth, per capita incomes and poverty ...........................127
3.1 The COVID-19 pandemic and mitigation measures.............................135
3.2 Health vulnerabilities in EMDEs .......................................................136
3.3 Indicators of economic activity and international trade .........................137
3.4 Financial and commodity market conditions .......................................139
3.5 EMDE growth response to growth slowdown in major economies .........140
3.6 EMDE vulnerabilities .......................................................................142
3.7 Fiscal and external positions of EMDEs .............................................143
3.8 Informality, poverty, and food insecurity.............................................144
3.1.1 EMDE vulnerabilities to financial stress and oil price plunges ...............146
3.1.2 Growth: Recessions, crises, and oil price plunges ..................................147
3.1.3 Potential output in EMDEs: Recessions, crises, and oil price
plunges ...........................................................................................148
3.9 EMDE potential output and recessions ...............................................150
3.2.1 Severity, frequency, and duration of pandemics, epidemics, and climate
disasters ...........................................................................................152
3.2.2 Disasters and productivity .................................................................154
3.2.3 Impact of disasters ............................................................................155
3.2.4 Impact of wars and financial crises on productivity ...............................156
3.10 Productivity and epidemics ................................................................158
3.11 Factors aggravating long-term costs.....................................................158
3.12 Fiscal and monetary policy responses ..................................................159
ix
Figures A.3.1.1 Economic impact of pandemics..........................................................161
4.1 Oil price decline ...............................................................................184
4.2 Drivers of the 2020 oil price plunge....................................................186
4.3 Oil markets during past recessions and travel disruptions ......................187
4.4 Oil market developments during past oil price plunges .........................189
4.5 Macroeconomic developments in EMDEs during past oil price plunges.. 190
4.6 Impact of 2014-16 oil price plunge on energy exporters ........................191
4.7 Impact of 2014-16 oil price plunge on the largest energy importers ........192
4.1.1 Reforms since 2014 ..........................................................................195
4.8 Pandemic and mitigation measures in EMDE energy exporters ..............197
4.9 EMDE energy exporters’ vulnerabilities: 2014-16 and 2019 ..................198
x
Acknowledgments
This World Bank Group Flagship Report is a product of the Prospects Group in the Equitable Growth,
Finance and Institutions (EFI) Vice Presidency. The project was managed by M. Ayhan Kose and Franziska
Ohnsorge, under the general guidance of Ceyla Pazarbasioglu.
Global and regional surveillance work was dissemination. Graeme Littler provided editorial
coordinated by Carlos Arteta. The report was support, with contributions from Adriana
prepared by John Baffes, Alistair Dieppe, Justin- Maximiliano.
Damien Guénette, Alain Kabundi, Sergiy
Kasyanenko, Sinem Kilic Celik, Gene Kindberg- Regional projections and write-ups were
Hanlon, Patrick Kirby, Maryla Maliszewska, produced in coordination with country teams,
Hideaki Matsuoka, Peter Nagle, Yoki Okawa, country directors, and the offices of the regional
Cedric Okou, Franz Ulrich Ruch, Rudi chief economists.
Steinbach, Naotaka Sugawara, Ekaterine
Vashakmadze, Dana Vorisek, Collette Mari The print publication was produced by Maria
Wheeler, Lei Sandy Ye, and Shu Yu. Hazel Macadangdang and Adriana Maximiliano,
in collaboration with Luiz H. Almeida, Andrew
Research assistance was provided by Yushu Charles Berghauser, Cindy A. Fisher, Michael
Chen, Zhuo Chen, Hrisyana Doytchinova, Fuda Harrup, and Jewel McFadden.
Jiang, Yi Li, Maria Hazel Macadangdang, Julia
Renee Roseman Norfleet, Ipek Ceylan Oymak, Many reviewers provided extensive advice and
Vasiliki Papagianni, Maria Filipa Seara E. comments. The analysis also benefited from
Pereira, Shijie Shi, Kaltrina Temaj, Xinyue comments and suggestions by staff members
Wang, Jinxin Wu, Heqing Zhao, and Juncheng from World Bank Group country teams and
Zhou. Modeling and data work were provided other World Bank Group Vice Presidencies as
by Rajesh Kumar Danda, Julia Renee Roseman well as Executive Directors in their discussion of
Norfleet, and Shijie Shi. the report on May 26, 2020. However, both
forecasts and analysis are those of the World
Online products were produced by Graeme Bank Group staff and should not be attributed
Littler. Indira Chand, Mark Felsenthal, and to Executive Directors or their national
Alejandra Viveros managed media relations and authorities.
xi
Foreword
The COVID-19 pandemic and the economic The World Bank Group is committed to helping
shutdown in advanced economies and other parts alleviate financing breakdowns from the COVID-
of the globe have disrupted billions of lives and 19 crisis in ways that work toward a more
are jeopardizing decades of development progress. resilient recovery. Some examples include
expanding and increasing the coverage of safety
This edition of the Global Economic Prospects net programs, providing trade finance, and
assesses the impacts of the pandemic and analyzes supporting the working capital needs of small and
possible courses and outcomes. It presents clear medium-sized enterprises. In the broad COVID-
actions needed by the global community and 19 response for the poorest nations, World Bank
national policymakers—to limit the harm, Group resources are being scaled up dramatically
recover, and rebuild better and stronger than and debt service payments by official bilateral
before. creditors were suspended on May 1, with
comparable treatment expected by commercial
The report describes a global economy suffering a creditors.
devastating blow. Our baseline forecast envisions
the deepest global recession since World War II. Yet these steps toward financing and liquidity will
The report also includes an exhaustive analysis of not be enough. Even before the pandemic,
the outlook for emerging market and developing development for people in the world’s poorest
economies, many of which are now fighting on countries was slow to raise their incomes, enhance
two fronts—containing the domestic outbreak living standards, or narrow inequality. The
and its consequences while coping with the pandemic and economic shutdown in advanced
economic spillovers from the deep recessions in economies and elsewhere are hitting the poor and
advanced economies. vulnerable the hardest – through illnesses, job
and income losses, food supply disruptions,
Looking a layer deeper, the report investigates the school closures and lower remittance flows.
depth and breadth of the economic and
humanitarian storm. The COVID-19 recession is Thus, policy makers face unprecedented
the first since 1870 to be triggered solely by a challenges from the health, macroeconomic and
pandemic. The speed and depth with which it has social effects of the pandemic. To limit the harm,
struck suggests the possibility of a sluggish it is important to secure core public services,
recovery that may require policymakers to maintain a private sector and get money directly
consider additional interventions. For many to people. This will allow a quicker return to
emerging market and developing countries, business creation and sustainable development
however, effective financial support and after the pandemic has passed. During this
mitigation measures are particularly hard to mitigation period, countries should focus on
achieve because a substantial share of targeted support to households and essential
employment is in informal sectors. public and private sector services; and remain
vigilant to counter potential financial disruptions.
Beyond the staggering economic impacts, the
pandemic will also have severe and long-lasting During the recovery period, countries will need
socio-economic impacts that may well weaken to calibrate the withdrawal of public support and
long-term growth prospects—the plunge in should be attentive to broader development
investment because of elevated uncertainty, the challenges. The Global Economic Prospects report
erosion of human capital from the legions of discusses the importance of allowing an orderly
unemployed, and the potential for ruptures of allocation of new capital toward sectors that are
trade and supply linkages. productive in the new post-pandemic structures
xiii
that emerge. To succeed in this, countries will ments is a key step in creating an attractive
need reforms that allow capital and labor to adjust investment climate and could make substantial
relatively fast—by speeding the resolution of progress this year. Faster advances in digital
disputes, reducing regulatory barriers, and connectivity are also necessary and should get a
reforming the costly subsidies, monopolies and vital boost from the pandemic, which heightened
protected state-owned enterprises that have the value of teleworking capabilities, digital
slowed development. information, and broad connectivity. Digital
financial services are playing a transformative role
To make future economies more resilient, many in allowing new entrants into the economy and
countries will need systems that can build and making it easier for governments to provide
retain more human and physical capital during rapidly expandable, needs-based cash transfers.
the recovery—using policies that reflect and
encourage the post-pandemic need for new types This edition of the Global Economic Prospects
of jobs, businesses and governance systems. describes a grave near-term outlook. The speed
Emerging market and developing economies are and strength of the recovery will depend on the
devoting more public resources to critical health effectiveness of the support programs
care and support for livelihoods during the governments and the international community
shutdown, adding to the urgency of their allowing put in place now; and, critically, on what
and attracting more private sector investment. policymakers do to respond to the new
This makes the financing and building of environment. The World Bank Group is
productive infrastructure one of the hardest-to- committed to seeking much better outcomes for
solve development challenges in the post- people in emerging market and developing
pandemic recovery. countries, especially the poor. During the crisis,
we call on policymakers to act fast and forcefully:
The transparency of all government financial our interventions should be no less powerful than
commitments, debt-like instruments and invest- the crisis itself.
David Malpass
President
World Bank Group
xiv
Executive Summary
COVID-19 has triggered a global crisis like no other—a global health crisis that, in addition to an enormous
human toll, is leading to the deepest global recession since the second world war. While the ultimate growth
outcome is still uncertain, and an even worse scenario is possible if it takes longer to bring the health crisis
under control, the pandemic will result in output contractions across the vast majority of emerging market and
developing economies (EMDEs). Moreover, the pandemic is likely to exert lasting damage to fundamental
determinants of long-term growth prospects, further eroding living standards for years to come. The immediate
policy priorities are to alleviate the ongoing health and human costs and attenuate the near-term economic
losses, while addressing challenges such as informality and weak social safety nets that have heightened the
impact on vulnerable populations. Once the crisis abates, it will be necessary to reaffirm credible commitment
to sustainable policies—including medium-term fiscal frameworks in energy-exporting EMDEs suffering from
the large plunge in oil prices—and undertake the necessary reforms to buttress long-term growth prospects. For
these actions, global coordination and cooperation will be critical.
Global Outlook: Pandemic, Recession: The Economic disruptions are likely to be more severe
Global Economy in Crisis. The COVID-19 and protracted in those countries with larger
pandemic has, with alarming speed, delivered a domestic outbreaks, greater exposure to
global economic shock of enormous magnitude, international spillovers (particularly through
leading to steep recessions in many countries. exposure to global commodity and financial
The baseline forecast envisions a 5.2 percent markets, global value chains, and tourism), and
contraction in global GDP in 2020—the deepest larger pre-existing challenges such as informality.
global recession in eight decades, despite Growth forecasts for all regions have been
unprecedented policy support. Per capita incomes severely downgraded; Latin America and the
in the vast majority of EMDEs are expected to Caribbean (LAC) and Europe and Central Asia
shrink this year. The global recession would be (ECA) in particular have large downgrades partly
deeper if bringing the pandemic under control because of the size of their domestic outbreaks
took longer than expected, or if financial stress and exposure to global spillovers, while South
triggered cascading defaults. The pandemic Asia’s substantial downgrade is primarily the
highlights the urgent need for health and result of stringent lockdown measures. Many
economic policy action—including global countries have avoided more adverse outcomes
cooperation—to cushion its consequences, through sizable fiscal and monetary policy
protect vulnerable populations, and improve support measures. Despite these measures, per
countries’ capacity to prevent and cope with capita incomes in all EMDE regions are expected
similar events in the future. Since EMDEs are to contract in 2020, likely causing many millions
particularly vulnerable, it is critical to strengthen to fall back into poverty.
their public health care systems, to address the
challenges posed by informality and limited safety This edition of Global Economic Prospects also
nets, and, once the health crisis abates, to includes analytical chapters on the short- and
undertake reforms that enable strong and long-term growth impact of the pandemic, as well
sustainable growth. as on global implications of the recent plunge in
oil prices.
Regional Macroeconomic Implications of
COVID-19. The rapid rise of COVID-19 cases, Lasting Scars of the COVID-19 Pandemic. The
together with the wide range of measures to slow COVID-19 pandemic has struck a devastating
the spread of the virus, has slowed economic blow to an already-fragile global economy.
activity precipitously in many EMDEs. Lockdowns and other restrictions needed to
xv
address the public health crisis, together with Adding Fuel to the Fire: Cheap Oil during the
spontaneous reductions in economic activity by Pandemic. The outbreak of COVID-19 and the
many consumers and producers, constitute an wide-ranging measures needed to slow its advance
unprecedented combination of adverse shocks have precipitated an unprecedented collapse in oil
that is causing deep recessions in many advanced demand, a surge in oil inventories, and, in March,
economies and EMDEs. Those EMDEs that have the steepest one-month decline in oil prices on
weak health systems; those that rely heavily on record. In the context of the current restrictions
global trade, tourism, or remittances from abroad; on a broad swath of economic activity, low oil
and those that depend on commodity exports will prices are unlikely to do much to buffer the effects
be particularly hard-hit. Beyond its short-term of the pandemic, but they may provide some
impact, deep recessions triggered by the pandemic initial support for a recovery once these
are likely to leave lasting scars through multiple restrictions begin to be lifted. Like other
channels, including lower investment; erosion of countries, energy-exporting EMDEs face an
the human capital of the unemployed; and a unprecedented public health crisis, but their fiscal
retreat from global trade and supply linkages. positions were already strained even before the
These effects may well lower potential growth and recent collapse in oil revenues. To help retain
labor productivity in the longer term. Immediate access to market-based financing for fiscal support
policy measures should support health care programs, these EMDEs will need to make
systems and moderate the short-term impact of credible commitments to a sustainable medium-
the pandemic on activity and employment. In term fiscal position. For some of them, current
addition, a comprehensive reform drive is needed low oil prices provide an opportunity to
to reduce the adverse impact of the pandemic on implement energy-pricing policies that yield
long-term growth prospects by improving efficiency and fiscal gains over the medium term.
governance and business environments, and
expanding investment in education and public
health.
xvi
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
AE advanced economy
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BVAR Bayesian vector autoregression model
CA Central Asia
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CE Central Europe
CEPR Center for Economic and Policy Research
CGE computable general equilibrium
CFRTV COVID-19 Financial Response Tracker Visualization
DALY disability-adjusted life year
DGE/DSGE dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
EAP East Asia and Pacific
ECA Europe and Central Asia
ECB European Central Bank
EDB Eurasian Development Bank
EE Eastern Europe
EIA U.S. Energy Information Administration
EMBI Emerging Market Bond Index
EMDE emerging market and developing economy
EM-DAT Emergency Events Database
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCV fragility, conflict, and violence
FDI foreign direct investment
FSIN Food Security Information Network
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP gross domestic product
GEP Global Economic Prospects
GFC global financial crisis
GNFS goods and nonfactor services
GNI gross national income
GVCs global value chains
HIPC heavily indebted poor countries
HIV human immunodeficiency viruses
ICTD The International Centre for Tax and Development
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IEA International Energy Agency
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IP industrial production
IRF impulse response function
JMP Joint Monitoring Programme
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LIC low-income country
LMIC low- and middle-income countries
xvii
LNY lunar new year
LPM local projections model
MNA/MENA Middle East and North Africa
MERS Middle East respiratory syndrome
MIC middle-income country
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
NO2 nitrogen dioxide
NPL nonperforming loan
NTI Nuclear Threat Initiative
ODA official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPEC+ OPEC and Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Russia,
Sudan, and South Sudan
PGSSC Program in Global Surgery and Social Change at Harvard Medical School
PM2.5 particulate matter with diameter less than 2.5 micrometers
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP purchasing power parity
PRIO Peace Research Institute Oslo
RHS right-hand side (in figures)
SAR South Asia Region
SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome
SCC South Caucasus
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SME small and medium enterprise
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SVAR structural vector autoregression
TB tuberculosis
TFP total factor productivity
TiVA trade in value added
TSA Transportation Security Administration
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNU-WIDER United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research
UNWTO United Nations World Tourism Organization
VAR vector autoregression
VAT value-added tax
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union
WBK Western Balkans
WFP World Food Program
WGI World Governance Indicators
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
xviii
CHAPTER 1
GLOBAL OUTLOOK
Pandemic, Recession:
The Global Economy in Crisis
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 3
The COVID-19 pandemic has, with alarming speed, delivered a global economic shock of enormous
magnitude, leading to steep recessions in many countries. The baseline forecast envisions a 5.2 percent
contraction in global GDP in 2020—the deepest global recession in eight decades, despite unprecedented policy
support. Per capita incomes in the vast majority of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) are
expected to shrink this year, tipping many millions back into poverty. The global recession would be deeper if
bringing the pandemic under control took longer than expected, or if financial stress triggered cascading
defaults. The pandemic highlights the urgent need for health and economic policy action—including global
cooperation—to cushion its consequences, protect vulnerable populations, and improve countries’ capacity to
prevent and cope with similar events in the future. Since EMDEs are particularly vulnerable, it is critical to
strengthen their public health care systems, to address the challenges posed by informality and limited safety nets,
and, once the health crisis abates, to undertake reforms that enable strong and sustainable growth.
associated with their own domestic outbreaks, FIGURE 1.1 Global growth prospects
EMDE GDP is forecast to contract by 2.5 percent The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a collapse of global economic
in 2020. This would be well below the previous activity. EMDE financial conditions have tightened and commodity prices,
trough in EMDE growth of 0.9 percent in 1982, especially oil prices, have plunged. Despite unprecedented
macroeconomic policy support, the share of countries experiencing
and the lowest rate since at least 1960, the earliest contractions in per capita GDP will reach its highest level since 1870.
year with available aggregate data. EMDEs
with large domestic COVID-19 outbreaks and A. Daily new COVID-19 cases B. Global growth
limited health care capacity; that are deeply
integrated in global value chains; that are heavily
dependent on foreign financing; and that rely
extensively on international trade, commodity
exports, and tourism will suffer disproportionately.
Commodity-exporting EMDEs will be hard hit by
adverse spillovers from sharply weaker growth in
China, and by the collapse in global commodity
demand, especially for oil. With more than 90
percent of EMDEs expected to experience C. Change in global activity indicators D. Commodity price changes since
in 2020
contractions in per capita incomes this year, many January 2020
FIGURE 1.2 Global risks and policy challenges and service their debt, while the increase in risk
The 2020 global recession is expected to be the deepest in eight decades, aversion could raise interest rates for higher-risk
and the subsequent recovery will be insufficient to bring output to borrowers. With debt levels already at historic
previously projected levels. Amid heightened uncertainty, worse outcomes highs, this could lead to cascading defaults and
could arise if the pandemic and economic disruptions persist or cascading
defaults amid high debt lead to financial crises. A lack of space is financial crises across many economies (Figure
constraining fiscal responses in many EMDEs. Building resilient health 1.2.C). Under this downside scenario, global
care systems is critical to prevent similar crises. With ongoing recessions
exerting scarring effects on potential output, pursuing reforms that bolster
growth would shrink almost 8 percent in 2020.
long-term growth prospects will be essential. The recovery that follows would be markedly
sluggish, hampered by severely impaired balance
A. Level of output relative to January B. Growth in advanced economies sheets, heightened financial market stress and
2020 projections and EMDEs
widespread bankruptcies in EMDEs. In 2021,
global growth would barely begin to recover,
increasing to just over 1 percent.
adequate social safety nets, and often suffer greater and social safety nets in many countries. It has also
food insecurity (Box 1.2). exposed the severe consequences of widespread
informality and financing constraints for small
An arsenal of macroprudential support policies has and medium enterprises (SMEs) in many EMDEs
been deployed in EMDEs to maintain financial (Box 1.4). There is a critical need to invest in
sector resilience and promote lending during the resilient health care systems that prioritize national
crisis. These include relaxing capital and liquidity health security, in order to prevent and mitigate
coverage requirements, allowing banks to draw similar crises (Figure 1.2.E).
down capital and liquidity buffers, and
encouraging banks to offer temporary loan It is also necessary to put in place social benefit
repayment holidays to distressed borrowers. systems that can provide an effective, flexible, and
Further, many countries have initiated debt efficient safety net during disasters. Such systems
moratoria and government guarantees on bank can be augmented by measures to deliver income
loans to strengthen bank balance sheets and support and emergency financing to vulnerable
support distressed borrowers. Policymakers would, groups such as the poor, urban slum dwellers,
however, need to carefully balance some of these migrants, and informal firms. In particular, digital
actions against jeopardizing the future stability of technologies can enhance the provision of cash
the financial sector. Once economic activity begins transfers and other critical support measures, as
to normalize, they will also need to prudently well as facilitate the flow of remittances.
withdraw the large-scale policy stimulus provided
during the crisis without endangering the In many countries, deep recessions triggered by
recovery. COVID-19 will likely weigh on potential output
for years to come (Figure 1.2.F; Chapter 3).
Meanwhile, many EMDEs have introduced fiscal Governments can take steps to alleviate the
measures to expand social safety nets and protect adverse impact of the crisis on potential output by
those most vulnerable, including wage support to placing a renewed emphasis on reforms that can
preserve jobs, increased access to unemployment boost long-term growth prospects.
benefits, and targeted cash transfers to low-income
households. In EMDEs with wider fiscal space, Major economies: Recent
the policy response has been markedly greater than
in those more constrained by higher debt levels developments and outlook
(Figure 1.2.D). For many energy-exporting
EMDEs, fiscal balances are deteriorating as oil All major economies have experienced COVID-19
prices have fallen below fiscal break-even prices. outbreaks, of varying intensity. Output in advanced
Elevated debt burdens in some low- and middle- economies is set to contract sharply in 2020, as
income countries also underscore the need for domestic demand and supply, trade, and finance
temporary debt relief. In this context, global have all been severely disrupted. Assuming that the
coordination and cooperation—of the measures pandemic does not lead to lasting damage to financial
needed to slow the spread of the pandemic, and of systems, growth is expected to rebound in 2021, aided
the economic actions needed to alleviate the by unprecedented support from fiscal, monetary, and
economic damage, including international financial sector policies. In China, output appears to
support—provide the greatest chance of achieving be recovering from the large drop at the start of the
public health goals and enabling a robust global year, but the strength of the expected rebound is
recovery. uncertain.
In the near term, COVID-19 has underscored the Advanced economies have faced a very substantial
need for governments to prioritize the timely and slump in activity as they grapple with the far-
transparent dissemination of accurate information reaching consequences of the pandemic. As a
in order to stem the spread of the disease, and to result, advanced-economy output is now projected
build public trust. In the long term, the pandemic to slow dramatically, from an expansion of 1.6
has laid bare the weaknesses of national health care percent in 2019 to a contraction of 7 percent in
8 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
heavily reliant on tourism, a sector virtually shut FIGURE 1.4 United States
down by government policies, and particularly High-frequency indicators point to an unprecedented collapse in services
prone to slow recoveries (Figure 1.5.C; Mann and travel. Industrial production and retail sales have fallen much more
2020). In contrast to the United States, the rise in sharply than during the global financial crisis. Meanwhile, the collapse in
oil prices has substantially reduced investment in the highly leveraged U.S.
unemployment has been modest so far, in large shale oil sector.
part due to the widespread use of short-time work
policies (Figure 1.5.D). A. Reduction in hours worked B. TSA passenger traffic
reflecting fading pandemic-related drag, and the C. Figure shows April 2020 for COVID-19 and the largest one-month decline over the period 2007-09
for the global financial crisis, which is September 2008 and November 2008 for industrial production
eventual effects of accommodative fiscal and and retail sales, respectively.
D. Figure shows quarterly data. Oil price is the quarterly average of the West Texas Intermediate
monetary policy. benchmark. Oil structures investment reflects the real private fixed investment in mining exploration,
shafts, and wells structures. Last observation for investment is 2020Q1 with forecast for 2020Q2
based on a regression of oil structures investment on oil price. Last observation for oil price is
2020Q2, which is based on data through May 28, 2020.
Japan Click here to download data and charts.
Global trends
The spread of the pandemic has essentially halted
international travel and disrupted global value
chains, resulting in a sharp contraction in global
trade. A flight to safety has triggered sharp falls in
global equity markets, unprecedented capital outflows
Source: Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports; Haver Analytics; Johns Hopkins University; from EMDEs, rising credit-risk spreads, and
University of Oxford; World Bank; World Travel and Tourism Council.
A. “Stringency” refers to daily number of measures implemented across advanced economies and depreciations for many EMDE currencies. Falling
include the following policy actions: School closings, workplace closings, cancelation of public events
and public transport, restrictions to gatherings, and to international and domestic travel, and stay at
demand has led to a sharp decline in most commodity
home requirements. Last observation is May 18, 2020. prices, with a particularly substantial plunge in oil
B. Data refer to May 21, 2020.
C. Data represents the sum of direct and indirect impacts of the travel and tourism sector estimated prices.
by the World Travel and Tourism Council. Euro Area is calculated using 2019 U.S. dollar GDP
weights at 2010 prices and market exchange rates.
D. Figure shows percent change between the monthly average of 2019 and the last observation for
2020. Last observation is April 2020.
Global trade
Click here to download data and charts.
Recent indicators suggest that global trade is on
track to fall more in 2020 than it did during the
global financial crisis, partly owing to the
China disruptions the COVID-19 pandemic has caused
to international travel and global value chains
Output contracted sharply in the first quarter, (Figures 1.7.A and 1.7.B). Trade is typically more
with private consumption and non-financial volatile than output, and tends to fall particularly
services being especially hard-hit by the pandemic sharply in times of crisis (Figure 1.7.C; Freund
and an extended period of restrictions to stem it. 2009; Bussière et al. 2013; Bems, Johnson, and Yi
Exports plunged, more than imports, as a result of 2010; Kose and Terrones 2015). Investment,
temporary factory closures. Activity has been which is more cyclical and more trade-intensive
normalizing gradually in the second quarter than other categories of expenditure, has declined
following the relaxation of lockdowns (Figures worldwide as firms face financing problems and
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 11
“The short-term collapse in global output now underway already seems likely to rival or exceed that of any recession in the
last 150 years.” Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
“The scope and speed of this downturn are without modern precedent, significantly worse than any recession since World
War II.” Jerome Powell, Chair, The U.S. Federal Reserve System
Current projections suggest that the COVID-19 global recession will be the deepest since the end of World War II, with the
largest fraction of economies experiencing declines in per capita output since 1870. Output of emerging market and developing
economies (EMDEs) is expected to contract in 2020 for the first time in at least 60 years. The current global recession is also
unique in that global growth forecasts have been revised down more steeply and rapidly than in any other recessions since at least
1990. The gradual nature of forecast downgrades in previous global recessions suggests that further downgrades may be in store as
forecasters absorb new information about the evolution of the pandemic. As such, additional policy measures to support activity
may be needed in the coming months.
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a deep global global recessions of the past 150 years. Second, it compares
recession. The pandemic, and the aggressive restrictions the performance of different groups of economies—
and voluntary restraints on human interaction adopted to advanced economies, EMDEs, low-income countries
contain it, have already led to massive downturns in (LICs), and EMDE regions—during the current episode
advanced economies, and to increasing disruptions in with their record in previous ones. Third, it compares the
EMDEs. Global growth forecasts have been downgraded evolution of growth projections between the current and
at an unusually rapid pace over the past three months. The previous global recessions to shed light on the likely future
uncertain course of the pandemic, in the absence thus far trajectory of forecasts.
of effective vaccines or treatments, has caused
extraordinary economic uncertainty, including about the Methodology and database. The dates of global recessions
possible depth and duration of the global recession, and are identified by two methods: a statistical method and a
about how different countries will be affected. judgmental method.2 The former method defines a global
recession as a decline in annual global real GDP per capita.
Against this background, this box presents the first The latter method, similar to the one used for the United
systematic comparison of the COVID-19 global recession States by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the
with previous global recession episodes over the past 150 National Bureau of Economic Research, considers whether
years. It addresses three questions: there is strong evidence for a broad-based decline in key
indicators of global economic activity in a given year.
• How does the depth of the COVID-19 recession These two methods imply that a global recession is a
compare with previous episodes? contraction in global real GDP per capita accompanied by
a broad decline in various other measures of global
• How does the current global recession differ from
activity.3
earlier episodes in different groups of economies?
episodes? (Burns and Mitchell 1946), under which business cycle expansions are
marked by increases in many measures of economic activity, and
Contributions. The box makes three contributions to contractions by broad declines in activity. Both are widely used in the
context of national business cycles, and often arrive at similar turning
earlier work on global recessions.1 First, it puts the points (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2012).
COVID-19 recession in historical context by analyzing the 3 Some employ a definition of global recession that relies on a simple
BOX 1.1 How deep will the COVID-19 recession be? (continued)
Source: Bolt et al. (2018); Kose, Sugawara, and Terrones (2019, 2020); World Bank.
Note: Data for 2020-21 are forecasts. Shaded areas refer to global recessions.
C. For multi-year episodes, the cumulative contraction is shown. The per capita growth contraction in 1885 was less than -0.1 percent.
D. Figure shows the proportion of economies in recession, defined as an annual contraction in per capita GDP. Sample includes 183 economies, though the sample
size varies significantly by year.
Click here to download data and charts.
Multiple data sources are employed to construct annual a historically richer perspective on global recessions, the
world GDP series for a large sample of economies over a analysis for this “historical period” is based on only the
long period. The series covers up to 183 economies—36 statistical method (i.e., using per capita GDP) because of
advanced economies and 147 EMDEs—over the period data limitations. The study of global recessions during the
1870-2021, though the sample size varies significantly by “modern period” since 1960 relies on both the statistical
year.4 While the 1870-1959 period is critical in providing
of countries in the sample increases over time. GDP series for 2020-21
4 The historical dataset covers the periods 1870-1949 (Bolt et al. are forecasts. The database also includes quarterly series that covers 106
2018) and 1950-59 (Kose, Sugawara, and Terrones 2020). The number economies over 1960:1-2019:4.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 15
BOX 1.1 How deep will the COVID-19 recession be? (continued)
and judgmental methods and involves a wider range of conclusion and aftermath of World War I (Barro, Ursúa,
measures of economic activity, including international and Weng 2020). In 2009, the Swine flu pandemic was
trade, retail sales, employment, and oil consumption. not a contributory factor to the global recession triggered
by the financial crisis.
A historical collapse in global output
Previous global recessions were driven by confluences of a
Another global recession after a decade. Since 1870, the wide range of factors, including financial crises (1876; the
world economy has experienced 14 global recessions: in 1930-32 Great Depression; 1982; 1991; 2009), large
1876, 1885, 1893, 1908, 1914, 1917-21, 1930-32, 1938, changes in monetary and fiscal policies (1938; 1982),
1945-46, 1975, 1982, 1991, 2009, and 2020 (Figures sharp movements in oil prices (1975; 1982), and wars
1.1.1.A and 1.1.1.B). In each of these episodes, there was a (1914; 1917-21; 1945-46).5 During the modern era, the
contraction in global real per capita GDP. The historical 1975 global recession was mainly the result of a steep
period, 1870-1959, saw nine global recessions—at least increase in oil prices in 1973-74. The 1982 episode was
one in each decade. While there was no global recession triggered by a combination of factors, including monetary
during the 1950s and 1960s, the following five decades policy responses, particularly by the U.S. Federal Reserve,
saw a global recession again in almost every decade. to the sharp increase in inflation, and the repercussions of
the monetary tightening, including the Latin American
Deepest recession since World War II. Current projec- debt crisis. The 1991 global recession was associated with
tions suggest that the COVID-19 recession will involve a financial disruptions and exchange rate crises in the
6.2 percent decline in global per capita GDP, making it European Monetary System and collapses in activity linked
the deepest global recession since 1945-46, and more than to the initial stages of the transition from central planning
twice as deep as the recession associated with the global in many Eastern European countries.
financial crisis (Figure 1.1.1.C). Among the 14 global
recession episodes of the past 150 years, it would rank as Highest synchronization ever. The fraction of economies
the fourth deepest (after the 1914, 1930-32, and 1945-46 experiencing annual declines in national per capita GDP
episodes). The current global recession is expected to tends to increase sharply during global recessions (Figure
register an outright contraction in global GDP (of 5.2 1.1.1.D). Current forecasts suggest that in 2020, the
percent) as did eight other episodes. highest share of economies will experience contractions in
per capita GDP since 1870—more than 90 percent, even
Duration: One and done? The current global recession is higher than the proportion of about 85 percent of
projected to last only one year: in other words, the growth countries in recession at the height of the Great
rate of global per capita GDP is projected to turn positive Depression of 1930-32.
in 2021. This is mostly consistent with experience of prior
global recessions: although recoveries took longer to begin Deep recessions in major country groups
in a few deeper recessions prior to 1960, global recessions and regions
since then have lasted only one year in terms of annual
data. The quarterly data show more variation in the Its highly synchronized nature also means that the
duration of global recessions but the average is still about COVID-19 global recession will involve most advanced
one year: the durations of the four previous post-1960 economies and EMDEs (Table 1.1.1). In 2020, both
global recessions ranged between two quarters (1991 groups will experience the largest declines in their growth
episode) and five quarters (1975 and 1982 episodes) with rates of the past sixty years. Advanced economies are
an average of about four quarters. Many private forecasters expected to experience a 7 percent drop in output, while
expect the COVID-19 global recession to last only two EMDEs will mark their first output contraction, by 2.5
quarters, with major advanced economies returning to percent, in at least the past sixty years. Per capita output
growth in the third quarter of 2020 after recording sharp growth in EMDEs will be 6.5 percentage points lower
contractions in the first and second quarters of the year.
The first driven solely by a pandemic. The COVID-19 5 The events surrounding these episodes are discussed in detail by
recession is unique as it is the only such episode, at least Allen (2009), Baffes et al. (2015), Eichengreen (2015), Fels (1951, 1952),
since 1870, to have been triggered solely by a pandemic Hamilton (2013), Knoop (2004), Kose et al. (2020), Kose and Terrones
and the actions taken to contain it. The prolonged global (2015), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Roose (1948), and Temin (1989).
The sharp drop in global GDP recorded in 1946 reflects the readjustment
recession of 1917-21 was partly driven by the 1918-20 to a peace-time economy after World War II (De Long 1996; Jones
Spanish flu pandemic but it also stemmed from the 1972).
16 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
BOX 1.1 How deep will the COVID-19 recession be? (continued)
Source: Haver Analytics; International Energy Agency; International Monetary Fund; Kose, Sugawara, and Terrones (2019, 2020); Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development; World Bank.
Note: Year “t” denotes the year of global recessions (shaded in light gray). The darker shaded area refers to the range of the three global recessions—1975, 1982, and
1991—with available data. GDP, per capita GDP, retail sales, trade, and oil consumption are index numbers equal to 100 one year before year “t” (i.e., t-1 = 100). Retail
sales for 2020 are based on data for the first quarter and shown as a year-on-year percent change. It shows that retail sales declined by around 4 percent in 2020Q1.
Unemployment rates for 2020-21 are based on forecasts by the International Monetary Fund in April 2020. Oil consumption for 2020 is taken from forecast data by the
International Energy Agency in May 2020.
Click here to download data and charts.
than its long-term average during global expansions. These Although the magnitude will vary across EMDE regions,
economies are expected to register a much weaker growth current projections indicate that all regions will experience
performance than in the global financial crisis partly sharp growth downturns, and five out of six are projected
because they entered the current episode with larger to fall into outright recession (Table 1.1.2). The majority
external and fiscal imbalances than they had a decade ago, of EMDE regions will experience the lowest growth in at
so that they have less room for policy maneuver (Kose and least sixty years and all of them will see declines in per
Ohnsorge 2019). capita income. EMDE regions with a large number of
commodity exporters will see especially deep contractions
LICs are projected to experience positive GDP growth this in 2020. For example, Latin America and the Caribbean is
year, but at the lowest rate in the past 25 years. Since projected to suffer not only the largest growth decline of
many of these economies are commodity exporters, in the six regions, but also its deepest recession of the past
addition to the COVID-19 shock, they are being sixty years. The contraction in Sub-Saharan Africa is also
negatively affected by the sharp drop in prices of industrial expected to be the largest over the same period. The two
commodities. The projected fall in their per capita income other heavily commodity dependent regions, the Middle
growth to -1.6 percent implies that they will see a East and North Africa region and the Europe and Central
substantial increase in poverty rates this year. Asia region, will also suffer deep recessions this year with
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 17
BOX 1.1 How deep will the COVID-19 recession be? (continued)
TABLE 1.1.1 Growth of GDP and per capita GDP in global recessions
Global recession years All years (1960-2020)
1975 1982 1991 2009 2020 Average Non-recession Full period
World
GDP 1.1 0.4 1.3 -1.8 -5.2 -0.8 3.7 3.3
Per capita GDP -0.8 -1.3 -0.3 -2.9 -6.2 -2.3 2.1 1.7
Advanced economies
GDP 0.2 0.3 1.3 -3.4 -7.0 -1.7 3.3 2.8
Per capita GDP -0.7 -0.3 0.6 -4.0 -7.3 -2.3 2.5 2.1
EMDEs
GDP 4.2 0.9 1.5 1.8 -2.5 1.2 4.8 4.5
Per capita GDP 2.0 -1.2 -0.4 0.4 -3.6 -0.5 2.9 2.7
LICs
GDP 0.0 1.0 -0.7 5.9 1.0 1.5 3.6 3.4
Per capita GDP -2.4 -1.6 -3.6 3.0 -1.6 -1.2 0.9 0.7
Note: Percent changes in GDP and per capita GDP in respective groups are presented. “Non-recession” refers to all years excluding the five global recession years.
TABLE 1.1.2 Growth of GDP and per capita GDP in global recessions, by region
Global recession years All years (1960-2020)
1975 1982 1991 2009 2020 Average Non-recession Full period
East Asia and Pacific
GDP 6.6 6.3 8.3 7.5 0.5 5.9 7.2 7.1
Per capita GDP 4.4 4.6 6.7 6.7 -0.1 4.5 5.6 5.5
Europe and Central Asia
GDP 6.2 3.0 -5.8 -5.1 -4.7 -1.3 3.5 3.1
Per capita GDP 5.3 2.1 -6.2 -5.4 -5.0 -1.8 2.9 2.5
Latin America and the Caribbean
GDP 3.8 -0.6 3.3 -1.8 -7.2 -0.5 3.8 3.5
Per capita GDP 1.4 -2.8 1.4 -2.9 -8.1 -2.2 1.9 1.6
Middle East and North Africa
GDP -1.3 -6.3 6.9 0.5 -4.2 -0.9 5.0 4.5
Per capita GDP -3.9 -9.4 4.4 -1.6 -5.8 -3.3 2.5 2.0
South Asia
GDP 7.5 3.8 2.3 4.8 -2.7 3.1 5.3 5.1
Per capita GDP 5.0 1.3 0.1 3.3 -3.8 1.2 3.2 3.1
Sub-Saharan Africa
GDP 0.3 0.3 0.2 3.2 -2.8 0.2 3.7 3.4
Per capita GDP -2.4 -2.6 -2.6 0.5 -5.3 -2.5 1.0 0.7
Note: Percent changes in GDP and per capita GDP in respective regions are presented. Only EMDEs are included. “Non-recession” refers to all years excluding the five
global recession years.
18 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
BOX 1.1 How deep will the COVID-19 recession be? (continued)
per capita growth 7.9 percentage points lower than their downgrades have reflected record declines in high-
historical average. frequency indicators of activity as many countries have
implemented widespread mitigation measures to get ahead
South Asia, a region composed entirely of commodity of the health crisis and as many people have undertaken
importers, will experience its first decline in GDP for more voluntary “social distancing.” To shed light on the likely
than forty years with per capita growth 7 percentage points future evolution of growth projections, the pattern of
below its long-term average. Although still suffering from a forecast downgrades this year is compared with those of
sharp decline in per capita GDP, output in East Asia and previous global recessions. The analysis here employs
Pacific is expected to expand this year, as it did in previous forecasts published by Consensus Economics, a firm that
global recessions. This outcome is mainly due to the surveys professional forecasters.6
expected recovery in China, which has already started
relaxing its lockdown measures and shows early signs of a The COVID-19 recession has seen by far the fastest and
rebound in activity. However, the region will still end up steepest downgrades in growth forecasts among all the
with its weakest growth performance for more than 50 global recessions for which the consensus forecast data are
years because all other major regional economies will available—the recessions since 1990 (Figure 1.1.3.A).
experience severe downturns this year. After staying above 2 percent in February, the 2020 global
GDP growth forecast has been downgraded by around 6.6
Broad-based plunge in multiple sectors percentage points since mid-March (Figure 1.1.3.B). As
the health crisis has intensified, advanced economies have
The COVID-19 global recession is expected to be been subject to much larger forecast downgrades, with
reflected in the sharpest contractions in six decades in their 2020 growth forecasts being reduced in only thirteen
many indicators of global activity (Figure 1.1.2). Most weeks by around 8 percentage points (from early March to
notably, while services-related activities were often early June). EMDE growth forecasts for 2020 were also
relatively resilient during previous global recessions, high- lowered, by about 6.1 percentage points, during the same
frequency indicators suggest that the COVID-19 shock period.
has led to a near sudden stop in a large swath of services,
reflecting both regulated and voluntary reductions in The speed and magnitude of the growth forecast
human interactions that could threaten infection. Current downgrades for both advanced economies and EMDEs
forecasts suggest that, partly owing to an unprecedented have been unprecedented, even compared to those that
weakening in services-related activities, global trade and oil occurred around the 2009 global recession (Figures
consumption will see record drops this year, and the global 1.1.3.C and 1.1.3.D). In particular, in the current global
rate of unemployment will climb to its highest level since recession, GDP growth forecasts of three major economies
at least 1965, when available data begin. In addition, (the United States, Euro Area, and China) were quickly
industrial production and retail sales are likely to register revised downward by significantly more than in previous
record drops this year. episodes. For example, the U.S. growth forecast has been
downgraded by about 8.7 percentage points over the past
The current forecasts indicate that global economic three months while it was reduced by about 4 percentage
recovery is expected to gain momentum next year, with a points over 12 months during the 2009 episode. The
rebound in world output similar in gradient to those COVID-19 recession has also seen a record increase in
following prior global recessions, and global employment uncertainty surrounding global growth forecasts, measured
and oil consumption recovering strongly. However, this by the dispersion of individual forecasts, since April as the
rebound would not be enough for output to return to its health crisis deepened in advanced economies (Figure
pre-recession trend level (Chapter 3). The delay in return 1.1.3.E). The increase in forecast uncertainty reflects the
to the trend level of global output is consistent with long- record increase in worldwide uncertainty over the past
lasting hysteresis effects associated with deep recessions
(Cerra, Fatás, and Saxena 2020; Ma, Rogers, and Zhou
2020). 6 As forecasts by Consensus Economics reflect perspectives of many
BOX 1.1 How deep will the COVID-19 recession be? (continued)
A. Consensus forecasts of global GDP B. Consensus forecasts of GDP growth C. Consensus forecasts of GDP growth
growth for 2020, February-June 2020 for 2009, July 2008-July 2009
Source: Ahir, Bloom, and Furceri (2018); Consensus Economics; World Bank.
A. Year “t” denotes the year of global recessions. Data for 1991 are for advanced economies only due to data availability.
B. Average GDP growth for 2020, based on 59 economies (including 32 advanced economies and 27 EMDEs) for which data for consensus forecasts are available,
weighted by GDP in constant 2010 U.S. dollars for 2019. Growth is computed each business day as a moving average of the latest revised forecasts. Horizontal axis
shows month and day. Last observation is June 1, 2020.
C. Average GDP growth for 2009 (based on 84 economies, including 33 advanced economies and 51 EMDEs), weighted by GDP in constant 2010 U.S. dollars for 2008.
The July 2008-July 2009 period is selected because of the relative stability of forecasts prior to and after this period.
D. Changes in consensus growth forecasts for 2009 and 2020, in percentage points. For 2009, changes represent differences in forecasts between July 2008 and July
2009 (based on the monthly surveys). For 2020, changes represent differences in forecasts between February 18, 2020, and June 1, 2020. Growth is computed each
business day as a moving average of the latest revised forecasts.
E. Consensus global growth forecasts for 2009 and 2020 in denoted months. Ranges show the minimum-maximum of growth forecasts.
F. The index is computed by counting the percent of word “uncertain” (or its variant) in the Economist Intelligence Unit country reports. Long-term average refers to
average over 1960-2020. Last observation is 2020Q1.
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three months (Figure 1.1.3.F). If the future trajectory of episodes.7 In previous global recessions, an initial adverse
forecasts follows the typical pattern and worldwide development was often followed by a series of disruptions
uncertainty remains elevated, there may well be further
downgrades in global growth in coming months. 7 Forecasters tend to be slow in internalizing adverse developments in
their projections and are often unable to correctly predict in advance the
Global recessions: From bad to worse? duration of national recessions (Ahir and Loungani 2014; An and
Loungani 2020; Aromí 2019). In light of the heightened uncertainty
The experience of past global recessions suggests that it about the growth outlook, it is useful to examine alternative scenarios
that can illustrate the range of likely growth outcomes in the near term.
takes time for forecasters to process incoming data and However, these scenarios are often adjusted in response to the changes in
fully recognize the magnitude of recessions, which are rare the baseline forecasts.
20 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
BOX 1.1 How deep will the COVID-19 recession be? (continued)
that spread worldwide through trade, financial, and global recession driven by a pandemic, because of their
confidence linkages. A sharp decline in global growth was very limited experience with them, than of previous global
ultimately an outcome driven by all of these developments. recessions, which were triggered by more run-of-the-mill
Forecasters gradually downgraded their projections as they financial and policy shocks.
better grasped the likely growth consequences of new
developments. Conclusion
The 2009 global recession provides a very good example of
the evolving nature of these episodes and its implications The COVID-19 recession is unique in many respects. It is
for the trajectory of forecasts. The initial trigger for the the first recession to have been triggered solely by a
global financial crisis was problems in certain segments of pandemic during the past 150 years, and current forecasts
the mortgage markets in the United States, but suggest that it will be the most severe since the end of
dislocations emanating from these markets soon engulfed World War II. The recession this year is likely to be the
the entire U.S. financial system. The high degree of deepest one in advanced economies since the end of World
interconnectedness between U.S. and other financial War II, and the first output contraction in EMDEs in at
markets then caused the crisis to spread to other advanced least the past six decades. Importantly, it is also expected to
economies and some EMDEs. As these events progressed, trigger per capita GDP contractions in the largest share of
global growth forecasts were downgraded steadily between economies since 1870.
September 2008 and July 2009.
The current episode is also unique because it has been
As in previous global recessions, the early consequences of accompanied by the fastest and steepest global growth
the initial shock—the pandemic in this case—may be forecast downgrades in recorded history. In previous global
followed by further adverse developments. It may take recession episodes, growth projections were gradually
longer than expected to suppress outbreaks of COVID-19 downgraded over a longer period as forecasters processed
in different parts of the world (Box 3.3). Initial disruptions incoming data and reassessed the implications. If the past
triggered by the pandemic could lead to financial crises in is any guide, there may be further downgrades in store as
vulnerable EMDEs. Moreover, the uniqueness of the forecasters better understand the growth repercussions of
COVID-19 global recession brings another challenge: this exceptional global recession. Further policy measures
professional forecasters and economists have a more to support activity, in addition to the large-scale initiatives
limited understanding of the growth implications of a already introduced, may be needed in the coming months.
regions as travel restrictions and widespread losses attacks or during previous global recessions
of service sector jobs discourage labor migration (Figure 1.9.C). Controls to slow the spread of the
and weigh on incomes of migrant workers (World pandemic have resulted in a sharp fall in travel and
Bank 2020b). In a number of EMDEs, banking transport, which accounts for two-thirds of oil
system profitability is being eroded by a rise in consumption. Oil demand is expected to fall by
nonperforming loans. 8.6 percent in 2020. Such a decline would be
unprecedented, surpassing the previous record fall
Commodity markets of 4 percent in 1980 (Figure 1.9.D).
Most commodity prices declined in the first half Global oil production is also starting to fall,
of the year because of the sharp fall in global although at a slower pace than demand. In April,
demand (World Bank 2020c; Figure 1.9.A). Brent OPEC and its partners agreed to new production
crude oil prices fell almost 70 percent from late cuts, starting with a reduction of 9.7mb/d in May
January to mid-April, before retracing some of and June, and gradually tapering thereafter.
these losses in recent weeks (Figure 1.9.B). The Production in non-OPEC+ countries is also
decline in oil prices since January has been larger starting to decline. The U.S. Energy Information
than in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 Administration expects U.S. production to fall by
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 21
just under 2 mb/d from current levels to a low of FIGURE 1.8 Global finance
11mb/d in 2020Q4. Overall, oil prices are A massive flight to safety caused sharp declines in asset valuations and
expected to average $32 per barrel in 2020 and heightened financial market volatility around the world. Earlier in the year,
$38 per barrel in 2021—$26 and $21 per barrel capital flowed out of EMDEs at a pace far exceeding the worst days of the
global financial crisis, resulting in higher spreads and weaker currencies,
below January forecasts, respectively. particularly for more vulnerable EMDEs. FDI inflows to EMDEs are
expected to slow considerably.
Demand for metals has also fallen. Prices are
anticipated to decline 16 percent in 2020 before A. Global stock market B. Stock market volatility indexes
showing a modest increase in 2021. This forecast
is predicated on a recovery of Chinese demand,
which accounts for around 50 percent of the
consumption of base metals.
FIGURE 1.9 Commodity markets unemployment, and led to a sharp decline in retail
Commodity prices fell sharply in the first half of 2020, owing to a collapse sales. Uncertainty over the spread of the virus and
in demand resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. The fall was greatest in the lifting of restrictions have coincided with the
oil prices, partly reflecting weaker demand for transport and travel. A erosion of business confidence and a decline in
renewed OPEC+ agreement in April proved insufficient to bolster prices,
which have fallen more than in previous major events. The decline in investment. Businesses have also had to contend
demand expected for 2020 is unprecedented by historical standards. with delivery delays in intermediate inputs,
plunging demand, and limited access to financing.
A. Commodity price changes since
January 2020
B. Brent crude oil price Domestic COVID-19 outbreaks are beginning to
overwhelm health care systems in a rising number
of EMDEs because of the small size of their health
care systems and limited hospital capacity.
In addition, commodity exporters are grappling FIGURE 1.10 EMDE recent developments
with domestic outbreaks and the side effects of Activity in EMDEs has markedly declined in response to the pandemic,
mitigation measures. The number of these with necessary measures such as lockdowns and other restrictions
measures was initially higher in commodity weighing heavily on both demand and supply. Private consumption will
suffer acutely, including in economies dependent on remittance inflows.
exporters than in commodity importers, in part EMDEs with weak health systems are particularly vulnerable to the
reflecting greater fear about the consequences of pandemic’s impact. Nearly 80 percent of EMDEs are expected to suffer
output contractions this year. Activity in LICs has also slowed sharply and
domestic outbreaks in countries where the financial conditions have tightened in some economies.
capacity of the public health system is low. As a
share of GDP, government health care spending A. Stringency measures and COVID-19 B. Change in remittance inflows in
cases in EMDEs and LICs 2020, by EMDE region
among commodity exporters is on average 30
percent lower than in commodity importers
(Figure 1.10.C).
Commodity importers Source: Air Quality Open Data Platform; Bloomberg; Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports;
Haver Analytics; Johns Hopkins University; Kose, Sugawara, and Terrones (2020); Oxford
University; World Bank; World Bank (2020b).
Growth in most commodity importers has been Note: EAP = East Asia and Pacific, ECA = Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America and the
Caribbean, LICs = Low-income countries, LMICs= Low- and Middle-Income countries, MNA = Middle
curtailed by severe domestic virus outbreaks and East and North Africa, SAR = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
restrictions to stem the pandemic, all of which A. Sample includes 144 EMDEs, of which 91 are commodity exporters, 64 are commodity importers,
and 33 are LICs. Last observation is May 28, 2020.
have heavily weighed on consumption and A.E. Aggregates calculated with U.S. dollar GDP weights at 2010 prices and market exchange rates.
B. Figure shows the simple average of the projected change between 2019 and 2020 remittances as
investment (World Bank 2020f, 2020g, 2020h). a share of 2019 GDP. Sample includes 141 EMDEs.
C. Sample includes 150 EMDEs, with 58 and 82 commodity importers and exporters, and 25 LICs.
Although commodity importers on average have D. The horizontal axis indicates the year of each global recession. Sample includes 86 EMDE
more developed health care systems than commodity exporters and 61 EMDE commodity importers. Shaded area indicates forecasts.
E. Data reflect monthly percent change relative to the baseline period of January 3, 2020 to February
commodity exporters, there is considerable 6, 2020. “Retail and recreation” reflect data on visits and length of stay and are calculated by Google.
“Air pollution” measured as particle matter (PM2.5) air pollution. Sample includes 93 EMDEs and 15
variation across regions. In Central European LICs for “Retail and recreation” and 53 EMDEs and 7 LICs for “Air pollution”. The last observation is
May 21, 2020 for “Retail and recreation” and May 29, 2020 for “Air pollution”.
economies, the number of hospital beds per F. Data for Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Rwanda reflect yields on the 2024, 2031, and 2023
person is similar to that in the Euro Area, while in Eurobonds, respectively. Last observation is May 29, 2020.
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24 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
BOX 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries (LICs)
The COVID-19 pandemic has exerted a particularly heavy humanitarian and economic toll on low-income countries (LICs), in
light of their underlying vulnerabilities. While activity among this group is expected to firm next year, the outlook is subject to
substantial downside risks. These include the possibility that mitigation and other control efforts to stem domestic outbreaks are
unsuccessful or that measures to slow the spread—such as border closures—induce a food crisis.
BOX 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries (LICs) (continued)
D. GDP growth in major LIC trading E. LIC sovereign borrowing costs F. Remittances in LICs in 2019
partners
Source: Bloomberg; Google LLC; Direction of Trade Statistics (International Monetary Fund); Johns Hopkins University; Oxford COVID-19 Government Response
Tracker (OxCGRT); World Bank.
Note: LICs = low-income countries.
A. Sample includes 29 countries. Last observation is May 29, 2020.
B. “Retail and recreation” reflect how visits and length of stay at places such as restaurants, cafes, shopping centers, theme parks, museums, libraries, and movie
theaters have changed relative to the baseline period January 3 to February 6, 2020. “Grocery and pharmacy” reflect places such as grocery markets, food warehouses,
farmers markets, specialty food shops, drug stores, and pharmacies. “Transit stations” reflect places such as public transport hubs such as subway, bus, and train
stations. The data are calculated by Google based on aggregated and anonymized location history of a subset of its users. Data reflect monthly percent changes relative
to the baseline. “Air pollution” reflects monthly percent changes in particle matter (PM2.5) air pollution relative to the baseline period January 3 to February 6,
2020. Sample for “Retail and recreation”, “Grocery and pharmacy”, and “Transit stations” includes 15 LICs. Sample for “Air pollution” includes 3 LICs.
C. Stringency index records the number and strictness of government policies. It is calculated by OxCGRT based on publicly available information on 13 indicators of
government response, including policies such as school closures, travel bans, and fiscal and monetary measures. Sample includes 17 LICs. Last observation is May
28, 2020.
D. “Share of LIC exports” reflects goods exports.
E. Data for Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Rwanda reflect yields on the 2024, 2031, and 2023 Eurobonds, respectively. Last observation is May 29, 2020.
F. Remittances and ODA samples include 31 and 26 LICs, respectively.
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options to buffer temporary income losses are mostly Disruptions to education systems as a result of school
limited. Among fragile LICs—where the incidence of closures have also brought school feeding programs to a
extreme poverty is higher—the fall in incomes is projected halt in many LICs (WFP, forthcoming; Figure 1.2.2.C).
to be steeper, with per capita GDP contracting by an For the most vulnerable populations, these disruptions are
estimated 4.6 percent this year (World Bank 2020i). The likely to exacerbate malnutrition and affect human capital
pandemic could leave long-lasting scars on the poor. development—exacting losses that may not be recoverable.
26 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
BOX 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries (LICs) (continued)
D. Health sector preparedness in LICs E. Food insecurity in LICs F. Agricultural GDP growth in years of
locust outbreaks
Source: Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and NTI, Global Health Security Index; World Bank; World Food Programme.
Note: Shaded area indicates forecasts. LICs = low-income countries. Fragile LICs are LICs affected by fragility, conflict, and violence.
A. Aggregate growth rates calculated using GDP weights at 2010 prices and market exchange rates. Other LICs include agricultural commodity exporters and
commodity importers. Industrial- commodity exporting LICs include metal and oil exporters.
B. Aggregate per capita growth rates calculated by dividing the total GDP at 2010 prices and market exchange rates for each subgroup by its total population. Sample
includes 27 LICs and 14 “Fragile LICs”.
C. Calculated based on World Food Programme’s implementation plan as of March 2020.
D. “Early detection and reporting” reflects countries’ capacity for detecting and reporting epidemics of potential international concern; “Rapid response and mitigation”
reflects their ability to respond to and mitigate the spread of an epidemic; and “Sufficient and robust health sector” reflects the capacity of health sectors to treat the sick
and protect health workers. Data reflects 2019. Sample includes 31 LICs, 123 EMDEs, and 35 advanced economies. EMDEs exclude LICs.
E. “Number of people in crisis” reflects those classified as Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC/CH) Phase 3, i.e., in acute food insecurity crisis or worse,
in 2019. “Population share” reflects the sample median. Whiskers reflect the interquartile range. Sample includes 25 LICs.
F. Brackets reflect years of past locust outbreaks.
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BOX 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries (LICs) (continued)
to dampen fiscal revenues, while spending has increased to financial institutions have made emergency support
buttress health care systems, improve testing infrastructure, packages available to assist governments in their response
enforce containment measures, and provide limited fiscal to the pandemic. They have also called on both official
support for the economy (Steel and Phillips 2020). Few and private bilateral creditors to suspend debt payments
LIC governments, however, have the resources to provide from these fiscally constrained LICs. In response, official
income support for vulnerable businesses and households creditors among the G20 and the Paris Club have
who are experiencing income losses. For many LICs, these temporarily suspended debt service payments for the
additional fiscal pressures are putting debt sustainability at poorest countries that request forbearance. This will allow
risk. Absent immediate external assistance, which may several LICs to concentrate more of their resources on
involve temporary debt relief from bilateral creditors, the fighting the pandemic. However, given the scale of the
pandemic may push some LICs toward sovereign default. pandemic, further external assistance from the
To help alleviate these funding shortfalls, international international community may be needed.
28 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
BOX 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries (LICs) (continued)
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic hit, almost one- Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South
fifth of the LIC population was already experiencing an Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania). Although the locust infestation
acute food insecurity crisis (Figure 1.2.2.E; FSIN 2020). was largely confined to more arid areas and also did not
The pandemic has further increased food insecurity in coincide with the peak growing season in most countries,
many LICs, including through disruptions to imports and the outbreak has not yet been brought under control—
the effect of mitigation measures on supply chains and partly due to pandemic-related supply chain disruptions
distribution networks (World Bank 2020g, 2020c). These delaying delivery of pesticides—and the next wave of
disruptions may also lead to food price spikes that further locusts is expected to be larger and hatch in the midst of
erode incomes of the poor, with evidence that prices of the May-June growing season. Past locust infestations such
certain staples have already risen (World Bank 2019a, as the 2003-05 outbreak in North and West Africa have
2020g, 2020j). Food insecurity could also be prolonged by cost harvests equivalent to US$ 2.5 billion—roughly 0.5
the lack of access to critical inputs such as seeds and percent of LIC aggregate GDP (Figure 1.2.2.F; Shu’aibu
fertilizer, which could weigh on upcoming harvests. et al. 2013). Absent effective intervention, this locust
infestation could further weigh on food security, and may
The pandemic has also come on the heels of a locust have longer-term welfare implications in vulnerable
infestation at the start of this year among several LICs in populations (Conte, Piemontese and Tapsoba 2020; Devi
East Africa that damaged agricultural crops (Democratic 2020).
have weighed on fiscal revenues, while efforts to FIGURE 1.11 EMDE outlook
buttress health systems and slow the spread of the The drop in 2020 aggregate EMDE growth is expected to be the worst on
virus have created new demands for government record, with that of LICs also falling sharply. Severe economic contractions
spending. Multilateral organizations have provided are expected in countries that are dependent on tourism, are deeply
integrated in global value chains, or rely on industrial commodity exports.
emergency funding packages to support LIC The pandemic will exacerbate the weakness in investment, and deep
governments in their efforts to protect the lives recessions will likely weigh on potential growth for years to come.
Prolonged school closures could have lasting implications for poverty.
and livelihoods of those most vulnerable; however,
given the scale of the pandemic, further external A. Growth in EMDEs B. Average size of forecast
assistance from the broader global development downgrade in 2020, by EMDE group
community may be needed.
Outlook
Growth outlook
D. Trade growth E. Growth in EMDE regions in 2020 F. Growth in EMDE regions in 2021
Aggregate growth rates calculated using GDP weights at 2010 prices and market exchange rates.
Baseline scenario: three months of mitigation measures would be enough to stem the pandemic. A recovery would get underway once mitigation measures are lifted but
would be hesitant.
Downside scenario: Three months of stringent lockdowns would prove insufficient and another three months of mitigation would be required before the pandemic can be
brought under control.
Upside scenario: Mitigation measures would be lifted after three months, and all major economies would sputter back to life in the third quarter of 2020. Monetary and
fiscal stimulus would remain in place and would be highly effective in supporting growth over the next 18 months.
Click here to download data and charts.
would resume only slowly, weighed down by remaining Households will be reluctant to undertake many activities
travel restrictions. that require face-to-face interaction, such as tourism.
Where possible, workers will make greater use of
Despite lingering social-distancing practices, the lifting of teleworking arrangements, reducing the discretionary
control measures by the end of 2020 would set the stage consumption that arises from daily professional
for a rebound in global growth in 2021. That said, the interactions.
envisioned global recovery next year is moderate, with the
level of global output in 2021 still 5.9 percent below that Second, households and firms will strive to rebuild
of January forecasts. This reflects various headwinds that precautionary savings and strengthen balance sheets next
will weigh on activity over the medium term. First, the year, following the precipitous declines in incomes
pandemic will likely cause notable shifts in consumption experienced in 2020. Low-income households—which
and work patterns that will dampen aggregate demand. have the highest marginal propensity to consume—will be
Some social-distancing habits will persist, despite the particularly cautious, as they grapple with lingering
eventual development and dissemination of a vaccine. unemployment and precarious financial situations. Many
32 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
firms, facing sharply higher debt and persistent 2020. Past increases in borrowing costs and financial
uncertainty, will opt to cut costs, delay expansion plans, market stress are assumed to weigh on activity throughout
and invest in labor-saving technologies. Moreover, the the remainder of 2020.
positive effects from fiscal support to households and firms
is expected to fade, as existing stimulus measures are Commodity markets. Amid plunging global growth and
phased out. financial market stress, oil prices are likely to further
decline, on net, reaching a trough in the second quarter,
Assumptions before recovering as activity stabilizes. Non-energy
commodity prices would also fall, with a particularly large
The baseline scenario is predicated on several assumptions
decline in metals prices.
about the evolution of activity, financial and commodity
markets, and policy responses. Policy responses. In most countries, stringent control
measures and large-scale support to the health sector
Activity. Outbreaks in advanced economies continue to
should help slow the pandemic but will also accentuate the
slow, allowing most countries to continue to lift lockdown
pandemic’s heavy toll on economic activity. Large fiscal
measures through 2020Q2; however, some control
support is provided to liquidity-constrained households
measures remain in place during the third quarter in order
and firms, but the effectiveness of policy measures is
to prevent flare-ups. Outbreaks in EMDEs and the
hampered in part by delays and elevated uncertainty.3 This
stringency of related lockdown measures reach their peaks
will help avoid lasting damage from the economic
somewhat later. During the lockdown period, all
downturn even if it provides only limited immediate boost
economies experience a precipitous collapse in a
to output growth. Aggressive monetary and financial sector
substantial share of domestic private consumption that
policy interventions, including conventional and
requires social interactions, as well as of business
unconventional monetary measures, are expected to
investment and employment.2
alleviate financial market volatility, but not fully control it
For example, even in EMDEs excluding China that are in until outbreaks subside.
the least open quartile by trade openness would see output
Downside scenario: More stringent lockdown
losses of about 8 percent, on average, in 2020— about
one-third less than the output losses of those in the most measures
trade-open quartile. These impacts, however, do not yet In this scenario, global output would shrink by almost 8
take into account the extraordinary policy stimulus being percent in 2020, as an additional three months of stringent
implemented, nor any additional spillovers from turmoil lockdown measures are assumed to be required before the
in financial or commodity markets as well as country- pandemic can be brought under control, increasing the
specific factors. severity of the impact on global growth. During these
This would put considerable strain on balance sheets of additional three months, measures that had previously
households and smaller firms that do not have access to begun to ease are quickly and aggressively re-introduced.
capital markets (Islam and Maitra 2012). Moreover, Despite additional fiscal policy support, vulnerable firms
activity is further hampered by a global collapse in would exit, vulnerable households would sharply curtail
tourism. In general, domestic disruptions in EMDEs are consumption, and travel would remain deeply depressed.
magnified by large spillovers from the sharp decline in Disruptions to global value chains would exacerbate the
activity in major economies. collapse in global trade, which is envisioned to contract by
about a quarter. These disruptions would also magnify the
Financial markets. Despite interventions by central banks, size of cross-border spillovers and lead to widespread
bouts of financial market stress persist; financial market
volatility is expected to largely subside in the second half of
3 Despite monetary policy at or near the zero-lower bound, fiscal
stimulus may be less effective when some sectors are completely shut
2 Simulations of a large-scale global macroeconometric model suggest
down (Guerrieri et al. 2020). Fiscal multipliers may be lower due to high
debt levels across many advanced and EMDE economies (Huidrom et al.
that the impact of a coincidence of such domestic shocks around the
2019). The effectiveness of fiscal policy may also be hampered by high
world will be large (Oxford Economics 2019). Relative to the baseline,
levels of informality, which can complicate the delivery of supportive
global output in 2020 would collapse by 12 percent, while that of
measures (Chapter 3). Widespread informality, coupled with low
EMDEs would fall by about 9 percent. In 2020, the impact of these
financial inclusion, can also reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy
domestic policy shocks would be considerably larger than spillovers from
(Alberola-Ila and Urrutia 2019).
external shocks.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 33
interruptions in production. Persistent and severe financial quarter in advanced economies, and somewhat later in
market turmoil would cause a notable spike in EMDEs. All major economies would sputter back to life in
bankruptcies worldwide and trigger serious bouts of the third quarter of 2020. During the lockdown period,
financial distress in many EMDEs. Simultaneously, a long most of the consumption that requires any social
period of low oil prices would lead to elevated financial interaction would be suspended, and external tourism
stress in some vulnerable oil exporters. would collapse amid temporary border restrictions, as in
the baseline case (OECD 2020). Nevertheless, and in
The prolonged period of stringent lockdowns would weigh contrast to baseline projections, a sharp economic rebound
heavily on advanced economies, with output contracting would promptly get underway as businesses re-open, trade
by nearly 10 percent in 2020. Output in EMDEs would and travel barriers are lifted, and confidence rebounds.
contract by almost 5 percent, with the largest declines in Financial conditions would ease substantially, and capital
commodity-exporting EMDEs, including those located in would quickly flow back into EMDEs, resuming its pre-
the LAC and ECA regions. The recovery that follows pandemic search for yield. Extraordinary monetary and
would be markedly sluggish, hampered by severely fiscal stimulus would remain in place and, once activity
impaired balance sheets, heightened financial market stress resumes, would be highly effective in supporting growth
and widespread bankruptcies in EMDEs. In 2021, global over the next 18 months. That said, even in this upside
growth would barely begin to recover, increasing to 1.3 scenario, global output would contract in 2020 by about 4
percent, while growth in EMDEs would rise to a modest percent—more than twice the pace registered in the 2009
2.7 percent. global recession—and EMDE growth would also be
negative. Global trade would fall by almost 10 percent,
Upside scenario: Prompt recovery
also worse than 2009. Once mitigation measures are fully
In this scenario, as in the baseline, pandemic-control lifted, global growth would rebound markedly in 2021,
measures would be largely lifted by the end of the second above 5 percent.
weakness in private investment that has been a malnutrition early in life can permanently impair
feature of the past decade (Figure 1.11.D; World learning abilities.
Bank 2018a). In previous epidemics, investment
declined by nearly 10 percent five years following The fallout from COVID-19 will be particularly
the event, reflecting substantial risk aversion amid severe in countries with widespread informality
heightened economic uncertainty. In many and limited safety nets (ILO 2020a). In the aver-
EMDEs, deep recessions will weigh on potential age EMDE, informal activity accounts for one-
output for a prolonged period (Figure 1.11.E; third of output and two-thirds of employment. In
Chapter 3). EMDEs with large informal sectors, workers and
firms have limited options to buffer temporary
The pandemic has also disrupted schooling at all income losses, while also being more vulnerable to
levels, with many EMDEs having fully or partially adverse health impacts. Additionally, temporary
closed their education systems in an effort to workers in the formal economy suffer from gaps in
contain its spread (UNESCO 2020). Extended social safety nets and social protection.
school closures, along with disruptions to early
childhood development programs, are expected to Growth in LICs is projected to fall to 1 percent in
set back learning, raise dropout rates, and slow 2020—the lowest rate in more than 25 years.
human capital development (Figure 1.11.F; Among fragile LICs, activity will slow to a crawl,
Armitage and Nellumns 2020; Burgess and reflecting the pandemic’s severe disruption to
Sievertsen 2020; Wang et al. 2020; World Bank activity in countries least equipped to lessen its
2020k, 2020l). Growing food insecurity, impact. The expected growth pickup in LICs in
including disruptions to school feeding programs, 2021 assumes that both domestic activity and
could also lower long-term productivity, as external demand recover as the pandemic fades,
34 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 1.12 EMDE per capita income growth and unlikely that the Sustainable Development Goal
poverty (SDG) of reducing global extreme poverty to 3
Per capita incomes in EMDEs have fallen sharply amid the pandemic, percent of the global population over the next
markedly affecting living standards and tipping many millions back into decade would be achieved (World Bank 2018b).
poverty. Among oil and metals exporters, in which contractions in per
capita incomes have been particularly steep, poverty rates tend to be
This goal is now even further out of reach.
higher. In some regions, lower commodity prices could constrain fiscal Household incomes are expected to be weighed
revenues needed for critical development spending. down by sharp income losses from diminished
employment opportunities and lost earnings due
A. EMDE per capita growth B. Level of EMDE per capita incomes
relative to January 2020 to illness, as well as reduced remittance receipts.
As a result, per capita incomes among more than
90 percent of EMDEs are expected to contract in
2020, markedly affecting living standards and
causing many millions to fall back into poverty
(ILO 2020a; Lakner et al. 2020; World Bank
2020a; Figures 1.12.A and 1.12.B). The crisis is
also likely to worsen inequality, as various factors
render the poor more vulnerable to the effects of
the pandemic, including their limited access to
C. Extreme poverty rates D. Infrastructure gaps and commodity health care and lack of resources to cushion
revenues
income losses (Furceri, Loungani, and Ostry
2020).
mitigation measures, financial crises, a further drop FIGURE 1.13 Risks to the outlook
in commodity prices, and a slower recovery due to The global economy is experiencing one of the sharpest contractions on
lasting impacts on consumers and firms and a retreat record. Forecasts for activity in both advanced economies and EMDEs
were downgraded substantially and much more rapidly than in 2009. Even
from global value chains. These factors could lead to after recovering in 2021, activity is expected to remain far below previously
a substantially greater loss of output in the near term. projected levels. Substantial uncertainty surrounds possible growth
outcomes, and there remains a heightened probability of even weaker
outcomes if downside risks materialize.
Global outlook
Informal activity is widespread in emerging markets and 40 percent of GDP in those regions between 2010 and
developing economies (EMDEs; World Bank 2019a; 2016. The share of self-employment, another measure of
Figure 1.4.1). Participants generally are not registered with informality, is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia,
the government and do not have access to social benefits, and East Asia and the Pacific, ranging from 50 percent to
with their activity largely unmonitored by authorities. The 62 percent of total employment. Informality is particularly
informal sector is often associated with underdevelopment, prominent in some EMDEs. For example, in 2016, the
labor-intensive industry, less educated and poorly paid informal economy accounted for more than 60 percent of
workers, limited access to financial and medical service, GDP in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
and poor or non-existent coverage by social security. These Zimbabwe. The sector accounted for 90 percent of total
features are likely to intensify the spread of COVID-19 employment in countries like Mali, Mozambique, and
among informal workers and worsen its adverse health and Côte d’Ivoire. In Kenya and India, about 8 out of 10
economic impacts. Confirmed COVID-19 cases have been workers were self-employed.1
rising rapidly in EMDEs with extensive informality since
the end of March, despite a low level of testing. Characteristics of informal workers. Workers in the
informal sector tend to be lower-skilled and lower-paid,
Against this background, this box addresses the following with less access to finance or social safety nets than workers
questions. in the formal sector (Loayza 2018; Perry et al. 2007;
World Bank 2019a). They often live and work in crowded
• What is the role of the informal economy in EMDEs? conditions and conduct all transactions in cash—factors
that enable the spread of disease (Chodorow-Reich et al.
• How may widespread informality alter the impact of 2020; Surico and Galeotti 2020). Informal workers on
the pandemic? average have incomes 19 percent lower than formal
workers, and have limited savings (World Bank 2019a;
• How do policies to mitigate the impact of pandemic Figure 1.4.2). In the one-third of EMDEs with the most
need to be tailored in the presence of large informal pervasive informality, 40 percent of the population would
economies? be driven into poverty if they had to cover direct out-of-
pocket payments for an unexpected health care emergency.
Informality in EMDEs In these economies, unemployment benefits are only
available to a miniscule fraction of the population (on
Widespread informality in EMDEs. The informal sector,
average, less than 2.5 percent).
on average, accounts for about a third of official GDP and
about 70 percent of total employment in EMDEs (World Characteristics of informal firms. Informal firms tend to
Bank 2019a; Figure 1.4.1). Informal enterprises account be labor-intensive and more prevalent in the services
for 8 out of every 10 enterprises in the world (ILO sector. These have been hard hit by measures to curtail
2020b). The size of the informal economy varies widely
across regions and countries. The share of informal output
is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia, 1 Common employment measures of informality are self-employment
and Latin America and the Caribbean, averaging around and informal employment, relative to total employment. The self-employed
work on their own account, or with one or a few partners, or in a
cooperative. Informal employment comprises all workers of the informal
Note: This box was prepared by Shu Yu. sector and informal workers outside the informal sector (see World Bank
2019a for details).
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 37
BOX 1.4 How does informality aggravate the impact of COVID-19? (continued)
A. Informality in EMDEs B. Informality across EMDE regions C. COVID-19 cases and the extent of
informality
Source: Elgin et al. (forthcoming); World Bank, World Development Indicators; Haver Analytics; International Labour Organization.
Notes: EAP=East Asia Pacific, ECA=Europe and Central Asia, MNA=Middle East and North Africa, SAR=South Asia, SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa.
A. Unweighted averages. Informal employment (in red) uses self-employment shares (with additional informal employment shares in shaded red) in the closest (latest)
available year around 1990 and 2016. World averages between 1990 and 2016 are in yellow.
B. Mean of informal output (DGE-based estimates) and employment estimate (share of self-employment) in each region during 2010-16.
C. Bars show the total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases (in thousands) for EMDEs (excluding China) with above-median informality and EMDEs (excluding China)
with below-median informality on March 24, 2020 and on May 27, 2020. Informality is measured by DGE-based informal output in percent of official GDP in 2016.
Click here to download data and charts.
social interactions (Benjamin and Mbaye 2012; Surico and less sanitary conditions, and only have access to weak
Galeotti 2020). In EMDE service sectors, about 72 public health and medical systems (Figure 1.4.3).2 In
percent of firms are informal, compared with 33 percent in the one third of EMDEs with the most pervasive
manufacturing sectors (see Amin, Ohnsorge, and Okou informality, sanitation facilities are accessible to only
2019 for sample coverage). Agricultural employment in 34 percent of the population, and clean drinking
EMDEs is roughly 90 percent informal. Epidemic-control water is available to only 55 percent of the
measures have already disrupted access to markets and population, compared to 80 percent in the one third
inputs and may also eventually threaten the food security where informality is least pervasive. Hand-washing
of smallholder farmers (Cullen 2020; FAO 2020b; ILO facilities are available for only 40 percent of the
2018). population in the former group. Access to medical
care is also extremely limited, with only three-fifths
Broader development challenges. A larger informal the number of doctors and nurses per 1,000 people
economy is associated with weaker economic, fiscal, than the EMDEs with the least informality. In
institutional, and developmental outcomes. GDP per countries like Malawi and Kenya, thousands of people
capita in countries with above-median informality is about have access to only one or two ICU beds (Murthy,
one-third to one-half that of countries below the median Leligdowicz, and Adhikari 2015).
informality (World Bank 2019a). Health systems in
EMDEs with more informality are relatively
underdeveloped, and government capacity to mount an 2 In the one third of EMDEs with the most pervasive informality, 5.3
effective policy response to pandemics is limited. percent of the population is aged 65 or above, compared with 6.2 percent
in the one third of EMDEs with the least pervasive informality. In the
• Health and sanitation. Although the populations of one third of EMDEs with the most pervasive informality, the number of
deaths per 1,000 people caused by communicable diseases and maternal,
EMDEs with the most pervasive informality tend to prenatal and nutrition conditions are about two times higher than in the
be younger, they also tend to be less healthy, live in one third of EMDEs with the least pervasive informality.
38 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
BOX 1.4 How does informality aggravate the impact of COVID-19? (continued)
A. Income in the informal sector B. Agricultural sector C. Risk of impoverishing expenditure for
surgical care
D. Social insurance E. Informality in manufacturing and F. Wage premium for formal over
services informal employment
Source: Elgin et al. (forthcoming); Amin, Ohnsorge, and Okou (2019), World Bank, Enterprise Survey; World Development Indicators; World Bank (2019a); Global
Surgery and Social Change (PGSSC) at Harvard Medical School.
A. Firm productivity is measured as sales per worker. “***” indicates the group differences between formal and informal firms are not zero at 10 percent significance level.
B-D. Bars are group means calculated for EMDEs with “high informality” (i.e., the highest one-third EMDEs by DGE-based informal output measure) and those with “low
informality” (i.e., the highest one-third EMDEs by DGE-based informal output measure) over the period 2010-16. “***” indicates the group differences are not zero at 10
percent significance level.
D. Adequacy of social insurance programs are measured in percent of total welfare of beneficiary households.
E. Data coverage of the share of informal (formal) firms in the manufacturing (service) sector is the same in Amin, Ohnsorge, and Okou (2019).
F. The wage premium is obtained from 18 empirical studies on the wage gap between formal and informal workers. See World Bank (2019a) for details. UKR=Ukraine,
VNM=Vietnam, RUS=Russia, BRA=Brazil, MEX=Mexico, MDG=Madagascar, PER=Peru, ECU=Ecuador, TUR=Turkey, CRI=Costa Rica, ZAF=South Africa, SLV=El
Salvador. The number of studies or estimates for each country is shown in parenthesis; country means are calculated using a random-effects meta-analysis model.
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• Government policy effectiveness. Countries with countries with more pervasive informality (Loayza,
pervasive informality are less likely to have the Oviedo, and Servén 2006). Moreover, less than a
institutional and fiscal capacity to mount an effective quarter of informal firms use bank accounts and about
response to the pandemic. Tax avoidance is prevalent one-half of small informal firms identified lack of
in the informal sector, resulting in limited fiscal access to finance as a major obstacle to their
resources (Besley and Persson 2014). For example, operations, which makes it difficult to use the
government revenues and expenditures in the EMDEs financial system to channel support to the informal
with the most pervasive informality are 5-10 economy (Farazi 2014; Schneider, Buehn, and
percentage points of GDP, on average, below those Montenegro 2010). The rising availability of digital
with the least pervasive informality (World Bank payments—whether on mobile phones, cards, or
2019a; Figure 1.4.3). In addition, governments are online—provided an alternative financial channel for
less effective, and corruption is more rampant, in governments to reach the informal sector. However, it
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 39
BOX 1.4 How does informality aggravate the impact of COVID-19? (continued)
Source: Elgin et al. (forthcoming); World Bank, World Development Indicators, World Bank (2019a), World Governance Indicators; IMF Government Financial Statistics;
The Program in Global Surgery and Social Change (PGSSC) at Harvard Medical School; WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply, Sanitation
and Hygiene; WHO.
Note: Here “high informality” are the third of EMDEs with the highest informality by the share of DGE-based informal output while “low informality” are the third of EMDEs
with the lowest informality by the share of DGE-based informal output.
A-C. Bars are group means calculated for EMDEs with “high informality” and those with “low informality” over the period 2010-16. “***” indicates the group differences are
not zero at 10 percent significance level.
D. Bars are group means calculated for EMDEs with “high informality” and those with “low informality” over the period 2010-16 (2016 for DALY). Death rates are
computed for all death causes and deaths caused by communicable diseases and maternal, prenatal and nutrition conditions. DALYS are the number of healthy life years
per person lost to diseases (“All” or “COM” for communicable diseases and maternal, prenatal and nutrition conditions).
E. Bars show group means calculated for EMDEs with “high informality” and those with “low informality” over 2010-2016. Government effectiveness index is rescaled to
range from 0 to 20, with a higher value indicating a more effective government. “***” indicates the group differences are not zero at 10 percent significance level.
F. The 2000-16 average fiscal indicators among the third of EMDEs with the highest (“high”) and lowest (“low”) informality by the share of DGE-based informal output
averaged during 2000-16. Sample includes 70 non-energy-exporting EMDEs with populations above 3 million people. “***” indicates the group differences are not zero at
10 percent significance level.
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BOX 1.4 How does informality aggravate the impact of COVID-19? (continued)
Health consequences. Health consequences of the and a potential expansion of the informal economy (ILO
pandemic are expected to be more adverse in EMDEs with 2020b).
more pervasive informality. In these countries, lack of an
adequate public health system worsens the transmission of Past pandemics, such as the Ebola epidemic in West Africa
infectious disease. Access to clean water and handwashing in 2014-15, provide a stark illustration of the vulnerability
facilities is often difficult or unfeasible. Living quarters and of smallholder farmers (World Bank 2015).5 The
working environments are often overcrowded and agricultural sector has the highest level of informal
insanitary. In Sub-Saharan Africa where informality is employment—estimated at more than 90 percent (ILO
pervasive, 70 percent of city dwellers live in crowded slums 2018). Farmers producing for the urban market may
(World Bank 2019b). Lack of medical facilities and a experience massive income losses as they are unable to sell
generally less healthy population are likely to worsen the their produce during the lockdowns (ILO 2020d).6 Small
severity of infections and to limit the ability to treat those informal firms play a critical role in the food supply chain
infected (Dahab et al. 2020). The absence of social safety and are likely to run into operational distress and
nets will mean that informal market participants will be insolvency due to logistical breakdowns during
unable to afford to stay at home, or to adhere to social- containment periods (FAO 2020b; World Bank 2020g;
distancing requirements, which will undermine policy ILO 2020b). Since they are among the poorest and most
efforts to slow down the spread of COVID-19 (Loayza vulnerable groups of society, informal workers, especially
and Pennings 2020). farmers, may have reduced access to food in the event of
sharp income losses.
Economic consequences. Lockdowns hit informal market
participants especially hard in the service sector, where In countries with wide-spread informality, governments
informal firms and employment are particularly common may have neither the resources nor the administrative
(Panizza 2020). For instance, in South Asia, about one out structures in place to effectively deliver well-targeted relief
of four households currently living in poverty is engaged in to those most in need (Muralidharan, Niehaus, and
informal activities in the service and construction sectors, Sukhtankar 2016). In a number of EMDEs with
which have been significantly affected by closures and widespread informality, existing social benefit systems,
disruptions (World Bank 2020j). In addition, women are such as ration cards, are plagued by corruption that
overrepresented in service sectors that are subject to high weakens their capacity to deliver support to the most
risks during the pandemic: 42 percent of women workers vulnerable (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010; World Bank 2004).
are working in sectors such as wholesale and retail trade,
compared to 32 percent of men (ILO 2020c). Also, about Policy implications
80 percent of informal firms rely on internal funds and
Informality adds to the challenges of dealing with the
financing from family and moneylenders for working
capital, making them especially vulnerable to the pandemic. Fiscal resources need to be used to strengthen
disruption to cashflows caused by mitigation and other the public health system to prevent, contain, and treat the
control measures (Farazi 2014). Informal workers too have virus, and support the livelihoods of informal participants
limited financial resources to buffer temporary income during the outbreak. As conventional measures—such as
losses during the containment period, making them more wage subsidies and tax relief—would hardly reach informal
likely to be pushed into poverty.4 The health crisis also firms and workers, innovative emergency measures should
causes immediate revenue losses for firms, forcing them to be considered to deliver income support to informal
temporarily or permanently close their businesses. This
could trigger an unprecedented surge in unemployment
5 In 2014-2016, the Ebola outbreak was followed by an economic
BOX 1.4 How does informality aggravate the impact of COVID-19? (continued)
workers, and credit support to informal firms (World group, social group) targeting may help expand
Bank 2020g).7 When managing the trade-off between program coverage by identifying vulnerable groups
coverage and costs, policymakers need to strive for a that are not on any existing registry (Loayza and
maximum reach of informal participants during the crisis, Pennings 2020; World Bank 2019a, 2020a, 2020m).
prioritizing temporary and reversable measures to
minimize the fiscal burden afterwards. In some situations, • Facilitate access to finance to informal firms. To
however, the crisis has exposed gaps in a patchwork of support informal firms, access to finance should be
social security facilities that should be filled, perhaps in the provided to help firms stay in business, keep jobs, and
context of a through reform. maintain links to local and global value chains (World
Bank 2020a, 2020n). Such support could be
• Expand existing social safety nets. The first line of provided, potentially under government guarantees,
response includes existing social protection and social by commercial banks, microfinance institutions,
assistance programs that could be quickly scaled up digital lending platforms, corporate supply chains, or
and expanded to provide immediate but temporary other intermediaries. Easier access to credit,
relief to families whose earnings have been adversely collateralization of existing properties, and online or
affected by the outbreak (World Bank 2020a, 2020e). mobile banking should help owners of informal firms
Food aid, cash (or in-kind) transfers, rent or utility to tap the available financial resources, especially with
bill waivers, can be particularly effective in countries the help of digital technologies.10
with pervasive informality, as they are easy to
implement and have wide reach outside the formal • Consider untargeted and unconditional programs
sector (Özler 2020).8 when needed. Targeted programs reduce the risk that
payments end up with those who do not need it,
• Utilize flexible platforms and technologies to reach especially in the absence of effective targeting and
informal workers. Cash transfer and other support delivery systems (Gentilini 2020; Loayza and
programs could utilize various existing registries and Pennings 2020). In EMDEs where informality is
platforms that have a wider coverage than banking or pervasive and most of the population is either poor or
tax systems (Aker et al. 2016; Aron 2018). Such near-poor, simple untargeted transfers may be better.
platforms should have sufficient coverages, provide Attempts to exclude the relatively few who are not in
possibilities to establish identities, and connect need would likely slow relief down and reduce the
accounts with beneficiaries (World Bank 2020m). desired coverage of informal workers (Özler 2020). In
Examples include existing national social registries practice, support programs that made formalization a
(e.g., Brazil), new online platforms (Thailand and condition of assistance have reduced the number of
Brazil), new mobile payment devices (Morocco), and intended beneficiaries and have not offered net
databases in health (Morocco) and energy (El benefits to many informal enterprises (Campos,
Salvador) sectors. Public transfers via mobile money Goldstein, and McKenzie 2018). During the
have been shown to improve food security and assets emergency and the potentially weak recovery right
as compared to manual cash transfers in the short- afterwards, the need is to quickly reach as many
term (Aker et al. 2016; Haushofer and Shapiro informal workers and firms as possible. To this end, in
2016).9 “Big data” analyses and geographic (or age- many EMDEs, unconditional support programs
would be advisable. Given their limited resources,
low-income countries would require international
funding for the effective implementation of such
7 See the policy section of Chapter 1 for details on the conventional
programs.
measures. See ILO (2020b) for details on the importance of reducing the
exposure of informal workers and their families to the virus and the risks
of contagion and while ensuring their access to health care.
8 Where conditional programs exist, waiving conditionality for a
sharp disruptions to real and financial activity in economic and financial distress among commodity
many economies and across many sectors. producers. It is less likely but also possible that
activity is stronger than expected if a combination
Historically, global recessions have tended to be of positive news on the flattening of the curve,
followed within a year by a global recovery— new treatments and vaccine development, and
characterized by a broad-based rebound in aggressive and effective policy support set the stage
activity—as was the case immediately after the for the beginning of a solid rebound in economic
global financial crisis. While a global recovery is activity during the second half of 2020.
envisioned in 2021, it is likely to be subdued.
Output is not expected to return to its previously In light of the large uncertainties around the near-
expected level (Figure 1.13.C). This reflects the term outlook, Box 1.3 provides illustrative
fact that the pandemic will likely lead to a slow scenarios that describe how the baseline forecast—
and incomplete return to activities that require which envisions a 5.2 contraction in global activity
face-to-face interaction, such as tourism, as some this year—would be adjusted if various
degree of social distancing continues. combinations of these risks to near-term activity
were to materialize. In all, depending on the
Many firms, households, and governments are
ultimate outcome, global output in 2020 might
weathering the 2020 global recession by relying on
decline by about 4 percent under an upside
savings and debt; as a result, a period of
scenario, but by more than 7 percent under a
deleveraging is likely to follow as they rebuild
worst-case scenario (Figure 1.13.D). Even in the
precautionary savings and strengthen their balance
best-case scenario, the 2020 global recession will
sheets. At the same time, the large and sudden loss
be about twice as deep as the global financial crisis.
of income in 2020 has pushed many individuals
into unemployment and companies into
There is also a possibility that activity will remain
bankruptcy, destroying valuable economic
very weak beyond the near term, even after
relationships that will take time to rebuild. Lower
restrictions are lifted. The aftermath of the
spending and continued uncertainty will likely
pandemic may cause lasting changes in consumer
lead to persistent weakness in investment and the
and business behavior, and high debt burdens
innovation embodied therein, with consequences
could hold back investment. The crisis could
for growth and productivity. Moreover, the
catalyze a retreat from, and fragmentation of,
financial turmoil and commodity price collapse
global value chains. Social unrest could erupt. If
engendered by the pandemic will likely have
these risks materialize, long-term growth prospects
significant long-term effects on potential growth
will be dampened, and goals for development and
in many economies (Chapter 3).
poverty reduction would be in severe jeopardy.
Risks to the outlook
More protracted pandemic
The global economy is experiencing one of the
sharpest recessions on record and, given the Despite the best efforts of policymakers, a renewed
unprecedented nature of the shock, forecasts are surge in cases remains a real possibility, especially
subject to a large degree of uncertainty. Downside if there are delays in the development and rollout
risks could deepen the recession or delay the of test-and-trace measures and vaccines. Recent
recovery. In the short run, the contraction would events and model-based analyses show the toll of
deepen if a protracted pandemic required an uncontained pandemics on human and economic
extension of control measures. Policy support development (McKibbin and Fernando 2020;
might fail to soften the economic blow to Verikios et al. 2011; Burns, van der Mensbrugghe,
households and firms to the degree assumed in the and Timmer 2006). A sharp rise in the number of
forecast. A prolonged disruption to economic patients requiring hospitalization amid a second
activity could exacerbate financial stress, which wave of infections could overwhelm even the most
could lead to widespread financial crises. Lower- robust health care systems in advanced economies,
for-longer commodity prices could trigger let alone those of EMDEs (Figure 1.14.A).
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 43
In these circumstances, the necessary extension of FIGURE 1.14 More protracted pandemic
policies to slow the spread of the outbreak and A sharp rise in the number of patients requiring hospitalization amid a
save lives would likely precipitate a renewed second wave of infections could quickly overwhelm many EMDE health
collapse in private consumption. The ability of care systems. Many households would struggle to access funds to smooth
over a longer period of lost incomes. The ability of welfare systems to
households to procure the funds needed to cushion such income losses varies considerably by country, and tends to
maintain consumption at a basic level would be be lower in commodity-exporting EMDEs and, particularly, LICs. This
suggests that a protracted pandemic could severely worsen development
further strained, given previous income losses and outcomes.
already low levels of savings (Figure 1.14.B). The
ability of welfare systems to cushion income losses A. Health indicators in 2017 B. Percent of households able to
varies considerably by country, and is considerably procure emergency funds in 2017
lower in LICs (Figures 1.14.C and 1.14.D).
Thus far, an extraordinary policy response has Source: Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2018); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;
World Bank.
prevented the slowdown in activity from Note: LICs = Low-income countries.
A. Unweighted averages. Sample includes 26 advanced economies and 11 EMDEs—Chile, China,
becoming a financial crisis. In many countries, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, and Turkey—as data are
fiscal measures have replaced a proportion of lost available.
B. Figure measures financial resilience by region. Data are based on a household survey on whether
incomes and mitigated default risk, loan or not individuals would be able to procure an amount equal to 1/20 of gross national income (GNI)
per capita in local currency within the next month. Aggregates are calculated as simple averages.
guarantees have helped keep businesses afloat, and C. Figure shows simple averages. Unemployment benefit coverage indicates share of unemployed
workers receiving unemployment benefits as reported by the ILO for the most recent year available.
liquidity provision by central banks have kept the Share of temporary workers based on most recent survey in the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys
financial system functional. However, should the database. Sample includes 27 commodity exporters, 23 commodity importers, and 5 LICs.
D. Aggregates calculated using population weights for the latest available year of data for each
impact of the pandemic continue to grow, country. Sample includes 106 EMDEs, of which 60 are commodity exporters, 46 are commodity
importers, and 21 are LICs. Coverage of social insurance programs shows share of population
financial crises may follow, resulting in a collapse participating in programs that provide old age contributory pensions (including survivors and
disability) and social security and health insurance benefits (including occupational injury benefits,
in lending, a longer global recession, and a slower paid sick leave, maternity and other social insurance).
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recovery.
FIGURE 1.15 Financial crises and debt burdens debt service costs relative to earnings, and are
Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, many countries had accumulated
typically below investment grade (Figure 1.15.D;
considerable amounts of public and private debt, much of it denominated BIS 2019).
in foreign currencies. The need to service and roll over this debt increases
countries’ vulnerability to spikes in borrowing costs, sharp currency
movements, and financial stress. Highly leveraged companies in advanced
Even if the global financial system avoids a crisis,
economies are also vulnerable to rising borrowing costs. the debt accumulated in response to the pandemic
may weigh on growth in the longer run. As global
A. Global debt B. EMDE sovereign borrowing costs activity rebounds, interest rates are likely to rise.
Higher debt service costs must be financed
through higher taxes, additional borrowing, or by
a reduction in other expenditures. In
circumstances of scarce domestic savings, and
limited access to foreign funds, additional
borrowing may crowd out private investment. In
addition, the loosening of macroprudential
standards to support credit provision during the
crisis may reduce balance sheet transparency and
C. Change in nominal broad effective D. U.S. corporate bond yields weaken market discipline in the longer term,
exchange rate potentially contributing to future financial
instability.
permanently lower productivity (Aghion and FIGURE 1.16 Retreat from global value chains
Durlauf 2014). Subsidized or government- After decades of rapid expansion, the role of global value chains in global
guaranteed credit provided in response to the trade has stalled over the past decade. COVID-19 has strained them
pandemic may help unprofitable firms to persist, further. Tensions could arise regarding China’s purchase commitments
under the Phase One U.S.-China trade agreement. A ramping up of tariffs
deterring newer entrants and suppressing on U.S.-Euro Area trade would affect a sizable share of global trade.
aggregate productivity (Caballero, Hoshi, and
Kashyap 2008). A. Global value chains as a share of B. Change in container throughput
global trade volumes
FIGURE 1.17 Monetary and financial policies in knowledge diffusion and the economies of scale
advanced economies that come with specialization.
In the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, advanced-economy central banks
have moved quickly to cut interest rates. In addition, they have ramped up Lower-for-longer commodity prices and other
their use of unconventional instruments, to levels beyond those seen during region-specific risks
the global financial crisis. Moreover, authorities have put in place currency
swap lines to boost global liquidity and buffers against exchange rate
volatility, as well as a slew of financial policies to support financial and The global economy remains vulnerable to a
banking systems. variety of regional risks, many of them stemming
from the pandemic. A persistent period of low oil
A. Cumulative change in policy rates B. Unconventional monetary policy in prices could weigh on activity in regions with a
major advanced economies
large number of oil exporters, particularly MENA.
Current prices are below the fiscal break-even level
for many producers. Some oil exporters may be
able to maintain spending during a lengthy period
of low prices, but many more would be forced
into pro-cyclical austerity at the same time the
domestic economy needs support. More generally,
the combination of more persistent effects of the
pandemic at the global level, widening domestic
C. Monetary policies across advanced D. Financial policies across advanced
outbreaks, and lower commodity prices could
economies economies result in severe economic damage in commodity-
exporting EMDEs, leading to falling investment,
declines in consumption and confidence, and
procyclical fiscal tightening (Frankel 2011).
Upside risk: Swift recovery and unleashed FIGURE 1.18 Fiscal policies in advanced economies
pent-up demand Many countries have introduced unprecedented and wide-ranging fiscal
support programs to offset the impact of the pandemic. These
Although global growth will be sharply negative in are providing some relief to vulnerable households and firms, and
2020, it is possible that the lifting of the aggressive cushioning the drop in domestic demand and employment.
Policy challenges
At the same time, monetary authorities have
Challenges in advanced economies implemented extraordinary measures to ease tight
credit markets. The Federal Reserve has pledged to
Authorities in advanced economies face the urgent purchase a wide array of obligations, including
challenge of containing COVID-19, finding the most corporate and municipal debt. The ECB has lifted
effective treatments for this new disease, and distributional restrictions on its bond-buying
developing a vaccine, as well as containing the program (Figures 1.17.B and 1.17.C). The Bank
economic fallout from the pandemic. Monetary of England has begun directly financing
authorities in advanced economies are using government expenditures. In the medium term,
quantitative easing on an enormous scale and central banks may need to further enhance their
developing new tools to bolster demand and financial toolkit to guard against the possibility of
market functioning. Large-scale fiscal policy responses persistently weak growth and below-target
have been implemented to support activity and inflation (Draghi and Yellen 2020).
enhance social safety nets. As the world struggles
through the health and economic impacts of the Inflation in most advanced economies was already
pandemic, international policy coordination is below target at the start of the year. Weaker
critical. In the longer run, advanced economies need demand and the fall in oil prices have added
to address gaps in epidemic preparedness and social deflationary pressure, causing inflation
safety nets laid bare by the outbreak. This is especially expectations to decline (Conflitti and Cristadoro
important in rapidly aging societies. 2018). Recent analysis suggests that a pandemic
significantly depresses the natural rate of interest
Monetary and financial policies (Jordà, Singh, and Taylor 2020). With nominal
rates at their effective lower bound, a combination
Advanced economy central banks moved quickly of lower inflation expectations and lower natural
to ease monetary policy in the wake of the rates acts as a headwind to growth, further
pandemic, bringing policy rates in most advanced complicating the conduct of monetary policy
economies close to or below zero (Figure 1.17.A). (Obstfeld, Arezki, and Milesi-Ferretti 2016).
48 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 1.19 Structural policies in advanced economies testing to better assess risks facing the banking
Bolstering the resilience and pandemic preparedness of health care
sector, while increasing attention to crisis
systems is critical in rapidly aging economies. The introduction of flexible management policies to swiftly resolve rising
and well-targeted social safety nets, including enhanced unemployment bankruptcies. Moreover, payment systems need to
benefits, could help support the recovery and cushion the impact of future
severe downturns. be bolstered to ensure the rapid disbursement of
relief payments and to ensure a smooth flow of
A. Health security in advanced B. Public unemployment spending in
transactions environments of limited physical
economies 2015 interactions.
Fiscal policy
constrained sovereigns has renewed calls for an FIGURE 1.20 EMDE monetary and financial policy
area-wide fiscal response, including the possibility The fall in oil prices and collapse in activity have helped lower EMDE
of fiscal burden sharing (Alesina and Giavazzi inflation, on average. However, some countries have experienced
2020; Wyplosz 2020). Once the effects of the substantial currency weakness. EMDE central banks have introduced
unprecedented monetary policy measures to support activity and market
pandemic have passed and a solid recovery is liquidity, including unconventional policies such as asset purchases.
underway, it will be important for advanced EMDEs with asset purchase programs have seen sharper declines in
government bond yields. An arsenal of macroprudential policies has also
economies to establish credible medium-term
been deployed to provide immediate relief to distressed borrowers.
plans to ensure the rebuilding of fiscal space for
future needs. A. EMDE inflation and oil prices B. External financing needs in 2020,
by year-to-date currency depreciation
Structural policies
research and development for pandemic vaccines B. Figure shows median values. External financing needs are calculated as the sum of the current
account balance and external debt amortization due in 2020 relative to either GDP or foreign
(Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security 2019). reserves. EMDEs that are “Above median” reflect those who have depreciated against the U.S. dollar
by more than the median EMDE. Sample includes 26 EMDEs. Last observation is May 28, 2020.
C. Sample includes 72 EMDEs. Last observation is May 2020.
Given the delays associated with the D. Announced central bank asset purchases, expressed relative to nominal local-currency GDP in
2019. Other EMDEs have also announced similar programs; however, their size is dependent on
implementation of discretionary fiscal policy and market conditions (Hungary, Poland, Romania, South Africa). Last observation is May 29, 2020.
E. Bars show the median percent change in 10-year government bond yields for EMDEs that have
the increasingly constrained role of monetary announced asset purchase programs, one day, one week, and one month after the announcement.
policy, social safety nets, including enhanced Diamonds show the change in the median EMDE yield on corresponding dates. Sample includes 24
EMDEs of which 10 announced asset purchases. Last observation is May 29, 2020.
unemployment benefits, need to be designed to be F. Sample includes 26 EMDEs. Last observation is May 28, 2020.
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50 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
flexible, efficiently administered, and well-targeted services (US$200 billion above its 2017 levels over
(Figure 1.19.B). Government-funded policies to the next two years) could lead to renewed trade
encourage firms to retain labor in economic tensions, unless a comprehensive and durable
downturns, including by supporting and trade agreement is reached.
subsidizing shorter working hours, can play an
important role in limiting the human cost of the In the longer term, a holistic “one health”
downturn and accelerating the subsequent approach to policies that enhance domestic health
recovery (Herzog-Stein, Horn, and Stein 2013; security, food safety, and epidemic preparedness
Contessi and Li 2013). and transparency is needed to build resilience and
restore confidence (World Bank 2019c; El
Challenges in emerging market and Zowalaty and Järhult 2020; World Bank 2020a).
developing economies Those policies could be complemented by
productivity-enhancing reforms that encourage
EMDEs face the immediate challenge of providing investment in human capital, reduce regulatory
support to front-line health workers, broadening burdens, and address market distortions given the
access to medical services to detect and treat COVID- role of state-owned enterprises in the economy.
19, and prioritizing the timely and transparent Reforming the rigid and inefficient “hukou”
dissemination of accurate information. Central banks household registration system could be prioritized
are confronted with the challenge of implementing (Song 2014; World Bank and DRC 2014).
measures to support the flow of credit and preserve
the functioning of financial markets during the crisis, EMDE monetary and financial policies
while guarding against the potential buildup of
systemic risks in the financial sector. Many EMDEs Policymakers in many EMDEs have responded
have limited fiscal space to address the crisis, swiftly to the pandemic with a variety of monetary
highlighting the role of international assistance. and financial policies, including both traditional
Spending will need to be reprioritized to the most and novel measures, as supporting the flow of
urgent needs to preserve lives and protect the most credit and preserving the functioning of financial
vulnerable. In the longer run, the pandemic markets are critical in alleviating its immediate
highlights the urgency of investing in resilient health economic impact. The fall in oil prices, along with
care systems, addressing the challenges posed by weak demand in the majority of countries, has
widespread informality, and pursuing growth- dampened a pickup in EMDE inflation that
enhancing structural reforms. COVID-19 is a global commenced in late-2019 and has helped central
crisis that calls for global solutions focused on banks focus on supporting activity (Figure
protecting the most vulnerable populations. 1.20.A). In a few economies, however, disruptions
to food supply chains or labor shortages are
Policy challenges in China pushing food prices up (Colombia, Ecuador,
Philippines, Vietnam). In addition, significant
China’s sharp economic slowdown and the
currency weakness following substantial capital
ensuing policy response have exacerbated the
outflows could constrain the scope for further
country’s challenge of buttressing economic
conventional monetary policy easing to support
activity without compounding financial stability
growth in some economies, particularly those with
risks. However, if short-term cyclical risks
large external financing needs and limited foreign
intensify, available policy space could be re-
reserve buffers (Figure 1.20.B; Hofmann, Shim,
deployed to stabilize the economy, while
and Shin 2020).
reinforcing the economy’s shift toward
consumption, services, and private sector growth.
In the face of severe economic disruptions and
Global economic and trade flow disruptions could generally contained inflation pressures, EMDE
complicate the implementation of the U.S.-China central banks have embarked on monetary policy
Phase One deal. Failure by China to meet its easing at an unprecedented scale (Figure 1.20.C;
purchasing commitments of U.S. goods and Brandao-Marques et al. 2020). A number of
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 51
central banks sharply lowered their policy rates, risks over the medium to long term, central banks
and some have complemented this easing with could communicate their intentions to primarily
unconventional monetary policies such as asset rely on conventional policy tools once the
purchase programs—a first for most EMDEs economy recovers and activity normalizes.
(Chile, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, Turkey, A variety of macroprudential policies have been
South Africa; Figure 1.20.D). These purchases— employed in a targeted fashion to help ease
which are mostly of government bonds but also funding stresses and support credit provision
private sector securities—helped stabilize yields of (Figure 1.20.F). In many EMDEs, banking sectors
longer-dated securities which had been rising entered the current crisis better capitalized than
sharply amid liquidity strains in many countries, before the global financial crisis, allowing
despite policy rates being lowered (Chile, regulators to relax capital requirements including
Colombia, South Africa, Turkey; Figure 1.20.E; countercyclical and conservation buffers, as well as
Arslan, Drehmann, and Hofmann 2020; Hartley capital surcharges that were imposed on
and Rebucci 2020; Hördahl and Shim 2020). systemically important financial institutions (Fang
et al. 2020). In a number of economies, regulatory
To help accommodate slowing economic activity, forbearance has been used to ease liquidity
EMDE central banks with sufficient monetary coverage and funding requirements, and to relax
policy room could ease their stances further, while loan-loss provisioning standards. To help preserve
reaffirming long-term inflation objectives. The banks’ capital, dividend payments and executive
effectiveness of conventional monetary policy bonuses have been prohibited in a few countries.
easing may, however, be reduced while lockdowns To help provide immediate relief to distressed
are still in place. Monetary policy easing could also borrowers, interest rate caps have been imposed in
be less effective in economies with large informal some countries, while commercial banks in others
sectors and low financial inclusion (Alberola-Ila have been encouraged to offer temporary loan
and Urrutia 2019; Box 1.4). In economies where repayment holidays to firms and households.
the solvency of private sector enterprises and Some countries have also prohibited the
households are at risk due to their cash flows being reclassification of distressed borrowers for the
disrupted, or banks’ appetite to lend wane, central duration of the pandemic.
banks could complement conventional monetary
Regulators’ adjustments of macroprudential
policy easing with additional liquidity provision to
policies may help prevent an adverse feedback loop
enable banks to continue extending credit to these
where persistently weak activity as a result of the
entities (Didier et al. 2020).
pandemic causes a rise in bankruptcies and non-
Central banks in EMDEs may face challenges performing loans that erode bank asset quality,
arising from their asset purchase programs, which leading to increasingly constrained bank lending
are a new addition to the monetary policy toolkit that further weighs on growth and hinders the
for most EMDEs. These policies could potentially projected recovery. However, policymakers would
be ineffective in the absence of credible policy need to carefully balance these actions—
frameworks and transparent communication. particularly those that relate to extended
Moreover, if investors fear that the central bank’s regulatory forbearance and deviate from minimum
independence is threatened and the institution is prudential standards—against the potential
being used to fund large fiscal deficits, these buildup of greater systemic risks in the financial
policies may result in unsustainable increases in sector (Drehmann et al. 2020; Garcia Mora
inflation, risk premia and government bond yields, 2020). Committing to time-bound and
and contribute to capital outflows, exchange rate transparent policy actions that are based on
depreciation, and financial instability. Given these rigorous risk assessments could help mitigate some
risks, asset purchase programs in EMDEs may of these risks. In the event that prolonged strains
remain a tool reserved for extreme shocks, such as threaten to collapse financial sectors, governments
the current global recession. To alleviate these may need to recapitalize troubled institutions,
52 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 1.21 EMDE fiscal policy while committing to divest ownership over the
Many EMDEs have implemented substantial fiscal measures to help stem medium term once stability has been restored (Al
the pandemic’s impact on activity and increase public support to the most Tuwaijri et al. 2020). In general, once economic
vulnerable, despite entering the crisis with limited fiscal space. In EMDEs
with narrow buffers, policymakers can reprioritize spending to manage
activity begins to normalize, EMDE policymakers
fiscal sustainability concerns and to boost spending efficiency. Energy would need to carefully withdraw the large-scale
exporters will have to confront narrowing budgetary space as oil prices policy stimulus provided during the crisis without
remain below break-even prices. The recent plunge in oil prices could
provide EMDEs with the opportunity to reduce or eliminate energy
endangering the recovery.
subsidies, to discourage wasteful energy consumption, and to reallocate
spending to programs that better target the poor. EMDE fiscal policy
A. Size of economic support B. Primary fiscal balance in 2019 Many EMDEs have announced fiscal policy
measures in 2020, by EMDE region versus 2021, by EMDE group support to confront the immediate health crisis
and preserve lives, as well as to limit the
magnitude of the economic contraction and
hasten the eventual recovery. At least three-fourths
of EMDEs have increased their funding of health
care systems to expand testing and hospital
capacity. Fiscal support has targeted the expansion
of social protection coverage, including wage
subsidies to protect jobs, cash transfers to
households, and increased access to
C. Discretionary fiscal support D. Fiscal and external break-even
measures in 2020, by debt levels prices in 2020 unemployment benefits (Figure 1.21.A). Measures
have also been implemented to ensure continued
access to critical public service delivery to
vulnerable groups, including low-income
households and the elderly (Argentina, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Russia, the Philippines). Fiscal space,
however, is constrained in some of the worst-
affected EMDEs, limiting the scope of fiscal
support and highlighting the need for improving
the allocation and efficiency of spending (Figure
E. Fiscal sustainability gaps F. Energy subsidies in 2018
1.21.B).
To support firms, policymakers have provided
access to credit, loan guarantees, and vouchers or
cash for critical employers and affected sectors
such as tourism. Temporary revenue-side measures
to ease the financial burden on households and
firms have complemented these efforts and include
tax filing and payment deferrals, income and VAT
Source: Air Quality Open Data Platform; International Energy Agency; International Monetary Fund;
Kose et al. (2017); World Bank.
tax cuts, and social contribution reductions.
Note: EAP = East Asia and Pacific, ECA = Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America and the Announced government support packages have
Caribbean, MNA = Middle East and North Africa, SAR = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
A.C. Total measures either planned or under consideration as of May 29, 2020. averaged 5.4 percent of GDP in EMDEs, and are
A. Aggregates are calculated using 2019 nominal U.S. dollar GDP. Sample includes 29 EMDEs.
B. Figure shows median values for each EMDE group. “Other EMDEs” indicates EMDEs not included
at least 10 percent of GDP in some cases (India,
in other categories. “Tourism reliant” indicates tourism as a share of GDP above the EMDE median
value. “Oil exporters” and “metal exporters” are defined in Table 1.2. Sample includes 79 EMDEs.
Malaysia, Poland, Qatar, South Africa, Thailand).
C. Figure shows median values. Above (below) median indicates countries with government debt-to-
GDP ratios above (below) a median of 51 in 2018. Sample includes 48 EMDEs. While most EMDEs have managed to implement
D. Break-even prices refer to the oil price at which either the fiscal or current account balance is zero.
E. Fiscal sustainability gaps are measured as the difference between the overall balance and the discretionary fiscal support packages, countries
debt-stabilizing overall balance under current condition. A negative (positive) bar indicates
government debt is on a rising (falling) trajectory. Yellow whiskers indicate the interquartile range. with more policy space have generally provided
Data for 2020 are World Bank staff estimates based on the April 2020 Fiscal Monitor.
F. Sample includes 37 EMDEs, of which 23 are oil exporters and 14 are oil importers.
greater support. Packages in countries with wider
Click here to download data and charts. space are almost twice the average of those in
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 53
countries with narrower space (Figure 1.21.C; FIGURE 1.22 EMDE structural policies
Balajee, Tomar, and Udupa 2020). This latter A rising frequency of biological disasters in EMDEs, including epidemics,
group includes many industrial commodity highlights the critical need for resilient health care systems, and for
exporters, reflecting the loss of revenue due to the improved emergency preparedness. Extensive informality across EMDEs is
associated with worse economic and fiscal outcomes, deficient health and
collapse in commodity prices. Expenditures have sanitation systems, and weaker social safety nets. SMEs across EMDEs
been prioritized and reallocated toward income face significant financing constraints, including limited access to credit.
COVID-19 will likely dampen long-term growth, as exemplified by previous
support and health spending to conserve space severe epidemics.
(Algeria, Brazil, Ghana, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia).
A. Frequency of biological disasters in B. EMDE health security, by region
EMDEs with available fiscal space and affordable EMDEs, 1960-2018
financing conditions could consider additional
stimulus if the effects of the pandemic persist.
This could be accompanied by measures to help
credibly restore medium-term fiscal sustainability,
including those that strengthen fiscal frameworks,
increase domestic revenue mobilization and
spending efficiency, and raise fiscal and debt
transparency (IMF 2020a; Koh and Yu 2019;
Munoz and Olaberria 2019; Tandberg and Allen
2020). The timing and sequencing of additional C. Social insurance D. Access to sanitation
stimulus measures should also be carefully
executed to optimize limited government
resources—liquidity injections, for instance, are
best implemented before critical firms or
industries default, but policies aimed at bolstering
demand may be more effective after lockdowns are
lifted (Blanchard 2020; Izvorski et al. 2020).
financing conditions highlight the need for prevent and to better cope with future health and
temporary debt relief and international assistance economic crises (Figure 1.22A; World Bank
to help EMDEs confront the immediate health 2020g). It also highlights the formidable
crisis head on, protect jobs and workers, and to challenges of weaker health systems, widespread
avoid procyclical fiscal policy, which could informality, and small and medium enterprise
otherwise exacerbate the downturn (Loayza and (SME) financing constraints in EMDEs. The deep
Pennings 2020; Hevia and Neumeyer 2020). contractions caused by the pandemic, and their
adverse consequences for potential output,
In light of limited fiscal space, EMDEs may want underscores the need for a renewed emphasis on
to preemptively identify priority expenditures that structural reform to set the stage for sustained
need to be safeguarded if financing shrinks, such economic growth. So too does the increased
as education and health measures, as well as lower- frequency of extreme weather events, which are a
priority, poorly targeted, or inefficiently spent growing threat to food supplies, housing, and
expenditures that yield lower growth dividends infrastructure, especially in already-deprived
and that can be delayed or suspended (IMF 2018; communities.
Herrera Aguilera and Ouedraogo 2020). While
lockdowns persist, governments should focus on Pandemic preparedness of health systems
mitigating the damage from interruptions in
household and corporate incomes (Blanchard Since 2003, there have been several serious
2020). A supplemental budget can also be epidemics—including of SARS, Ebola, avian flu,
considered, especially if increased access to public and now COVID-19. These experiences under-
services, including food banks, and expanded score the importance for EMDEs to provide
social safety nets are needed to protect the most broad-based access to medical services to identify
vulnerable. and treat acute symptoms during health
emergencies. As part of comprehensive measures
Steps can be taken to bolster EMDE fiscal space to alleviate the stress on health systems, front-line
and flatten the debt curve once the immediate health workers need to be supported with
crisis subsides. EMDEs that temporarily cut taxes protective equipment and strengthened hazardous-
or suspended fiscal rules should provide clear exit waste management. At the same time, govern-
strategies to preserve the credibility of medium- ments need to seek to prioritize the timely and
term fiscal frameworks (Gbohoui and Medas transparent dissemination of accurate information
2020). These steps can be complemented by better on infections in order to build public trust.
prioritizing public expenditures and enhancing the Emergency health policies must be adapted to the
review of public investment projects. The recent unique challenges of many EMDEs, including
downturn in oil prices also provides a window of weaker health systems, crowded housing con-
opportunity to put in place mechanisms that ditions, and limited access to water and sanitation.
permanently eliminate costly and poorly targeted
After taking stock of the current pandemic,
energy subsidies, particularly in EMDE oil
enhancing health security in EMDEs will first
exporters where these subsidies, on average,
require the development of national epidemic
accounted for 4.2 percent of GDP in 2018 (Figure
preparedness strategies which highlight existing
1.21.F; Coady et al. 2017; Guénette 2020; IEA
gaps (Figure 1.22.B; Johns Hopkins Center for
2015; Stocker et al. 2018; Chapter 4). Reductions
Health Security 2019). Funding can be allocated
in energy subsidies could provide longer-run
in national budgets to implement these strategies
efficiency dividends by freeing resources to boost
and address any gaps. In general, funding for
investment in green energy and technology.
epidemic preparedness tends to be allocated in
EMDE structural policies waves during crises rather than smoothly and
efficiently over time; therefore, it is vital that
The pandemic, coupled with the rising frequency countries routinely stress-test their health systems
of biological and other natural disasters, highlights to monitor progress and demonstrate the system’s
the critical need to invest in health care capacity to viability in a crisis (Yamey et al. 2017).
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 55
More broadly, authorities need to take steps to dependent on internal funds and moneylenders
strengthen clinical and general health care, invest for working capital (Farazi 2014). More broadly,
in access to clean water and sanitation, and tighten SMEs across EMDEs face significant financing
food safety standards. In particular, boosting constraints as higher information asymmetries
investment in the foundational capacity for caused by their lack of established track records
national health systems—by developing a robust and publicly available information discourage
public health workforce—is critical for enhancing bank lending (Figure 1.22.E; Abraham and
long-term preparedness and the quality of national Schmukler 2017).
health outcomes (Johns Hopkins Center for
Health Security 2019). Maintaining effective In light of this, policy support is needed to
public health safety nets—including unrestricted increase the availability of finance for urgent
access to emergency medical care—will also be capital needs. Governments could temporarily
essential to removing barriers to testing and incentivize lenders—including commercial and
treatment. A lesson from the current crisis is that domestic development banks and digital
investments in public health infrastructure must platforms—to redirect credit to SMEs through
be continuously sustained, even during quiet risk-sharing measures such as public credit
times, when it may appear that the system has guarantees. In doing so, policies could be put in
redundant capacity. In an epidemic, such place to increase funds available for financial
redundancy pays ample dividends. sector institutions without access to central bank
liquidity facilities. In addition, governments could
Informality and SME financing constraints consider temporary equity injections to prevent
highly productive firms from exiting the market.
Informality is widespread across EMDEs, with the Authorities could implement well-regulated credit
informal sector, on average, accounting for about a information sharing mechanisms to minimize
third of official GDP and about 70 percent of information asymmetries. Well-enforced collateral
total employment in EMDEs (World Bank laws enhance the use of movable assets as
2019a). Extensive informality is associated with collateral, and thereby reduce risks to lenders. For
weaker economic and fiscal outcomes, reduced the duration of the crisis at least, government
efficacy of monetary policy, deficient health and might consider public credit guarantees as a means
sanitation systems, and weaker social safety nets to redirect credit to SMEs, with sunset clauses.
(Figures 1.22.C and 1.22.D; Box 1.4; Alberola-Ila
and Urrutia 2019). This leaves countries with Given the substantial challenge posed by
widespread informality severely constrained in widespread informality and SME financing
their ability to address the health, economic and constraints, pandemic-control measures will need
social challenges of COVID-19. A general lack of to be complemented with measures that support
adequate medical infrastructure may worsen the the income of the most vulnerable firms and
severity of infection outcomes (Dahab et al. households, including those households that have
2020). At the same time, economic pressures been pushed into poverty by the crisis. Authorities
associated with poverty—which is expected to rise also need to preserve access to essential health and
sharply as a result of the pandemic—may nutrition services. Similarly, maintaining access to
undermine efforts to slow the spread of the virus education is critical for avoiding irreversible losses
(Lakner et al. 2020; Loayza and Pennings 2020). in long-term human capital. In countries lacking
The impact is likely to be particularly severe on adequate income redistribution systems, policies
women, since they have an outsized participation such as untargeted cash transfers, public works
in informal activities. programs and food aid may minimize delays in
providing assistance. The delivery of cash transfer
The sudden stop of activity caused by lockdowns and other support policies can be enhanced with
and other mitigation measures would have dire the use of digital technologies, including mobile
consequences for many firms in EMDEs. Forced payment platforms (Box 1.4; Pazarbasioglu et al.
closures could quickly lead to the widespread 2020). Prompt financial support from the
collapse of informal firms, as they are highly
56 CHAPTER 1 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
international community can play a key role in shocks (Chapter 4). Lastly, policymakers can
financing these efforts in countries without the develop new insurance frameworks that enhance
necessary fiscal capacity. the quality and transparency of risk sharing during
systemic economic disruptions.
Setting the stage for a robust recovery
Global coordination and cooperation
Beyond the unprecedented near-term damage,
COVID-19 will likely dampen long-term growth, The pandemic underscores the crucial value of
as exemplified by previous severe epidemics global coordination and cooperation in public
(Figure 1.22.F; Chapter 3). The long-run loss in health as well as in economic policy. Cooperation
output growth would be compounded if the across governments, and between governments,
current recession triggers financial crises. For these non-governmental organizations, and the private
reasons, once the immediate health emergency sector is necessary to help build domestic capacity
abates, setting the stage for a robust recovery will to detect and respond to health crises, as well as
require policies that deal with the lingering effects develop and disseminate global public goods such
of the pandemic. as vaccines. Global coordination is vital for
transferring health supplies and expertise where
The immediate need is to implement a they are most needed in the near term, and to
comprehensive set of policies to alleviate solvency develop a coordinated exit strategy from
strains, and, where necessary, prevent bankruptcies restrictions on the free movement of people in the
of firms that will be viable in the longer run medium term. Moreover, the unprecedented
without infringing on the integrity of private common economic shock adds to the growing
ownership. Where possible, support can be evidence of the gains from coordinating monetary
employed to invest in digital infrastructure to and fiscal actions across countries (Bodenstein,
ensure uninterrupted provision of critical services Corsetti, and Guerrieri 2020; Triggs 2018). In late
to a broad set of households, including those in March, the G7 pledged to “do whatever is
the informal sector, while facilitating wider necessary to restore confidence and economic
adoption of these technologies. growth and to protect jobs, businesses, and the
In the medium term, a renewed emphasis on resilience of the financial system” (U.S.
structural reforms and inclusive and Department of the Treasury 2020).
environmentally sustainable post-disaster Many fiscally constrained EMDEs will benefit
investments, as well as the development of sound from the coordinated support of G20 countries
fiscal policy frameworks, institutions, and business and multilateral organizations. International
environments, can help establish a robust and financial institutions can adopt a two-phase
resilient recovery (Hallegatte, Rentschler and approach to their policy response. In the first
Walsh 2018). Structural reforms need to be phase, rapid policy support can be deployed to
carefully calibrated to unique country help provide the fiscal resources necessary to
circumstances, as productivity gains will heavily protect the most vulnerable, keeping firms and
depend—among other factors—on their timing, jobs in place. For example, bilateral creditors
mix and sustainability. Such reforms include might suspend debt payments from low-income
policies to promote investment in physical and countries that request forbearance. In the second
human capital, including green infrastructure; phase, policy should focus on ensuring a strong
reallocation toward more productive sectors; and and sustainable economic recovery, seizing the
greater rates of technology adoption (World Bank opportunity to increase investment in
2020p). Reforms to reduce excessive regulations infrastructure, human capital, and growth-
and litigiousness could also be pursued. In the case enhancing institutions—each of which has an
of oil exporters, persistently lower world oil prices important public health dimension.
reinforce the need for economic diversification,
subject to market forces. This would increase long Recently, many countries have responded to
-term growth and enhance resilience to external increasing domestic demand for food and medical
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 1 57
equipment with export restrictions. At the obstruct supply chains for essential items.
macroeconomic level, these policies, if applied Facilitating the flow of remittances is also
over long periods, are likely to increase price important. Good outcomes are more likely when
volatility and dampen growth (Barattieri, countries work together to support increased
Cacciatore and Ghironi 2019; Laborde, Lakatos, production, and cooperate to ensure that resources
and Martin 2019). Authorities need to avoid the flow to where they are most needed. More
temptation of damaging isolationist or tit-for-tat broadly, upholding a stable rules-based
protectionist policies. Critically, governments need international trading system will be critical to
to avoid restricting exports of necessary food and launching a strong and durable global economic
medical products. In view of closely integrated recovery (IMF 2020b).
trade in intermediate inputs, such measures can
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CHAPTER 2
REGIONAL
OUTLOOKS
The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a severe human and economic toll on East Asia and Pacific (EAP).
Regional growth is projected to slow sharply in 2020, to 0.5 percent—the lowest rate since 1967—reflecting
impact of pandemic-related lockdowns, tighter financing conditions, and a deep contraction in exports. Sizable
policy support will prevent a more severe deceleration. Although subject to significant uncertainty, regional
growth is expected to rebound to 6.6 percent in 2021 as the pandemic subsides, global import demand recovers,
and capital flows to the region normalize. However, the balance of risks to the outlook is firmly tilted to the
downside. Key risks include a longer-than-expected duration of the pandemic, a prolonged period of heightened
financial stress, and a sharper- and longer-than-expected contraction in global trade compounded by re-
escalating trade tensions.
FIGURE 2.1.1 EAP: Recent developments production, and trade flows, leading to the
In China—the initial epicenter of COVID-19—GDP contracted in 2020Q1. In sharpest fall in activity since the Asian financial
the rest of the region, economic conditions deteriorated in March crisis for most countries.
reflecting lockdowns and external spillovers. The region has suffered sharp
spikes in interest rate spreads and large capital outflows. All major regional
economies have implemented sizable macroeconomic policy support The outbreak appears to have largely subsided in
measures to mitigate the impact of the outbreak. Activity in the region China, Malaysia, and Vietnam but has not yet
excluding China bottomed out in mid-2020 as domestic lockdowns eased.
peaked in some regional economies (Indonesia,
the Philippines). China and Vietnam have relaxed
A. GDP growth B. Manufacturing PMI, China and EAP
excl. China the national lockdowns but kept selective
restrictions in place, to prevent a second wave of
outbreaks. Malaysia has begun gradual easing of
the lockdown by allowing more economic sectors
to operate.
and return to around trend by late 2021. Growth FIGURE 2.1.2 Recent developments, China
in China is projected to slow to 1 percent in Following a collapse in 2020Q1, China’s output has bottomed out. Various
2020—4.9 percentage point below January indicators, including domestic flights, have rebounded, but the outlook
remains uncertain amid contracting global activity. Exports contracted in
forecast and the lowest rate since 1976—reflecting 2020Q1, because of factory closures in China followed by a plunge in
the significant disruptions caused by COVID-19, global demand. Bond spreads have widened but less than in other
and then rebound above its trend pace, to 6.9 emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). The exchange rate
has remained broadly stable in contrast to that in other EMDEs. Total debt
percent in 2021, as lockdowns are lifted around is estimated to have increased by about 17 percentage points in 2020Q1
the world. reflecting fiscal and monetary policy support amid economic contraction.
Growth in EAP excluding China is projected to A. GDP, industrial production, retail B. Domestic flights
sales
contract by 1.2 percent in 2020—the first
contraction since the 1998 Asian financial crisis—
and then rebound to 5.4 percent in 2021 as the
effects of the virus dissipate. Among the major
economies, the largest downward revisions for
2020 are in Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand (7.6, 8.0, and 7.7 percentage point
below January forecast respectively; Table 2.1.2).
This reflects the significant impact of domestic
lockdown measures, as well as the impact from
C. Trade flows D. Exchange rate
reduced tourism, disruption of trade and
manufacturing sector, the spillovers from financial
markets, and lower commodity prices in Malaysia
(World Bank 2016, World Bank 2020c).
FIGURE 2.1.3 EAP: Outlook and risks comparatively underdeveloped health infrastruc-
Regional growth is projected to slow to 0.5 percent in 2020—the lowest ture.
rates since 1967. Growth in China this year is projected to slow to the
lowest rate since 1976, and performance in the rest of the region is The pandemic will likely further slow potential
forecast to be the worst since the East Asian financial crisis of 1998. The
deterioration in regional activity has been broad-based reflecting both growth in the region by weakening investment
domestic and external channels. the Pacific Islands are particularly and the supply chains that have been an important
dependent on tourism and likely to see a massive decline in national
income following the pandemic. Regional economies are vulnerable to
conduit for productivity gains over the past decade
tighter global financing conditions and financial shocks in different ways, (World Bank 2020a, 2020d). The negative impact
including through elevated domestic debt, external debt, sizable fiscal is expected to be broad-based and will add to the
deficits, or heavy reliance on volatile capital flows.
long-term slowdown from deteriorating demo-
A. GDP growth B. GDP growth
graphic trends and falling growth in total factor
productivity (Chapter 3).
E. Total debt F. Foreign holdings of government The regional outlook is subject to significant
bonds
uncertainty. The full duration and spread of the
pandemic is still unknown, as is the effectiveness
of the policies implemented in response. The
erosion of consumer and business confidence may
be longer-lasting. In addition, the spillover
impacts of the outbreak through global trade,
financial markets, confidence, and other second
round effects continue to evolve. The containment
measures in major economies may last longer than
Source: International Monetary Fund; Institute of International Finance; World Bank.
A. Aggregate growth rates are calculated using GDP weights at 2010 prices and market exchange three months assumed under the baseline scenario.
rates. Data in shaded areas are forecasts. EAP downside shows simple average of regional forecast.
Global average shows weighted average forecast. The recovery process in many tourism, export-
B. EAP excl. China = Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Thailand, and Vietnam. Pacific Island excl. PNG includes Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
oriented, remittances- and commodity-dependent
Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 1990-2019 average for
EAP excl. China excludes Myanmar and 1990-2019 for Pacific Island excl. PNG excludes Marshall
EAP economies will be impeded by the slowdown
Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu. Aggregate growth rates are calculated using in their main trading patterns, source countries,
GDP weights at 2010 prices and market exchange rates. Data in shaded areas are forecasts.
C. Remittances received represent the largest part of primary and secondary income. Tourism and and low commodity prices. The regional outlook
transportation represent the largest part of services exports. Data on personal remittances come from
the IMF’s Balance of Payment Statistics database. Missing data filled by World Bank staff estimates. will also significantly deteriorate if global trade
D. Forecasts, including those for the Pacific Island economies, are not strictly comparable because of
the difference in accounting financial year periods. EMDE averages show weighted average forecast.
tensions re-escalate.
E. Total debt is defined as a sum of domestic and external debt. Includes government, corporate and
household debt. Last observation is 2018.
F. Blue bars denote foreign holdings of government bonds in local currency. Last observation is 2018.
Click here to download data and charts.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC 73
TABLE 2.1.1 East Asia and Pacific forecast summary Percentage point
differences from January
(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise) 2020 projections
TABLE 2.1.2 East Asia and Pacific country forecasts1 Percentage point
differences from January
(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise) 2020 projections
FIGURE 2.2.1 ECA: Recent developments Fiscal support packages have been announced in
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) has been hard hit by the COVID-19
nearly all of the economies in ECA, and a number
pandemic, with a severe decline in activity indicators and a material of countries have requested aid from official
deterioration in financing conditions. Sharp depreciations in the region’s sources (Figure 2.2.1.E). Although funding has
largest economies could limit the scope for further policy rate cuts,
although low energy prices are helping to offset these pressures in also been allocated to boost the capacity and
commodity importers. Numerous economies have deployed economic responsiveness of the health care system, some
stimulus packages to confront the immediate health crisis and to limit the
negative impact on growth.
countries entered the crisis ill-prepared to cope
with widespread infections given the limited
A. Stringency measures in ECA, 2020 B. Change in ECA indicators, 2020 capacity of health care systems and health care
spending (Figure 2.2.1.F).
Outlook
Regional economies are expected to contract by
4.7 percent in 2020, with recessions in nearly all
ECA economies (Figure 2.2.2.A; Tables 2.2.1 and
2.2.2). The outlook assumes that restrictive
C. ECA portfolio outflows in 2020 D. ECA bond spreads and currency
measures to slow the spread of the virus are
depreciation in 2020 gradually lifted by the start of the second half of
2020. Growth in ECA is projected to recover to
3.6 percent in 2021, as the economic effects of the
pandemic gradually wane and the recovery in
trade and investment gathers momentum.
decline of 4 percent seen in 2009—while nearly all FIGURE 2.2.2 ECA: Outlook and risks
countries have imposed travel restrictions Regional growth is expected to sharply contract in 2020, to -4.7 percent,
(UNWTO 2020). Tourist arrivals have collapsed amid the pandemic and its associated disruptions to services activity and
in ECA, but the impacts may be felt most strongly supply chains. The impact is expected to be most severe in economies that
depend heavily on tourism and commodity exports, capital inflows, and in
in countries such as Albania, Croatia, Georgia, those deeply integrated in global value chains. The risk of a full-fledged
Montenegro, and Turkey, where tourism accounts financial crisis could dent foreign direct investment and remittance inflows,
the latter of which will be dampened by rising unemployment in host
for a sizable share of GDP (Figure 2.2.2.C). Some economies such as the Euro Area. The downturn in ECA is likely to have an
of these countries may experience a smaller especially severe impact on informal and temporary workers.
rebound in 2021 relative to the rest of the region,
A. GDP growth in ECA, 2020-21 B. Average size of forecast
as tourism is generally prone to slow recoveries downgrade in ECA, 2020
(Mann 2020).
response, an economic support package equivalent The outlook for Eastern Europe has substantially
to roughly 9 percent of GDP was announced in weakened as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic,
March, including support to low-income with GDP expected to contract by 3.6 percent
households and pensioners and tax breaks and (World Bank 2020j). Activity in Ukraine is
financial support for firms. The economy is projected to shrink in 2020, by 3.5 percent, but
expected to return to growth in 2021, on the back the depth of the contraction will depend on the
of gradual improvement in domestic demand. duration of the health crisis, progress on major
pending reforms, and the ability to mobilize
Central Europe is forecast to contract in 2020, by adequate financing to meet sizable repayment
5 percent, as large domestic outbreaks weigh on needs (World Bank 2019a).
private consumption and investment. Widespread
disruptions to global value chains (GVCs) are In Central Asia, growth is forecast to sharply slow
expected to limit access to capital and intermediate in 2020, to -1.7 percent, as the subregion grapples
goods (Special Focus). The impact from GVC with negative spillovers from the Euro Area and
disruptions is expected to be larger for Central China through trade, commodity, and remittance
Europe than for the rest of ECA, given that channels. Activity in Kazakhstan will likely be
manufacturing accounts for nearly a fifth of gross dampened by the waning effect of earlier fiscal
value added, and 20 to 40 percent of the value stimulus, as well as weak or contracting output in
added of exports are derived from foreign content key trading partners (China, Russia; World Bank
(Figure 2.2.2.D). 2019b).
In the Western Balkans, activity is expected to
shrink by 3.2 percent in 2020, but to rebound by Risks
4.6 percent in 2021, assuming that consumer and
business confidence are restored as the impact of Risks to the outlook are strongly to the downside.
COVID-19 fades, and that political instability An intensification of the spread of infections
remains in check (World Bank 2020i). Rising across ECA economies would worsen the outlook,
fiscal liabilities in the subregion have reduced while associated restrictive measures could weigh
space for fiscal support and weakened the business on private consumption and investment more
climate. Additionally, the recent earthquake in than expected. An even harsher recession in the
Albania took a heavy toll on human life and Euro Area, perhaps from a worsening of the
physical infrastructure, and, along with the pandemic or more prolonged restrictive measures,
COVID-19 outbreak, is expected to weigh on could amplify the negative spillovers in economies
tourism. The budget will be further stretched to with tightly linked trade ties to these economies,
counter the damaging economic effects of the including through global value chains, as well as
COVID-19 outbreak, with a recently announced through commodity, financial, and remittance
support package that includes an increase in channels. The pandemic also poses medium-term
unemployment benefits and transfers. risks, particularly if global value chain linkages are
lost or if extended school closures have a
Growth in the South Caucasus is projected to significant impact on learning, dropout rates, and
decelerate to -3.1 percent this year as the human capital development (Chapter 3; Shmis et
subregion faces growth headwinds from the al. 2020; World Bank 2020k). Regional weather
COVID-19 pandemic and, subsequently, low patterns, including the drought that is affecting
commodity prices. Activity is projected to pick up economies in Eastern Europe and the Western
to 3 percent in 2021, as the impact of shocks Balkans, also pose a downside risk to the forecasts.
related to the COVID-19 pandemic dissipates and
tourism recovers alongside improving consumer A further tightening in global financing conditions
and business confidence in Armenia and Georgia. could increase debt-servicing costs substantially,
Activity is expected to firm in Azerbaijan in 2021 a particular risk in countries with already-high
as oil prices stabilize, but the overall recovery will debt levels or large external financing needs
be muted by lingering structural rigidities. (Albania; Croatia; Montenegro). Significantly
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 E URO PE AND CE NTRAL AS IA 79
tighter financing conditions may also generate A prolonged deterioration in global investment
pressure on corporate balance sheets, raising sentiment could have material implications for
rollover risks and triggering widespread defaults ECA (Chapter 1; World Bank 2016). Depending
and the realization of contingent liabilities (World on the duration of the pandemic, foreign direct
Bank 2020f, 2020i). A prolonged downturn in the investment (FDI) flows could fall substantially in
region could affect domestic financial sectors by 2020, which would most affect the Western
increasing nonperforming loans and weakening Balkans and South Caucasus (Figure 2.2.2.E;
earnings and profitability. This will likely UNCTAD 2020; World Bank 2020i). Investment
constrain banks’ ability to lend and support real prospects, which were already weakening at the
activity, and increase the risk of financial start of the year, will likely erode further in
instability (Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Mare response to the slowdown in capital expenditures.
2020). The impact would be more severe for small The most vulnerable economies are likely to be
and medium-sized enterprises, which already face those suffering from large domestic outbreaks or
limited access to credit in many countries. supply chain disruptions, as well as those with a
TABLE 2.2.1 Europe and Central Asia forecast summary Percentage point differences
from January 2020
(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)
projections
2017 2018 2019e 2020f 2021f 2020f 2021f
EMDE ECA, GDP1 4.1 3.3 2.2 -4.7 3.6 -7.3 0.7
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars) 3.6 2.9 1.8 -5.0 3.4 -7.3 0.7
EMDE ECA, GDP excl. Turkey 3.1 3.5 2.7 -5.0 3.2 -7.5 0.6
(Average including countries with full national accounts and balance of payments data only)2
EMDE ECA, GDP2 4.2 3.3 2.1 -4.9 3.7 -7.4 0.9
PPP GDP 4.1 3.3 2.2 -4.8 3.7 -7.4 0.8
Private consumption 5.2 3.1 1.9 -3.7 2.9 -6.3 0.4
Public consumption 3.4 2.9 3.0 5.2 2.0 3.5 0.2
Fixed investment 6.7 2.3 0.5 -8.5 6.7 -12.9 2.5
Exports, GNFS3 7.5 5.8 2.4 -11.8 4.0 -14.1 0.6
Imports, GNFS3 11.6 3.3 2.0 -10.7 4.7 -14.8 -0.2
Net exports, contribution to growth -0.8 1.0 0.3 -0.9 0.0 -0.4 0.3
Memo items: GDP
Commodity exporters4 2.2 2.9 2.0 -5.1 2.9 -7.2 0.6
Commodity importers5 6.1 3.8 2.5 -4.3 4.3 -7.4 0.8
Central Europe6 5.1 4.8 4.1 -5.0 3.8 -8.4 0.7
Western Balkans7 2.7 4.0 3.5 -3.2 4.6 -6.8 0.8
Eastern Europe8 2.6 3.3 2.6 -3.6 2.4 -6.5 -0.7
South Caucasus9 2.1 2.7 3.6 -3.1 3.0 -6.2 -0.1
Central Asia10 4.6 4.7 5.1 -1.7 3.7 -6.1 -0.9
Russia 1.8 2.5 1.3 -6.0 2.7 -7.6 0.9
Turkey 7.5 2.8 0.9 -3.8 5.0 -6.8 1.0
Poland 4.9 5.3 4.1 -4.2 2.8 -7.8 -0.5
heavy presence of travel and transport industries measures to slow the spread of the virus generate
and capital-intensive sectors, such as energy and job losses in host countries and leave migrant and
high-value manufacturing industries. Many temporary workers idled or furloughed (Figure
multinational enterprises have issued profit 2.2.2.F; World Bank 2020l; Jolevski and Muzi
warnings. This is expected to dampen reinvested 2020). At nearly 10 percent of GDP, remittances
earnings—an important source of FDI for ECA to ECA represent an important source of income,
economies. The impact could also weigh on the particularly in Central Asia and Eastern Europe,
labor market, particularly in Central Europe where where they can be as high as 30 percent of GDP.
foreign-owned firms can account for a quarter of Remittances are likely to come under further
jobs in the private sector (OECD 2017). pressure due to increased difficulty in accessing
money transfer facilities, as several operators in
A sharper fall in remittances could amplify the this sector have been temporarily shut down
regional economic downturn. Remittance inflows during the pandemic.
to ECA are likely to decline steeply in 2020, as
TABLE 2.2.2 Europe and Central Asia country forecasts1 Percentage point differences
from January 2020
(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise) projections
2017 2018 2019e 2020f 2021f 2020f 2021f
Albania 3.8 4.1 2.2 -5.0 8.8 -8.4 5.2
Armenia 7.5 5.2 7.6 -2.8 4.9 -7.9 -0.3
Azerbaijan 0.2 1.5 2.2 -2.6 2.2 -4.9 0.1
Belarus 2.5 3.1 1.2 -4.0 1.0 -4.9 0.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 3.2 3.7 2.6 -3.2 3.4 -6.6 -0.5
Bulgaria 3.5 3.1 3.4 -6.2 4.3 -9.2 1.2
Croatia 3.1 2.7 2.9 -9.3 5.4 -11.9 3.0
Georgia 4.8 4.8 5.1 -4.8 4.0 -9.1 -0.5
Hungary 4.3 5.1 4.9 -5.0 4.5 -8.0 1.9
Kazakhstan 4.1 4.1 4.5 -3.0 2.5 -6.7 -1.4
Kosovo 4.2 3.8 4.2 -4.5 5.2 -8.7 1.1
Kyrgyz Republic 4.7 3.8 4.5 -4.0 5.6 -8.0 1.6
Moldova 4.7 4.3 3.6 -3.1 4.0 -6.7 0.2
Montenegro 4.7 5.1 3.6 -5.6 4.8 -8.7 2.0
North Macedonia 1.1 2.7 3.6 -2.1 3.9 -5.3 0.6
Poland 4.9 5.3 4.1 -4.2 2.8 -7.8 -0.5
Romania 7.1 4.4 4.1 -5.7 5.4 -9.1 2.3
Russia 1.8 2.5 1.3 -6.0 2.7 -7.6 0.9
Serbia 2.0 4.4 4.2 -2.5 4.0 -6.4 0.0
Tajikistan 7.6 7.3 7.5 -2.0 3.7 -7.5 -1.3
Turkey 7.5 2.8 0.9 -3.8 5.0 -6.8 1.0
Turkmenistan 6.5 6.2 6.3 0.0 4.0 -5.2 -1.5
Ukraine 2.5 3.3 3.2 -3.5 3.0 -7.2 -1.2
Uzbekistan 4.5 5.4 5.6 1.5 6.6 -4.2 0.6
FIGURE 2.3.1 LAC: Recent developments on quantitative easing in advanced economies, the
As the COVID-19 pandemic began to impact Latin America and the
first in the region.
Caribbean (LAC), stringent, multipronged mitigation policies were
implemented. Emissions and sentiment data suggest that the economic Fiscal stimulus plans have been announced in
impacts of the pandemic have been sudden and severe. Financial
conditions in the region have tightened substantially amid flight-to-safety
numerous countries (e.g., Chile, Colombia, Costa
sentiment among investors. Policymakers have responded to the abrupt Rica, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and across the
shift in the economic environment with a range of monetary and fiscal Caribbean), including some where public finances
support.
are already strained (Argentina, Brazil, El
A. COVID-19 cases in LAC B. Nitrogen dioxide emissions Salvador; Figure 2.3.1.F). These packages include
social assistance measures, support for small
businesses, and additional health sector spending.
In some countries, tax deadlines have been delayed
and loan and utility payments temporarily
suspended.
Outlook
The multiple domestic and external shocks
C. Business confidence D. Cumulative portfolio outflows from
LAC stemming from the pandemic will have a severe
impact on regional growth in 2020. Activity is
projected to contract by 7.2 percent, much more
steeply than during the global financial crisis or
the 1980s Latin American debt crisis (Figure
2.3.2.A; Tables 2.3.1.A and 2.3.1.B). The outlook
is exceptionally uncertain, however, and highly
dependent on the magnitude and duration of the
pandemic.
E. LAC sovereign bond spreads F. Announced fiscal support The baseline forecast assumes that domestic
measures
mitigation measures will be relaxed by the
beginning of the second half of the year, ushering
in a recovery in activity, and that commodity
prices will firm as global demand stabilizes. A
normalization of domestic and global conditions is
envisaged to allow growth to recover to a
moderate 2.8 percent in 2021. The baseline
outlook is for a contraction in 2020 in all except
one economy in the region, a notably worse
Source: Air Quality Open Data Platform; Haver Analytics; Institute of International Finance; Interna-
tional Monetary Fund; Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center; national sources;
outcome than for the broader group of EMDEs
Standard and Poor’s; World Bank. (Figure 2.3.2.B).
A. Lines show 14-day moving averages. Last observation is May 29, 2020.
B. Data reflects conditions in Buenos Aires, Bogotá, and Mexico City. Last observation is May 29,
2020.
C. For Mexico, business confidence pertains to the manufacturing sector. Last observation is May
Regional domestic demand is projected to slow
2020 for Brazil and April 2020 for Mexico and Chile. dramatically in 2020, despite increased
D. LAC capital flows are proxied by the sum of equity flows for Brazil and debt flows for Mexico.
COVID-19 line shows cumulative capital outflows beginning the week of January 24, 2020 and government spending, as shuttered businesses
ending the week of May 22, 2020; global financial crisis line shows outflows beginning the week of
September 5, 2008. result in lower wages and private consumption.
E. Lines show medians of the two country groups. Sample includes 7 investment-grade economies
and 10 non-investment-grade economies. Last observation is May 29, 2020.
Fixed investment will be particularly hard hit by
F. Measures are the total amount announced, including discretionary spending, loan guarantees, and tighter financing conditions and deep uncertainty
other credit measures. Data are as of May 29, 2020 and are subject to change.
Click here to download charts and data. about the trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Exports will be sharply curtailed with the global
economy in recession.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 LATIN AME RIC A AN D THE C ARIBBE AN 83
In Brazil, the economy is projected to contract by FIGURE 2.3.2 LAC: Outlook and risks
8.0 percent in 2020, owing to mitigation meas- Activity in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is expected to contract
ures, plunging investment, and soft global in 2020 by far more than it did during either the global financial crisis or the
commodity prices. An expected recovery to 2.2 1980s Latin American debt crisis. Downside risks to the outlook are
substantial and include a resurgence of social unrest, adverse market
percent growth in 2021 is based on the reactions to a rise in already high debt levels, a recovery in commodity
assumption of a steady fading of the factors that prices less robust than expected, and medium-term adverse impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic on services sectors through prolonged uncertainty
weighed on activity in 2020, as well as a restarting and changes in consumer behavior.
of the tax and business environment reform
agenda that had been put on hold in order to A. Growth B. Share of economies contracting
prioritize the COVID-19 response. during global recessions
despite plans for significant fiscal stimulus. In the and are particularly vulnerable to growing food
short term, growth in Chile is also expected to be security risks. The region’s recent progress on
adversely impacted by high uncertainty related to reducing poverty and inequality could be lost
the constitutional reform process that began after (Cord, Genoni, and Rodríguez-Castelán 2015).
social unrest in 2019. Although income inequality has fallen in LAC, it
remains very high relative to the rest of the world,
Central America’s economy is projected to shrink as does inequality of opportunity (Figure 2.3.2.C).
by 3.6 percent in 2020, constrained by stringent The income shocks related to COVID-19, or
COVID-19 mitigation measures in most countries reactions to the authorities’ management of the
during the first half of the year, together with a pandemic, could reignite the wave of social unrest
sharp fall in remittances, a halt in tourism, and that LAC experienced last year and weigh on
lower agricultural prices relative to 2019. confidence and economic conditions.
Growth in the Caribbean is projected to Fiscal balances will deteriorate in 2020 through a
experience a 1.8 percent contraction in 2020, or a combination of lower government revenue from
3.1 percent contraction if excluding Guyana, commodities and taxes, greater spending needs,
where the offshore oil sector is being developed and higher borrowing costs, pushing debt levels
rapidly, albeit somewhat more slowly than higher (Figure 2.3.2.D). This is occurring at a
previously envisaged. Falling tourism activity and particularly precarious time for Argentina, which
remittance inflows will be a severe drag on growth is seeking to restructure its foreign-currency-
in a large swath of economies in the subregion. denominated government debt, and for Ecuador,
which was already struggling to make interest
Risks payments on its debt before the pandemic began.
Rising government debt levels heighten
Risks to the growth outlook for LAC are firmly to vulnerability to financial sector stress and could
the downside, many of them stemming from the result in debt servicing challenges as interest rates
COVID-19 pandemic. A continued acceleration rise in the context of recovering activity. Many
of COVID-19 cases in the second half of the year economies in the region entered the pandemic
would further stress domestic health systems, with with worse fiscal indicators than they had prior to
the risk of high fatality rates in countries with low the global financial crisis (Chapter 1; World Bank
capacity to manage a large outbreak. It is also 2020m).
possible that outbreaks in large regional economies
Corporate debt in the region is broadly at more
will generate intra-regional economic spillovers in
manageable levels than government debt
addition to those from advanced economies—for
(notwithstanding pockets of significant
Central America through trade and remittance
vulnerabilities, such as Pemex in Mexico), and
channels with Mexico; for Argentina and Paraguay
banking sectors are broadly sound. However, this
through trade channels with Brazil; and for Brazil,
situation could deteriorate in the near term if
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay through trade and
financing conditions remain tight and a protracted
remittance channels with Argentina. Moreover, a
period of pandemic-related business interruptions
renewed wave of COVID-19 outbreaks in major
weakens cashflows materially and leaves companies
global economies could prolong the negative
unable to service their debt. Small and medium
global spillovers the region has experienced in
enterprises, which represent the vast majority of
recent months.
companies in the region, already faced worse
Although social assistance measures are expected financing conditions than large companies prior to
to partially soften the economic impacts of the the pandemic (OECD 2020).
pandemic, widespread informality in the region
In the baseline outlook, oil prices are expected to
will limit their reach (World Bank 2019c).
recover in 2021 as the shock of pandemic to the
Moreover, the poorest members of society have
global economy fades. However, the path of oil
little capacity to manage negative income shocks
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 LATIN AME RIC A AN D THE C ARIBBE AN 85
prices is also contingent on policy decisions by particularly elevated risks for countries where these
OPEC+ countries. Unexpected policy develop- sectors represent a large share of the economy
ments could postpone a recovery in oil prices, with (Figure 2.3.2.F). Prolonged school closures during
growth implications for some countries (Figure the pandemic could have adverse effects on human
2.3.2.E). capital accumulation and potential growth
(Chapter 3; Wang et al. 2020).
Downside risks also emanate from long-lasting
pandemic impacts, such as the possibility that Finally, LAC faces persistent risks related to
consumer demand does not recover fully after the natural disasters and weather-related events,
pandemic fades (Chapter 3; Smith et al. 2014). including the upcoming hurricane season in the
Demand for tourism, personal services, and Caribbean. A major natural disaster on the heels of
entertainment, for instance, may be slow to the COVID-19 pandemic would be economically
recover if pandemic-related fears or concerns of a devastating for some countries in the region.
second wave of the outbreak persist, with
TABLE 2.3.1 Latin America and the Caribbean forecast summary Percentage point differences
from January 2020
(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise)
projections
2017 2018 2019e 2020f 2021f 2020f 2021f
EMDE LAC, GDP1 1.9 1.7 0.8 -7.2 2.8 -9.0 0.4
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars) 0.7 0.6 -0.3 -8.1 1.9 -8.9 0.4
(Average including countries with full national accounts and balance of payments data only) 2
EMDE LAC, GDP2 1.9 1.7 0.8 -7.2 2.8 -9.0 0.4
PPP GDP 2.0 1.7 0.8 -7.1 2.9 -8.9 0.4
Private consumption 2.7 2.0 1.1 -8.3 2.9 -10.4 0.2
Public consumption 0.7 1.3 -0.1 1.8 0.1 0.9 -0.9
Fixed investment -0.2 2.2 -1.0 -11.1 4.7 -13.7 0.7
Exports, GNFS3 3.8 4.2 0.6 -12.5 6.4 -15.3 3.3
Imports, GNFS3 6.3 5.1 -0.9 -13.2 5.9 -16.5 2.1
Net exports, contribution to growth -0.5 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3
Memo items: GDP
South America4 1.6 1.3 1.0 -7.4 2.7 -9.3 0.1
Central America5 4.0 2.7 2.4 -3.6 3.6 -6.6 0.3
Caribbean6 3.2 5.0 3.6 -1.8 3.3 -7.4 -0.6
Brazil 1.3 1.3 1.1 -8.0 2.2 -10.0 -0.3
Mexico 2.1 2.2 -0.3 -7.5 3.0 -8.7 1.2
Argentina 2.7 -2.5 -2.2 -7.3 2.1 -6.0 0.7
TABLE 2.3.2 Latin America and the Caribbean country forecasts1 Percentage point differences
from January 2020
(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise) projections
2017 2018 2019e 2020f 2021f 2020f 2021f
Argentina 2.7 -2.5 -2.2 -7.3 2.1 -6.0 0.7
Belize 1.9 2.1 0.3 -13.5 6.7 -15.6 4.9
Bolivia 4.2 4.2 2.7 -5.9 2.2 -8.9 -1.0
Brazil 1.3 1.3 1.1 -8.0 2.2 -10.0 -0.3
Chile 1.2 3.9 1.1 -4.3 3.1 -6.8 0.1
Colombia 1.4 2.5 3.3 -4.9 3.6 -8.5 -0.3
Costa Rica 3.9 2.7 2.1 -3.3 3.0 -5.8 0.0
Dominica2 -9.5 0.5 9.6 -4.0 4.0 -8.9 -0.1
Dominican Republic 4.7 7.0 5.1 -0.8 2.5 -5.8 -2.5
Ecuador 2.4 1.3 0.1 -7.4 4.1 -7.6 3.3
El Salvador 2.3 2.4 2.4 -5.4 3.8 -7.9 1.3
Grenada 4.4 4.2 3.1 -9.6 6.5 -12.5 3.6
Guatemala 3.0 3.1 3.6 -3.0 4.1 -6.0 0.9
Guyana 2.1 4.1 4.7 51.1 8.1 -35.6 -2.4
Haiti3 1.2 1.5 -0.9 -3.5 1.0 -2.1 1.5
Honduras 4.8 3.7 2.7 -5.8 3.7 -9.3 0.2
Jamaica 1.0 1.9 0.7 -6.2 2.7 -7.3 1.5
Mexico 2.1 2.2 -0.3 -7.5 3.0 -8.7 1.2
Nicaragua 4.6 -4.0 -3.9 -6.3 0.7 -5.8 0.1
Panama 5.6 3.7 3.0 -2.0 4.2 -6.2 -0.4
Paraguay 5.0 3.4 0.0 -2.8 4.2 -5.9 0.3
Peru 2.5 4.0 2.2 -12.0 7.0 -15.2 3.5
St. Lucia 2.2 1.4 1.4 -8.8 8.3 -12.0 5.3
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.0 2.0 0.4 -5.5 4.0 -7.8 1.7
Suriname 1.8 2.6 2.3 -5.0 3.0 -7.5 0.9
Uruguay 2.6 1.6 0.2 -3.7 4.6 -6.2 1.1
FIGURE 2.4.1 MENA: Recent developments sharply amid anemic external demand, including
Regional output is expected to contract by more than 4 percent in 2020 in
from the Euro Area (a major export partner).
the face of the COVID-19 pandemic and the plunge in oil prices associated Domestic policy uncertainty is further weighing
with collapsing global demand. Non-oil activity is decelerating in large heavily on investment activity among smaller oil
GCC economies as pandemic concerns amplify. A new OPEC+ production
cut agreement was negotiated to continue recently after earlier uncertainty. importers.
Egypt, the largest oil importer, has further cut policy rates in response to
COVID-19 concerns amid moderating inflation. The spillovers of the recent Inflation has continued to moderate in MENA. In
global financial turbulence have also reached MENA.
Egypt, inflation has generally declined over the
A. Growth B. Global oil demand expectations past year, partly owing to the stability of the
exchange rate. In the GCC, inflation has averaged
less than 1 percent and it has also been broadly
contained in smaller non-GCC economies. Iran’s
inflation has been falling on a year-by-year basis,
although it still remains elevated at about 20
percent. Moderating inflation has allowed
monetary policy space for large economies like
Egypt to aggressively cut policy rates in response
to the pandemic (Figure 2.4.1.E).
C. Composite PMI D. Oil production
The financial sector in MENA has been shaken in
recent months by the broad-based erosion of
investor sentiment toward EMDEs under the
pandemic, leading to sharp falls in equity market
indexes and capital outflows in large economies
(Figure 2.4.1.F). In response to COVID-19,
authorities have introduced financial stability and
corporate sector support measures, including zero-
interest collateralized banking sector loans in the
UAE and measures to support lending to small
E. Egypt F. GCC equity markets
and medium-sized enterprises in Saudi Arabia.
Outlook
As a consequence of the pandemic and oil market
developments, GDP in the region is forecast to
contract sharply by 4.2 percent in 2020, although
there is substantial uncertainty around this
projection (Table 2.4.1). The forecasts have been
Sources: International Energy Agency, Haver Analytics, World Bank.
A. Weighted average growth rate of real GDP. “downside” refers to downside regional growth scenar-
further downward revised from those in January
io in 2020 and 2021. and April and reflect continued deterioration of
B. Denotes IEA forecasts for global oil demand. X-axis denotes the forecasted quarter. Legend
denotes month-year in which forecast is published. the outlook in the global economy recently
C. H1 and H2 denote monthly period averages of the first and second half of 2019.
D. Crude oil production. GCC includes 6 economies.
(Arezki et al. 2020; Chapter 1). Oil exporters
E. Policy rate refers to overnight deposit rate. Inflation refers to year-on-year consumer price inflation. suffer from the plunge in oil prices and ongoing
Reserves denote gross official reserves. Equity index denotes the EGY 100 index. Reserves are
based on quarterly data. domestic outbreaks of the pandemic (Figure
F. MSCI emerging market share price indexes.
Click here to download data and charts.
2.4.2.A). Oil importers suffer spillovers from
weakness in advanced economies and major
EMDEs, pandemic-related disruptions, and falling
tourism. Moderating inflation in much of the
region has provided room for monetary authorities
in some economies to loosen policy rates to
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 MID D LE E AS T AN D NO RTH AFRIC A 89
mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the real FIGURE 2.4.2 MENA: Outlook and risks
economy (Figure 2.4.2.B). The baseline outlook The outlook in large MENA economies is weighed heavily by the pandem-
for the region rests upon the assumptions that the ic, although moderate inflation in parts of the region allows some space for
pandemic subsides somewhat later in the year, and additional monetary easing. Oil importers are reliant on tourism activity and
are vulnerable to further decline in tourist arrivals and global disruptions.
that geopolitical tensions do not escalate further. The capacity for an effective response by health systems varies widely,
making some large economies unprepared for an intensification of infection
Among oil exporters, output in 2020 is expected rates. Conflict-related risks in fragile economies have not subsided.
June) has been disrupted by the pandemic, while health and oil shocks are likely to be amplified by
other smaller oil importers grapple with additional structural impediments (e.g., low diversification)
shocks to growth (e.g., balance of payments in and weigh on job creation and long-term growth
Lebanon). Firms in smaller oil importers are also prospects in the region (Arezki et al. 2020; Baduel,
expected to suffer from anemic demand and global Geginat, Pierre 2019; Jaller, Sophia, Martin
disruptions, given some reliance on foreign- 2020). These shocks also increase the difficulty of
sourced inputs (Figure 2.4.2.D). Weak financial implementing long-term growth strategies in the
system balance sheets and high public debt have region, including those that foster energy
further compounded the financial stability, sustainability (World Bank 2019d).
growth, and humanitarian challenges faced by the
smaller oil importers. Lower oil prices could Negative spillovers from major trading partners
provide some relief to oil importers’ current are already significant and could intensify.
accounts, but high volatility in oil prices is The Euro Area is an important export destination
weighing on investment and confidence, limiting for economies in the Maghreb region, and China
their benefits. is an important source of trade and investment for
some large oil exporters. Larger-than-expected
Medium-term growth prospects for the MENA growth spillovers from outside the region could
region are contingent upon no amplification of further set back MENA growth prospects via even
regional conflicts or their spillovers. Continued lower oil demand, weaker foreign direct
structural programs in many economies (e.g., investment, and weaker intraregional remittance
Egypt’s private sector development, GCC’s flows (for which oil importers are reliant on the
diversification programs; Youssef et al. 2019) are GCC).
expected to encourage growth-enhancing
structural reforms (e.g., stronger fiscal manage- The recent sharp decline in oil prices and the
ment framework, water access), and reforms in the continued high uncertainty about their future path
financial sector are expected to continue to also pose an important risk to MENA’s short-term
strengthen the investment climate in the region. outlook. If this uncertainty lingers, business and
But success is contingent upon a sustained consumer confidence would be dampened further,
commitment to reforms, including by newly undermining efforts by oil importers to reform
formed governments (Mansour et al. 2020). their energy subsidies and enact fiscal adjustment
programs. Persistently low oil prices would also
Risks further erode MENA’s already weak fiscal space
and heavily constrain investment activity in the
Risks to the outlook are heavily tilted to the region, as oil prices and public investment often
downside. Thus far, Iran has experienced the comove closely in MENA (Albino-War, et al.
largest number of reported COVID-19 cases in 2014).
the region. Similar outbreaks in other economies
could impose broad-based damage to their In addition to the effects of the pandemic,
manufacturing and services sectors. Moreover, conflict-related risks in MENA remain high
widespread infections could exact a humanitarian (Figure 2.4.2.F). Conflicts in Syria and Libya have
toll, especially among the fragile economies (e.g., been complicated by military actions of external
Syria) where forced displacement and insecurity parties. The impact of conflict on Libya’s oil
leave populations already highly vulnerable. Many production could further contribute to volatility in
non-GCC economies also are ill-equipped to global oil markets. Yemen’s peace prospects are
respond owing to weak fiscal positions and heavily clouded by the instability of negotiated
inadequate health systems, leaving them in danger agreements among various parties. U.S.-Iran
of negative feedbacks between economic activity tensions have not eased appreciably even as both
and health outcomes (Figure 2.4.2.E). Moreover, countries attempt to cope with the effects of the
the adverse impacts of the simultaneous public pandemic.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 MID D LE E AS T AN D NO RTH AFRIC A 91
The pace of reform, especially in smaller oil the face of nearer-term pressures. If reform
importers, has been impeded by political initiatives are not integrated as part of COVID-19
challenges recently, including delays in the policy responses, further delays could hinder
formation of governments. COVID-19 has further medium and long-term growth prospects in the
clouded the prospects of reforms, as it adds region via lower rate of job creation and private
pressure to shift to non-reform policy priorities in sector development (Chapter 3).
TABLE 2.4.1 Middle East and North Africa forecast summary Percentage point
differences from January
(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise) 2020 projections
TABLE 2.4.2 Middle East and North Africa economy forecasts1 Percentage point
differences from January
(Real GDP growth at market prices in percent, unless indicated otherwise) 2020 projections
Industrial and services activity has plummeted in Tourism activity was on a path to recovery but
the region after global demand collapsed. This is became severely damaged by the pandemic. This
reflected in sharp decelerations in the purchasing includes sharp declines in tourist arrivals in
managers’ indexes and new export orders in India, economies like Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and
the largest regional economy (Figure 2.5.1.A). especially Maldives, where tourism directly and
Trade activity has sharply fallen across the region. indirectly accounts for more than two-thirds of
Sales and production in a number of key sectors in GDP. This includes a decline in arrivals from
regional economies (e.g., autos in Pakistan, China, a key market, since early in the year.
garment in Bangladesh) have been hit especially International travel bans and other restrictions
hard amid anemic demand. Business confidence in adopted by regional economies (e.g., airport
both manufacturing and services sectors have closure for arrivals in Sri Lanka) have further
contributed to the weakness in tourism.
FIGURE 2.5.1 SAR: Recent developments all major regional economies. These stimulus
The COVID-19 outbreak has significantly reduced industrial and services
packages have included health spending increases,
activities and confidence in the region. The pandemic has also rattled its direct transfers, social assistance, employment
financial markets, including some exchange rate depreciation. Inflation in protection, support for migrants and rural area
the region is now contained by subdued activity and low oil prices,
allowing room for monetary stimulus to help resuscitate activity and private workers, credit support for small and medium-
sector credit. sized enterprises, and food security measures.
A. India: Purchasing managers’ B. Pakistan: business confidence Financial markets in SAR have been rattled earlier
indexes surveys in the year by the global market turmoil associated
with the pandemic. Equity indexes tumbled and
capital flows in large economies have reversed
amid high investor risk aversion, with some
stabilization recently (Figure 2.5.1.C). Due to
balance of payment pressures, the exchange rates
of large economies have also deteriorated
somewhat (Figure 2.5.1.D). High financial market
uncertainty has contributed to delays in capital
spending in large corporate conglomerates.
C. Equity indices: SAR D. Exchange rates
Outlook
Growth in the region is projected to register a
contraction of -2.7 percent in 2020 and is marked
by high uncertainty (Table 2.5.1). Across the
region, pandemic mitigation measures will severely
Source: Haver Analytics, JPMorgan, World Bank. hinder consumption and services activity, while
A. IHS Markit Diffusion PMI indexes. New export orders are a subcomponent under the
manufacturing and services PMI indexes. high uncertainty about the pandemic will con-
B. State Bank of Pakistan business confidence indexes.
C. MSCI local currency share price indexes. “EMDE” denotes MSCI Emerging Market Index.
strain private investment. The sheer depth of
D. Parentheses indicate start month of event. “GFC” denotes global financial crisis. Bilateral USD
average monthly exchange rate. Columns denote percent depreciation relative to start month.
global contractionary activity in the current
E. CPI inflation (year-on-year monthly rate). environment will also weigh substantially on SAR
F. Monthly year-on-year growth of private sector credit.. Data for India refers to credit to the
commercial sector, for Bangladesh refers to deposit money banks and central bank’s claim to the activity, despite relatively more modest trade
private sector, for Pakistan refers to claims on public nonfinancial corporations and other sectors, and
for Sri Lanka refers to credit to corporations and private sector.
linkages with advanced economies than other
Click here to download charts and data. EMDE regions (Special Focus). Despite the rela-
tively low number of reported cases per capita,
COVID-19 infections are still rising in several
economies in the region (Figure 2.5.2.A). As a
result, the outlook is highly uncertain and subject
to large downside risks (Figure 2.5.2.B, Chapter 1).
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 SOUTH ASIA 95
In India, growth is estimated to have slowed to 4.2 FIGURE 2.5.2 SAR: Outlook and risks
percent in FY 2019/20 (the year ending in March- Growth in SAR is projected to contract as a result of the COVID-19
2020) and output is projected to contract by 3.2 pandemic, damaging consumption, tourism, and other services activities.
percent in FY2020/21, when the impact of Despite aggressive monetary policy, inadequate health systems and weak
infrastructure mean that a large-scale domestic outbreak of COVID-19
COVID-19 will largely materialize. Stringent could have humanitarian consequences. High debt could further
measures to restrict the spread of the virus, which compound global financial market stress and may hinder monetary policy
effectiveness. While low oil prices may provide some support, they will
heavily curtail activity, will contribute to the weaken remittance flows, especially from the Gulf Cooperation Council.
contraction. Spillovers from contracting global
growth and balance sheet stress in the financial
A. COVID-19 cases: 2020 B. Growth outlook
sector will also adversely impact activity, despite
some support from fiscal stimulus and continued
monetary policy easing (Figure 2.5.2.C).
The sharp decline in oil prices in 2020 could A continuation of recent disruptions in global
provide some support to the region, given sizable financial markets could further add pressure to
oil imports in India and Pakistan, and help vulnerable balance sheets of the banking and non-
cushion fiscal and current account balances. This banking financial sectors in several large
positive effect may be offset by falling remittance economies in the region (e.g., India). These
inflows from oil-exporting economies, however, as vulnerabilities include elevated non-performing
economies that host migrants from SAR struggle loan levels in many regional economies. Public
with the twin challenges of the pandemic and the banks in the SAR region have a large market
oil price collapse. These flows are expected to presence, which may help provide countercyclical
decline by about one-fifth in the SAR region this support during times of stress, but are also subject
year (World Bank 2020l). to inefficiencies associated with agency problems
and information asymmetry (World Bank 2020n;
Growth in 2021 is projected to recover to 2.8 Hossain, Jain, and Mitra 2013).
percent as pandemic mitigation measures are
rolled back and services and manufacturing High levels of debt among systemically important
activity resume. An expected tapering of global firms in some economies risk saddling
headwinds is expected to further support recovery governments with contingent liabilities should
of activity in the region. Lingering legacies from balance sheets deteriorate to the point that
the pandemic, such as slow revival of confidence government bailouts are needed, with adverse
and tourism activity, will still weigh on the pace of implications for future public debt sustainability.
this recovery, however. Government debt refinancing needs can be
vulnerable to deeper reversal of global capital flows
Risks and higher global financial market uncertainty. A
further pullback in capital flows would likely
Risks to the outlook are heavily titled to the reduce investment activity and private sector credit
downside. The most acute of these risks are growth. Corporate balance sheet weakness in
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. regional economies could also hinder capital
Although reported COVID-19 outbreaks in SAR investment. High debt and deficits, as well as
have started later and remain smaller in per capita inadequate fiscal management regimes across the
terms compared to most other regions, they are region, also limit the scope and effectiveness of
expanding at a faster pace. Coupled with fiscal stimulus (Goretti et al. 2019; Figure
widespread mobility restrictions, this could result 2.5.2.E). In some instances, financial sector
in humanitarian consequences, given the region’s support due to COVID-19 could raise financial
high population, large informal sectors, high sector risks by stressing the capacity of commercial
inequality, and underdeveloped health systems banks to support private-sector credit.
(Special Focus). Besides the potential for
substantial loss of lives, there is a risk that the Spillovers from major trading partners could be
pandemic will trigger a long-lasting rise in poverty, more severe than expected. Despite the limited
especially among the low-income countries in the integration of SAR into global value chains relative
region. This could occur through food shortages, to regions such as East Asia and Pacific or Europe
for example, if supply disruptions raised food and Central Asia, the region is still somewhat
prices to unaffordable levels. Estimates for selected reliant on countries abroad for intermediate inputs
areas in the region suggest that those that face in some sectors (e.g., Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical
food insecurity could be a significant share of and textile sector; India’s auto sector). Economies
population in vulnerable economies (UN 2020). like Nepal are also vulnerable to sharper-than-
Inadequate infrastructure, such as existing major expected deceleration in India, an important intra-
constraints to electricity access, can magnify the regional trade partner (Masha and Ding 2012,
negative impacts of lockdowns via low World Bank 2016). Permanent loss in gross
productivity and poor service delivery (Figure value-added supply chain linkages after the fading
2.5.2.D). of the pandemic could damage medium-term
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 SOUTH ASIA 97
growth prospects of SAR via lower productivity regional economies are heavily dependent on these
(Chapter 3). types of remittance flows, a large portion of which
is from MENA, especially in the Gulf Co-
Further volatility in oil prices and even more operation Council. Although these flows are often
severe contracting activity in economies in the countercyclical, that’s unlikely to be the case in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) could current environment given the highly synchro-
further curtail remittance flows from South Asian nized nature of the global shock (World Bank
expatriate workers (many of whom work in the 2020b; Figure 2.5.2F).
Gulf economies) to their home countries. Many
EMDE South Asia, GDP3 6.5 6.5 4.7 -2.7 2.8 -8.2 -3.1
PPP GDP 6.5 6.5 4.7 -2.8 2.8 -8.3 -3.1
Private consumption 6.4 7.2 4.5 -2.6 3.3 -8.4 -3.0
Public consumption 12.1 8.7 10.8 8.4 6.3 0.6 -1.3
Fixed investment 5.8 11.2 -0.1 -8.2 1.2 -14.6 -5.3
Exports, GNFS4 4.8 10.2 0.3 -12.5 4.1 -17.7 -1.8
Imports, GNFS4 14.1 13.2 -5.8 -13.6 2.6 -18.4 -3.5
Net exports, contribution to growth -2.6 -1.6 1.8 1.1 0.1 1.4 0.6
Memo items: GDP2 16 /17 17 /18 18 /19e 19 /20f 20 /21f 19 /20f 20 /21f
South Asia excluding India 5.8 6.0 5.1 2.1 -0.7 -2.7 -5.4
India 8.3 7.0 6.1 4.2 -3.2 -0.8 -9.0
Pakistan (factor cost) 5.2 5.5 1.9 -2.6 -0.2 -5.0 -3.2
Bangladesh 7.3 7.9 8.2 1.6 1.0 -5.6 -6.3
Fiscal year basis1 16 /17 17 /18 18 /19e 19 /20f 20 /21f 19 /20f 20 /21f
Bangladesh 7.3 7.9 8.2 1.6 1.0 -5.6 -6.3
Bhutan 6.3 3.8 3.9 1.5 1.8 -4.1 -5.8
India 8.3 7.0 6.1 4.2 -3.2 -0.8 -9.0
Nepal 8.2 6.7 7.0 1.8 2.1 -4.6 -4.4
Pakistan (factor cost) 5.2 5.5 1.9 -2.6 -0.2 -5.0 -3.2
FIGURE 2.6.1. SSA: Recent developments programs (Rwanda, South Africa), or deployed a
COVID-19 has spread throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and pushed regional
variety of macroprudential measures to enable
activity into contraction due to necessary but disruptive domestic financial institutions to support distressed
containment measures and weakening external demand. Industrial borrowers (Ghana, Madagascar, Nigeria, South
commodity exporters have also faced deteriorating terms of trade as most
commodity prices declined sharply. Heightened risk aversion has led to Africa; Figure 2.6.1.F).
sharp rises in sovereign borrowing costs and large currency depreciations.
A variety of monetary and macroprudential policies have been Most countries have also announced fiscal
implemented to help support activity.
measures to support activity and buttress health
sector responses to the pandemic. However, given
A. COVID-19 infections in SSA B. Median purchasing managers
indexes for SSA countries binding fiscal policy constraints, these measures
have often involved reprioritization of existing
budgets. To help alleviate funding shortfalls,
international financial institutions have called on
bilateral creditors to temporarily suspend debt
payments from fiscally constrained low-income
countries. They have also made emergency
support packages available to assist governments;
however, given the scale of the pandemic, further
external assistance from the broader global
C. Commodity prices D. Change in sovereign borrowing development community appears necessary.
costs in 2020
Outlook
As a result of these severe economic strains,
activity in the region is expected to contract by 2.8
percent this year—the sharpest contraction on
record and 5.8 percentage points weaker than
previous forecasts (Figure 2.6.2.A). The fall in per
capita GDP is bound to be even deeper, likely
E. Exchange rates versus the U.S. F. Monetary and macroprudential causing millions in the region to fall back into
dollar policy measures in SSA during the
COVID-19 pandemic
extreme poverty (Lakner et al. 2020; Figure
2.6.2.B).
(Walker et al. 2020; Figure 2.6.2.C). The region FIGURE 2.6.2 SSA: Outlook and risks
also has large populations with underlying health Activity is forecast to contract sharply this year as a result of COVID-19. A
conditions that elevate their risk of developing longer lasting and more severe pandemic would trigger an even deeper
complications in case of infection, only partly recession in the region. Falling per capita incomes will reverse some of the
progress in poverty reduction. Governments’ ability to contain the virus is
offset by a relatively young population (Figures limited by weak and underfunded health care systems. Large populations
2.6.2.D and E). with existing underlying health conditions are at greater risk of developing
complications in the event of infection, although the region’s generally
young population helps alleviate some of this risk. Rising fiscal burdens are
Pandemic-control measures such as social expected to cause significant debt sustainability concerns.
distancing and self-isolation are made more
challenging to implement by the fact that the A. GDP growth B. Growth per capita
majority of workers in most countries are in the
informal economy and depend on daily incomes
that are insufficient to stockpile food and other
essential items (World Bank 2019c, Special
Focus 1). For many, living conditions are also not
suited to these measures, as more than two-thirds
of urban populations live in crowded slums, and
necessities like water are often accessed at
communal points (World Bank 2020o). Without
external assistance, constrained fiscal space across C. Health care indicators in SSA D. Tuberculosis incidence and HIV
most of the region also limits governments’ ability prevalence
In South Africa, activity is expected to contract by prices and demand. Of those countries in the
7.1 percent this year—the deepest contraction in a highest quartile of growth in 2020, more than 80
century and 8 percent weaker than previously percent are agricultural commodity exporters.
forecast—as stringent but necessary domestic With the impact of the pandemic assumed to have
containment measures, including an extended faded by next year, the recovery in agricultural
national lockdown, have severely disrupted commodity exporters is expected to be
activity. Growth is expected to rebound in 2021, underpinned by investment in infrastructure,
helped in part by the government’s announced 10 greater export diversification, and continued
percent-of-GDP fiscal stimulus package to soften implementation of reforms to improve business
the impact of the pandemic and help set the stage environments (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia,
for a robust recovery. The recovery could gain Rwanda, Senegal, Togo). However, an expected
further traction if planned structural reforms are fall in foreign direct investment amid the global
implemented, including plans to improve public recession, as well as tighter financial conditions,
investment management and to encourage greater could delay the delivery of infrastructure projects
private-sector participation in infrastructure in these economies.
development. However, prospects for faster
growth over the medium term are likely to be The financing of current account deficits has
constrained by needed fiscal tightening and will become more difficult this year, as heightened risk
continue to be dampened by persistent power- aversion has caused significant capital outflows
supply disruptions and the need for extensive and tighter financial conditions. This is
maintenance and repair work on the national grid. particularly challenging for countries dependent
on portfolio inflows (Nigeria, South Africa), or
Elsewhere in the region, growth prospects have official development assistance (Central African
also been eroded. Among commodity importers, Republic, Malawi). Several countries also depend
activity is forecast to contract particularly sharply on remittance inflows, which are expected to slow
this year—despite the oil price collapse improving markedly (Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria,
their terms of trade—as international travel Uganda). If these conditions were to continue for
restrictions weigh heavily on large tourism sectors a prolonged period, the lack of access to external
in several of these economies (Cabo Verde, financing could weigh heavily on foreign reserves,
Mauritius, Seychelles). Activity in industrial while those without adequate buffers could face
commodity exporters is also expected to contract balance of payment stress.
notably in 2020, as domestic disruptions from the
pandemic are compounded by low prices and Fiscal deficits in the region are projected to
demand for oil and metals (Angola, Democratic deteriorate sharply this year—doubling on average
Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, to roughly 5 percent of GDP (Figure 2.6.2.F).
Republic of Congo, Sudan). With commodity Larger deficits reflect increased public spending to
prices projected to remain depressed, the recovery help limit the transmission and economic
in these economies is expected to be sluggish. In consequences of the virus, sharp falls in revenue as
Senegal, oil and gas production was projected to mitigation and other control measures have
come on stream in 2022; however, these capacity- dampened activity, higher interest payments, and
enhancing investments have been delayed to at in some instances, the impact of weaker exports on
least 2023 amid pandemic-related disruptions. government revenues (Angola, Cabo Verde,
Republic of Congo, Seychelles).
Among agricultural commodity exporters, growth
is projected to all but collapse this year, falling by Risks
roughly two-thirds, on average, from 2019 growth
rates. Although exports of agricultural goods have Risks are firmly to the downside. Given the
suffered from the collapse in global demand, these underlying vulnerability of the region, a longer
economies are somewhat more insulated from the lasting and more severe pandemic would trigger an
effects of sharply lower industrial commodity even deeper recession in the region and have
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 103
devastating effects on the health and well-being of There are also growing concerns that the COVID-
the region’s population. It would also have long 19 pandemic may cause a food security crisis in
lasting effects on development and growth, as has the region. Before the pandemic, 72 million
been the case during previous epidemics people across 35 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Chapter 1; World Bank 2014; World Bank were already in food crisis, with many millions on
2020o). Even if the current pandemic is the verge of falling into acute food insecurity
successfully contained, a second wave of infections (WFP 2020). Border closures and other trade-
could erupt within the region, especially if the restrictive policies, such as export bans for
easing of current measures to mitigate the spread domestic stockpiling, are disrupting trading in
of the virus is not guided by the evolution of the food and agricultural products (World Bank
pandemic. 2020o). Shortages could also induce food price
spikes that may further exacerbate poverty (World
COVID-19 is also expected to markedly increase Bank 2019c).
the vulnerability of the region to debt distress.
Government debt had already risen to 60 percent The region’s large and growing number of
of GDP, on average, in 2019—almost double the displaced populations—mostly due to conflict,
level in 2013. The composition of debt had also violence, and insurgencies—could curtail efforts to
become riskier, with a greater share owed to non- mitigate the spread of COVID-19 (Burkina Faso,
concessional lenders at a higher cost (Calderón Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
and Zeufack 2020). These strains will be Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia; Dahab et al.
compounded by the increased borrowing required 2020; Refugees International 2020). The virus is
to fund larger deficits. In addition, borrowing likely to spread rapidly among displaced people, as
costs across the region have risen sharply given they mostly live in densely populated camps or
heightened risk aversion, placing further pressure informal settlements, where access to basic
on fiscal capacity. Significantly larger, and more sanitation and health care is limited.
expensive, government debt burdens than last year
mean that the risk of sovereign debt defaults has There is also a risk that violence and social unrest
increased, and may rise further if the projected may erupt as a result of the pandemic, weighing
recovery in activity were to disappoint. further on mitigation efforts and activity. Critical
peacekeeping missions in many countries may lose
Severely constrained government resources, as well momentum if governments are forced to refocus
as restrictions due to social-distancing measures, their efforts toward the pandemic and its
could lead to a loss of critical public services associated mitigation measures, which could create
during the pandemic and further weigh on room for insurgencies to gain greater footholds in
activity. These include provision of water, vulnerable areas. Moreover, rising unemployment,
electricity, and normal health care services. falling incomes, and potential shortages of
Evidence suggests that during the 2014-16 Ebola essential items such as food could likely lead to
crisis in West-Africa, mortality rates unrelated to social unrest and instability in several countries
the Ebola disease increased (Menéndez et al. that may continue to weigh on activity even after
2015). the pandemic has faded.
104 CHAPTER 2.6 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
EMDE SSA, GDP 1 2.6 2.6 2.2 -2.8 3.1 -5.8 0.0
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars) -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -5.3 0.5 -5.6 0.0
(Average including countries with full national accounts and balance of payments data only) 2
EMDE SSA, GDP2,3 2.6 2.5 2.2 -2.8 3.1 -5.7 0.0
Net exports, contribution to growth 1.4 -1.6 0.1 -1.1 0.2 -0.8 0.3
SSA excluding Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola 4.8 4.4 3.7 -0.3 4.1 -4.9 -0.6
Spillovers to South Asia.” IMF Working Paper 12/56, Wang, G, Y. Zhang, J. Zhao, J. Zhang, and F. Jiang.
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 2020. “Mitigate the Effects of Home Confinement on
Children During the COVID-19 Outbreak.” The
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Langer. 2015. “Ebola Crisis: The Unequal Impact on
Women and Children's Health.” The Lancet Global Youssef, H., S., Alnashar, B. Hamed, J. Erian, A.
Health 3 (3). Elshawarby, C. Zaki. 2019. Egypt Economic Monitor:
From Floating to Thriving – Taking Egypt’s Exports to
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and New Levels. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Development). 2017. “Hungary: Trade and Investment
Statistical Note.” Organisation for Economic Co- World Bank. 2014. The Economic Impact of the 2014
operation and Development, Paris. Ebola Epidemic: Short- and Medium-Term Estimates for
West Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2020. “COVID-19 in Latin America and the
Caribbean.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation ———. 2016. Global Economic Prospects: Spillovers
and Development, Paris. amid Weak Growth. January. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
Park, D., and K. Shin. 2015. “Financial Integration in
Asset and Liability Holdings in East Asia.” ADB ———. 2019a. “Ukraine Economic Update.” Spring.
Economic Working Paper 444, Asian Development World Bank, Washington, DC.
Bank, Manila, Philippines.
———. 2019b. “Kazakhstan Economic Update:
Refugees International. 2020. “COVID-19 and the Sustaining Growth Momentum.” World Bank,
Displaced: Addressing the Threat of the Novel Washington, DC.
Coronavirus in Humanitarian Emergencies.” Issues
Brief. Refugees International, Washington, DC. ———. 2019c. Global Economic Prospects: Darkening
Skies. January. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Shmis, T., A. Sava, J. E. N. Teixeira, and H. A.
Patrinos. 2020.” Response Note to COVID-19 in
———. 2019d. Gulf Economic Update. Economic
Europe and Central Asia: Policy and Practice
Diversification for a Sustainable and Resilient GCC.
Recommendations.” World Bank, Washington, DC.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Smith, K., M. Goldberg, S. Rosenthal, L. Carlson, J.
———. 2020a. World Development Report 2020:
Chen, C. Chen, S. Ramachandran. 2014. “Global Rise
Global Value Chains: Trading for Development in the
in Human Infectious Disease Outbreaks.” Journal of the
Age of Global Value Chains. Washington, DC: World
Royal Society 11 (101): 20140950.
Bank.
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development). 2020. “Coronavirus Could Shrink ———. 2020b. East Asia and Pacific Economic Update:
Global FDI by 5% to 15%.” Press release available at East Asia and Pacific in the Time of Covid-19. March.
https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx? Washington, DC: World Bank.
OriginalVersionID=2299.
———. 2020c. “Business Cycles.” Mimeo, World
United Nations. 2020. Global Report on Food Crises. Bank, Washington, DC.
World Food Programme. New York: United Nations.
———. 2020d. Global Economic Prospects: Slow
UNWTO (United Nations World Tourism Organiza- Growth, Policy Challenges. January. Washington, DC:
tion). 2020. “World Tourism Barometer.” May. World Bank.
United Nations World Tourism Organization, Madrid.
———. 2020e. China Economic Update. June
Walker, P. G. T., C. Whittaker, O. Watson, M. (forthcoming). Washington, DC: World Bank.
Baguelin, K. E. C. Ainslie, S. Bhatia, S. Bhatt et al.
2020. “The Global Impact of COVID-19 and ———. 2020f. “Europe and Central Asia Economic
Strategies for Mitigation and Suppression.” Imperial Update: Fighting COVID-19.” Washington, DC,
College COVID-19 Response Team, London. World Bank.
108 CHAPTER 2 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
———. 2020g. Russia Economic Report. June ———. 2020l. “COVID-19 Crisis Through a
(forthcoming). Washington, DC: World Bank. Migration Lens.” Migration and Development Brief 32.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2020h. Turkey Economic Monitor. June
(forthcoming). Washington, DC: World Bank. ———. 2020m. Semiannual Report of the Latin
America and Caribbean Region: The Economy in the
———. 2020i. “Western Balkans Regular Economic Time of Covid-19. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Report: The Economic and Social Impact of COVID-
19.” Spring. Washington, DC: World Bank. ———. 2020n. South Asia Economic Focus: The Cursed
Blessing of Public Banks. Spring. Washington, DC:
———. 2020j. “Moldova Economic Update.” Spring. World Bank.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2020k. The COVID-19 Pandemic: Shocks to ———. 2020o. Africa’s Pulse: Assessing the Economic
Education and Policy Responses. Washington, DC: Impact of COVID-19 and Policy Responses in Sub-
World Bank. Saharan Africa. April. Washington, DC: World Bank.
SPECIAL FOCUS
Regional Macroeconomic
Implications of COVID-19
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S P EC IAL FO CU S 111
The rapid rise of COVID-19 cases, together with the wide range of measures to slow the spread of the virus, has
slowed economic activity precipitously in many emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).
Economic disruptions are likely to be more severe and protracted in those countries with larger domestic
outbreaks, greater exposure to international spillovers (particularly through exposure to global commodity and
financial markets, global value chains, and tourism), and larger pre-existing challenges such as informality.
Growth forecasts for all regions have been severely downgraded; Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) in particular have large downgrades partly because of the size of their domestic
outbreaks and exposure to global spillovers, while South Asia’s substantial downgrade is primarily the result of
stringent lockdown measures. Many countries have avoided more adverse outcomes through sizable fiscal and
monetary policy support measures. Despite these measures, per capita incomes in all EMDE regions are expected
to contract in 2020, likely causing many millions to fall back into poverty.
While these measures are necessary, they have Recent reports from international institutions have
severely disrupted economic activity among provided an initial assessment of the impact of the
EMDEs. The magnitude of disruption varies, pandemic on regional prospects (ADB 2020; EDB
however, according to the scale of the domestic 2020; IDB 2020; IMF 2020; World Bank 2020a,
outbreak, the vulnerability of the economy to 2020b, 2020d, 2020e, 2020f). These publications
spillovers from global weakness, and the severity of converge on several common points: the pandemic
pre-existing issues such as debt and informality. In will have a large impact through multiple
response, EMDE central banks and governments channels, no region will be unaffected, growth
have implemented a wide range of policy measures forecasts are highly uncertain, and support from
to limit the economic and financial fallout. policymakers is essential. This special focus builds
on the existing regional analysis with the following
In this context, this special focus addresses the specific contributions. First, it provides an up-to-
following questions: date, concise, and cross-regional update of the
latest developments. Second, it discusses how
Note: This Special Focus was prepared by Patrick Kirby and Rudi
important vulnerabilities—such as exposure to
Steinbach. The box on the impact of COVID-19 on global value commodity and financial markets, global value
chains was prepared by Patrick Kirby and Maryla Maliszewska, and chains and tourism, as well as informality—differ
includes simulation results prepared by Maryla Maliszewska, Aaditya
Mattoo, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe. Research assistance by region. Third, it summarizes the health,
was provided by Yushu Chen, Hrisyana Doytchinova, Fuda Jiang, monetary and fiscal policy responses in each
Maria Hazel Macadangdang, Julia Renee Roseman Norfleet, Ceylan
region. Finally, it assesses how the combination of
Oymak, Vasiliki Papagianni, Maria Filipa Seara E. Pereira, and
Kaltrina Temaj. incoming information, pre-existing data, and
1 The World Bank groups EMDEs into six geographical regions.
policy responses combine into a forecast for
They are East Asia Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA),
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North
regional growth, with important implications for
Africa (MENA), South Asia (SAR), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). the poverty outlook.
112 S P EC IAL FO CU S G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
The pandemic and health Malaysia, and the Philippines fell to 27.4,
31.2, and 31.6, respectively.
policy responses
• ECA. Europe and Central Asia (ECA) has the
Spread of the pandemic. As of early June, there second largest outbreak, after Latin America
have been over 6 million confirmed COVID-19 and the Caribbean (LAC), with 770,000
cases globally, of which almost one-half are in cases, of which about one-half are in Russia
EMDEs (Figure 2.1.1.A). The rising number of and a further one-fifth in Turkey. The virus
infections in EMDEs represents a third global has been confirmed as the cause of 15,000
wave of COVID-19 outbreaks, following an initial deaths in the region, but excess mortality
wave in China and neighboring countries that has statistics suggest the true human toll could be
largely subsided and a second wave in advanced much higher. PMIs in the region fell sharply
economies that is slowing. The scale of the EMDE in April as the pandemic spread: The
wave is likely being substantially understated, as manufacturing indexes for Poland, Russia,
testing capacity is limited in EMDEs—when and Turkey fell to 31.9, 31.3, and 33.4,
available, tests are often restricted to include only respectively.
patients with existing symptoms or those who
have been in contact with a known case (Figure • LAC. The region initially accounted for a
SF.1.B and SF.1.C). About 100,000 deaths in small share of COVID-19 cases in EMDEs
EMDEs have been attributed to COVID-19 but but has recently become the new epicenter as
this too may be an under-estimate given generally outbreaks in the region have spread rapidly.
weaker health care capacity and difficulties in Of the region’s roughly 1 million infections,
tracing deaths outside of hospitals. Excess one-half are in Brazil. Large outbreaks are also
mortality statistics suggest such under-estimation occurring in Peru, Chile, Mexico, and
could be large. Ecuador. More than 50,000 deaths have been
officially reported as a result of the virus.
Cases first mounted in East Asia Pacific (EAP) and Activity in Mexico fell 6.2 percent in 2020Q1
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (q/q saar), while the composite PMI for Brazil
(especially the Islamic Republic of Iran) but have fell to 26.5 in April.
since then spread rapidly in other regions, with
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lagging. At this point, • MENA. In MENA, the virus was first
the largest regional outbreak is in LAC, followed recorded in the United Arab Emirates in late
closely by ECA. January, but began spreading rapidly in Iran
after the first cases were identified there mid-
• EAP. In EAP, there are currently about February. The region currently has about
140,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases as the 450,000 confirmed cases, of which around
virus has spread rapidly within some of the one-third are in Iran. Sizable outbreaks have
region’s large economies. In addition to the also occurred in Saudi Arabia (87,000), Qatar
84,000 cases in China, notable outbreaks are (58,000), and the United Arab Emirates
occurring in Indonesia, the Philippines, and (35,000). Over 11,000 people in the region
Malaysia, with a combined 55,000 cases. are reported to have lost their lives due to the
Close to 7,500 people in the region are virus. Non-oil activity has decelerated sharply
reported to have died from the virus. Most in large regional economies.
economies in the region contracted in the first
quarter—including China, where output fell • SAR. The pandemic reached SAR later than
35 percent (q/q saar) in 2020Q1, the first some other regions, but the incidence of cases
drop since 1976. While China’s purchasing is rising rapidly. The number of confirmed
manager indexes (PMIs) partially rebounded COVID-19 cases has risen to around 350,
at the start of the second quarter, those in 000, with more than 8,000 people having
other countries reached unprecedented lows in died as a result. While limited testing capacity
April; manufacturing PMIs in Indonesia, may understate the true scale of the regional
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S P EC IAL FO CU S 113
Mitigation measures. To help mitigate the spread E. Stringency of government response F. Contact tracing
to COVID-19 and workplace mobility
of the virus, most EMDEs have implemented
necessary but severely disruptive measures (Figure
SF.1.D). These have included school closures in
more than 100 countries, restrictions on non-
essential business activities, prohibitions of public
gatherings, suspension of public transport,
restrictions on movement, border closures, and
travel bans. Traffic data show that regions with
more stringent containment measures have less Source: Hale et al. 2020; Johns Hopkins University; Oxford University; Our World in Data; World Bank.
activity around workplaces (Figure SF.1.E). Note: EMDE = Emerging Market and Developing Economies, EAP = East Asia and Pacific, ECA =
Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean, MNA = Middle East and North
Africa, SAR = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
A. Last observation is May 29, 2020.
Many EMDEs face challenges in implementing B. Bars reflect tests per 100,000 people in each region (for countries that report testing data) as a
some of these measures. In regions such as SAR percent of those in advanced economies. Red markers reflect confirmed COVID-19 cases per
100,000 people in each region as a percent of those in advanced economies. For tests (cases), the
and SSA, where the majority of workers are in the sample includes the following number of economies per region: EAP 6 (13); ECA 11 (22); LAC 12 (32);
MNA 5 (19), SAR 4 (8), and SSA 9 (46). Last observation is May 28, 2020.
informal economy and depend on daily incomes C. “Open public testing” is aggressive testing such as in a “drive-through” and available to everyone.
“Testing if symptoms” refers to testing anyone who shows COVID-19 symptoms. “Limited testing” is
that are insufficient to stockpile food and other when an individual is showing symptoms and meets a specific criterion (e.g. key workers, admitted to
hospital, came in contact with a known case or came from overseas). “No policy” refers to having no
essential items, social-distancing and self-isolation testing policy in place. Last updated on May 29, 2020. Individual countries may be several days older.
are difficult to implement (World Bank 2019a). D. Bars shows the peak level of stringency imposed for each containment measure from January to
May. The diamond markers indicate the latest level of stringency for each measure. The yellow lines
In many countries, living conditions are also not indicate the share of countries who have recommended or implemented the containment measure,
without weighting by the level of stringency or whether the measure was targeted to a region or was
suited to these measures, especially for those who at the national level. Each letter on the x-axis corresponds to a containment measure. A = School
closings, B = Restrictions on gatherings, C = Stay-at-home requirements, and D = Restrictions on
live in crowded slums, and where necessities like international travel. The sample includes 154 EMDEs. Last observation is May 29, 2020.
E. Aggregates are calculated as medians. Sample includes 97 EMDEs for mobility and 136 EMDEs
water are often accessed at communal points for stringency. Last observation is May 25, 2020. Individual countries may be several days older.
(World Bank 2020a). F. “Limited contact tracing” is tracing not done for all cases. “Comprehensive contact tracing” is
tracing of all cases. Last observation is May 29, 2020. Individual countries may be several days older.
Click here to download data and charts.
114 S P EC IAL FO CU S G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
Survey indicators suggest the most stringent or required closing of non-essential businesses,
measures have been implemented in MENA but and restricted travel from heavily hit areas.
even in SSA, with limited state capacity,
mitigation measures have been introduced on a • LAC. The majority of countries have closed
broad scale. The most commonly used measures schools and partially or completely shut their
across EMDEs have been international travel borders to foreigners. Numerous countries
restrictions (74 percent of countries), shelter-in- (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
place orders and restrictions on internal mobility Honduras, Peru, Venezuela) have mandated
(71 percent), and school closures (68 percent). business closures and imposed large-scale
mobility restrictions. Some countries have
Of these measures, international travel restrictions, embarked on comprehensive contact tracing
shelter-in-place requirements, and restrictions on efforts, but such measures have generally been
internal mobility have been most broadly imposed limited in most of the region.
in MENA, LAC, and SSA. School closures have
been particularly broad-based in MENA, where • MENA. From late February, widespread and
virtually all countries have imposed such measures, highly stringent mitigation measures have
as well is in SAR and SSA (more than 85 percent). been implemented to help limit the spread
Many countries have also imposed restrictions on of infection. These include curtailing the size
the use of public transport, particularly in MNA of public gatherings, air travel restrictions
(95 percent), SAR (89 percent) and LAC (69 in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
percent). Cancellation of public events and that brought tourism to a halt, cancellation of
restrictions on the size of public gatherings have large international events, closing schools
been more stringent in MENA, LAC, SSA, and throughout the region, and shelter-in-place
ECA. Restrictions on non-essential work have requirements orders.
been broad-based in MENA and LAC, but
imposed in only about one-half of countries in • SAR. International travel bans and school
EAP and SSA. closures have been widespread in SAR
economies. Public transport has also been
To further help prevent the domestic spread of closed in two-thirds of countries. Near total
COVID-19, many countries have supplemented lockdowns in several regional economies
these social distancing measures with public severely hindered mobility and impeded
information campaigns, broad-based testing, and delivery of essential services. In Bangladesh,
contact tracing of individuals who were potentially large sections of the workforce left major cities
exposed to known cases. Contact tracing has been to return to their villages. Non-essential
most comprehensive in ECA, EAP and MENA businesses have been closed in Pakistan, and
(Figure SF.1.F). airports have been shut for arrivals in Sri
Lanka.
• EAP. Measures to mitigate the spread in these
economies have included the prohibition of • SSA. Stringent measures to mitigate the
mass gatherings, school closures, restrictions pandemic’s spread have been implemented in
on internal movement, shelter-in-place orders, most countries. These include school closures,
and travel restrictions, but have been less travel bans, border closures—national and
broadly imposed than in other regions (World provincial in some—and lockdowns of entire
Bank 2020b). countries or in other cases large cities. While
shelter-in-place orders have been broad-based,
• ECA. In response to domestic outbreaks, 20 they have still accommodated essential trips.
of the 24 countries in ECA have closed In about 6 percent of countries in the region,
schools since mid-March, and many have shut closing of non-essential businesses has been
international borders, issued shelter-in-place recommended, as opposed to required
orders, closed public transport, recommended (Malawi, Mauritania, Somalia).
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S P EC IAL FO CU S 115
payment pressures. In SSA, sovereign Exposure to global value chains. Regions are also
borrowing spreads have risen in South Africa, exposed to global spillovers through their
as sovereign debt lost its investment-grade participation in global value chains, which account
rating. By contrast, the increase in borrowing for about half of global trade and can propagate
costs in EAP has been less pronounced international shocks (Box SF.1). Regions with a
reflecting robust monetary, prudential, and greater prevalence of forward linkages such as
fiscal policy frameworks. ECA, MENA (mostly through oil), and SSA have
experienced substantial falls in demand and prices
• Corporates. More than a quarter of corporate for their exports (Figure SF.2.C).2 Regions with a
debt in the average EMDE is denominated in preponderance of backward linkages, such as EAP
foreign currency. Regions with greater and ECA, are vulnerable to disruptions in
exposure to foreign-currency corporate debt— production abroad leading to shortages of critical
ECA, LAC, and SSA—have tended to have inputs. PMIs in these regions have declined
larger currency depreciations, increasing debt sharply: in Vietnam and Poland, for example, the
service burdens (Figure SF.2.B). Informal headline PMI dropped 28 and 27 points between
SMEs, which are especially prevalent in SAR January and April, respectively. In LAC, the
and SSA, face a different problem: they often abrupt slowdown in China’s economy disrupted
face significant financing constraints that supply chains for Mexico and Brazil and caused a
prevent them from accessing the lending that sharp drop in exports from commodity-producing
would help keep them afloat during periods of economies. In ECA, supply chain disruptions and
economic weakness. falling demand have caused a collapse in exports
from the auto sector among the countries in
• Financial systems. The ability of banking
Central Europe and the Western Balkans
systems to withstand financing shocks varies
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Serbia). While it is
across regions. While MENA countries in the
less integrated in global value chains than some
Gulf Cooperation Council entered the crisis
other regions, SAR has experienced disruptions in
with relatively sound financial system buffers,
its textile, garments, and auto sectors.
SAR entered the crisis with weaker financial
sector balance sheets. Exposure to tourism. Regions that rely on tourism
• Households. Lost incomes are expected to are being adversely affected by widespread travel
weigh heavily on households, and may lead to restrictions and the associated collapse in tourist
difficulties with debt servicing which may arrivals in the first half of 2020. They also face
migrate to the financial system, for example large declines in services activity, particularly in
through a spike in mortgage defaults. food, entertainment, and retail services. This is
Household are also expected to lose incomes particularly important for many EAP and LAC
through falling remittances (World Bank countries, such as both regions’ small island
2020c). Recessions in the Euro Area and economies. Travel bans and changes in consumer
Russia will weigh on remittance inflows to behavior have led to a collapse in the number of
ECA, which averaged 10 percent of GDP in visitors to popular tourist destinations such as the
2019 and were as high as 30 percent for some Caribbean, North Africa, Southern Europe, and
countries. Similarly, the deep U.S. recession Pacific Island countries, among others. In all,
will substantially reduce remittances to global tourism is set to contract by about two-
Central America, while weakness in oil- thirds in March, which will weigh heavily on
exporting MENA countries will likely have
the same impact for countries in SAR and
2 Countries with forward linkages are those whose exports are not
EAP that supply many guest workers. In
fully absorbed in the importing country and are instead embodied in
addition to lost work for migrants, many the importing country’s exports to third countries (World Bank
money transfer agencies in either the origin or 2019b). Countries with backward linkages are those whose exports
embody value added previously imported from abroad, such as auto
recipient countries have closed as a result of
or electronics manufacturers, that process and then export inputs
lockdown measures. from abroad.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S P EC IAL FO CU S 117
One of the ways that the COVID-19 pandemic is disrupting economic activity is through its impact on global value chains
(GVCs), which can amplify the effects of shocks on trade, production, and financial markets. Workplace closures or transportation
difficulties have caused interruptions to the delivery of intermediate goods, severely affecting production in manufacturing
industries that practice lean inventory management. Governments have become concerned about shortages of essential products
from offshore sources. A simulation of the current crisis using a model with input-output linkages suggests that all countries and
almost all sectors will suffer a decline in exports, with worse outcomes in regions more dependent on international trade,
particularly through GVCs and tourism. In the wake of this shock, firms as well as countries may seek to reduce the risk exposure
of supply chains over the medium term by increasing the geographical diversity of their suppliers. Countries that wish to seize this
opportunity to become more integrated into GVCs could pursue sound government policies with respect to infrastructure
investment, education, and public health. The benefits to real incomes and welfare associated with GVC production have been
large, but could be undermined by a rise in protectionism.
A. Major economies’ share of global B. Latest mobility and production growth C. Latest mobility and production growth
aggregates data, by concentration of backward value data, by concentration of forward value
added in trade added in trade
Source: Google; Johns Hopkins University; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank; World Trade Organization.
Note: GVCs = global value chains. EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies. IP = industrial production.
A. Trade is the average of export and import volumes. “Euro Area top 4” is a weighted average of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. Sample includes 28 advanced
economies and 34 EMDEs, which represent 89 percent of global GDP. Data for GDP and trade are 2019 and industrial production is December 2019.
B.C. Countries are considered to have “low” forward value added if the domestic value added in foreign exports as a share of gross exports is less than 25 percent, and
“high” if above 25 percent. The same threshold applies for backward forward value added, in terms of the foreign value added share of gross exports. Last observation for
industrial production is March 2020. “Mobility” is the percent change in workplace mobility relative to the global median change for May 21st from baseline, which is the
median value for the corresponding day of the week during the 5-week period January 3-February 6, 2020, based on data from Google. Sample includes 32 advanced
economies and 23 EMDEs for the Mobility data and 29 advanced economies and 22 EMDEs for IP.
Click here to download data and charts.
provide relatively stronger support for non-tradable sectors spreads has made sharply more expensive (Bruno, Kim,
(Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein. 2011; Bénassy-Quéré et al. and Shin 2018). This would offset the edge in
2009; Bricogne et al. 2012; Bussière et al. 2011; Chor and competitiveness arising from the depreciation of their
Manova 2012). Sharp declines in trade through GVCs are currencies (Boz, Gopinath, and Plagborg-Møller 2018).
generally followed by rapid recoveries.1 For regions with significant backward linkages, such as
EAP and ECA, the increased cost of imported inputs also
The fact that trade flowing through GVCs is highly reduces the effect of exchange rate depreciation on
dependent on just-in-time delivery of critical components competitiveness (Ahmed, Appendino, and Ruta 2015).
from abroad may make it particularly vulnerable to the Disruptions to agri-food supply chains could lead to
interruptions of supply caused by regional quarantines, especially severe problems: food insecurity; health risks;
production shutdowns, and border controls implemented and social unrest. Many countries are suffering from
to slow the spread of COVID-19. GVCs are likely to shortages of chemicals, fertilizers, and seeds, which are
amplify the effects of the pandemic through other channels sometimes exacerbated by restrictions on exports by
as well. For example, they are particularly prominent in trading partners (World Bank 2020a). These pose a clear
the manufacture of durable goods, purchases of which can threat of smaller harvests, higher food prices, and rising
be postponed until consumers have more freedom to travel levels of poverty, with the most vulnerable of the world’s
and shop (Taglioni and Zavacka 2016). population most exposed.
Moreover, GVCs in emerging markets tend to be reliant
Which countries and sectors are more
on external U.S. dollar financing, which increases in risk
vulnerable?
1 This is known as the “bullwhip effect”, and takes place even when A global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
the negative shock is largely from demand (Altomonte et al. 2011). illustrates the heterogenous impact of COVID-19 on
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S P EC IAL FO CU S 119
output and trade, and the transmission channels. It Bank 2020d). Regions that are less integrated through
encompasses 20 countries, 7 regional country groups, and trade and tourism, such as SSA and LAC, are the least
29 economic sectors.2 The model incorporates GVCs affected. On a sectoral level, industries more integrated in
through input-output linkages and durable relationships in GVCs tend to suffer from more severe contractions in
production networks. Shocks applied identically to all activity (Figure SF.1.2.B). This aligns with the results of
countries for one year represent the economic impact of a other simulations (Sforza and Steininger 2020).
stylized representation of COVID-19:
Medium- and long-term implications
• Employment shock. A 3 percent drop in employment as
factory closures and social distancing force capital and The shock from COVID-19 comes at the same time as
workers into idleness. U.S.-China trade relations are once again deteriorating.
These shocks may well cause GVC participants to re-assess
• Trade cost shock. A 25 percent rise in the costs of all the viability of existing production networks, and explore
imports and exports, driven by a combination of whether they should increase the geographical diversify-
additional inspections, reduced hours of operation, cation of supply chains, or even reshore production
road and border closures, and increases in transport (Freund 2020). Efforts to force reshoring could damage
costs, among other factors. The Ebola crisis, in productivity and incomes, especially among EMDEs
comparison, caused an estimated 10-percent increase whose economic development and poverty reduction
in trade costs for affected countries (Evans et al. efforts have benefitted from their participation in GVCs
2015). (World Bank 2019b).
• Tourism shock. A sharp drop in international tourism, The current environment of global recession and
equivalent to approximately 25 percent, which aligns heightened risk aversion has been very unfavorable for
with the forecast of the World Travel and Tourism international trade. This poses a threat to the gains from
Council for 2020. trade through comparative advantage, specialization, and
economies of scale. Regions that are already well-integrated
• Services shock. A 15 percent switch in household in GVCs should take steps to ensure that they retain,
demand away from services requiring close human strengthen, or expand their attractiveness as participants in
interaction—such as mass transport, domestic GVCs, including by ensuring the free flow of their
tourism, restaurants, and recreational activities— manufactured goods across borders. In regions that are not
towards consumption of goods and other services. as well integrated, such as MENA, LAC, SAR and SSA,
the desire of companies to increase the geographic diversity
Short-term implications of their supply chains may provide an opportunity to
undertake the structural reforms that would encourage
The combination of four shocks in the simulation causes a greater integration (Engel, Winkler, and Farole 2016;
severe global recession. On a sectoral level, services affected World Bank 2019c).
by social distancing and tourism experience a sharper
decline than agriculture and manufacturing, as they are Policymakers more generally need to avoid the
negatively impacted by all four shocks. Country-specific implementation of trade restrictions that could reverse the
results show differences reflecting the composition of global welfare gains, including a large reduction in global
output and exports by sector and destination, as well as poverty, that GVCs have facilitated. Protectionism does
relative levels of openness, reliance on tourism, and not offer a solution to the problems of security of supply
endogenous changes in competitiveness. All countries highlighted by the pandemic, and countries with more
suffer a decline in exports (Figure SF.1.2.A). The EAP and GVC linkages tend to be more reluctant to impose trade
ECA regions are among the worst-affected, consistent with barriers (Blanchard, Bown, and Johnson 2017). Shortages
their significant exposure to GVCs and tourism (World would be even more likely in situations where offshore
suppliers are shut out, or where domestic suppliers lack the
technology and skills available offshore. During the crisis,
2 The model and the simulations are detailed in Maliszewska, Matoo,
offshore sourcing has posed less risk to supply in several
and van der Mensbrugghe (2020). This box describes the paper’s
amplified global pandemic scenario. The model used is ENVISAGE,
key sectors than has concentration of production in a few
calibrated to GTAP Version 10A. It is used in its comparative static large facilities (e.g., meat packing, medicines)—a reduced
specification, and uses 2014 as a reference year. reliance on foreign inputs often results in an increased
120 S P EC IAL FO CU S G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
A. Regional responses of GDP and exports B. Sectoral responses in a modeled COVID-19 shock, the case of Vietnam
to modeled COVID-19 shock
reliance on domestic inputs, which are also vulnerable to supply. The threat to profitability of GVCs provides in
disruption from the pandemic (Bonadio et al. 2020). The itself a market incentive to encourage transnational firms
most effective way to reduce such risks lies in in this direction. Sound government policies with respect
diversification of sources, which may well include some to infrastructure investment and improving governance,
reshoring, as well as a broadening of foreign sources of education, and public health, would facilitate the process.
regions where tourism accounts for a large share of challenging in the crowded settings of the urban
activity, such as MENA (5.5 percent), EAP (5.2 poor. The spread of COVID-19 is expected to
percent), and ECA (4.8 percent). cause the number of food insecure people to
double in 2020, worsening malnutrition and
Informality and food insecurity. In the average causing permanent developmental damage,
EMDE, informal activity accounts for one-third of especially in SSA where 20 percent of the
output and two-thirds of employment—and population is already undernourished (Figure
considerably more in SSA and SAR. This may SF.2.D; WFP 2020).
magnify both the health and economic impacts
from COVID-19 (Chapter 1; Box 1.4). Workers
and firms in the informal sector have limited Macroeconomic policy
options to buffer temporary income losses, and responses
often depend on daily incomes that are
insufficient to permit the accumulation of Regional outcomes also depend on countries
stockpiles of food or other essential items. having the space and ability to adopt and
Measures to slow the spread of the virus such as implement an effective policy response. Many
social distancing and self-isolation are more EMDEs have taken measures to support
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S P EC IAL FO CU S 121
households and firms through severe economic • ECA. About two-thirds of central banks in
downturns. ECA have eased their monetary policy stances
(Poland, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine,
Monetary and macroprudential policy measures Uzbekistan), and several have employed liq-
uidity measures to boost funding conditions
EMDE central banks and governments have (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Turkey).
implemented a wide range of policy measures to In Poland, the central bank has also started an
limit the economic and financial fallout of the asset purchase program, as have those in
pandemic (Figure SF.3.A). Prospects of reduced Hungary and Turkey. About 80 percent of
inflationary pressures during the remainder of this economies in the region have also adopted
year, helped by the collapse in oil prices and weak macroprudential measures to further support
demand, have aided policy easing efforts in many activity. These have included the easing of
countries. On aggregate, every region has provided regulatory capital buffers (Bulgaria, Hungary,
monetary easing through a variety of traditional Poland, Russia), banking fee reductions
and novel measures. Central banks have (Ukraine), loan repayment holidays (Russia),
aggressively cut monetary policy rates, with some and mandated capitalization last year’s
complementing this easing with unconventional banking sector profits. Although capital ratios
monetary policies such as asset purchase today are on average higher than before the
programs—a first for most EMDEs. In addition, global financial crisis, banking sector balance
they have provided liquidity to help resolve credit sheets in several ECA economies are more
crunches, and deployed an arsenal of impaired.
macroprudential measures to further support
lending. While the overall direction of monetary • LAC. Several economies in LAC aggressively
and macroprudential policy has been common cut their monetary policy interest rates (Brazil,
across all regions, a considerable degree of Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru). Brazil’s
variation stems from each region’s policy central bank has reduced the policy interest
framework and economic circumstances. rate by 150 bps since the start of the year, to a
historic low of 3 percent, while also easing
• EAP. Several economies in EAP implemented capital conservation buffers, reserve require-
conventional monetary policy rate cuts to help ments, and provisioning rules to increase
support activity (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, liquidity in the banking system. Mexico’s
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam). Relatively central bank has established several new
muted inflation in the region has further liquidity facilities for banks to ease constraints
aided policy efforts. To ease funding stresses, and enable lending to firms. The central
central banks also provided emergency banks of Brazil and Mexico have also
liquidity to markets (China, Philippines). benefited from a newly established temporary
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand also swap line with the U.S. Federal Reserve that
embarked on asset purchase programs that provides dollar liquidity equivalent to 17 and
would buy government securities worth an 32 percent of their international reserves.
estimated 1-2 percent of GDP. These Colombia and Chile have launched asset
measures have been further complemented by purchase programs valued at about 1 and 3
a variety of macroprudential measures, percent of GDP, respectively.
including the relaxation of regulatory capital
buffers (Indonesia, Malaysia), the lowering of • MENA. Many economies in MENA have
liquid-ity coverage ratios (Malaysia), and the eased their monetary policy stances (Egypt,
easing of Basel III net stable funding ratios. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). Among the Gulf
Heading into the COVID-19 shock, the Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, policy
banking sector in EAP is better capitalized and rates have also fallen, reflecting these
its balance sheets are stronger when compared economies’ peg to the U.S. dollar tying
to before the global financial crisis of 2008. changes in their policy stances to that of the
122 S P EC IAL FO CU S G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE SF.3 Policy measures Federal Reserve. Some countries have also
EMDEs have embarked on unprecedented monetary policy stimulus, used macroprudential measures to comple-
including liquidity measures and an array of macroprudential policies. A ment changes in their monetary policy
broad range of fiscal stimulus programs have also been announced that stances. However, scope for further
are expected to markedly widen already-large fiscal deficits. Government
debt is elevated in some regions, reducing fiscal room to maneuver. forbearance might be limited, as banking
Inflation is also expected to exceed central bank targets, weighing on the sector capital ratios in many non-GCC
scope for further monetary policy easing. Banking sectors across EMDE
regions are better capitalized today than before the global financial crisis,
MENA economies are vulnerable.
although some have been grappling with greater balance sheet
impairments. • SAR. Several central banks in SAR have also
lowered policy interest rates, aided by an
A. EMDE monetary and financial B. Fiscal support measures, by region
policy measures impending drop in inflation due to falling oil
prices (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka). These monetary policy actions have
been complemented with measures to provide
liquidity to financial markets and banking
systems in several economies. In India, the
central bank has been purchasing government
bonds to further ease financial conditions. In
Bangladesh, the central bank lowered the cash
reserve ratio and announced purchases of
C. Government debt, by region D. Expected inflation deviations from
targets in 2020 government securities from banks. Some
economies have also reverted to macro-
prudential measures to free up capital in the
banking system and help support borrowers.
These have included loan repayment holidays
(Bhutan, Sri Lanka), easing of regulatory
capital buffers (India), and lowering of
liquidity coverage ratios (Sri Lanka). Non-
performing loan ratios in SAR are however
E. Regulatory capital ratios by region F. NPLs by region
among the highest across EMDEs, on
average—reflecting existing financial sector
weaknesses. These could limit the scope for
further regulatory forbearance in some
economies.
Nigeria). Although several countries’ banking business support initiatives. Indonesia and the
sectors have stronger capital positions today Philippines have both announced sizable fiscal
than before the global financial crisis (Ghana, stimulus packages that range between 3-5
Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa), banking sector percent of GDP, which includes targeted
capitalization is slightly weaker in the region support to vulnerable groups. Sharply higher
on average—potentially limiting the scope for spending is expected to contribute markedly
leveraging macroprudential policies to provide to widening fiscal deficits in the region this
further support to activity. year, with the median deficit expected to
increase to 5 percent of GDP, from 2.2
Fiscal policy measures percent in 2019.
EMDEs have also implemented a wide range of • ECA. Sizable fiscal measures have also been
fiscal stimulus programs equivalent to around 5 announced in ECA—the fiscal deficit of the
percent of GDP in the EMDEs where they have median economy is projected to widen from 1
been announced (Figure SF.3.B). These measures percent in 2019 to 6.8 percent of GDP in
have been targeted at confronting the immediate 2020. In Poland, an economic package of
health crisis, as well as to limit the magnitude of around 12 percent of GDP will be aimed at
the economic contraction and to provide support boosting health care, expanding social
for the eventual recovery, and have included protection coverage, supporting wages, and
expansion of social protection, cash transfers to providing loan guarantees and credit
households, increased access to unemployment extensions. Measures in Turkey amount to 9
benefits, and wage subsidies to firms to protect percent of GDP and include increased health
jobs. To further support firms, policymakers have care spending, support for utility payments,
also provided access to credit, loan guarantees, and and increased social protection. In Georgia,
vouchers or cash for critical employers and announced fiscal measures are equivalent to 3
affected sectors such as tourism. However, elevated percent of GDP over the next few years and
debt-to-GDP ratios and large fiscal deficits in include additional health spending, support
many EMDEs is constraining their room to for the tourism sector, accelerated and
aggressively ease fiscal policy—particularly among increased VAT refunds, a moratorium on tax
some industrial commodity exporters, reflecting payments for low-income earners, subsidized
the loss of revenue due to the collapse in utility costs of the poor, and unemployment
commodity prices. Although most EMDEs have subsidies. In Kazakhstan, fiscal measures—on
managed to implement discretionary fiscal support and off-budget—amount to 5.7 percent of
packages, those with more fiscal space have GDP, while several other economies in the
generally provided greater support. region have announced similar measures that
range between 2-7 percent of GDP. These
• EAP. Several countries in EAP have include increased health care spending
announced large fiscal stimulus packages to (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Tajikistan,
help support activity. Measures in China Uzbekistan), tax payment deferrals
totaled 5.4 percent of GDP and included tax (Azerbaijan, Albania, Russia), support for
breaks and deferrals and special central and utility payments (Armenia), and employment
local government bond issuances. Malaysia protection (Armenia, Albania, Kazakhstan,
and Thailand have both implemented Russia), and expansion of social protection
extraordinary policy support packages coverage (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz
equivalent to around 17 and 13 percent Republic, Russia, Uzbekistan).
of GDP respectively, which included direct
fiscal stimulus packages of about 6 percent • LAC. The median fiscal deficit in the region is
of GDP in both countries. The remainder expected to nearly double this year to 5.2
covers health care, public welfare and the percent of GDP. Brazil’s announced fiscal
expansion of social protection, and other package of more than 8 percent of GDP
124 S P EC IAL FO CU S G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
includes income support measures for have announced fiscal, liquidity, and loan
vulnerable groups, tax deferments, and loan support measures, ranging from 3 to 10
guarantees, among others. Peru has percent of GDP. Measures in India include
announced a fiscal package equivalent to 7 spending on health care to bolster the
percent of GDP, which includes direct COVID-19 response, wage support, in-kind
transfers to poor households, deferrals of tax and cash transfers to lower-income
payments, and utility-payment support, households, deferral of tax payments, as well
among others. Fiscal measures in the region as loan and liquidity support for small
have targeted a range of areas, including businesses and financial institutions. In
health spending (Argentina, Chile, Pakistan, measures also include additional
Guatamala), tax payment deferrals (Chile), tax spending on health care, cash transfers, and
cuts (Jamaica), and loans or credit guarantees relief of utility payments. The fiscal support
to SMEs (Argentina, Chile), and enhanced package in Bangladesh includes subsidies on
employment protection (Argentina, Chile, interest payments for loans to businesses, loan
Guatamala). Governments in Mexico, guarantees equivalent to almost 2 percent of
Paraguay, and Honduras, and Uruguay have GDP, food distribution, targeted cash
provided support for SMEs, including transfers to the poor, additional procurement
through the provision of additional resources of rice and paddy, and an agricultural lending
to their development banks and other program. The median fiscal deficit in SAR is
financial institutions. Fiscal support has also foreseen to widen from 5.4 percent of GDP in
included the expansion of social protection 2019 to 6.9 this year.
coverage (Argentina, Brazil, Peru). In Brazil,
limited fiscal space has required reallocation of • SSA. Several countries in SSA have
expenditures toward income support and announced various fiscal measures to support
health spending. activity and buttress health sector responses to
the pandemic. However, given binding fiscal
• MENA. Announced fiscal policy responses policy constraints, these measures have mostly
have ranged between 1 and 13 percent of been smaller than in other EMDE regions and
GDP in MENA—a region hit hard by both often involved reprioritization of existing
the pandemic and the collapse in oil prices. As budgets (Cabo Verde, Nigeria, Zimbabwe).
a result, fiscal deficits in the region are The median fiscal deficit in the region is
expected to widen to 10 percent of GDP in projected to reach 5.1 percent of GDP this
2020, from 3.1 percent in 2019, on average. year, almost doubling from 2019. Despite
In the GCC economies, measures have severely constrained fiscal space and a recent
included health spending and social sovereign rating downgrade to sub-investment
protection spending increases, employment grade, the South African government has
protection measures, and support for service announced a near 10 percent-of-GDP fiscal
sectors like tourism. In several GCC support package, which includes loan
economies (e.g., Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United guarantees—equivalent to almost 4 percent of
Arab Emirates), packages also specifically GDP—measures to strengthen the health
provided relief for small and medium-sized sector, bolster sanitation infrastructure, and
enterprises. In non-GCC economies (e.g., relieve social distress, as well as tax relief.
Egypt, Iran), measures have focused on health Announced fiscal support in Ethiopia
spending, cash transfers, and social protection. equivalent to close to 2 percent of GDP will
With the collapse in oil prices weighing boost health care spending and assist in
further on fiscal positions in MENA, some emergency food distribution. In the Republic
support packages have entailed budgetary of Congo, the government’s 1.6 percent-of-
reallocations (Algeria, Saudi Arabia). GDP fiscal package is targeted at bolstering
the health system and includes tax payment
• SAR. In SAR, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh deferrals.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S P EC IAL FO CU S 125
To help alleviate funding shortfalls among the space in the third of the region’s economies
world’s poorest economies, many of which are in that are industrial commodity exporters
SSA, the World Bank and the IMF have called on (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan,
bilateral creditors to suspend debt payments from Turkmenistan). In some countries, however,
fiscally constrained countries. Both institutions elevated shares of foreign-currency-denom-
have also made emergency support packages inated debt could leave their debt burdens
available to assist governments; however, given the vulnerable to sharp depreciations. In over one-
scale of the pandemic, further external assistance half of economies in ECA—particularly
from the broader global development community among oil exporters—inflation is expected to
is imperative. exceed its target next year by a greater margin
than the EMDE median, likely constraining
Limitations on policy room to maneuver further easing of monetary policy.
Many economies have limited room to implement
• LAC. A few LAC economies have weak
additional fiscal and monetary stimulus. EMDE
foreign reserve buffers, with the region’s
government debt has risen sharply over the last
economies accounting for one-quarter of those
decade, rising to above 60 percent of GDP in
EMDEs in the bottom quartile for reserves-to-
one-third of EMDEs by 2019, while fiscal deficits
imports cover. There is wide heterogeneity,
were wider than 3 percent of GDP in 40 percent
however, as countries like Brazil have strong
of countries (Figure SF.3.C). Although inflation
reserve buffers. Reserve buffers in some
among EMDEs is expected to moderate as a result
countries with fixed exchange rates, such as
of the pandemic, inflation in many EMDEs is
the Caribbean islands, have also come under
projected to remain above central bank targets,
severe pressure amid the international
constraining these economies’ ability to ease
financial turmoil. A number of countries in
their monetary policy stances further (Figure
LAC also have large external financing
SF.3.D). In general, EMDE banking sectors were
requirements, exacerbating the limitations of
better capitalized in 2019 than they were before
low reserves.
the global financial crisis in 2008; however,
elevated balance sheet impairments in some
• MENA. The region’s disproportionate
regions could weigh on banks’ ability to extend
exposure to the collapse in oil prices is
much-needed credit to firms and households
expected to weigh heavily on fiscal balances as
during the COVID-19 crisis, and could put
government revenue is bound to drop steeply,
financial stability at risk (Figures SF.3.E and
constraining the room for significant
SF.3.F).
countercyclical fiscal stimulus. Fiscal deficits
• EAP. Banking sectors in EAP are the best are expected to widen to beyond 9 percent in
capitalized on average of all EMDE regions, 2020—from around 4 percent in last year. As
with the average regulatory capital to risk- a result, median government debt is expected
weighted assets ratio around 22 percent. to rise 10 percentage points this year, with
However, banking sectors in the region also debt-to-GDP ratios in about half of the
have the highest loan-to-deposit ratios of all region’s economies being in the worst quartile
EMDE regions, suggesting an increased for EMDEs.
likelihood of liquidity constraints arising in
the event of severe funding stress. • SAR. Although banking sectors in SAR are
well capitalized relative to regulatory
• ECA. Debt levels in a number of ECA requirements, capital adequacy ratios are the
economies are below that of the average lowest among EMDE regions, on average.
EMDE, facilitating the implementation of Even before the pandemic, credit extension
large fiscal stimulus packages. However, the was slowing in some countries (Bangladesh,
fall in revenues as a result of the decline in India). Non-performing loan ratios in SAR
commodity prices is expected to reduce fiscal are among the highest of all EMDE regions.
126 S P EC IAL FO CU S G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
In about 90 percent of the region’s economies, • EAP. Regional growth is projected to slow
non-performing loan ratios exceed that of the sharply from 5.9 percent in 2019 to 0.5
EMDE median. This weighs heavily on the percent in 2020—the lowest rate since
banking sector’s ability to provide credit 1967—with sizable policy support preventing
during the current downturn. High debt a more severe deceleration. Although subject
burdens in a number of countries are also to significant uncertainty, regional growth is
constraining fiscal space. expected to rebound to 6.6 percent in 2021.
Per capita incomes are forecast to contract by
• SSA. Around 40 percent of economies in the 0.1 percent, on average, this year—the
worst quartile for government debt are in weakest performance and first contraction
SSA. In addition, half of the EMDEs in the since 1968—before rebounding to 6 percent
worst quartile for government debt-to-revenue in 2021. Over the last 30 years, per capita
ratios—a crude indication of the years of income growth in EAP has averaged 7
revenue needed to repay debt—are in the percent. Falling per capita incomes amid the
region. Many countries in SSA also have COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a
limited foreign reserve buffers, with the devastating impact on poverty and welfare in
median economy having enough reserves to the region (Lakner et al. 2020; World Bank
cover 3.5 months of imports. 2020b).
and external demand conditions become more FIGURE SF.4 Prospects for growth, per capita incomes
supportive, regional growth is projected to and poverty
recover to 2.8 percent in 2021. The implied Nearly 80 percent of EMDEs are expected to register negative growth this
8.1 percent drop in per capita incomes this year, with the deepest regional contractions in ECA, LAC, and MNA.
Revisions to growth forecasts have been substantial across all EMDE
year will also be the steepest among all EMDE regions. The decline in per capita incomes due to the fall in activity is
regions. This sharp contraction in per capita expected to be even steeper and could cause many millions to fall back
incomes is likely to cause millions to lapse into extreme poverty.
into extreme poverty, as many of those who
A. Regional growth B. Downgrades to growth forecasts
escaped poverty in recent years are still
vulnerable to falling back into it (World Bank
2020d).
economies, and will be compounded by the United States and China would cause
sharply lower growth in major trading renewed disruption to trade, and increase
partners and the collapse in commodity prices. existing pressures on the supply of
Growth in the region is expected to rebound intermediate goods.
to 3.1 percent in 2021; however, the outlook
is subject to substantial uncertainty. Per capita • ECA. An even sharper-than-expected slow-
GDP this year is projected to fall by 5.3 down in the Euro Area, perhaps from a
percent, likely causing millions to fall back worsening of the pandemic or more prolonged
into extreme poverty. With the region already mitigation measures, could amplify the
home to about 60 percent of the world’s negative spillovers from the region, including
extreme poor, this rise is bound to further through global value chains, as well as through
concentrate global poverty in the region commodity, financial, and remittance
(Lakner et al. 2020; World Bank 2020a). channels. With remittances accounting for 10
percent of GDP in the region, a sharp fall
could amplify the regional economic down-
Risks turn. Similarly, a prolonged deterioration in
global investment sentiment could have
Given the size and unprecedented nature of the
material implications for the region if it
COVID-19 shock to the global economy, any
weighs on foreign direct investment.
numerical forecast for the period ahead is subject
to an unprecedented level of uncertainty. • LAC. Downside risks to the outlook in LAC
Downside risks to the outlook predominate for all include a resurgence of last year’s wave of
EMDE regions and could lead to a substantially social unrest, increasingly adverse market
greater loss of output in the near term if they reactions to rising public debt, weaker-than-
materialize. Several risks common to all regions are expected commodity prices, and persistent
discussed in Chapter 1. These include a longer- pandemic-related uncertainty slowing the
than-expected pandemic, financial crises, and a recovery of the services sector. In addition,
retreat from global value chains. These risks are LAC faces persistent risks related to natural
global in nature, notwithstanding a degree of disasters and weather-related events. A major
regional variation in their impact. For example, natural disaster on the heels of the COVID-
the likelihood of more persistent outbreaks of 19 pandemic would be economically
COVID-19 is higher in regions with weaker devastating for some countries in the region.
health systems, financial crises are more likely and
more damaging in regions burdened with higher • MENA. The recent sharp decline in oil
debt, and a global retreat from value chains would prices and the continued high uncertainty
be more damaging for regions that are tightly about their future path pose an important
integrated in world trade. In addition to these downside risk to the region’s outlook. More
global risks, there are also myriad risks specific to widespread COVID-19 outbreaks could exact
each region. a significant humanitarian toll, especially
among the fragile economies where forced
• EAP. Key risks include the possibility of a displacement and insecurity leave populations
second wave of the outbreaks, which would already highly vulnerable. In addition to the
renew pressure on countries’ health care effects of the pandemic, conflict-related risks
systems and interrupt the recoveries which in MENA remain high.
have begun in countries that have largely
brought domestic outbreaks under control. • SAR. The regional spread of COVID-19
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the could have especially severe humanitarian
policy accommodation being provided will be consequences given the region’s high
sufficient to prevent a more severe deteriora- population, large informal sectors, high ine-
tion in confidence, investment, and trade. quality, and underdeveloped health systems.
Finally, a renewal of trade tensions between An intensification of financial market stress
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S P EC IAL FO CU S 129
would add further pressure to financial sector Bénassy-Quéré, A., Y. Decreux, L. Fontagné and D.
balance sheets already burdened with existing Khoudour-Casteras. 2009. “Economic crisis and global
vulnerabilities, including high levels of non- supply chains.” CEPII Working Paper 2009 (15).
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abstract_id=1588946.
risk saddling governments with contingent
liabilities should bailouts be needed, with Blanchard, E. J., C. P. Bown, and R. C. Johnson.
adverse implications for public debt 2017. “Global Value Chains and Trade Policy.” CEPR
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Boz, E., G. Gopinath, and M. Plagborg-Møller. 2017.
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weakness of its health care systems, Bonadio, B., H. Zhen, and A. Levchenko. 2020.
constrained fiscal policy space, and its limited “Global Supply Chains in the Pandemic.” NBER
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Taglioni, and V. Vicard. 2012. “Firms and the Global
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Bruno, V., S. J. Kim, and H. Shin. 2018. “Exchange
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Ahmed, S., M. Appendino, and M. Ruta. 2015. EDB (Eurasian Development Bank). 2020. EDB Macro
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CHAPTER 3
Lasting Scars of the
COVID-19 Pandemic
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 133
The COVID-19 pandemic has struck a devastating blow to an already-fragile global economy. Lockdowns and
other restrictions needed to address the public health crisis, together with spontaneous reductions in economic
activity by many consumers and producers, constitute an unprecedented combination of adverse shocks that is
causing deep recessions in many advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).
Those EMDEs that have weak health systems; those that rely heavily on global trade, tourism, or remittances
from abroad; and those that depend on commodity exports will be particularly hard-hit. Beyond its short-term
impact, deep recessions triggered by the pandemic are likely to leave lasting scars through multiple channels,
including lower investment; erosion of the human capital of the unemployed; and a retreat from global trade
and supply linkages. These effects may well lower potential growth and labor productivity in the longer term.
Immediate policy measures should support health care systems and moderate the short-term impact of the
pandemic on activity and employment. In addition, a comprehensive reform drive is needed to reduce the
adverse impact of the pandemic on long-term growth prospects by improving governance and business
environments, and expanding investment in education and public health.
Note: This chapter was produced by a team led by M. Ayhan • Evolution of the pandemic: While outbreaks in
Kose and Franziska Ohnsorge and including Carlos Arteta, Alistair
Dieppe, Justin-Damien Guenette, Alain Kabundi, Sergiy
most advanced economies appear to be
Kasyanenko, Sinem Kilic Celik, Gene Kindberg-Hanlon, Patrick abating, the pandemic is rapidly spreading
Kirby, Hideaki Matsuoka, Yoki Okawa, Cedric Okou, M. Rudi across EMDEs, including low-income
Steinbach, Dana Vorisek, and Shu Yu. Research assistance was
provided by Hrisyana Doytchinova, Maria Hazel Macadangdang, countries (LICs), where health care systems
Vasiliki Papagianni, and Heqing Zhao. have very limited capacity.
134 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
• Severe short-term impact. The pandemic, the formation. In most years during the past
widespread restrictions put in place to stem it, decade, EMDE growth fell short of its long-
and the spontaneous reactions of many term average. This was reflected in repeated
consumers and producers have already caused downgrades to long-term growth projections
a deep global recession. Along with the public for EMDEs. The pandemic is expected to
health crisis, EMDEs are facing tighter exacerbate the multi-decade trend slowdown
financing conditions, plunging oil and other in potential output growth and productivity
commodity prices, sharp declines in remit- growth.
tances, and collapsing international trade.
• Policies. While the immediate priorities of
• Magnifying short-term weakness. Many EMDEs policymakers are to address the health crisis
entered this global recession less well-prepared, and moderate the short-term economic losses,
and with larger vulnerabilities, than when they the likely long-term consequences of the
were hit by the last global recession in 2009. pandemic highlight the need to forcefully
EMDEs that are most vulnerable to the undertake comprehensive reform programs to
impact of the pandemic include those that improve the fundamental drivers of economic
have weak health systems, that rely heavily on growth.
global trade or tourism, that are vulnerable to
financial disruptions, and that depend on oil Spread of the pandemic
and other commodity exports. The recession
will prolong a decade of disappointing growth Outbreak. As of May 22, more than 5.2 million
for EMDEs. cases of COVID-19 have been confirmed globally,
alongside about 340,000 deaths attributed to the
• Persistent damage in the long run. COVID-19 disease. Although the number of confirmed cases
and the resulting recessions engulfing vast represents just 0.07 percent of the global
swaths of the developing world will leave population, cases continue to rise rapidly in most
lasting scars, eroding productivity and countries, including in EMDEs (Figure 3.1).
potential output for extended periods. The Reported cases may be significantly lower than the
long-term damage will be particularly severe in number actually infected, given the sparseness of
economies that suffer financial crises, and in testing in some countries (Bendavid et al. 2020;
energy exporters because of plunging oil Hortaçsu, Liu, and Schwieg 2020; Barro, Ursúa,
prices. In the average EMDE, over a five-year and Weng 2020).
horizon, a recession combined with a financial
crisis could lower potential output by almost 8 Comparison with previous pandemics. The
percent while, in the average EMDE energy COVID-19 pandemic is the latest in a long series
exporter, a recession combined with an oil of epidemics and pandemics during the twentieth
price plunge could lower potential output by and twenty-first centuries. These have included
11 percent. The pandemic is expected to Ebola in West Africa (2014-15), MERS in the
exacerbate the weakness in productivity Middle East (2012), swine flu (2009-10), SARS in
growth and private investment that were East Asia (2002-03), Hong Kong flu (1968-69),
features of the past decade. Asian flu (1957-58) and Spanish flu (1918-19).
Preliminary estimates suggest that COVID-19
• Aggravating long-term challenges. Recessions may be considerably more infectious than many of
associated with the pandemic will likely have these diseases, but not among the most deadly for
an even larger impact on long-term growth those infected (Figure 3.1).
prospects because of pre-existing
vulnerabilities, fading demographic dividends Influenza pandemics during the past century are
and structural bottlenecks, and permanent estimated to have infected around one-quarter to
changes in behavior patterns, including one-half of the global population, although these
consumption habits, and human capital estimates are highly uncertain (Annex 3.1; Van
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 135
Kherkove et al. 2013). Previous coronavirus FIGURE 3.1 The COVID-19 pandemic and mitigation
outbreaks, SARS and MERS, are estimated to measures
have been significantly less contagious than The global number of infections has been growing rapidly. Many countries,
COVID-19; they resulted in approximately 8,000 accounting for almost all of global GDP, have put in place mitigation
policies that restrict school, work, public gatherings and events, and travel.
and 2,500 worldwide cases, respectively (Wilder- Reflecting a near-halt to much of economic activity, indicators of mobility
Smith, Chiew, and Lee 2020). In some historical as well as air pollution have declined.
episodes, prophylactic measures were taken to
reduce the spread of the diseases, but on a much A. Number of cases in EMDEs B. Contagiousness (R0) of selected
epidemics and pandemics
smaller scale than the measures implemented to
counter COVID-19.1
80 had closed all workplaces. Travel restrictions B.C. Range of estimates from the literature.
C. Confirmed cases are estimated number of those with symptoms for seasonal flu, swine flu, and
were widespread. Hong Kong flu; confirmed cases for SARS, MERS, and Ebola; and total infections for Spanish flu.
D. Figure shows share of GDP accounted for by economies with restrictions. Restrictions are counted
if required (i.e., not only recommended) and, for school and work closures, if applied across all levels
and sectors, respectively. Travel restrictions are counted if they entail a ban on arrivals from all
regions or a total border closure. Data is for April 1, 2020. Sample includes 125 EMDEs and 34 AEs.
E.F. GDP-weighted averages (at 2010 prices and market exchange rates).
E. Based on data from Google’s Mobility Tracker. Weekly averages for weeks ending May 13 and
1 During the Spanish flu, for example, only 6 percent of cities in
February 15.
the United States declared general business closures, while 82 percent F. Baseline is defined as daily average for same month in 2015-19. NO2 = nitrogen dioxide;
of U.S. states issued statewide stay-at-home orders in 2020 (Hatchett, PM2.5 = particulate matter with diameter less than 2.5 micrometers. Based on daily data from Air
Quality Open Data Platform. GDP-weighted monthly averages for January and April.
Mecher, and Lipsitch 2007).
Click here to download data and charts.
136 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 3.2 Health vulnerabilities in EMDEs 19 lower should medical attention be needed. The
EMDEs, with generally younger populations, might be better placed to limit
median LIC, for instance, has less than one
fatalities from COVID-19 than advanced economies. However, EMDEs also hospital bed per 1,000 people—compared to more
tend to have poorer clinical care, are less prepared to manage health than four in the median advanced economy.
crises, and their populations have less access to safe water and sanitation.
Finally, a higher proportion of the population of
EMDEs live in informal, crowded housing
A. Age structure of population B. Health preparedness index
conditions where access to clean water and
sanitation services is limited, making the hygiene
and physical distancing measures needed to
contain the virus impractical or impossible
(Corburn et al. 2020).
home have in many countries been encouraged or FIGURE 3.3 Indicators of economic activity and
instructed to do so, but fewer jobs can be international trade
undertaken remotely in EMDEs than in advanced The recent decline in global economic activity is one of the steepest and
economies, partly because of more limited internet deepest on record. Purchasing managers’ indexes have fallen sharply in
major economies and global sentiment has plunged. Global trade
connectivity (ILO 2020). In some advanced indicators, such as container shipping and the new export order
economies, such restrictions as quarantine component of PMI, experienced historically large falls in February. Air
requirements on the entry of temporary foreign traffic volumes have fallen to a fraction of early 2020 values.
workers have been threatening agricultural
production. Delays in input deliveries and limited A. Composite PMIs B. Global Sentix Index
in April, deep in recessionary terrain. Its 11-point lockdown measures in some countries. Capital
fall from March was the steepest on record and outflows from EMDEs have subsided and equity
considerably steeper than at the onset of the global market valuations have retraced a share of their
financial crisis, during the Euro Area crisis (2010- earlier losses. Nonetheless, financial conditions
13), or during the recent period of trade tensions remain fragile for many EMDEs. Remittance
(2018-19). inflows to EMDEs are expected to collapse in
2020 across EMDE regions (World Bank 2020b).
With international travel restricted and internal Foreign aid flows may also shrink in 2020 as
travel discouraged in most countries, global donors focus on supporting their own economies
tourism and travel have been severely curtailed. So (UNCTAD 2020).
far this year, tourist arrivals declined by nearly 100
percent among reporting countries. Globally, the Commodity markets
number of commercial flights is down about 70
percent since the beginning of the year. As a result of the sharp decline of global
commodity demand, the prices of most
Disruptions to production and international commodities have fallen steeply, particularly those
transport have increased the risk that critical used in the transport industry. Benchmark oil
inputs will be unavailable, potentially leading to prices have been most affected, with the European
cascading production shortfalls in global value Brent spot price plunging by 85 percent between
chains. Manufacturers’ stocks of purchases have late January—when the first human-to-human
fallen, while suppliers’ delivery times have transmissions of the virus were announced—and
lengthened. Industries reliant on “just-in-time” its trough in late-April and the WTI price briefly
inputs from global value chains and lean trading at negative levels, before a gradual recovery
inventories have been particularly affected. In the in May. The decline in oil prices in March was the
automobile sector, a collapse in demand, largest one-month price plunge on record (Figure
combined with production and delivery 3.4; Chapter 4). The restrictions implemented to
challenges, has led to a precipitous plunge in sales control the outbreak have resulted in sharp
worldwide. declines in travel and transport—which account
for two-thirds of oil consumption—and in other
Global financial conditions energy-using economic activities. Oil demand is
expected to fall by about 20 percent in the year to
Global equity markets fell sharply as the pandemic the second quarter of 2020 and an unprecedented
spread across the world. Within a week of decline of 9 percent is projected for the year as a
reaching an all-time high in mid-February, the whole.
S&P 500 index in the United States experienced
its fastest decline since October 1987, and stock Industrial metals prices declined by 24 percent
markets in other major economies experienced between late January and late April—more than
declines of similar magnitude. The VIX volatility one-quarter as much as they did at the peak of the
index more than quadrupled in March before global financial crisis. With some exceptions,
settling at about double its February value in mid- agricultural commodity prices have experienced
May. only minor declines since January, reflecting their
less direct relationship with economic activity
Flight to safety resulted in a sharp tightening of (World Bank 2020a). While stocks-to-use ratios of
EMDE financing conditions (Chapter 1). Net most grains are at near-record highs, concerns
portfolio outflows from EMDEs during each of about food security as a result of the pandemic
the last three weeks of March were the three have grown as countries have announced export
largest on record (Figure 3.4). bans (for example, Russia for wheat, Vietnam for
rice) or “excess” buying (for example, Philippines
More recently, global risk sentiment improved in for rice, Egypt and Saudi Arabia for wheat).
May amid large-scale liquidity injections by major Although most of these announcements have thus
central banks and a gradual relaxation of far not resulted in policy action, such action could
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 139
result in localized food price spikes despite ample FIGURE 3.4 Financial and commodity market conditions
global supply (Voegele 2020). Disruptions to Net portfolio outflows from EMDEs were the largest on record in March.
supply chains have already affected the exports Across all EMDE regions, remittances in 2020 are expected to suffer larger
from some EMDEs of perishable products such as declines than during the global financial crisis or the Asian financial crisis.
Most commodity prices have fallen since January, with oil prices in March
flowers, fruits, and vegetables. experiencing their largest one-month fall since at least 1960. Base metals
prices have also declined amid weak industrial demand, while a sharp fall
Short-term growth impact in platinum prices reflects the use of the metal in the automobile industry. In
contrast, gold prices have risen on heightened uncertainty and safe-haven
demand.
The global economy was confronted by the
pandemic when it was on a weak footing. Since A. Lowest weekly net portfolio inflows B. Annual change in remittances
to EMDEs
the 2009 global recession, growth in all country
groups had fallen short of pre-crisis and long-term
averages in most years. And, in 2019, the global
economy delivered its weakest growth perfor-
mance in the past decade.
FIGURE 3.5 EMDE growth response to growth slowdown already weigh on investment. Both in the United
in major economies States and in the Euro Area, economic policy
A steep growth slowdown in advanced economies and China is expected uncertainty is currently at record highs. In the
in 2020, which will generate considerable adverse spillovers for other past, such uncertainty significantly lowered
EMDEs, especially the ones most open to global trade, including
commodity exporters, and with less resilient policy frameworks.
EMDE investment. For example, a doubling of
the U.S. or Euro Area economic policy
A. Response of EMDE growth B. EMDE growth response, by uncertainty index (approximately the rise thus far
(excluding China) to a 1 percentage
point growth slowdown in the United
commodity exporter status
in 2020) has been associated with 6 percentage
States, Euro Area, and China point weaker investment growth in EMDEs and
in EMDEs in Europe and Central Asia,
respectively, over the following year (World Bank
2017a).
ones if growth in the three largest economies since 2007, with particularly large deteriorations
slowed by 1 percentage point. in fiscal vulnerabilities in commodity-importing
EMDEs. In contrast, commodity-importing
Vulnerabilities: Magnifying the short-term EMDEs have scaled back their openness, and
impact corresponding vulnerability, to global trade and
tourism since 2007. However, island states that
The impact on individual EMDEs will depend on rely heavily on tourism have seen a small increase
country-specific factors, including vulnerabilities in their exposure to this sector since 2007. With
to external and domestic stresses and the ability to regard to poverty, commodity exporters continue
provide income support or policy stimulus. These to have sizable vulnerable population groups, with
vulnerabilities generally refer to conditions that limited savings and recourse to finance and
increase the likelihood or severity of economic or typically reliant on informal sector activity. While
financial stress when downside risks materialize. these vulnerable groups tend to be smaller in
commodity-importing EMDEs, they have not
Evolution of vulnerabilities shrunk there since 2007.5
importing and commodity-exporting EMDEs, another 26 percent is near-poor, compared with 13 percent of the
financial and fiscal vulnerabilities have grown population in each category in other EMDEs (World Bank 2020e).
142 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 3.6 EMDE vulnerabilities care capacity, which even before the outbreak
Financial and fiscal vulnerabilities have increased in all regions since 2007. suffered from lack of public funding and
Some EMDEs are particularly open to trade, exposing them to spillovers underinsured populations. The median LIC has
from steep recessions in major economies, or are heavily reliant on less than one hospital bed per 1,000 people, and
commodity exports, exposing them to falling commodity prices.
the median EMDE just under two, compared
with more than four per 1,000 people in the
A. Vulnerability indexes: EMDE B. Vulnerability indexes: EMDE
commodity exporters commodity importers median advanced economy.
constrain commodity exporters’ ability to FIGURE 3.7 Fiscal and external positions of EMDEs
support their economies with income support The global expansion before the global recession of 2009 helped EMDEs
or fiscal stimulus. improve their fiscal and external positions. Since 2007, however, fiscal and
current account deficits have widened, government debt has risen, and
international reserves have declined.
• Reliance on labor-intensive sectors. Many LICs
have large shares of labor-intensive
A. Fiscal balances B. Government debt
production, which require working in close
proximity, than higher-income countries. This
type of production may suffer large
disruptions as a result of social-distancing
efforts or missed work due to illness (Smith
and Keogh-Brown 2013).
EMDEs, fiscal surpluses of more than 2 percent of Note: Bars denote unweighted averages. Orange whiskers denote interquartile ranges. Green lines
denote 1990-99 averages.
GDP in 2007, on average, had turned into deficits A. Based on data for 149 EMDEs.
B. Based on data for up to 150 EMDEs.
of 1 percent of GDP by 2019; near-balanced C. Based on data for up to 154 EMDEs.
current accounts in 2007 had become sizable D. Based on data for up to 130 EMDEs.
Click here to download data and charts.
deficits (Figure 3.7).
Financial vulnerabilities not only constrain Informality. The informal sector, on average,
EMDEs’ ability to support their economies with accounts for about a third of official GDP and
monetary and fiscal stimulus; they can also reduce about 70 percent of total employment in EMDEs
the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus (Huidrom et al. (World Bank 2019b; Figure 3.8). Pervasive
2019). In addition, the health of public sector informality is associated with widespread poverty,
balance sheets is an important determinant of the lack of access to sanitation, lack of access to
costs of credit for banks and non-financial financial and medical resources, and poor social
corporations since they are linked to the sovereign safety nets—all factors likely to amplify the health
credit rating. In times of stress, sovereign-bank and economic impacts of the pandemic.
financial linkages can amplify shocks (World Bank
2018). Banks hold sovereign debt to manage their Poverty. In EMDEs with large numbers of
balance sheets and to fulfill regulatory extremely poor or near-poor, populations may not
requirements. Losses on these holdings can disrupt be able to comply with restrictions on economic
financial intermediation. Over the past decade, activity unless the restrictions are suitably designed
bank exposures to sovereign debt have increased in (Chang and Velasco 2020). The poorest often live
EMDEs relative to both GDP and total bank in crowded conditions that make social distancing
assets (World Bank 2018). extremely challenging or impossible (Sánchez-
144 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 3.8 Informality, poverty, and food insecurity Páramo 2020). For example, 70 percent of city
Informality is widespread in many EMDEs. It is associated with lower dwellers in SSA live in crowded slums where
incomes and higher incidence of poverty, less access to medical handwashing facilities are sparse and communal
treatment, and poorer sanitation. Even before the pandemic spread to and where sanitation is weak (World Bank
EMDEs, several economies were struggling with the challenges of extreme
poverty and food crisis. 2019c). Among the most vulnerable groups are
women, which tend to be overrepresented in the
A. Informality across EMDE regions B. Income in the informal sector informal sector and in services jobs that cannot
easily move online (Freund and Hamel 2020).
Women employed in the tourism industry and as
small-scale farmers are particularly hard-hit
(Freund 2020, Freund and Hamel 2020).
Source: Amin, Ohnsorge, and Okou (2019); Elgin et al. (forthcoming); Global Surgery and Social
Change (PGSSC) at Harvard Medical School; Haver Analytics; IMF Government Financial Statistics;
Long-term growth effects
PovCalNet; WFP (2020); WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply,
Sanitation, and Hygiene; World Bank (Enterprise Survey World Development Indicators); World Bank
(2019). Prior to the pandemic, the global economy already
A. Mean of informal output (DGE-based estimates) and employment estimate (share of self-
employment) in each region during 2010-16. faced prospects of slower long-term growth, with
A E. EAP = East Asia Pacific, ECA = Europe and Central Asia, MNA = Middle East and North Africa,
SAR = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
long-term (ten-year-ahead) growth forecasts
B. *** indicates the group differences between formal and informal firms are not zero at 10 percent having been repeatedly revised down for all
significance level.
C.-D. Bars are group means calculated for EMDEs with “high informality” (i.e., the highest one-third country groups since the global recession of 2009.
DGE-based informal output measure) and those with “low informality” (i.e., the highest one-third DGE
-based informal output measure) over the period 2010-16. *** indicates the group differences are not
This, in part, reflected a recognition of slowing
zero at 10 percent significance level. potential growth in EMDEs, particularly China,
E. Regional aggregates use a poverty line of $3.20 per day in 2011 purchasing power parity terms.
F. Bars show peak number of people in IPC/CH phase 3 food crisis or worse. “Food crisis” is defined over the past decade and reaching into the next
as having food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition or
being marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets decade (Kilic Celik, Kose, and Ohnsorge 2020;
or through crisis-coping strategies. Sample includes 55 EMDEs.
Click here to download data and charts.
World Bank 2018).
have significant long-term effects. The substantial activity. All these forces will tend to lower long-
economic dislocations, deep output contractions run as well as short-run labor productivity.7
across large numbers of countries, and heightened
and wide-ranging uncertainties that have arisen The current pandemic may be particularly
from the pandemic may dampen human and damaging to long-term growth prospects because
physical capital accumulation. Supply chains and the disruptions caused by the measures to contain
working arrangements in many industries may go the pandemic call into question the viability of
through costly reconfigurations. There may also be global supply chains that have been a foundation
long-lasting shifts in consumer behavior, including of growth over the past two decades. Productive
in the composition of spending. Households may firms may be disproportionally affected by the
also opt for increased precautionary saving in view disruptions because they are more likely to export,
of heightened uncertainty about employment and are embedded in complex value chains and employ
income prospects. Both consumer spending and workers with firm-specific skills (Didier et al.
business investment may suffer from sustained 2020).
declines in confidence. Depressed capital spending
The current global recession has occurred with a
would be particularly damaging to long-term
severity that is unmatched in eight decades and
growth prospects in EMDEs, coming on the heels
has been accompanied by sharply tighter financing
of several years of weak investment (World Bank
conditions and a record oil price collapse. These
2019a).
two key features of the current global recession—
There is little research on the medium- or long- the higher likelihood of financial crisis and a
term effects of disease outbreaks on output severe terms-of-trade shock to energy exporters—
(McKibbin and Fernando 2020). However, it is increase the risk of lasting damage to potential
well-known that other major adverse economic output in many EMDEs.
shocks, such as financial or currency crises, have
• Recessions and financial crises. The lasting
been associated with persistently negative effects
damage of recessions has been more severe
on growth. This suggests that the current
when they have been accompanied by
pandemic may also leave lasting scars on the global
financial crises.8 A range of channels drive
economy by lowering potential output and
this outcome. Financial crises increase
productivity.
liquidity demand and tighten credit
Implications for potential output conditions more broadly—including for
productivity-enhancing technologies embod-
Sources of long-term effects. Severe recessions ied in new investment and for research and
have been associated with highly persistent losses development spending; they curtail access to
in output in both advanced economies and bank lending for creative firms; they leave a
EMDEs (Box 3.1).6 These effects arise from legacy of obsolete capacity; they trigger self-
various interlinked factors. Low levels of capacity fulfilling expectations of weak growth; and
utilization discourage investment and lead to a
legacy of obsolete capacity; expectations of weak
growth also discourage investment and become 7 For technology absorption, see Anzoategui et al. (2016); for the
self-fulfilling; protracted unemployment causes legacy of obsolete capacity, see Nguyen and Qian (2014); for self-
fulfilling expectations of weak growth prospects, see Caballero and
losses of human capital and reduces job-search Simsek (2017); and for human capital loss and reduced job search
activity among the long-term unemployed, see Ball (2009);
Blanchard and Summers (1987); Hall (2014); Lindbeck (1995);
Lockwood (1991); and Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2015).
8 Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2009 and 2012); Furceri and
6 For estimates of the impact of contractions on actual output
levels, see Ball (2014); Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers (2015); Mourougane (2012); Mourougane (2017); Queralto (2019); and
Cerra and Saxena (2008, 2017); and Martin, Munyan, and Wilson Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) estimate lasting losses from financial
(2015). For estimates of the impact on actual output growth, see crises and Ball (2014) and Hall (2014) the lasting losses from the
Candelon, Carare, and Miao (2016). For estimates of the impact on global financial crisis. Candelon, Carare, and Miao (2016) and Cerra
potential output growth, see Haltmeier (2012) and World Bank and Saxena (2008) find longer-lasting losses from banking, debt, or
(2018). equity market crises than from currency, inflation, or political crises.
146 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
The global economy is currently in the midst of one of the deepest recessions in living memory, which is hitting emerging market
and developing economies (EMDEs) hard. Historically, recessions accompanied by financial crises or, in energy exporters, by oil
price collapses tend to generate particularly deep and lasting damage to potential output, especially in countries that enter the
recession with larger vulnerabilities. The average EMDE is now more vulnerable to financial stress than before the 2007-09
global financial crisis, and the average energy-exporting EMDE remains as dependent on energy exports as before the last oil price
collapse in 2014. Under these circumstances, the recessions associated with the COVID-19 are likely to have a severely adverse
and lasting impact on potential output. Pro-active monetary and fiscal policies, and structural reforms, could moderate this
damage.
FIGURE 3.1.1 EMDE vulnerabilities to financial stress and oil price plunges
Today’s average EMDE is more vulnerable to financial market stress, with higher debt and wider fiscal deficits, than before
the global financial crisis. Today’s average energy-exporting EMDE is as dependent on commodity exports as before the last
oil price plunge.
A. EMDE government and corporate debt, B. Commodity export share of energy C. Economic activity indicators
2007 and 2019 exporters, 2013 and 2018
Source: Institute of International Finance; Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics; International Monetary Fund; World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution;
World Bank.
A.B. Bars show unweighted averages. Whiskers show interquartile range. Based on data for up to 150 EMDEs (A) and up to 27 energy-exporting EMDEs (B).
C. Net portfolio inflows to EMDEs, based on data for 20 economies. EMDE = emerging market and developing economies.
Click here to download data and charts.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 147
BOX 3.1 How do deep recessions affect potential output in EMDEs? (continued)
A. Frequency of recessions B. Average EMDE growth during reces- C. Average growth during oil price
sions and financial crises plunges
after the event (World Bank 2018). It extends this work by average of the Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate
analyzing the extent to which the long-term impact of oil prices plunged by 30 percent or more over a six-month
recessions differs when they are accompanied by financial period (1986, 1990-91, 1998, 2001, 2008, and 2014-15).
crises or oil price plunges.
Short-term output losses. In the average year of recession,
Impact of recessions with crises and oil price output declined by more than 3 percent in advanced
economies and more than 5 percent in EMDEs. On their
plunges
own, neither financial crises nor oil price plunges were
The COVID-19 pandemic presents a public health crisis. associated with recessions (Figure 3.1.2). However, when
The direct impact of sickness and mortality, and the they did accompany recessions, financial crises or oil price
associated restrictions to stem the pandemic, alone would plunges were associated with steep output losses.
constitute a major global economic shock. In addition, • Financial crises. On average, economies still grew by
many EMDEs are facing exceptionally severe economic almost 1 percent in the year of financial crisis and the
pressures from financial and oil markets. The 2020 global following year. More than one-half of these events
recession will be extraordinarily deep and prolonged were currency crises, which tend to be associated with
(Chapter 1). To shed light on its implications over a milder output losses (Cerra and Saxena 2008;
longer time horizon, this section presents evidence on the Candelon, Carare, and Miao 2016). Financial crises
long-term output cost of severe recessions and how they that did accompany recessions (about 24 percent of
interact with financial crises and oil price plunges. financial crises in the sample) were associated with
output contractions of more than 5 percent.
Data and methodology. The medium-term impact of
recessions on potential output is estimated using a local • Oil price plunges. Oil price plunges were, on average,
projections model (Annex 3.4). Recessions are defined as accompanied by more than 3 percent growth in the
years of negative output growth (see Huidrom, Kose, and same year. Energy-exporting EMDEs historically have
Ohnsorge 2016). Financial crises include banking, had large fiscal buffers, which have allowed them to
currency, or debt crises defined as in Laeven and Valencia provide substantial policy support to their domestic
(2018). Years with oil price plunges are those in which the economies: their growth averaged more than 2
148 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
BOX 3.1 How do deep recessions affect potential output in EMDEs? (continued)
FIGURE 3.1.3 Potential output in EMDEs: Recessions, crises, and oil price plunges
Recessions in EMDEs, especially those associated with financial crises or (for energy exporters) oil price plunges, lowered
potential output over the medium-term. Potential output losses were lower when countries entered these events with lower
external debt or current account deficits, and with an inflation-targeting monetary policy framework.
A. Cumulative potential output response B. Cumulative potential output response C. Cumulative potential output response
after recessions, oil price plunges, and after recessions and financial crises in energy exporters after recessions and
financial crisis oil price plunges
D. Cumulative potential output response E. Cumulative potential output response F. Cumulative potential output response
after recessions and financial crises, by after recessions and financial crises, by after financial crises, by current account
inflation targeting external debt deficit
percent in the year of the plunge (Stocker et al. 2018). also tended to be associated with lower potential output
In cases when oil price plunges were accompanied by over the medium term. Five years after a financial crisis,
recessions (17 percent of recessions in energy- potential output in EMDEs was about 4 percent below the
exporting EMDEs), the output contractions in energy baseline. Five years after an oil price plunge, potential
exporters were especially deep (about 10 percent). output in energy-exporting EMDEs was about 8 percent
below the baseline.
Medium-term potential output losses. In line with earlier
findings, recessions left a legacy of lower potential output
Recessions that were accompanied by financial crises
for four to five years after their onset. Five years after the
caused larger long-term potential output losses in EMDEs
average recession, potential output were about 6 percent
than recessions without financial crises. Five years after a
below baseline in EMDEs (Figure 3.1.3).
recession-cum-crisis, potential output in EMDEs remained
Financial crises and oil price plunges alone—including almost 8 percent below baseline—more than the 6 percent
those which were not associated with outright recessions— potential output loss following the average recession.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 149
BOX 3.1 How do deep recessions affect potential output in EMDEs? (continued)
In energy-exporting EMDEs, oil price plunges that were to two broad sets of priorities to improve growth
accompanied by recessions were associated with prospects.
particularly severe and lasting potential output losses. On
average five years after such plunges-cum-recessions, First, since financial crises cause longer-lasting and more
potential output in energy exporting EMDEs remained 11 severe output losses, EMDEs need to avoid sliding into a
percent below the baseline. financial crisis. Macroprudential policies as well as
monetary and fiscal policy support and international
Effect of policy regimes. Long-term potential output losses assistance are critical to ensure the maintenance of
are somewhat more modest for countries that enter the confidence, the stability of lending institutions, and
recession with fewer vulnerabilities. For example, normal flows of credit to households and firms.
estimated potential output losses five years after a
combined recession and financial crisis were lower in Second, oil price plunges cause particularly lasting output
countries that entered the recession with external debt in losses in energy exporters when they are accompanied by
the bottom decile of the sample than in those that entered outright output contractions—as will be the case for
it in the top decile of the sample. Similarly, EMDEs with energy-exporting EMDEs in 2020 (Chapter 1). Once the
inflation-targeting monetary policy regimes suffered about current crisis subsides, efforts to diversify these economies
one-half the potential output losses in recessions and can help reduce their vulnerability to oil price shocks
financial crises than countries with other monetary policy (Chapter 4). Such measures include ensuring appropriate
regimes. EMDEs that entered financial crises with trade policies that promote diverse exports, infrastructure
narrower current account deficits witnessed lower potential investment to enable private sector competition,
output losses after five years. competition regulation to avoid market concentration, and
support for innovation through research and development
Conclusions
(Ruch 2019b). They also include reforms to establish
The immediate policy priority is to address the COVID-19 institutional frameworks for sustainable fiscal and
health crisis. Policies also need to take into account the monetary policies. These would help to buffer external
lasting economic damage from the deep recession triggered shocks and macroeconomic volatility in the short run, and
by the health crisis. Evidence presented in this box points to provide a growth-friendly environment for the long run.
they cause long-term unemployment that inflation and interest rates, and the expansion
leads to human capital loss and reduced job- of energy-intensive activities.
search activity.9
Estimates of potential output impacts.
• Oil price plunges and recessions. Steep drops in Empirically, recessions were associated with large
the price of oil have a direct negative impact and lasting potential output losses in EMDEs,
in oil-exporting economies that magnifies the especially when accompanied by financial crises.
depth and duration of a recession. They also Five years after a recession, EMDE potential
weigh on global growth in the short-term output was about 6 percent below baseline and
(Chapter 4). Once the global economic five years after recessions with financial crises,
recovery gains momentum, however, the EMDE potential output was about 8 percent
overall effect of lower oil prices, while they are below baseline (Box 3.1; Figure 3.9). For energy-
sustained, on global growth may be positive, exporting EMDEs, recessions accompanied by oil
through increased real incomes, lower price plunges were particularly damaging: on
average, five years after such episodes, potential
output in energy exporters was about 11 percent
9 For loss of access to bank lending for creative firms, see
below baseline. These potential output losses were
Queralto (2019); for lower labor productivity after financial crises, see
Oulton and Sebastia-Barriel (2017); and for lower productivity-
somewhat smaller when economies entered
enhancing investment, see De Ridder (2016) or, specifically, for recessions and financial crises with lesser
R&D spending, see Fatás (2000).
150 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 3.9 EMDE potential output and recessions and geological disasters (such as volcanic
Recessions have tended to lower potential output in EMDEs over a five-
eruptions). Evidence from different types of more
year horizon. Recessions associated with financial crises have tended to common natural disasters suggests lasting
reduce potential output by more than those without such crises. Oil price productivity losses.
plunges have also significantly lowered potential output in EMDEs over the
long term but by less than recessions or financial crises—except for EMDE
energy exporters when oil price plunges have been accompanied by
Since 2000, there have been several large-scale
recessions. disease outbreaks, including SARS (2002-03),
swine flu (2009-10), MERS (2012-13), Ebola
A. Cumulative potential output B. Cumulative potential output (2014-15), and Zika (2016). These affected over
responses after recessions, financial responses after recessions and
crises, and oil price plunges financial crises 115 EMDEs and advanced economies. Climate
disasters occurred twice as often as all other types
of natural disasters combined, accounting for
around 70 percent of all natural disasters in 2000-
19, but on average they lasted only half as long as
epidemics.
Estimates of productivity impacts. Major
epidemics have had persistent adverse effects on
productivity in the afflicted countries, although
C. Cumulative potential output D. Cumulative potential output without the global reach of the COVID-19
responses in energy exporters after
recessions and oil price plunges
responses after recessions and
financial crises, by external debt
pandemic (Box 3.2). For example, major
epidemics that have occurred since 2000—such as
SARS, MERS, Ebola and Zika—are estimated to
have been associated with 6 percent lower labor
productivity in the affected countries after five
years (Figure 3.10). This largely reflects a
significant erosion in capital deepening:
investment was, on average, about 11 percent
lower five years after these events, amid
Source: Ha, Kose, and Ohnsorge (2019); World Bank.
heightened risk aversion and uncertainty. The
Note: Data and methodology are detailed in Box 3.1 and Annex 3.4. Charts show impulse responses greater global spread and death toll of COVID-19
for 75 EMDEs from local projections model. Year t is the year of the event. Dependent variable is
defined as cumulative slowdown in potential output after a recession event. Bars show coefficient than these previous epidemics suggest it could
estimates; vertical lines show 90 percent confidence bands.
D. 10th percentile of external debt in EMDEs is 27 percent of GDP; 90th percentile of external debt in have even more costly long-term consequences for
EMDEs is 73 percent of GDP.
Click here to download data and charts.
productivity.
Epidemics that occurred since 2000 are estimated to have lowered labor productivity by a cumulative 6 percent after five years,
mainly through their adverse impact on investment and the labor force. In contrast, severe climate events tend to be of shorter
duration and reduce labor productivity mainly through weakened total factor productivity. Severe disasters have
disproportionately deeper negative effects on productivity partly because they have been more likely to trigger financial stress.
Given its global nature, COVID-19 may lead to sizable adverse cross-border spillovers and weaken global value chains, which
will further damage productivity. The immediate policy focus is to address the health crisis but policymakers also need to
introduce reforms to rekindle productivity growth once the health crisis abates.
and Xinyue Wang. (2015). Biological epidemics can also disproportionally affect low-skilled
1 Natural disasters include climate (floods, cyclones), biological workers and raise inequality (Furceri et al. 2020).
(epidemics, insect infestation), and geophysical disasters (earthquakes, 3 See Collier (1999), Reynaerts and Vanschoonbeek (2018), and
FIGURE 3.2.1 Severity, frequency, and duration of pandemics, epidemics, and climate
disasters
In less than half a year, COVID-19 already ranks as a major disaster. In the most severely affected countries, its impact may
be as large as those from a severe climate disaster, which typically results in mortality rates of over 100 per million of the
population. Climate disasters were the most frequent type of natural disaster in 1960-2018, accounting for nearly 70 percent
of all disasters. Epidemics and wars are much rarer although their duration is longer. About 20 percent of biological disasters
that have affected EMDEs and LICs have been severe and resulted in death ratios of over 100 per million (0.01 percent) of
the population.
A. Global mortality rates for selected B. Global mortality rates for recent C. Mortality rates for severe climate
pandemics epidemics events, pandemics, and epidemics
D. Number of biological and epidemic E. Episodes by type of all disaster, F. Duration of natural disasters,
episodes, 1960-2018 worldwide, 1960-2018 epidemics, and wars
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Correlates of War; EM-DAT; Johns Hopkins University; OurWorldInData.org; Peace Research Institute Oslo; United
Nations; World Bank; World Health Organization.
A.-C. Cumulative deaths per million habitants worldwide. Last observation of death toll for COVID-19 is May 14, 2020. Severe climate disasters are defined as events that
led to at least 100 deaths per million population.
C. Blue bars indicate the medians of mortality rates across affected countries. The bottom (top) of the yellow line represents the 1st (3rd) quintile. Red marker indicates
100 deaths per million habitants.
D.-F. Natural disasters include climate (floods, cyclones), biological (epidemics, insect infestation), and geophysical (earthquakes, volcanoes) disasters, and follow EM-
DAT definitions. Wars are identified using the World Bank’s Correlates of War database. The sample includes 170 economies: 35 advanced economies and 135 EMDEs,
of which 27 are low-income countries.
E. Biological disasters include epidemics.
F. The five pandemics and epidemics considered are SARS (2002-03), MERS (2012), Ebola (2014-15), and Zika (2015-16) .
Click here to download data and charts.
undermine the incentives to invest in R&D and new and quarantines—can further limit the diffusion of
technologies, including by triggering wide-scale technologies.
institutional dysfunction, weakening property rights,
and increasing costs of doing business. Capital Disasters can also impact demand through:
outflows tend to be associated with drops in inward
foreign direct investment, which can be an important • Lower business investment. Short-term projections of
source of technology transfer. Containment efforts demand and economic activity tend to be scaled back
during biological events—such as workplace closures and business uncertainty to increase sharply following
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 153
major disasters, while financial conditions tighten, Epidemics since the 2000s. During 2000-18, the world
including in response to increased risk aversion. These experienced SARS (2002-03), MERS (2012), Ebola
typically cause a sharp drop in investment demand. A (2014-15), and Zika (2015-16). The increased frequency
more prolonged disaster, even at the same magnitude, of epidemics increases the likelihood that pandemics will
results in higher uncertainty. This causes firms to break out. Since 1960, there have been more than 250
delay or deter investments and thereby compounding episodes of biological disasters with losses of life of over 10
the negative economic effects of disasters (Bloom per million population in the countries affected. LICs have
2014; Baker, Bloom, and Terry 2019; and Bloom et been disproportionally affected by these types of disasters,
al. 2018). The more severe the disaster, the larger the whereas advanced economies were not affected. The
uncertainty (Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng 2020). Model- frequency of biological episodes has been increasing over
based estimates by Baker et al. (2020) suggest that time, but they have mostly been contained in size and
increased uncertainty accounts for half of the output severity.
loss in the United States in early 2020.
Frequent climate disasters. Climate disasters accounted
• Weaker consumer demand. Job losses, reduced income, for around 70 percent of natural disasters during 1960-
increased cost of debt service, higher uncertainty, the 2018, occurring twice as often as other types of natural
forced closure of marketing outlets, and, in the case of disasters combined (Figure 3.2.1). However, the frequency
diseases, fear of infection, all tend to cause consumers of severe climate disasters—defined as causing losses of life
to reduce their spending on goods and services and to exceeding 100 people per million—has stabilized since
increase saving rates. Furthermore, effects on 2000, perhaps reflecting better mitigation policies in some
consumer behavior could be long-lasting—for countries as they have confronted climate change (Figure
example, a pandemic could cause households to 3.2.2). Furthermore, climate disasters tend to be short-
reduce their demand, over an extended period, for lived compared to epidemics which on average last twice as
travel, tourism, eating out, entertainment, and other long.
activities involving human interaction, and to increase
their saving in the absence of close substitutes. Wars. Apart from their direct toll on human life and
welfare, wars also have major adverse effects on output and
Frequency and short-term effects of disasters productivity (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Cerra and
Saxena 2008). The frequency of wars has dropped over
This section briefly reviews the experience of severe 2000-18, although a typical LIC was twice as likely to
disasters over the past 60 years for insights into the main experience a conflict as a typical EMDE.4 The destruction,
channels through which they impact productivity. disruption, and diversion effects of wars can cause sharp
Pandemics, epidemics and wars are rare events although reductions in the labor force and physical capital, and also
they last longer than other types of disasters. Biological dampen productive investment and innovation.5
disasters and geophysical disasters are more common.
Climate disasters (such as storms, floods, droughts, and Damaging severe disasters. Compared to unaffected
periods of extreme temperature) occur more often but countries, severe biological disasters are associated with 9
typically last for less than six months. All these events are percent lower median labor productivity and 8 percent
associated with weaker productivity over long time spans. lower total factor productivity (TFP) three years after the
shock (Figure 3.2.2). Severe natural disasters (including
Pandemics. The Spanish flu (1918-19) has an unusually climate and biological disasters) also correlate with weaker
high death toll and mortality rate, killing between 20-100 labor productivity and TFP compared to countries not
million people globally. Other, more recent, pandemics suffering such disasters. In EMDEs, three years into a
had far lower mortality rates. They included the Hong
Kong flu (1968-69) and the Asian flu (1957-58), with
4 The definition and data for wars are from the Correlates of War
nearly 300 and 400 deaths per million, respectively. This
database (Singer and Small 1994). The dataset was updated after 2007
was followed by swine flu (2009-10), with 11 deaths per
using the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) data (Pettersson,
million globally (Figure 3.2.1). COVID-19 is the most Högbladh, and Öberg 2019). In the database, wars are defined as
severe pandemic since the Hong Kong flu, despite the conflicts with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths.
unprecedented mitigation efforts that have been 5 See Becker and Mauro (2006); Collier (1999); Easterly et al.
A. Average number of severe climate B. Average number of severe wars per C. Labor productivity
disaster episodes per year, worldwide year, worldwide
severe natural disaster episode median labor productivity lowering it by between 6 percent and 15 percent (if
was around 8 percent lower in the countries affected, and accompanied with recessions) after five years. Climate
TFP was 7 percent lower than in countries unaffected disasters weaken productivity by between 4 to 8 percent.
whereas investment remained virtually unchanged, which Wars also affect productivity for a sustained period.
could reflect large-scale reconstruction investment
offsetting other negative effects. Methodology. The local projection method (LPM) is used
to provide a reduced-form estimate of the response of
Long-term effects of severe disasters labor productivity to adverse events over various horizons,
and to identify key transmission channels through output,
To help draw inferences on the possible effects of investment, and TFP (Jordà, 2005; Jordà, Schularick, and
COVID-19, this section examines the extent different Taylor, 2013).
types of disasters such as epidemics, climate disasters, and
wars have lasting negative effects on labor productivity. Adverse effects of epidemics. Results suggest that four
Epidemics are particularly damaging to productivity, epidemics since 2000 (SARS, MERS, Ebola, and Zika)
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 155
A. Epidemics: Labor productivity and B. Epidemics: Investment and output C. Severe climate disasters: Labor
total factor productivity productivity and TFP
D. Severe climate disasters: Investment E. Severe epidemics and recession: F. Severe epidemics and recession:
and output Labor productivity Output
had significant and persistent negative effects on epidemics led, on average, to a contemporaneous loss of
productivity (swine flu is excluded since it coincided with productivity equal to about 1 percent (Figure 3.2.3). After
the global financial crisis).6 These estimates indicate that five years, such disasters lowered labor productivity by a
6 Jordà, Singh, and Taylor (2020) consider major pandemics and (Dieppe, Francis, and Kindberg-Hanlon, forthcoming). Ma, Rogers, and
find long lasting effects on output. Barro and Ursúa (2008) report that Zhou (2020) focused on the same set of epidemics in 210 countries and
the macroeconomic impact of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 is found that real GDP in EMDEs is around 2 percent lower, on average, in
substantial. Sustained low levels of demand, and excess capacity during the first year, and 4 percent lower, on average, after five years. This
disasters, including pandemics, can have persistent effects on productivity suggests some uncertainty around the long-run effects.
156 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
A. Effects of wars on labor productivity in B. Effects of financial crises on labor C. Estimates from the literature of effects
EMDEs productivity in EMDEs of events on output per capita
Source: Correlates of War (COW); EM-DAT; Laeven and Valencia (2018); Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); World Bank
Note: Wars include intra-state and external (extra-state and inter-state) wars (COW and PRIO). Financial crisis episodes include banking crisis, currency crisis, and
sovereign debt crisis (Laeven and Valencia 2018). Natural disasters include climate, biological, and geophysical disasters (EM-DAT). EMDEs=emerging market and
developing economies (including low-income countries), The sample includes 170 economies: 35 advanced economies and 135 EMDEs, of which 27 are low-income
countries.
A.B. Blue bars indicate the average impact of the event for each group and orange lines represent the 90 percent significance range.
C. The range of estimates is from the literature.
Click here to download data and charts.
cumulative amount of about 6 percent. Over the same disaster lasts for a more extended period—as is the case
horizon, investment declined by nearly 11 percent with biological disasters—or if reconstruction efforts are
reflecting heightened uncertainty and risk aversion. delayed (Cerra and Saxena 2008; Sawada 2007).7 Twelve
out of around 360 recessions (excluding the 2009 global
Losses associated with severe climate disasters. In financial crisis) were associated with severe disasters; 38
EMDEs, severe disasters (greater than 100 deaths per were associated with epidemics. In the case of the four
million) have resulted in considerable losses in output, major epidemics, the effects associated with recessions are
labor productivity, and total factor productivity. The LPM significantly larger on productivity (Figure 3.2.3).8
estimates for climate disasters indicate that labor
productivity was lower by 8 percent after five years (Figure Scarring effects of wars. This is due to the destruction of
3.2.3, Fomby, Ikeda, and Loayza; 2013). The estimates human and physical capital and reduced total factor
show that lower labor productivity is mainly accounted for productivity. In EMDEs, wars (including internal and
by weaker total factor productivity rather than reduced external wars) have been especially damaging as they
investment. Possibly because after a severe disaster, firms lowered labor productivity by about 4.5 percent after five
delay or cancel investment in R&D, which impedes the years (Figure 3.2.4).
creation, transfer, and adoption of new technologies and
hinders global value chains. On the other hand,
reconstruction spending offsets to some extent the negative
impact on other capital spending.
7 The pace of reconstruction may be slowed by financial, physical,
The literature finds severe disasters have disproportionately and transaction constraints (Hallegatte and Rentschler 2018).
larger economic impacts due to non-linear effects on labor 8 Severe disasters can widen inequalities and exacerbate political
force participation and human capital, particularly tensions in affected countries. Besley and Persson (2011) estimated, for a
sample of 97 countries in the period 1950-2005, that severe natural
amongst younger workers (Cavallo et al. 2013; Hallegatte
disasters increased the probability of wars by about 4 percentage points.
and Przyluski 2010; Loayza et al. 2012). Furthermore, the Biological epidemics can also disproportionally affect low-skilled workers
cumulative loss of productivity tends to be larger if the and raise inequality (Furceri et al. 2020).
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 157
9 See Benson and Clay (2004); Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers 10 See Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar (2017); Hsiang (2010);
(2015); Celiku and Kraay (2017); and Cerra and Saxena (2008, 2017). Skidmore and Toya (2002); and Strobl (2011).The accompanying job
During 1990-2018, the number of financial crises—sovereign debt, losses are likely to be lower-skilled and less productive (Lazear, Shaw, and
banking, and currency—nearly doubled compared to 1960-1989. Over Stanton 2013). To the extent vulnerable groups are particularly exposed
the past three decades, labor productivity growth halved in advanced to economic losses from disasters, policies to protect these groups are
economies and slowed, albeit less markedly, in EMDEs. needed (OECD 2020b).
158 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 3.10 Productivity and epidemics patterns motivated by the aim of lowering
Since 2000, severe biological disasters (including SARS, MERS, Ebola,
infection risks (Smith et al. 2014).
and Zika) have left large and lasting scars on affected economies. On
average, after five years, they lowered labor productivity by about 6 • Erosion of human capital. The learning
percent and investment by about 10 percent. disruptions associated with widespread school
and university closures, as well as income
A. Labor productivity B. Investment
losses, may cause lasting setbacks to human
capital accumulation (UNESCO 2020; Wang
et al. 2020).10
will weigh on potential output and productivity, FIGURE 3.12 Fiscal and monetary policy responses
especially if financial crises erupt and oil prices Many countries have implemented unprecedented and wide-ranging fiscal
remain depressed for an extended period. The support in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, while many central banks
pandemic and the accompanying recessions will have moved quickly to provide accommodation, in many cases beyond
levels seen during the global financial crisis.
likely prolong and deepen the multi-decade trend
decline in long-term growth prospects.
A. Fiscal policies across advanced B. EMDE fiscal support, by type of
economies measures
The exceptional severity of the pandemic and
economic collapse raises concerns about the risk of
“super-hysteresis”: not only a permanent loss of
output levels but a permanent slowdown in
potential output growth (Ball 2014). The
pandemic could alter the very structures upon
which the growth of recent decades was built,
since it could cause prolonged damage to global
supply chains, global trade and financial flows,
and global collaboration. C. Unconventional monetary policy in D. Monetary policy in EMDEs
major advanced economies
The evolving response to the pandemic has
included an extensive menu of policies to dampen
the effects of the health crisis, including the short-
term economic losses. Many countries have
instituted stringent measures to stem the
pandemic, including full lockdowns. They have
restricted international and domestic travel, closed
schools and non-essential businesses, and
discouraged work performed other than at home.
Source: Bank for International Settlements; Bloomberg; European Central Bank; Haver Analytics;
They have banned, or advised their citizens to World Bank; Yale Program on Financial Stability.
avoid, large gatherings. As countries cautiously feel A. Sample comprises 27 advanced economies and the Euro Area. Last observation is May 20, 2020.
B. Total of measures either planned or under consideration. Contains 147 EMDEs. Last updated May
their way toward a gradual reopening of their 17, 2020.
C. "COVID-19" reflects recently announced asset purchases and are expressed as a share of 2019
economies, they face the challenge of rebuilding a nominal GDP. "Global financial crisis" asset purchases reflect the increase in central bank balance
sheets between August 2008 and December 2009 as a share of 2008 nominal GDP.
healthy economy while at the same time guarding D. Sample consists of 26 EMDEs.
against the threat of a renewed outbreak of the Click here to download data and charts.
pandemic.
To support their economies through the stronger long-term growth. The implication is that
shutdowns, policymakers have implemented relief for policymakers to be able to fund health systems
programs of an unprecedented scale (Chapter 1; and support domestic demand through the
Figure 3.12). The immediate fiscal policy response eventual recovery, they need to credibly undertake
has included support for health care systems, comprehensive reform programs to improve
expanded social benefit programs, and measures to institutions and frameworks that can ensure an
help firms and households. EMDE monetary eventual return to robust growth while setting the
authorities across the world have eased monetary stage for stronger long-term prospects. This will
conditions to support activity and provided require credible fiscal frameworks that ensure that
emergency liquidity support to stabilize financial fiscal sustainability will be restored; it will also
markets. demand credible monetary policy frameworks that
ensure that monetary policy will safeguard low
Beyond these short-term policies to confront the inflation and financial stability. In addition, it will
current health and economic crisis, the likely long- require stronger governance and business
term implications of the COVID-19 pandemic environments, and expanding investment in
also highlight the need to lay the foundation for education and public health.
160 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
As the world emerges from the pandemic, it will Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS) in 2002-
also be critical to strengthen the mechanisms for 03, MERS-Cov (Middle East Respiratory
preventing and responding to epidemics before the Syndrome, or MERS) in 2012, Ebola in 2014-15
next one strikes. Less than 5 percent of countries and again in 2018-20, the Zika virus in 2015-16,
entered this pandemic scoring in the highest tier as well as endemic diseases such as cholera and
for their ability to respond to and mitigate the yellow fever (Table A.3.1.1).
spread of an epidemic (Johns Hopkins University
and NTI 2019). Improving these capabilities will Past pandemics, especially the Spanish flu, have
require international policy cooperation and imposed a heavy toll in terms of human lives. The
coordination, especially given the global reach of number of fatalities from COVID-19 is rising
such disasters. strongly, and is likely to rise considerably more
(Figure A.3.1.1; Atkeson 2020; Ferguson et al.
2020).
Pandemics and epidemics also have significant
ANNEX 3.1 The macroeconomic
economic impacts. Even a relatively mild
effects of pandemics and pandemic, in terms of the number of deaths, can
epidemics: A literature review generate substantial global output losses in the
short term. This annex reviews the relevant
A growing literature has examined the economic literature, addressing the following questions:
losses from historical and simulated pandemics,
taking account of a range of channels, including • What are the channels through which the
labor force disruption; a collapse in consumption, global economy is disrupted by pandemics
trade, and travel; and amplification through and epidemics?
confidence and financial market disruptions. These
• What were the economic costs associated with
studies have found initial GDP losses that fall in a
previous pandemics and what do model-based
range of 1-8 percent. However, these estimates
simulations suggest about the costs of
generally do not account for containment measures
pandemics of different severity?
of the scale used during the COVID-19 pandemic,
which could significantly increase the economic • What are the expected economic costs of
costs. Other major economic shocks, such as COVID-19, based on existing studies?
financial or currency crises, have been associated
with persistently negative effects on growth, Channels of economic impact
suggesting that there may be long-term scarring
effects from COVID-19. The macroeconomic impacts of disease outbreaks
(epidemics or pandemics) stem from effects on
Introduction aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Demand-
side channels capture the effects on consumption,
SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) is the latest in a long investment, trade, and travel, while supply
series of global disease outbreaks. In just the past channels capture workforce and supply-chain
century, the world has experienced four influenza disruptions and the rising costs of doing business.1
pandemics: H1N1 in 1918-19 (Spanish flu),
H2N2 in 1957-58 (Asian flu), H3N2 in 1968-69 Demand channels
(Hong Kong flu), and H1N1 in 2009-10 (swine
flu). HIV/AIDS, which appeared in the early Avoidance, fear, and uncertainty. Infectious
1980s, was also eventually classified as a pandemic. disease outbreaks can have a substantial impact on
In addition, the world has suffered from numerous demand as governments, consumers, and firms
other disease outbreaks, such as SARS-Cov (Severe
Note: This annex was prepared by Gene Kindberg-Hanlon, Yoki income which are then magnified by credit constraints and firm
Okawa, and Dana Vorisek. failures, reducing demand (Guerrieri et al. 2020).
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 161
A. Impact on GDP from simulated flu B. Estimated impact on GDP from C. Estimated number of deaths
pandemics COVID-19
Source: Cobos et al. (2016); Dawood et al. (2012); Simonsen (1999); Spreeuwenberg, Kroneman, and Paget (2018); WHO (2018); World Bank.
A. Blue bars show the median of reported GDP shrinkage. Orange lines represent the range of the median estimates of influenza pandemics on first-year (peak impact in all cases) GDP
growth from models in McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006); Burns, Mensbrugghe, Timmer (2006); Verikios et al. (2011); and McKibbin and Fernando (2020). In “mild” scenarios, the mortality rate
is 2.2 per 10,000 population. In “moderate” scenarios, the mortality rate is 20-50 per 10,000 population. In “severe” scenarios, the mortality rate is 90-110 per 100,000 people.
B. Blue bars show the median reported GDP shrinkage. Orange line represents the range of the simulated impacts of COVID-19 on first-year GDP growth from Baker et al. (2020b);
Breisinger et al. (2020); IMF (2020); McKibbin and Fernando (2020); and World Bank (2020b). Baseline estimates from IMF (2020) are changes in forecasts in April 2020 from January 2020.
Baker et al. (2020b) and Breisinger et al. (2020) are estimates for only the United States and Egypt, respectively.
C. Number of cumulative daily infections from first day when infections exceeded 100. Data for COVID-19 is as of May 22, 2020.
Click here to download data and charts.
take actions to limit contagion. In some cases, this labor productivity in the short run, while loss of
effect may be magnified by uncertainty. SARS, for schooling and job experience, as well as mortality,
example, triggered a substantial reduction in can have persistent effects. In past pandemics,
travel, consumption, services exports (including illness and absences to care for family members
tourism), and even investment, despite causing reduced labor supply more than mortality
just 800 deaths. Consumer spending patterns have (Kilbourne 2004; McKibbin and Sidorenko
shifted dramatically during the COVID-19 2006).2
pandemic. In the United States, the magnitude of
changes in spending has been linked to both the Business closures and supply chain disruptions.
severity of local outbreaks, which creates Business costs are likely to increase during a
heightened avoidance of contagion risk, and to pandemic as measures are taken to protect
controls imposed at the city and state level, which employees and the general population, and
halt many normal activities (Baker, Farrokhina et closures can exact an even greater toll. Empirical
al. 2020). Heightened uncertainty may also be assessments of disease outbreaks have found that
reflected in financial market stress. The market high-exposure service sectors, such as travel,
volatility from COVID-19 has been severe. Risk accommodation, and food services, are hardest hit
spreads on borrowing costs have widened sharply. during pandemics, even when few restrictions or
Many EMDEs have experienced capital flight. closures were imposed (Joo et al. 2019; Siu and
Previous infectious disease outbreaks have had Wong 2004). Manufacturing can be deeply
qualitatively similar effects on financial markets affected by supply chain disruptions. In some
(Ma, Rogers, and Zhou 2020). CGE-based estimates of the economic costs of
pandemics, rising business costs in affected sectors
Supply channels
Labor force effects. Illness and preventive 2 In addition, over the long term, the loss of human capital due to
measures to reduce contagion during infectious fatalities during the outbreak can result in long-term output losses
(Fan, Jamison, and Summers 2018).
disease outbreaks reduce available labor supply and
162 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
TABLE A.3.1.1 Estimated mortality and infection rates of impacts of pandemics for lower-income
pandemics during the past century households. Because low-income workers typically
have limited savings to buffer income shocks, and
Spanish Asian Hong Kong Swine
COVID-19 because telecommuting is not an option for many
flu flu flu flu
low-paid service jobs, these workers may be forced
Period 1918-19 1957-58 1968-69 2009-10 2020
to work in environments where the risk of
Deaths
(% of global 1.0-5.7 0.03-0.05 0.02-0.03 0.001-0.004 0.004
infection is high.
population)
Cross-country spillovers. Simulations have shown
Infections
(% of global 28 42-55 30-57 24 0.07 that global trade would fall by as much as 14
population) percent in a medium-scale outbreak of avian flu,
even if viral cases were limited to South and East
Source: Cobos et al. (2016); Johnson and Mueller (2002); Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus
Resource Center; Simonsen (1999); Taubenberger and Morens (2006).
Asia (Bloom, de Wits, and Carangal-San Jose
Note: COVID-19 infections and deaths are as of May 22, 2020. 2006). During the SARS outbreak, the high
dependence of Hong Kong SAR, China on
tourism and services exports was found to have
are responsible for the majority of economic losses magnified GDP losses (Siu and Wong 2004).
(Lee and McKibbin 2003; McKibbin and Disruption to global value chains provides an
Sidorenko 2006). additional channel that can increase the economic
cost of pandemics and epidemics. The impact of
Amplifying and dampening factors
COVID-19 on global trade has been a major
Several factors affect the magnitude of economic concern in part because countries that collectively
losses from disease outbreaks. account for the majority of global manufacturing
production and exports (China, Germany, Italy,
Demographic profiles. Large-scale infectious Korea, and the United States) have also
disease outbreaks tend to strike some age segments experienced some of the largest outbreaks
more than others. For example, the case fatality (Baldwin and Tomiura 2020).
rate during the Spanish flu was highest for young
adults, while during the Asian flu, school-aged Macroeconomic policy response. Fiscal and
children and young adults experienced the largest monetary policy support can blunt the adverse
elevation in mortality relative to the baseline economic impacts of disease outbreaks and
(Gagnon et al. 2013; Viboud et al. 2016). Early aggressive mitigation measures. With much of the
experience with COVID-19 shows a dispro- global economy under lockdown during the
portionally higher frequency of death for the COVID-19 pandemic, such support has been
elderly suggesting that the loss of life may be essential to offset drastic interruptions to the
severe for countries and regions with a high share normal income, credit, and spending patterns
of older people (Farzanegan, Feizi and Gholipour among businesses and households. The
2020; Sornette et al 2020; Verity et al. 2020).3 effectiveness of policy support depends on the
credibility of the measures, and the extent of pre-
Health care systems and social safety nets. Low-
existing vulnerabilities such as high debt levels and
and lower-middle-income economies may suffer
large external financing needs, and structural
particularly high loss of life from disease outbreaks
issues. For example, fiscal multipliers are typically
as a result of low-quality health care systems and
lower in economies with high debt (Huidrom et
poor access to water and sanitation services
al. 2019). The effectiveness of fiscal policy also
(Corburn et al. 2020; Farzanegan, Feizi, and
depends critically on a well-functioning social
Gholipour 2020; McKibbin and Sidorenko 2006).
security system, and could be complicated by high
Weak social safety nets can magnify the economic
levels of informality (Box 1.4; Loayza and
Pennings 2020). Monetary policy easing also may
3 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2020) be less effective in economies with large informal
estimates that the case fatality rate for patients ages 20-44 is less than sectors and low financial inclusion (Alberola-Ila
one-tenth of the rate for patients ages 65-74. and Urrutia 2019).
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 163
more cyclical economic sectors, such as economies (McKibbin and Fernando 2020). This
manufacturing, experiencing output reductions of would be comparable to the estimated 6 percent
up to 18 percent (Barro, Ursua, and Weng 2020; global economic losses due to Spanish flu (Barro,
Correia, Luck, and Verner 2020). In contrast, Ursua, and Weng 2020). Maliszewska, Mattoo,
estimates for more moderate episodes of influenza, and van der Mensbrgghe (2020) estimate losses of
such as the Asian flu, which killed approximately 1 2.5-4.0 percent in EMDEs, and 1.8-3.8 percent of
million people globally, show GDP losses that are GDP in advanced economies. This results from a
largely indistinguishable from normal growth fall in employment, lower consumption, rising
volatility (Henderson et al. 2009). SARS is trade costs, and reduced travel and tourism.
estimated to have reduced output by 1-4 percent However, these studies do not factor in the full
in some of the worst affected economies in the stringency of the controls that were later imposed
second quarter of 2003, with less clear impacts on globally.
growth during the whole of 2003 (Siu and Wong
2004). Several studies have attempted to separate the
losses of output that preventive controls may
COVID-19: Short and long-term losses impose from those of a hypothetical COVID-19
outbreak with no such restrictions. Restrictions on
Several studies have published initial estimates of retail, travel, and other services industries could
the possible economic losses from the COVID-19 reduce output by 25 percent in OECD economies
pandemic (Table A.3.1.4). Some take account of during their enforcement (OECD 2020a). Were
the economic impacts of the stringent these restrictions to remain in place over three
containment and mitigation measures, which months in 2020, this would imply a 6 percent
could make the economic impacts of this reduction in annual GDP, equivalent to estimates
pandemic much more severe relative to past of lost output in severe simulated pandemics
episodes (Boissay and Rungcharoenkitkul 2020).7 (without explicit containment measures) and
empirical estimates of losses from Spanish flu.
Short-term economic losses
Other estimates suggest that growth will be
The existing estimates of the economic approximately 5-8 percentage points lower in
consequences of COVID-19 have a wide range, advanced economies and EMDEs in 2020 due to
reflecting the large uncertainty surrounding the effects of COVID-19 and associated
contagiousness, the eventual infection and fatality containment measures. The impact on growth
rates, the stringency and duration of policies to would be an additional 3 percentage points if the
reduce virus transmission, and other factors duration of containment measures is extended to
(Figure A.3.1.1). The first estimates showed small increase the number of lost working days by 50
economic losses. Subsequent estimates were percent (IMF 2020).
higher, as the pervasiveness and severity of the
A developing strand of the literature models the
disease, and the containment and mitigation
economic impact of imposing “optimal”
measures, became more apparent.8
containment measures to limit the spread of
One study puts output losses from the COVID- COVID-19. In a model of the United States,
19 pandemic at 2-6 percent of GDP in EMDEs in consumption falls by 22 percent under optimal
the first year, and 2-8 percent in advanced containment measures, compared to just 7 percent
if only the effect on labor supply owing to illness
and mortality and consumer behavior is
7 Keogh-Brown et al. (2010) estimate that extending a four-week considered (Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt
school closure to 15 weeks alongside increased levels of prophylactic 2020).9 Another model-based approach applied to
absenteeism might double economic losses in a medium-scale
pandemic but only reduce the rate of infection by 2-15 percent. the United States finds that targeting containment
8 For example, ADB (2020) initially estimated a “worst-case
measures to older age groups results in a 10 Human capital implications. Schools and
percent reduction in output over one year, universities have been closed across the world as
compared to a 24 percent loss of output with part of the policy response to slow the spread of
universally-applied lockdown measures (Acemoglu COVID-19 (UNESCO 2020). The associated
et al. 2020). Age-targeted containment measures learning disruptions, although partially
may be particularly effective at limiting output compensated by home schooling and remote
losses in EMDEs, which have a smaller share of teaching, are likely to have the most adverse effects
their population in vulnerable age groups (Alon et for disadvantaged students, including on health
al. 2020). and safety (World Bank 2020d). School closures
may cause lasting setbacks to human capital
Medium- and long-term impacts accumulation and earnings potential
(Psacharopoulos et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2020).
Scarring effects and offsetting policy. Most
Missed learning opportunities can have larger
analysis of the economic costs of pandemics and
impacts for low-income families, who often have
epidemics focuses on short-term impacts.
limited ability to support learning at home (Van
However, severe economic contractions of the
Lancker and Parolin 2020). Evidence from the
magnitude expected in 2020 have historically cast
Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014 suggests
long shadows, typically lowering potential growth
that school closures were associated with higher
for four to five years (Box Lasting damage of
dropout rates and wider gender gaps in
recessions; Martin, Munyan, and Wilson 2015;
educational attainment (UNDP 2015). Large
World Bank 2018). This can result from reduced
declines in household income are also associated
investment, credit constraints, and slower
with increased school dropout rates in EMDEs
adoption of new technologies (Anzoategui et al.
(Glick, Sahn, and Walker 2016). In addition,
2019; Queralto 2019).10 History suggests that
closure of workplaces will deprive many people of
good policy may reduce the adverse effects of
opportunities to improve skills and productivity
severe contractions. Regions implementing
through apprenticeships and on-the-job learning.
significant containment measures during the
Spanish flu are found to have experienced faster Poverty implications. The COVID-19 pandemic
rates of growth than other regions in the five years could have severe effects for the poor through
following the pandemic (Brainerd and Siegler multiple channels, including greater vulnerability
2003; Correia, Luck, and Verner 2020). to declines in labor and non-labor income,
Debt and insolvency risk. The negative shock increased risk of infection and mortality, and
from COVID-19 is occurring at a time of lower availability of essential items due to market
heightened vulnerabilities in sovereign and private disruptions hit the poor particularly hard (Barnett-
sector debt. Historically, episodes of rapidly FAO et al. 2020; Howell and Mobarak 2020;
accumulating debt are associated with an increased World Bank 2020d). Although the social
likelihood of a financial crisis (Kose et al. 2020). assistance measures that have been implemented
The unprecedented scale of the current fiscal by many countries may soften the impacts on
stimulus will stretch public sector balance sheets households, they do not fully offset the income
even further in many EMDEs, and in some losses from shutdowns. Moreover, the poorest
advanced economies. Private sectors may members of society have little capacity to manage
experience a wave of insolvencies, posing a threat negative income shocks. Less than 20 percent of
to banking systems in various jurisdictions. One of workers are covered by social insurance or
the lasting effects of the COVID-19 induced assistance programs in low-income countries
recession may be increased financial fragility. (LICs), in part due to their large informal sectors
(World Bank 2019b). All this suggests that recent
progress on the reduction of poverty and
inequality will likely be lost (Sumner, Hoy, and
10 Downward pressure on real rates of return following a
Burns, 108 - Illness and mortality No explicit 1 year DSGE/CGE 3.0 3.6
Mensbrugghe, - Reduction of 20% in travel, transport, and containment or
and Timmer restaurant consumption for 1 year policy measures
(2006)
Smith, Keogh- - Illness: 35% of working labor force is School closures CGE United -
Brown, and infected and prophylactic 1 year Kingdom: 0.3-
Barnett (2011) - Case fatality rate of 0.06-0.35% absenteeism 0.6 considering
considered in disease only;
alternate 3.4-4.3 with
scenarios school closures
and
prophylactic
absenteeism
Verikios et al. 20 - Illness and mortality - unspecified School closures Multi-year. CGE 3.9 2.4
(2011) - School closures add 75% to lost working Losses largely
days unwound after
- Reduction of tourism and travel of 70% one year
Note: Losses are reported relative to a baseline level of GDP or growth rate, which are approximately equivalent. Median of the first year GDP loss in advanced economies or EMDEs are
reported, except Burns, Mensbrugghe, and Timmer (2006), which only reports aggregated GDP impact. “High-income countries” in Burns, Mensbrugghe, Timmer (2006) are presented in the
tables as advanced economies and “low and middle-income countries” are presented as EMDEs.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 167
SARS Lee and McKibbin CGE modeling exercise Asia-Pacific Reduction in 2003 GDP:
(2004) calibrated following the SARS Hong Kong SAR, China -2.6%
epidemic China -1.1%
Singapore -0.5%
SARS Siu and Wong Event study of the effects of Hong Kong Initial 15% decline in year-on-year retail
(2004) SARS using sectoral, trade, and SAR, China sales growth during the peak of the
tourism data outbreak; tourist arrivals decline 10% at
peak; unemployment rate increases by
more than one percentage point at peak;
tourist arrivals and consumption
subsequently recover to pre-SARS
levels but no indication that lost growth
is recovered
SARS Keogh-Brown and Event study examining a range 16 economies, One-quarter losses:
Smith (2008) of aggregate and sectoral primarily in China -3%
indicators Asia Hong Kong SAR, China -4.75%
Canada -1%
Singapore -1%
Losses are concentrated in travel,
leisure activities, and tourism; results do
not specify whether quarterly impacts
are recovered in subsequent quarters
SARS Kholodilin and VAR using monthly data on Eight major News of SARS outbreak reduced
Rietha (2020) industrial production and index economies industrial production by 2% in China and
of news about flu-like disease 10% in Republic of Korea during the
peak of the episode
MERS Joo et al. (2019) Event study of tourism, travel, Republic of Permanent losses in affected sectors
accommodation, and food Korea equivalent to -0.2% of GDP
sectors during 2015
168 CHAPTER 3 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
Maliszewska, Not -Illness and mortality reduce labor input by - Effect of containment 1 year CGE 1.8-3.8 2.5-4.0
Mattoo, and specified 3% in year 1 embedded in assumptions
van der -Trade costs increase by 25% across all about labor input and
Mensbrugghe goods and services consumption reduction
(2020); World -Tourism fall implemented with a 50%
Bank (2020c) increase in costs
-Demand “reallocated” away from high-risk
service sectors
McKibbin and 20-90 -Illness and mortality: -0.4 to -4.6% fall in - No explicit containment 1 year DSGE/ 2.0-8.0 1.6-6.0
Fernando labor supply measures (year of CGE
(2020) -Consumer behavior: initial -0.8 to -4.5% fall - 0.2-2.7% positive shock to shock);
in total consumption, including targeted government expenditure reversion
tourism and trade reductions - Endogenous fiscal and to
-Financial market disruption: 1.1-2.9 monetary response to shocks baseline
percentage point increase in equity risk after 1
premium year
-Costs of doing business: 25-50% increase,
varying by sector
-Demographics and health care quality
indexes vary mortality rates across
economies
WTO (2020) - Illness and mortality reduce labor supply -Work from home for 3 months 2 years CGE 4.8-11.1 in year 1
by 1-4% in year 1 to 1 year and school closures (global)
-Tourism declines 20-80% over 3-6 months for 3 months
-Retail activity declines 5-20% over 3-9
months
-Manufacturing falls by a maximum of 80%
for 3 months and 40% for 6 months
-Trade costs increase: 22.5% rise in cost of
services transport and specialized
equipment transport over 6-18 months, 70%
rise in air cargo costs over 6-18 months
Baker et al. Not -Based on U.S. stock return and volatility n/a VAR 3-20
(2020b) specified from February 24 to March 31 (United
States)2
Banco de Not -Spillovers from weak global economy - 8-12 weeks of containment 2 years, Hybrid 8.5-14.1
España specified -Weak domestic demand due to measures, reducing domestic with macro (Spain)
(2020) containment demand strong model
- Discretionary fiscal policy to support the rebound
economy in year 2
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 3 169
Note: Losses are reported relative to a baseline level of GDP or growth rate, which are approximately equivalent. Median of the first year GDP loss in advanced economies/EMDEs are
reported.
1. Calculated as the deviation of the forecast in the IMF’s April 2020 World Economic Outlook relative to its January 2020 World Economic Outlook Update. Upper bound is calculated under
the scenario such that containment measures last 50 percent longer than baseline. Upper bound numbers are rounded to nearest integer.
2. 90 percent confidence interval of year-on-year change on quarterly GDP in the worst quarter.
3. Indicates a GDP impact based on the study’s cited consumption impact of 7 percent without containment and 22 percent with containment, and assuming that consumption accounts for
two-thirds of GDP.
170 CH A PTER 3 GLOB A L EC ONOMI C PROSPE C T S I JUNE 2020
ANNEX 3.2 Bayesian vector interest rates, and the EMBI are also assumed to
be initially exogenous to growth in each of the
autoregression model EMDE regions under consideration, but not
A Bayesian vector autoregression model (BVAR) is exogenous to fluctuations in growth of the three
employed, in reduced form, to capture past major economies. This is consistent with the three
empirical relationships through multiple channels. major economies, and in particular China,
These channels operated historically, including accounting for a major proportion of global
during previous global synchronized downturns. demand for oil (Baffes, Kabundi, and Nagle
Spillovers are estimated using the BVAR model 2020). It is also consistent with research
including, in this Cholesky ordering, the GDP- suggesting that monetary policy in the United
weighted average of GDP growth in China, the States is a key driver of global financial conditions,
Euro Area, and the United States; oil prices in part reflected by the EMBI, which can
(unweighted average of Brent, WTI, and Dubai subsequently drive macroeconomic developments
prices); a measure of global interest rates (GDP- in EMDE regions (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey
weighted average of up to 122 central bank policy 2020).
rates) ; a measure of EMDE sovereign borrowing
Impulse response functions (IRFs) are estimated
costs Q.P. Morgan's EMBI Emerging Market
to account for the impact of shocks from growth
Bond Index); and GDP-weighted average GDP
in the three major economies to each EMDE
growth of groups of EMDEs. GDP-weighted
aggregate. Due to the identification of the VAR,
averages are at 2010 market exchange rates and
these shocks also contemporaneously affect oil
prices. These variables correspond to those used in
prices, interest rates, and the EMBI, allowing
VAR-based estimations of spillovers across
additional spillovers through commodity and
economies and in standard small open economy
financial channels to EMDE aggregates.
DSGE models that have been used to examine the
transmission of shocks across economies
(Huidrom et al. 2020). The sample includes
quarterly data for 1998-2019. ANNEX 3.3 EMDE vulnerability
index
The VAR is estimated using four lags, as is
standard in quarterly VARs, and using Normal- Methodology. For each country, six vulnerability
Wishart priors, taking the form: sub-indexes are calculated that capture the main
4 challenges EMDEs are facing in the current
Yt = C + BiYt −i + t pandemic: health, financial, fiscal, trade, tourism,
i =1
and poverty.
where Yt 1s an m x 1 vector of endogenous
• The financial vulnerability index is compiled
variables, C is an m x 1 vector of constants, Bi 1s an
from current account and fiscal balances
m x m vector of coefficients for each lag of Y , and
(percent of GDP); government, corporate,
ϵt 1s an m x 1 vector of reduced-form error terms.
and external debt (percent of GDP); the share
of short-term external debt; and the share of
The BVAR is identified using an assumption on
foreign-currency-denominated government
the exogeneity of the variables with respect to one
another in the first quarter following an economic and corporate debt.
shock (using a Cholesky decomposition of the • The fiscal vulnerability index is compiled from
error variance-covariance matrix). In particular, government debt and fiscal balances (in
the identification assumes that a shock to all three percent of GDP) and the share of foreign-
major economies' (China's, Euro Area's and U.S.) currency government debt.
GDP growth combined is initially exogenous to
changes in the other variables, such that they can • The trade vulnerability index is compiled from
only affect growth in the three major economies the share of trade in GDP; the share of
with a lag of at least one quarter. Oil prices, global commodity exports in total goods exports; the
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS I JUNE 20 20 CHAPTER 3 171
the interest. The equation controls for country- Acevedo, S. M., M. Mrkaic, N. Novta, E. Pugacheva,
specific effects (αi) and persistence of the shock by and P. Topalova. 2018. “The Effects of Weather Shocks
including the lagged shock in a forward bias on Economic Activity: What Are the Channels of
Impact?” IMF Working Paper 18/144, International
correction (Teulings and Zubanov 2014).
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Five shocks are considered: recessions, financial ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2020. “The
crises, oil price plunges, a combination of Economic Impact of the COVID-19 Outbreak on
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Finance Discussion Paper 1260, Board of Governors for
In a second step, regressions are estimated with the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC.
three separate interaction terms to explore the role
Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014. “Children of War: The Long-
of vulnerabilities to financial crises: external debt
Run Effects of Large-Scale Physical Destruction and
in percent of GDP, current account balances in Warfare on Children.” Journal of Human Resources 49
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CHAPTER 4
Adding Fuel to the Fire:
Cheap Oil during the Pandemic
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 4 183
The outbreak of COVID-19 and the wide-ranging measures needed to slow its advance have precipitated an
unprecedented collapse in oil demand, a surge in oil inventories, and, in March, the steepest one-month decline
in oil prices on record. In the context of the current restrictions on a broad swath of economic activity, low oil
prices are unlikely to do much to buffer the effects of the pandemic, but they may provide some initial support
for a recovery once these restrictions begin to be lifted. Like other countries, energy-exporting emerging market
and developing economies (EMDEs) face an unprecedented public health crisis, but their fiscal positions were
already strained even before the recent collapse in oil revenues. To help retain access to market-based financing
for fiscal support programs, these EMDEs will need to make credible commitments to a sustainable
medium-term fiscal position. For some of them, current low oil prices provide an opportunity to implement
energy-pricing policies that yield efficiency and fiscal gains over the medium term.
fell by 72 percent over this period, on par with the declines during
Note: This chapter was produced by a team led by Franziska these comparator periods for the global financial crisis and the 2014-
Ohnsorge and including John Baffes, Alain Kabundi, Gene 16 price slide.
Kindberg-Hanlon, Peter Nagle, and Collette Mari Wheeler, with 2 This reflected an expiring futures contract and no physical oil
FIGURE 4.1 Oil price decline putting it in a historical context and drawing
Oil prices collapsed in the first quarter of 2020, with March featuring the
lessons from the experience of emerging market
single largest one-month drop on record. Meanwhile, oil inventories have and developing economy (EMDE) energy
risen steeply. exporters and importers during the 2014-16
A. Spot oil prices B. Commodity price changes during
plunge. Specifically, the chapter addresses the
January 22-April 21, 2020 following questions:
• Output losses in energy-exporting EMDEs. This fiscal revenue bases, and enhance fiscal and
latest oil price plunge was preceded by six monetary policy frameworks.
previous plunges over the past half-century.
During past demand-driven episodes, energy Drivers of the oil price
exporters and importers suffered similar initial
output losses (about 0.5 percent) that were plunge
unwound within three years. In supply-driven
oil price plunges, however, energy importers By one measure, the European Brent spot price,
did not witness robust growth pickups but crude oil prices fell by 85 percent between January
energy exporters witnessed similar initial 22nd (the date the first recorded human-to-human
output losses as in demand-driven plunges infection was announced) and their trough of $9
and less than one-third of these losses had per barrel on April 21st before recovering in May
been unwound three years later. This lasting to less than half their January average (Figure
impact of supply-driven oil price plunges may 4.1).3 The oil market has been hit by an
reflect a reassessment of long-term prospects unprecedented combination of demand and
for energy exporters. Energy-exporting supply shocks. The pandemic, and the restrictions
EMDEs with lower debt, more flexible on business and personal activities imposed to
exchange rates, and more diversified export stem its spread, have triggered a global recession,
bases suffered smaller short-term output and a steep drop in the demand for oil (Chapter
losses. 3). Total oil demand fell by almost 5 percent in
the first quarter of 2020, and is projected to
• Potential support for global growth early in a decline 20 percent in the second quarter of 2020
recovery. As long as widespread restrictions (IEA 2020). This coincided with a delay in early
continue to constrain economic activity across March of OPEC and its partners (OPEC+) to
the global economy, low oil prices are unlikely agree an extension of their production cuts (World
to provide meaningful support to global Bank 2020). Meanwhile, petroleum inventories
growth. If anything, the current episode of have risen rapidly and are expected to reach near-
low oil prices holds less promise for a full capacity in June (IEA 2020).
sustained boost to global growth than past
episodes of low oil prices since energy Demand decline resulting from lockdowns. The
exporters entered the current episode with single largest factor driving the collapse in oil
eroded fiscal positions and foreign exchange prices has been the sharp reduction in oil demand
buffers to support their economies, after arising from government restrictions to stem the
having drawn on them to weather the spread of the pandemic. Many countries have
previous oil price plunge of 2014-16. That implemented wide-ranging travel bans, sharply
said, when current pandemic-related reducing the number of flights. Stay-at-home
restrictions ease, excess inventories and low oil orders and a widespread shift to remote working
prices could provide some initial support for have caused the number of passenger journeys to
the revival of global economic activity. plummet. For example, passenger journeys in
China fell by three-fifths compared to their
• Need for policy action. Current low oil prices normal level in March, while subway journeys in
are an opportunity to review energy-pricing New York fell by more than nine-tenths in April
policies, including remaining energy subsidies.
A carefully calibrated design, phasing, and
communication of such reforms is critical for 3 Another frequently used measure, the Dated Brent spot price,
their success. For energy exporters, this most fell by 72 percent over this period, on par with the 70 percent decline
during the global financial crisis (end-August to late December 2008)
recent oil price decline is yet another reminder and the 76 percent decline during end-June 2014-mid-January 2016.
of the urgency to continue with reforms to In late-April, the West Texas Intermediate oil price (a U.S. oil price
benchmark) contract for delivery in May temporarily fell below zero
diversify their economies. These include on concerns about near-full U.S. storage capacity; however, no
measures to strengthen competition, broaden physical oil was traded at negative prices.
186 CHAPTER 4 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 4.2 Drivers of the 2020 oil price plunge (Figure 4.2). There has also been a reduction in
Government restrictions to stem the pandemic have disproportionately the volume of shipping, both for consumers (most
disrupted travel and transport, which accounts for around two-thirds of notably cruises) and container shipping for
global oil consumption. Global oil consumption has fallen steeply in the first industry, as a result of shrinking global trade. The
half of 2020. The pandemic has also triggered a global recession that has
sharply reduced oil demand. The initial failure to agree on an extension of unprecedented reduction in transport in many
the production agreement between OPEC and its partners in March countries—which accounts for around two-thirds
(although agreement was achieved in April) added to price pressures.
of demand for oil—has led to a sharp fall in fuel
A. Change in transport demand B. Container shipping throughput
volume growth
consumption.
positive supply shock—such as would have been FIGURE 4.3 Oil markets during past recessions and
caused by the failure of the OPEC agreement in travel disruptions
early March—as an event that lowers prices and at Travel disruptions in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the
the same time raises both global oil output and United States contributed to a decline in oil prices. During global
recessions, oil prices tended to fall, with the largest declines in the current
industrial production. In contrast, a negative global recession.
demand shock—such as would have been caused
by travel restrictions or falling global growth—is A. Oil price B. Oil consumption growth around
an event that lowers oil prices amid falling oil recessions
travel disruptions have been associated with a A. The y-axis is a price index, with “100=t” indicating prices at the start of the events. The x-axis
shows the passage of time (in days). Start dates for the two events are the first trading day before a
considerably steeper oil price collapse than similar major event occurred: September 10, 2001, for 9/11; and January 22, 2020, for COVID-19. Swath
shows the four global recessions: 1974-75, 1981-82, 1990-91, and 2008-09. For the first two
episodes in the past (Figure 4.3). For 2020 as a recessions, daily data were unavailable, so monthly percent changes were taken (assuming each
month lasts 22 working days).
whole, oil demand is expected to drop by an B. Dates of recessions are taken from Kose, Sugawara, and Terrones (2020). The four recessions
included are: 1974-75; 1981-82; 1990-91; and 2008-09."Before" shows average annual growth rates
unprecedented 9 percent—more than twice as in commodity consumption over the three years prior to the recession. "During" shows average
much as during any previous global recession or annual growth rates of recession years. Note that in 1980 a global slowdown occurred with similar
negative growth rates in consumption; as such the "Before" period covers 1977-79.
oil-specific demand slowdown. Click here to download data and charts.
spike in uncertainty and prolonged the recession that might have triggered upturns (Cashin,
following the dot-com collapse in the United Mohaddes, and Raissi 2014; Kilian 2009;
States, and hence the slowdown in global activity. Peersman and Van Robays 2012).
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, oil prices fell • Timing. During oil price plunges, the output
sharply (by one-third over the following two losses in energy exporters materialized more
months), while other commodity prices were quickly than output gains in energy importers,
largely unaffected. Travel disruption dispro- resulting in short-term global growth
portionately affected oil consumption but slowdowns (de Michelis, Ferreira, and
heightened uncertainty and slowing growth also Iacovelli, forthcoming).
weighed on oil demand. However, the oil price
decline was short-lived: within six months, oil • Asymmetries. Uncertainty, frictions, and
prices had returned above their pre-attack levels. asymmetric monetary policy responses can
Oil consumption growth averaged close to zero in create asymmetries that increase the damage
the three quarters following the attacks, down to energy exporters compared with the
from an average of 1.5 percent (y/y) in the benefits to energy importers.9
previous four quarters.
Past oil price plunges
Implications of oil price Features of past plunges. Since 1970, the global
plunges for the global economy has witnessed seven oil price plunges
economy when oil prices fell by 30 percent or more over a
six-month period: 1985-86, 1990-91, 1998, 2001,
Other things being equal, low oil prices might be 2008-09, 2014-16, and 2020.
expected to help boost global growth, including by
stimulating energy-intensive activities such as • Drivers. Oil price plunges in 1990-91, 1998,
travel and transportation. Moreover, by 2001, and 2008-09 were one-half (1998) to
dampening inflation, lower prices would also give entirely (2008-09) demand-driven, whereas
central banks more room to ease monetary policy the oil price plunges of 1985-86 and 2014-16
(Baffes et al. 2015; Ratti and Vespigniani 2016).7 were four-fifths and two-thirds supply-driven,
However, these effects would vary across respectively (Figure 4.2).10
countries: energy exporters in particular would
• Persistence. Oil price plunges associated with
suffer real income losses, which would dampen
global slowdowns were short-lived (1998,
consumption and investment.
2001), with oil prices regaining their pre-
In practice, however, all of the oil price plunges plunge levels in less than four years. In
since 1970 have been accompanied by global contrast, oil price plunges around global
recessions, global slowdowns and, in some cases, recessions (1990-91, 2008-09) and largely
widespread financial crises.8 Three reasons may supply-driven plunges (1985-86, 2014-16)
account for this. were followed by more prolonged periods of
low prices (Figure 4.4).
• Sources. Many of the past oil price plunges
were themselves responses to economic
downturns rather than independent shocks
9 See Hamilton (2011); Hoffman (2012); Jimenez-Rodriguez and
• Depth. Similarly, oil price plunges associated FIGURE 4.4 Oil market developments during past oil
with global slowdowns (1998, 2001) were price plunges
shallower than those around global recessions The oil price plunge in 2020 is only the latest in a series of plunges since
(2008-09, 1990-91) or those associated with 1970. During two of these (1985-86, 2014-16), supply remained robust or
increased as did demand. During three others (2000-01, 2008-09, 1997-
largely supply-driven plunges (1985-86, 2014- 98), demand dropped sharply and, in response, production was reined in.
16). The oil price plunge of 2014-16 was
particularly protracted.
A. Global oil price B. Global oil production
FIGURE 4.5 Macroeconomic developments in EMDEs the third year. Three years after the shock,
during past oil price plunges investment and consumption in energy
The global economy has witnessed seven oil price plunges since 1970. exporters were still 1.4 and 0.6 percent,
Supply-driven oil price plunges have been followed by lasting contractions respectively, below baseline levels. These
in EMDE output as a result of steep output losses in energy exporters that
were not offset by output gains in energy importers. Demand-driven
lasting losses may have reflected a reassessment
plunges were followed by shorter-lived output contractions. Those energy of long-term growth prospects of energy
exporters with higher debt and fixed exchange rates witnessed greater exporters in supply-driven oil price drops.
output losses.
Meanwhile, growth gains in energy importers
A. Cumulative impulse response of B. Cumulative impulse response of
were gradual and delayed (de Michalis,
output, by type of oil price plunge output to demand-driven oil price Ferreira, and Iacovelli forthcoming).
plunges
C. Cumulative impulse response of D. Supply-driven oil price plunges: The 2014-16 oil price plunge
output to supply-driven oil price Cumulative investment and
plunges consumption responses in energy-
exporting EMDEs In late 2014, the 50 percent decline in oil prices
between June and November 2014 was expected
to lift global GDP by around 0.3-0.7 percent
(Arezki and Blanchard 2014). The cheaper cost of
a critical input into global production was
expected to raise global activity, and the transfer of
income and wealth from energy-exporting
economies with higher savings rates to energy-
importing economies, with higher propensities to
spend, was also expected to boost global demand
E. Demand-driven oil price plunges: F. Supply-driven oil price plunges: (Baffes et al. 2015; World Bank 2015a). While
Cumulative output responses of Cumulative output responses of
energy-exporting EMDEs energy-exporting EMDEs lower oil prices were expected to depress
investment in the oil industry, this was expected to
be more than offset by the boost to consumption
and energy-intensive sectors (transportation,
manufacturing, and agriculture).
Output and investment slump in energy FIGURE 4.6 Impact of 2014-16 oil price plunge on energy
exporters. The impact of the oil price plunge of exporters
2014-16 on commodity exporters was severe. The oil price plunge of 2014-16 forced many energy exporters into
Growth slowed in more than 70 percent of procyclical fiscal and monetary tightening. Market intervention to support
currencies caused a substantial decline in foreign exchange reserves.
energy-exporting EMDEs in 2015 and 2016, with Those with more flexible exchange rates and greater export diversification
many facing declining consumption and had milder output losses.
investment (Figure 4.6). Since energy-exporting
countries are generally less diversified than other A. Cumulative output increase for B. Share of energy-exporting EMDEs
commodity exporters, they are particularly energy-exporting EMDEs, 2014-16 with increasing/decreasing growth
2015a, 2016c). Energy-exporting low-income C. Nominal effective exchange rate and foreign reserve levels indexed to 100 in January 2014.
Change in official reserve assets from 2014 to 2016. Last observation is December 2016.
countries (Chad, South Sudan) were hit D. Sample includes 28 oil-exporting EMDEs (excludes Albania, Brunei Darussalam, Ghana, Libya,
Myanmar, South Sudan, and Turkmenistan). Change in overall fiscal balance is measured from 2014-
particularly hard, as the effect of the oil price 16. “Above average” and “below average” oil revenue groups are defined by countries above or below
the sample average of oil revenues as a share of GDP based on 2014 data.
shock was exacerbated by conflict and Click here to download data and charts.
(2016a, 2016b, 2017a). The effects of the price shock were also
exacerbated by idiosyncratic factors, including sanctions on Russia
and conflict and geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and North
Africa region.
192 CHAPTER 4 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
FIGURE 4.7 Impact of 2014-16 oil price plunge on the 2014; Caldara, Cavallo, and Iacoviello 2019).
largest energy importers This reflects less oil-intensive energy mixes,
The oil price plunge of 2014-16 provided limited boost to activity in China, less energy-intensive consumption, and energy
which tends to use more coal than oil for energy generation. In the United price controls that limit the pass-through of
States, the shale oil industry slowed sharply. world prices to domestic retail prices. In
addition, many countries seized the
A. Consumption of fuels, 2018 B. Contribution of mining investment
to U.S. GDP growth and U.S. industrial opportunity to lower energy subsidies (Box
production growth 4.1). While this improved fiscal and external
positions, it dampened the benefit to activity
in energy-importing EMDEs.
The 2014-16 oil price plunge forced many energy Saudi Arabia’s fiscal non-oil revenues improved from 7.7
exporters into procyclical fiscal tightening that deepened percent of GDP in 2016 to 10 percent of GDP in 2019.
their downturns. Many energy exporters recognized an Nigeria identified several sectors to promote greater
urgent need to render both their economies and their diversification of export earnings and government revenues
public finances more resilient, and embarked on reforms (Nigeria Ministry of Budget and National Planning 2017).
to encourage diversification, strengthen non-oil revenues, Kazakhstan’s “100 Concrete Steps” program, adopted in
and cut poorly targeted subsidies (Stocker et al. 2018; 2015, aimed to diversify the economy and improve
Figure 4.1.1). Energy-importing EMDEs also seized the competitiveness and transparency. By the start of 2020,
opportunity of low oil prices to cut energy subsidies. This Kazakhstan has completed more than half of these 100
box examines these reforms in greater detail, answering the steps, including efforts to improve governance. However,
following two questions: efforts to boost industrialization have encountered
challenges, while plans to increase private land ownership
• Which reforms did EMDE energy exporters embark have been delayed.
on?
Efforts to encourage diversification have continued and
• Which reforms did EMDE energy importers embark include: reducing labor market rigidities (for example,
on? Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar), supporting foreign and
private investment (for example, Saudi Arabia), expanding
Reforms in energy exporters infrastructure investment (for example, Malaysia),
improving the business environment (for example, Algeria,
Energy exporters initiated economic diversification Brunei Darussalam, the GCC countries, Kazakhstan,
programs, energy subsidy reforms, and measures to Nigeria, Russia), expanding deeper trade integration
strengthen non-energy government revenues. within the Eurasian Economic Union (for example,
Russia), and strategic investment plans in renewables
Diversification programs. Before the current plunge in oil energy (Azerbaijan, the GCC countries). However, in
prices, hydrocarbon sector activity represented more than some cases, the structural reform agenda has faced
one-third of GDP in a number of countries in Central legislative or implementation delays (for example, Algeria,
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and, in particular, the Middle Kazakhstan).
East. Oil production represented the majority of
government revenue and exports in most energy-exporting Energy subsidy reform. The sharp reduction in
EMDEs in 2013. This suggests an untapped potential for government revenues among energy-exporting EMDEs led
greater diversification of exports and government revenues, to an increased emphasis on reducing energy subsidies to
which would bolster long-term growth prospects and restore fiscal space, discourage wasteful energy
improve these economies’ resilience to external shocks consumption, and reallocate spending to programs that
(Hesse 2008; IMF 2016; Lederman and Maloney 2007). better target the poor (IMF 2017b). Between mid-2014
and end-2016, more than half of energy-exporting
Following the 2014-16 oil price collapse, several large EMDEs reformed energy subsidies, including countries in
energy-exporting EMDEs laid out medium- to long-term the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa,
plans to reduce their reliance on the energy sector. As part East Asia, Latin America, and Central Asia.1 A number of
of Saudi Arabia’s 2016 Vision 2030 plan, the National energy exporters have also reduced utility subsidies
Transformation Program targeted an increase in non-oil
commodity exports and non-oil government revenues
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2016; World Bank 2016c). 1 Energy subsidies were reformed between mid-2014 and late 2017 in
BOX 4.1 Reforms after the 2014-16 oil price plunge (continued)
although, during the COVID-19 pandemic, subsidies were Egypt, Mexico).2 In response to the COVID-19
raised again in some countries (for example, Gabon, pandemic, some governments have provided fuel price
Indonesia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates). discounts to some sectors (for example, Egypt) or increased
subsidies to vulnerable households (for example,
In some cases, subsidy reform was a significant break from Guatemala, Montenegro, Ukraine).
past policy (Krane and Hung 2016; World Bank 2017b).
Encouragingly, the design and implementation of recent Other reforms. Other reforms have aimed to raise
energy subsidy reforms have been superior to past efforts, revenues, with some countries increasing taxes on energy
which were poorly phased and hampered by insufficient or energy-dependent sectors such as transportation (for
communication to the public about the rationale for example, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Mozambique,
reform (Asamoah, Hanedar, and Shang 2017; Clements et Rwanda, South Africa, Vietnam; IEA 2015; IMF 2016;
al. 2013). In many cases, recent reforms have also helpfully Kojima 2016). These steps also included measures to avoid
included measures to mitigate the impact on the poor and energy subsidies reemerging if oil prices rebound—
to strengthen social safety nets (for example, Algeria, automatic pricing mechanisms or full energy price
Angola, Saudi Arabia). More recently, Nigeria announced liberalization have been common (for example, China,
plans to eliminate energy subsidies. However, revenue- Côte d’Ivoire, India, Jordan, Madagascar, Mozambique,
enhancing energy price reforms have remained absent in Mexico, Thailand, Ukraine; Asamoah, Hanedar, and
some countries (for example, Cameroon). Shang 2017; Beylis and Cunha 2017).3
Fiscal reforms. Several countries have implemented tax
reforms to compensate for the loss of government revenues
Conclusion
and to insulate themselves from future oil price
Remaining challenges. Some of these policies have yet to
fluctuations (World Bank 2018c). This has included the
bear fruit. Notwithstanding fiscal and energy subsidy
introduction of taxes on goods and services or value-added
reforms in energy exporters, fiscal break-even prices—the
taxes (for example, Bahrain, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, the
oil prices at which government budgets are balanced—in
United Arab Emirates), as well as raising existing VAT or
almost all energy-exporting EMDEs exceed current prices,
excise tax rates (Bahrain, Colombia, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
often by considerable margins. Energy subsidies still
United Arab Emirates). Russia has implemented a fiscal
represented an average of 4 percent of GDP as of 2018
rule that targets a primary deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP at
among energy-exporting EMDEs, many of which
the benchmark oil price of $40 per barrel (in 2017 U.S.
implemented reforms 2014-16 (Figure 4.1.1). In 2019,
dollars). Any excess fiscal resources that are generated from
the share of commodity exports in total goods exports
higher oil prices are saved in the National Welfare Fund.
remained as high now as in 2013, before the last oil price
The assets from this fund have already helped Russia
plunge. The recent oil price plunge may provide further
support its economy and extend benefits to vulnerable
momentum to proceed with planned reforms and deepen
households during the recent pandemic. However
them once the immediate health crisis subsides. Energy
implementation of fiscal reforms has stalled in some cases
importers, in contrast, should take advantage of lower
(for example, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar), while exemptions
energy prices to lower subsidies—which averaged over 2.5
have limited revenue growth in some others (Malaysia).
percent of GDP in 2018—and utilize these resources to
finance urgent health care needs. In energy exporters and
Reforms in energy importers
importers alike, there is an opportunity to put in place
Energy subsidy reform. Like energy-exporting EMDEs, reforms now that are non-binding in the short term but
energy-importing EMDEs took advantage of declining oil address long-standing inefficiencies and fiscal costs in the
prices to begin dismantling energy subsidies, which tend to long term.
disproportionately benefit those with higher incomes. In
addition, they can crowd out public investment and
encourage more intensive use of fossil fuels (Arze del
2 Mexico has a diversified export base and, hence, is classified as an
Granado, Coady, and Gillingham 2012). Several countries
energy importer.
have implemented such reforms in response to the 2014- 3 In Mozambique, the elimination of fuel subsidies, the introduction
16 oil price plunge (for example, China, the Arab Republic of an automatic fuel price adjustment, and increased tariffs on electricity
of Egypt, Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia), but slippages in and public transportation, contributed to the 2 percentage points of GDP
implementation have occurred in some cases (for example, narrowing of the primary fiscal balance between 2016 and 2018.
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 4 195
BOX 4.1 Reforms after the 2014-16 oil price plunge (continued)
A. Number of reforms in energy exporters B. Energy subsidies C. Fiscal and external breakeven prices
for selected energy exporters, 2020
Sources: International Energy Agency; International Monetary Fund; World Bank Doing Business.
A. Sample includes 35 energy-exporting EMDEs.
B. Sample includes 25 energy-exporting EMDEs and 14 energy-importing EMDEs.
C. Breakeven prices refer to the oil price at which either the fiscal balance or the current account balance is zero in 2020. Dashed line indicates the average of daily Brent
oil prices from May 1, 2020, to May 20, 2020.
Click here to download data and charts.
Fiscal space generated by subsidy reforms. Replacing • Entrenching reform. Reforms formally embedded in
energy subsidies with expanded and better-targeted social legislation may be more likely to be enforced and
safety nets, coupled with structural reforms, can improve sustained once oil prices rise again.
fiscal positions while supporting low-income households.4
Policies to reduce subsidies can help promote growth • Transparency. Reforms are more likely to be sustained
because fiscal savings generated by lower subsidies can if price setting can be de-politicized (Inchauste and
fund productivity-enhancing education and infrastructure. Victor 2017). This can be achieved with a transparent
For example, in Egypt, fiscal savings from the energy formula for setting energy prices.
subsidy reforms were redirected towards social spending
(ESMAP 2017b). These policies can also foster low-carbon • Frequent price adjustments. A formula with more
transition and promote green energy (Monasterolo and frequent price adjustments can help avoid larger and
Raberto 2019; Mundaca 2017). For energy-exporting more disruptive price changes, especially once oil
EMDEs, eliminating costly energy subsidies could help prices return to more normal levels.
offset the collapse in revenue from oil extraction given that
oil prices are well below their fiscal breakeven points. • Tax design for price stability. A transparent formula for
frequent price adjustments can be accompanied by
Increasing the chances of success of subsidy reform. combination of fixed and variable taxes that can
Energy subsidy reform raises formidable political-economy smooth price volatility, such as in the case of Chile.
challenges (Inchauste and Victor 2017). The different
prongs of reforms, however, need to be carefully sequenced • Supporting reforms. Subsidy cuts that are accompanied
and communicated to avoid delays, social unrest or by cuts in the cost of other household public services,
reversals, as has been the experience in some client such as school or public transport fees, or increases in
countries (for example, Ecuador; Worley, Pasquier, and other social benefits can help build public support for
Canpolat 2018). Reforms may prove more lasting if a few reform. In India, for example, the removal of price
principles are observed in their implementation. controls was accompanied by targeted cash transfers
and in Brazil by targeted assistance to low-income
households for energy conservation (Deichmann and
4 For details, see Coady et al. (2017, 2019); Guénette (2020); Stocker
Zhang 2013). Such supporting reforms need to be
et al. (2018); and World Bank (2014, 2015a, 2015b). accompanied by improved capacity to implement
benefit programs (Inchauste and Victor 2017).
196 CHAPTER 4 G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020
BOX 4.1 Reforms after the 2014-16 oil price plunge (continued)
• Public awareness. Awareness campaign can highlight competition and the potential for new entrants signifi-
the benefits of subsidy reforms, in terms of giving cantly lowered their markups.
greater room for higher-priority spending, and thus
raise public support for reform (El-Katiri and Fattouh Energy pricing reform. Even in EMDEs where energy
2017). subsidies have been eliminated, the current low oil prices
provide an opportunity to introduce carbon pricing and
Role of competition, legal and regulatory frameworks. other energy taxation that will discourage inefficient
Improving the macroeconomic framework and competi- consumption as global oil prices rise again. As a cost-
tive environment can be more effective in improving the effective instrument for meeting climate targets, 57
financial positions of both consumers and producers than initiatives (including 28 emission trading systems) were
energy subsidies. Carefully designed and properly enforced implemented at the national and subnational level in
antitrust laws and consumer protection legislation are 2019, covering about 20 percent of global green-house gas
essential components of institutional frameworks that emissions (World Bank 2019a). Existing carbon pricing is
support market mechanisms. A sound legal and regulatory considered insufficient to meet climate targets, so
framework favoring competitive markets provides a more policymakers should seize the current opportunity of
effective response to many of the problems that subsidies exceptionally low energy prices to put in place pricing
attempt to address. For example, the removal of price formulas now that encourage more energy-efficient growth
controls and barriers to entry in the transportation sector once the recovery gathers momentum (World Bank
significantly increased competition and lowered trans- 2019a). Finally, support measures for energy-intensive
portation costs in Rwanda (Teravaninthorn and Raballand industries during the current pandemic could be made
2009). Even in the case where incumbent firms contingent on improvements in fuel efficiency.
maintained outsized market shares, the presence of
EMDEs—may outweigh benefits to activity in Coincidence with other shocks. The public health
energy importers.15 Adverse effects are likely to be crisis, unprecedented capital outflows from
compounded by new headwinds, including EMDEs, and a collapse in global trade and tour-
elevated macro-financial vulnerabilities that were ism have put financial and economic pressures on
less relevant in previous oil price plunges, or even energy exporters and importers alike (Figure 4.8).
a second wave of infections. That said, there might
be a short window early in the recovery when still- • Public health crisis. The number of confirmed
high inventories depress prices and support infections has soared in energy-exporting
activity. EMDEs, as well as energy-importing EMDEs,
and the effect of the sharp loss in consumer
Implications of the demand-driven nature of oil and investor confidence may linger long after
price plunge. In contrast to the oil price plunge of the pandemic has subsided.
2014-16, the 2020 episode has been mainly driven
by a collapse in energy demand resulting from • Trade collapse. Global manufacturing activity,
restrictions to stem the spread of the pandemic tourism, and trade have plunged amid
and the global recession (Figure 4.1). Once the closures of non-essential services, shops,
global recovery is underway, and excess inventories factories, and public spaces; stay-at-home
are unwound, oil prices would be expected to orders travel restrictions; and a high degree of
increase again in tandem with global growth. risk aversion of consumers (Chapter 1).
extreme volatility. EMDE currencies have FIGURE 4.8 Pandemic and mitigation measures in EMDE
weakened substantially against the U.S. dollar energy exporters
despite foreign exchange market interventions The pandemic is spreading in energy-exporting and energy-importing
by central banks. Yield spreads on EMDE EMDEs. In response, governments have imposed restrictions that curtail
bond issues have risen steeply. economic activity. The impact on informal activity may be particularly
adverse.
FIGURE 4.9 EMDE energy exporters’ vulnerabilities: exporting EMDEs had risen to 50 percent of GDP
2014-16 and 2019 in 2019 from 27 percent of GDP in 2013, and the
Today’s energy-exporting EMDEs are typically no less reliant on energy fiscal balance has turned from near-balance in
exports than in 2013, and have more precarious fiscal positions. 2013 to a deficit of 2.7 percent of GDP in 2019
(IMF 2017a; World Bank 2017a). As a result,
A. Resource sector activity in
energy-exporting EMDEs
B. Export concentration
even after the public health crisis subsides, the
need to shore up public finances is likely to weigh
on their recovery.
Conclusions
The the restrictions imposed to stem the
pandemic and the global recession triggered by the
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic have been
accompanied by an unprecedented collapse in oil
C. Share of energy revenues in D. Commodity export share of energy
demand and prices. Unfortunately, the price
government revenues of exporters decline is unlikely to provide much of an
energy-exporting EMDEs
immediate buffer for global growth, because of the
impact of mitigation measures that are
constraining energy-intensive activities and
because energy-exporting EMDEs have less fiscal
and monetary policy room to counter the impact
on their economies. That said, there might be a
short window early in a recovery when still-high
inventories depress prices and support activity.
and financial weaknesses in energy exporters are • Elasticity restrictions. Restrictions are imposed
especially likely to pose difficulties. This highlights on the short-run price elasticity of oil
the importance of ensuring that necessary fiscal demand. The impact price elasticity of
support during the pandemic be accompanied by demand is assumed to be non-positive; the
credible commitments to restore fiscal median draw in the range -0.2 to -0.1 is used,
sustainability once it subsides. For the energy in line with estimates of the elasticity since the
exporters, this will require pressing ahead with the 1980s in Baumeister and Peersman (2013).
reform programs that many launched after the
price plunge of 2014-16 (Box 4.1). Some energy- Data. The data set uses monthly data from
exporting EMDEs have successfully diversified January 1980 to April 2020. Global industrial
their economies after implementing measures to production is the production-weighted average of
stimulate non-energy exports, as part of a broad industrial production in 31 advanced economies
program of reforms to improve the business and 47 EMDEs (unbalanced sample depending on
environment, education, and skills acquisition (for availability). Data for industrial production in
example, Malaysia, Mexico; Callen et al. 2014). April is estimated as the level predicted by the
For the energy-importing EMDEs, the plunge in global manufacturing purchasing managers’ index.
oil prices is an opportunity to revisit energy Global oil production is from the International
pricing and make lasting fiscal room for higher- Energy Agency (IEA) from 1987-2020 and the
priority spending to reignite long-term growth U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
prospects (Chapter 3). from 1980-86. Oil prices are the unweighted
average of Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and
Dubai crude oil prices from the World Bank’s
Pink Sheet (measured in U.S. dollars). OECD
inventories use IEA data from 1991-2020 and EIA
ANNEX 4.1 Methodology: data from 1987-1990. In April 2020 and prior to
1987, percent changes in U.S. inventories are used
Decomposition of oil price as a proxy for changes in OECD inventories (U.S.
movements stocks account for around one-third of total
OECD inventories).
Methodology. A structural vector autoregression
(SVAR) as in Kilian and Murphy (2014) is used to
model global oil prices. The SVAR includes the
logarithms of global oil production, global oil
ANNEX 4.2 Oil price
prices, global industrial production, and OECD plunges since 1970
inventories. Three shocks are identified using a
combination of sign restrictions on impact Until 2020, there had been six previous oil price
responses and on the impact price elasticity of oil plunges since 1970 when oil prices fell by 30
demand. percent or more over a six-month period.
• Sign restrictions. A negative demand shock is 1985-86. The 1985-86 oil price slump arose from
identified as a shock that lowers oil prices a supply shock as OPEC reverted to its production
while lowering global industrial production target of 30 mb/d in response to rising oil supply
and global oil production. A positive supply from the North Sea and Mexico and breaches of
shock is identified as a shock that lowers oil OPEC production agreements (Gately, Adelman,
prices while raising oil production and and Griffin 1986). The oil price plunge ushered in
industrial production. A positive speculative a period of weak growth and significant debt
demand shock (the residual in Figure 4.2.F) is problems in some large EMDEs as well as slow
identified as one that raises oil inventories, growth in European countries, and, at the end of
increases prices and oil production, and 1987, a significant downward correction in U.S.
reduces industrial production. and global stock markets
200 CHAPTER 4 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS I JUNE 2020
1990-91. While the oil price decline of 1990-91 and Kilian 20166; World Bank 2018a). Supply
satisfy the definition employed here, it differed factors accounted for about two-thirds of the oil
from other oil price plunges in being a reversal of price decline (Figure 4.2; Baffes et al. 20156). 1 It
a previous oil price spike triggered by the first was accompanied by a period of slowing global
Gulf War. Despite monetary policy loosening, potential growth (World Bank 2018c, 20196).
global growth slowed in 1992 before recovering
modestly in 1993, as a recession in Europe ran its
course, the recovery in the United States remained
hesitant amid financial strains in the savings and
loans sector, and Japan entered a period of ANNEX 4.3 Methodology:
prolonged stagnation.
Impact of oil price plunges
1998. The 1997 Asian financial crisis, set against a on output
backdrop of a continued expansion of OPEC
production until mid-1998, was accompanied by Methodology. The responses of real output,
weakening oil demand and a sharp decline in oil investment, consumption, and productivity
prices (Fattouh 2007). Despite low oil prices, the growth-denoted by yt-following oil price
global recovery remained tepid for most of 1998, collapses are estimated using the local projections
partly as a result of the failure of a large asset model ofJorda (2005). The model is given by
management fund in the United States and
financial stress in major emerging markets.
yt + h , j = α( h ), j + β( h ) t , j + sp=1 lq=1 γ( h ) X tl− s , j
2001. The disruptions and uncertainty caused by + sp=1 δ( h ), s yt − s , j + u ( h )t , j
the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United
States intensified a growth slowdown already where h = 0, …, 5 is the forecast horizon, α(h),j is
underway as the "dotcom" bubble deflated. country j fixed effects, and u(h)t,j is an error term.
Sofrening global activiry and rising uncertainty The coefficient of interest β(h) captures the
triggered a sharp decline in oil prices. However, dynamic multiplier effect (impulse response) of
aggressive monetary policy easing by the Federal the dependent variable with respect to the event
Reserve and other major central banks supported a l
dummy variable Et,j X t , j represents a set of control
rapid rebound in activiry.
variables with coefficients y(h) . The specification
2008-09. A severe recession following the global controls for lagged dependent variables yt-s,j . The
financial cns1s sent all commodity prices number of lags for each variable is denoted by p
tumbling. The recovery from the global recession and varies from 1 to 3 for the estimation. While
was sluggish as many countries faced a wide the supply shock is represented by a univariate
variety of legacy challenges and global potential model, the demand shock controls for lagged
growth slowed (Kilic, Kose, and Ohnsorge 2020; output and investment as critical macroeconomic
Kose and Ohnsorge 2019). However, starting in determinants. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard
2009, strong demand for oil and other errors are used to address cross-sectional and serial
commodities from China propelled a rebound in correlation. The model is estimated separately for
their prices. all EMDEs, for energy-exporting EMDEs, and for
other EMDEs, and for subgroups of EMDEs with
2014-16. Between mid-2014 and early 2015, oil fixed and floating exchange rates and with high
prices fell by more than 50 percent and then and low government debt.
continued to fall until their trough in early 2016.
The decline was triggered by a combination of Definitions. Oil price collapses are defined as
surging U.S. shale oil production, receding years in which oil prices fell by 30 percent or more
geopolitical risks involving some key producers,
shifts in policies by OPEC, and weakening global
1 Other estimates put the share of supply factors at just under half
growth prospects (Baffes et al. 2015; Baumeister (Baumeister and Hamilton 2019).
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 CHAPTER 4 201
over a six-month period: 1985-86, 1991, 1998, Baffes, J., A. Kabundi, and P. Nagle. 2020. “The Role
2001, 2008-09, 2014-16. Largely supply-driven of Income and Substitution in Commodity Demand.”
collapses occurred in 1985-86 and 2014-16 when Policy Research Working Paper 8495, World Bank,
OPEC abandoned production agreements in favor Washington, DC.
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lowered energy demand (Baffes et al. 2015). Consequences, and Policy Responses.” Policy Research
Note 1, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Data. Using annual data, the sample includes 155
EMDEs for 1970-2018. This includes 36 EMDEs Baumeister, C., and J. D. Hamilton. 2019. “Structural
that are energy exporting (oil, gas, or coal), Interpretation of Vector Autoregressions with
defined as in Table 1.2 (Chapter 1) and 120 other Incomplete Identification: Revisiting the Role of Oil
Supply and Demand Shocks.” American Economic
EMDEs. Data on output, investment, consump-
Review 109 (5): 1873-1910.
tion, and productivity are available from the
World Bank’ World Development Indicators. The Baumeister, C. and L. Kilian. 2016a. “Lower Oil Prices
exchange rate classification follows the IMF’s and the U.S. Economy: Is This Time Different?”
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Fall): 287-336.
Restrictions. High (low) public debt is above
———. 2016b. “Understanding the Decline in the
(below) 70 percent of GDP for high-income
Price of Oil Since June 2014.” Journal of the Association
EMDEs and 30 percent of GDP for upper-
of Environmental and Resource Economists 3 (1): 131-
middle-income, lower-middle-income, and low- 158.
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Baumeister, C., and G. Peersman. 2013. “The Role of
Time-Varying Price Elasticities in Accounting for
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STATISTICAL
APPENDIX
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S TATIS TICAL APP ENDIX 207
Advanced economies 2.5 2.1 1.6 -7.0 3.9 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.4 ..
United States 2.4 2.9 2.3 -6.1 4.0 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.3 0.3
Euro Area 2.5 1.9 1.2 -9.1 4.5 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.0 -3.2
Japan 2.2 0.3 0.7 -6.1 2.5 -0.3 0.8 0.9 1.8 -0.7 -2.2
Emerging market and developing economies 4.5 4.3 3.5 -2.5 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 ..
East Asia and Pacific 6.5 6.3 5.9 0.5 6.6 6.3 6.1 5.9 5.8 5.7 -5.2
Cambodia 7.0 7.5 7.1 -1.0 6.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
China 6.8 6.6 6.1 1.0 6.9 6.5 6.4 6.2 6.0 6.0 -6.8
Fiji 5.4 3.5 1.0 -4.3 1.9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Indonesia 5.1 5.2 5.0 0.0 4.8 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 3.0
Lao PDR 6.9 6.3 4.7 1.0 4.6 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Malaysia 5.7 4.7 4.3 -3.1 6.9 4.8 4.5 4.8 4.4 3.6 0.7
Mongolia 5.3 6.9 4.8 -0.5 4.9 9.6 8.7 6.3 4.2 1.8 -10.5
Myanmar 6.2 6.8 6.3 1.5 6.0 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea 3.5 -0.8 6.0 -1.3 3.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Philippines 6.9 6.3 6.0 -1.9 6.2 6.4 5.7 5.4 6.3 6.7 -0.2
Solomon Islands 3.7 3.9 2.7 -6.7 -0.3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Thailand 4.1 4.2 2.4 -5.0 4.1 3.8 2.9 2.4 2.6 1.5 -1.8
Timor-Leste -3.8 -0.8 3.4 -4.8 3.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Vietnam 6.8 7.1 7.0 2.8 6.8 7.3 6.8 6.7 7.5 7.0 3.8
Europe and Central Asia 4.1 3.3 2.2 -4.7 3.6 1.8 1.1 1.4 2.2 3.6 ..
Albania 3.8 4.1 2.2 -5.0 8.8 3.1 2.4 2.5 4.2 -0.1 ..
Informality
How does informality aggravate the impact of COVID-19? June 2020, Box 1.4
Growing in the shadow: Challenges of informality January 2019, Chapter 3
Linkages between formal and informal sectors January 2019, Box 3.1
Regional dimensions of informality: An overview January 2019, Box 3.2
Casting a shadow: Productivity in formal and informal firms January 2019, Box 3.3
Under the magnifying glass: How do policies affect informality? January 2019, Box 3.4
East Asia and Pacific January 2019, Box 2.1.1
Europe and Central Asia January 2019, Box 2.2.1
Latin America and the Caribbean January 2019, Box 2.3.1
Middle East and North Africa January 2019, Box 2.4.1
South Asia January 2019, Box 2.5.1
Sub-Saharan Africa January 2019, Box 2.6.1
Inflation
Low for how much longer? Inflation in low-income countries January 2020, Special Focus 2
Currency depreciation, inflation, and central bank independence June 2019, Special Focus 1.2
The great disinflation January 2019, Box 1.1
Growth prospects
The macroeconomic effects of pandemics and epidemics: A literature review June 2020, Annex 3.1
How deep will the COVID-19 recession be? June 2020, Box 1.1
Lasting Scars of the COVID-19 Pandemic Chapter 3, June 2020
Regional macroeconomic implications of COVID-19 Special Focus, June 2020
Growth in low-income countries: Evolution, prospects, and policies June 2019, Special Focus 2.1
Long-term growth prospects: Downgraded no more? June 2018, Box 1.1
Global output gap
Is the global economy turning the corner? January 2018, Box 1.1
Potential growth
How do deep recessions affect potential output? June 2020, Box 3.1
Building solid foundations: How to promote potential growth January 2018, Chapter 3
What is potential growth? January 2018, Box 3.1
Understanding the recent productivity slowdown: Facts and explanations January 2018, Box 3.2
Moving together? Investment and potential output January 2018, Box 3.3
The long shadow of contractions over potential output January 2018, Box 3.4
Productivity and investment growth during reforms January 2018, Box 3.5
East Asia and Pacific January 2018, Box 2.1.1
Europe and Central Asia January 2018, Box 2.2.1
Latin America and the Caribbean January 2018, Box 2.3.1
Middle East and North Africa January 2018, Box 2.4.1
South Asia January 2018, Box 2.5.1
Sub-Saharan Africa January 2018, Box 2.6.1
G LO BAL EC O NO MIC P ROS P EC TS | J U NE 2020 S E L E C T E D TO P I C S 213
Fiscal Policies
The fourth wave: Rapid debt buildup January 2020, Chapter 4
Debt: No free lunch June 2019, Box 1.1
Debt in low-income countries: Evolution, implications, and remedies January 2019, Chapter 4
Debt dynamics in emerging market and developing economies: Time to act? June 2017, Special Focus 1
Having fiscal space and using it: Fiscal challenges in developing economies January 2015, Chapter 3
Revenue mobilization in South Asia: Policy challenges and recommendations January 2015, Box 2.3
Fiscal policy in low-income countries January 2015, Box 3.1
What affects the size of fiscal multipliers? January 2015, Box 3.2
Chile’s fiscal rule—an example of success January 2015, Box 3.3
Narrow fiscal space and the risk of a debt crisis January 2015, Box 3.4
Commodity Markets
Reforms after the 2014-16 oil price plunge June 2020, Box 4.1
Adding Fuel to the Fire: Cheap Oil in the Pandemic June 2020, Chapter 4
The role of major emerging markets in global commodity demand June 2018, Special Focus 1
The role of the EM7 in commodity production June 2018, SF1, Box SF1.1
Commodity consumption: Implications of government policies June 2018, SF1, Box SF1.2
With the benefit of hindsight: The impact of the 2014–16 oil price collapse January 2018, Special Focus 1
From commodity discovery to production: Vulnerabilities and policies in LICs January 2016, Special Focus
After the commodities boom: What next for low-income countries? June 2015, Special Focus 2
Low oil prices in perspective June 2015, Box 1.2
Understanding the plunge in oil prices: Sources and implications January 2015, Chapter 4
What do we know about the impact of oil prices on output and inflation? A brief survey January 2015, Box 4.1
Prospects Group:
Selected Other Publications on the Global Economy, 2015-20
Commodity Markets Outlook Column1
Food price shocks: Channels and implications April 2019, Special Focus
The implications of tariffs for commodity markets October 2018, Box
The changing of the guard: Shifts in industrial commodity demand October 2018, Special Focus
Oil exporters: Policies and challenges April 2018, Special Focus
Investment weakness in commodity exporters January 2017, Special Focus
OPEC in historical context: Commodity agreements and market fundamentals October 2016, Special Focus
Energy and food prices: Moving in tandem? July 2016, Special Focus
Resource development in an era of cheap commodities April 2016, Special Focus
Weak growth in emerging market economies: What does it imply for commodity markets? January 2016, Special Focus
Understanding El Niño: What does it mean for commodity markets? October 2015, Special Focus
How important are China and India in global commodity consumption? July 2015, Special Focus
Anatomy of the last four oil price crashes April 2015, Special Focus
Putting the recent plunge in oil prices in perspective January 2015, Special Focus
A Decade After the Global Recession: Lessons and Challenges for Emerging and Developing Economies
A Decade After the Global Recession: Lessons and Challenges Chapter 1
What Happens During Global Recessions? Chapter 2
Macroeconomic Developments Chapter 3
Financial Market Developments Chapter 4
Macroeconomic and Financial Sector Policies Chapter 5
Prospects, Risks, and Vulnerabilities Chapter 6
Policy Challenges Chapter 7
The Role of the World Bank Group Chapter 8
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