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THIRD DIVISION

June 19, 2017

G.R. No. 177000

NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL


CARANDANG and SP02 ALFREDO CARANDANG
y PRESCILLA, Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review


on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2 dated November 17, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
27021, affirming in toto the conviction of Nestor
Guelos (Nestor), Rodrigo Guelos (Rodrigo), Gil
Carandang (Gil) and Senior Police Officer 2 Alfredo
Carandang y Prescilla (Alfredo) (petitioners)
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tanauan City, Batangas, Branch 83 in its
Decision3 dated January 24, 2003 in Criminal Cases
Nos. P-204 and P-205. The CA Resolution 4 dated
March 6, 2007 denied the motion for reconsideration
thereof.

The Facts

On December 5, 1995, two separate


5
Informations  were filed with the RTC against the
petitioners for Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a
Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to
Article 48, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The
accusatory portions of the two Informations state:

Criminal Case No. P-204

That on or about the 4th day of June,


1995, at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Boot, Municipality
of Tanauan, Province of Batangas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating
together, acting in common accord and
mutually helping one another, [Nestor]'
while armed with an Armalite Rifle, with
intent to kill and without any justifiable
cause, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot with the said firearm one SP02
Estelito Andaya, a bonafide member of
the Philippine National Police assigned
at Tanauan Police Station, while
engaged in the performance of his official
duties as peace officer, and while the
latter is being held from the back by [Gil]
and other companions, whose identities
and whereabouts are still unknown,
thereby hitting and inflicting· upon the
said SP02 Estelito Andaya gunshot
wounds on his body which caused his
instantaneous death.

Contrary to law. 6

Criminal Case No. P-205

That on or about the 4th day of June,


1995, at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Boot, Municipality
of Tanauan, Province of Batangas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating
together, acting in common accord and
mutually helping each other, [Nestor]
while armed with an Armalite Rifle, with
intent to kill and without any justifiable
cause, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot with the said firearm, one
P/Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho,
a bonafide member of the Philippine
National Police and concurrently the
Chief of Police of Tanauan, Batangas,
while engaged in the performance of his
official duties as peace officer, and while
the latter is being held at the back
including his two arms by [Alfredo] and
the barrel of his armalite rifle is being
held by [Rodrigo], thereby hitting and
inflicting upon the said P/Chief Inspector
Rolando M. Camacho gunshot wounds
on his head which caused his
instantaneous death.

Contrary to law. 7

The petitioners pleaded not guilty to the foregoing


charges. Thereafter, the joint trial of the two cases
ensued. The prosecution and the defense presented
their respective versions of the case. 8

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:


P02 Edgardo Carandang (P02 Carandang), Alex
Malabanan, P02 Pastor Platon Castillo, Ruel
Ramos, Ricardo Jordan, SPOl Anacleto Garcia
(SPOl Garcia), Dr. Olga Bausa, Rowena Rios, Police
Inspector Loma Tria, Dr. Hermogenes Corachea,
P03 Eugenio Llarina, Marilou Reyes Camacho and
Teodora Torres Andaya. 9

On the other hand, the defense presented: Cancio


Angulo (Angulo), Juana Precilla and herein
petitioners Nestor, Alfredo and Rodrigo as its
witnesses.

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

In the morning of June 4, 1995, Police Chief


Inspector Rolando M. Camacho (P/C Insp.
Camacho), SP02 Estelito Andaya (SP02 Andaya),
P02 Carandang and SPO 1 Garcia set off for Sitio
Mahabang Buhangin in Tanauan, Batangas to
conduct their routine as peace officers of the area. It
was already 10:00 a.m. when they left Tanauan
Police Station on board a patrol car driven by SPO 1
Garcia. While they were in Barangay Gonzales
waiting for a boat that would bring them to Sitio
Mahabang Buhangin, they heard successive
gunshots apparently coming from Barangay Boot.
P/C Insp. Camacho then decided to proceed to
Barangay Boot to check and to apprehend those
who were illegally discharging their firearms. Upon
arrival at the place, they were invited for lunch in the
house of Angulo. Thereafter, they stayed at the
house of the incumbent Barangay Captain, Rafael
Gonzales. 10

At around 2:45 p.m., P/C Insp. Camacho instructed


SP02 Andaya and P02 Carandang to join the
religious procession to monitor those who will
indiscriminately fire guns. As they were moving on
with the procession, they heard successive
gunshots, which they determined to have emanated
from the backyard of Silveria Guelos (Silveria). They
went back to the house of the Barangay Captain to
report to P/C Insp. Camacho what they found out.
Acting upon their report, P/C Insp. Camacho decided
to go with them to the place of Silveria. In going to
the house, they rode a passenger jeepney in order
to conceal their purpose. SPOl Garcia drove their
patrol car and followed them. 11

Upon reaching the place of Silveria who let them in,


P/C Insp. Camacho, P02 Carandang and SP02
Andaya then proceeded to the back of the house
where they saw around 15 persons drinking liquor.
They also noticed empty shells of armalite rifle
scattered on the ground. P/C Insp. Camacho then
introduced himself as the Chief of Tanauan Police
Station and told the group that he and his men were
verifying who fired the shots. Someone from the
group of drinking men asked him: "Who are you
going to pick-up here?" Before P/C Insp. Camacho
was able to respond to the taunting question, P02
Carandang pointed to him the "empty shells" near
the comfort room located at the right side from
where the group was drinking. Consequently, P/C
Insp. Camacho instructed him to collect the
scattered empty shells. 12

When P02 Carandang was about to follow P/C Insp.


Camacho's orders, the former noticed a person,
whom he identified as Nestor, wearing a
white sando and blue walking shorts stand up. While
P02 Carandang was collecting the empty shells,
somebody hit him on his nape which caused him to
drop his armalite. When he tried to retrieve his
firearm, someone hit his hand. 13

As he was trying to stand up, he saw Alfredo tightly


holding (yapos-yapos) P/C Insp. Camacho from
behind while Rodrigo grabbed the former's baby
armalite. As soon as P02 Carandang was able to
stand up, he was hit by Nestor on his left jaw, even
as he received a blow to his left eye. Thereafter, as
P/C Insp. Camacho was in a helpless and
defenseless position, he was shot by Nestor causing
him to fall to the ground and later die. 14

While P02 Carandang was retreating, he saw SP02


Andaya being tightly held by the neck by Gil. He
then saw Nestor shoot at SP02 Andaya, who then
fell to the ground and died. 15

P02 Carandang retreated and started to run but


Nestor went after him and shot at him. It was at this
juncture when SPO 1 Garcia arrived at the scene
and returned fire at Nestor, hitting the latter with
three out of six shots. 16
For the defense, petitioners Nestor, Alfredo and
Rodrigo took the witness stand and denied the
accusations. They narrated a different story. 17

Nestor testified that at around 3:00 p.m. on June 4,


1995, he was inside the house of his mother when
he heard several gunshots. He told his children to lie
flat on the floor until it stopped. Thereafter, he went
out of the house and saw four persons lying on the
ground; he identified two of them as Gil and Alfredo.
He also saw an old man standing nearby and asked
the latter what happened, but the old man did not
reply. Just when he heard that people were rushing
towards his mother's house, the old man asked him
to pick up the gun laying on the ground. He followed
and picked up the same with the intention of
surrendering it to a police officer but as he was on
his way towards the gate, SPO 1 Garcia shot him
instead. He was hit three times: on his stomach, his
left side, and on his left hand. 18

Alfredo, on the other hand, testified that as they


were drinking, P/C Insp. Camacho together with two
other police officers came. They entered one after
the other but P/C Insp. Camacho came in first. They
were wearing civilian clothes, although he noticed
that P/C Insp. Camacho was also wearing a vest
where extra ammunition-magazines were kept. P/C
Insp. Camacho was armed with a baby-armalite,
while his companions were carrying M-16 rifles. The
police officers asked who among them fired a gun to
which somebody answered, "We do not know who
fired the shot." At this point, Alfredo introduced
himself as a fellow-member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP); he even saluted P/C lnsp.
Camacho, but the latter merely ignored the former.
Instead, P/C Insp. Camacho pointed the nozzle of
his baby armalite at Alfredo's stomach and used it to
lift hist-shirt, as the former asked the latter if he had
a gun. Alfredo answered that he had none. While
P/C Insp. Camacho was frisking three other men,
Rodrigo approached him to ask if he can be of help
to the former. P/C Insp. Camacho did not answer
Rodrigo's query. Rather, while he was in "port-hand
position," P/C Insp. Camacho pushed Rodrigo with
his firearm; the latter was out-balanced and fell on
his back. While P/C Insp. Camacho was pushing
Rodrigo with the use of the nozzle of his "armalite
rifle", the latter swiped the said firearm as he told the
former, "Baka pumutok iyan." Thereupon, the
firearm of P/C Insp. Camacho fired; a bullet hit
Alfredo's thigh. Thereafter, the latter lost
consciousness and awakened only when being
transported to a nearby hospital. 19

Rodrigo testified that in the afternoon of June 4,


1995, he was watching a religious procession in
front of the gate of his parents' house when P/C
Insp. Camacho and two others, all in civilian clothes
and each bearing a long firearm, entered the
premises of his parents' house. The group went
directly to the area where people were drinking
liquor. P/C Insp. Camacho introduced himself as the
Chief of Police of Tanauan, and asked who among
them fired a gun. He poked his gun at the people
there and then started frisking some of them. Alfredo
stood up and introduced himself as a fellow-member
of the PNP, to which P/C Insp. Camacho responded
by poking his gun at the former, asking him ifhe had
a gun. Answering "none," Alfredo pulled-up his t-shirt
to show he had no gun. His t-shirt was lifted by P/C
Insp. Camacho with the nozzle of his gun. Rodrigo
approached P/C Insp. Camacho and offered to
assist the latter, but instead, P/C Insp. Camacho
pointed the gun at his face. Rodrigo swayed the gun
away from his face, but he was, in tum, pushed back
by P/C Insp. Camacho with the use of the barrel of
the same gun causing him to fall to the ground. Then
he heard several gunshots, so he covered his head
with his hands. When the gunshots stopped, he saw
two persons lying, one by his left side and the other,
by his right. He then ran for help but on his way out
of the premises, he saw a wounded person whom he
offered to help. The wounded person ignored him
and continued to walk towards a jeepney. Rodrigo
proceeded to approach a Barangay Tanod and
asked him to report the incident to the Barangay
Captain. Soon thereafter, the Barangay Captain
arrived; police officers from Tanauan also came and
Rodrigo was invited to the Police Station for
investigation.20

On January 24, 2003, the RTC issued a Joint


Decision,21 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. P-


204, this Court finds accused [NESTOR]
and [GIL] GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of Direct Assault
Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority
with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to
Article 48, of the [RPC], for killing [SP02
Andaya], and hereby sentences each of
the accused to suffer the penalty of
eleven (11) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, up to eighteen
(18) years of reclusion temporal
maximum, as maximum, and a fine of
One Thousand Pesos (Phpl,000.00). The
accused are directed to pay the heirs of
victim [SP02 Andaya] an indemnity of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00),
actual damages in the amount of One
Million Pesos (Phpl,000,000.00), and
moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php50,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. P-205, the Court


finds accused [NESTOR], [RODRIGO]
and [ALFREDO] GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of Direct Assault
Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority
with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to
Article 48, of the [RPC], for killing [P/C
Insp. Camacho], and hereby sentences
each of the accused to suffer the penalty
of eleven (11) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, up
to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos
(Phpl,000.00) each. The accused are
directed to pay the heirs of victim [P/C
Insp. Camacho] an indemnity of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual
damages in the amount of One Million
Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Phpl,600,000.00), and moral damages
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.22

The RTC found that between the conflicting versions


of the parties, that of the prosecution is more
credible; the positive declarations of the police
officers who testified for the prosecution, particularly
that of eyewitness P02 Carandang, were not
impeached.23 Further, the RTC did not find any
reason for any of the prosecution witnesses to
falsely testify against the accused. The trial court
observed that said witnesses, with special reference
to P02 Carandang, testified in a straightforward
manner and showed signs of candor, as compared
to the accused, who were smart-alecky and did not
sound truthful. 24 The petitioners appealed to the CA.

On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed in toto the


petitioners' conviction in its Decision25 as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed


from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.26

Hence, this petition for review with the following


assignment of errors:
A. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON
THE UNSUBSTANTIATED TESTIMONY OF THE
ALLEGED EYEWITNESS P02 CARANDANG AND
HOLDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.

B. THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE


JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE GLARING
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO WARRANT
THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS.

C. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT


THERE IS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE
PETITIONERS DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME.27

Forthwith, the petitioners fault the CA for affirming


their conviction, contending that the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses were uncorroborated by
evidence sufficient to establish the petitioners' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the
petitioners allege the following, to wit:

1. There is no direct assault of a person


in authority to speak of because the
group of P/C Insp. Camacho was not in
the performance of their duties. The
prosecution failed to present the alleged
mission order supporting the intelligence
operation conducted by P/C Insp.
Camacho and his men in Barangay Boot.
Further, while the police officers were in
civilian attire (shorts, slippers and t-
shirts) to go undercover, they were
carrying rifles that were not concealed;28

2. The injuries suffered by P02


Carandang, as a result of the assault
upon his person while he was in the act
of collecting the empty bullet shells, are
also unsupported by evidence. The trial
court simply took the testimony of P02
Carandang as the "biblical truth;"29 and

3. The narration of P02 Carandang on


how P/C Insp. Camacho and SP02
Andaya were killed cannot stand the test
of logic. He could not have possibly
witnessed the entire event at the precise
moment that he was also assaulted and
injured.30

Notably, in their Reply,31 the petitioners incorporated


a motion for new trial based on alleged new and
material evidence impugning the credibility of P02
Carandang. They averred that in the case for Direct
Assault with Attempted Homicide which P02
Carandang also filed against Nestor, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 95-401 and pending before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tanauan, Batangas,
his testimony therein given from October 10, 2007 to
July 30, 2008 was different from his testimony in the
case at bar. 32

Ruling of the Court

It is clear that the petitioners basically raise only


questions of fact. Nonetheless, the Court gave due
course to the instant petition due to the following
reasons:

Firstly, pursuant to the settled rule that in a criminal


case an appeal throws the whole case open for
review, 33 the Court, however, finds that this case
actually presents a question of law; specifically, on
whether or not the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was properly observed.

Secondly, the petitioners, in the Reply, invite the


Court's attention to the subsequent testimony of P02
Carandang in the later case filed against
Nestor.1âwphi1 The petitioners assert that said
testimony should be considered as new and material
evidence which thereby makes the findings of the
trial court in the instant case as manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible. Thus, the petitioners moved
for a new trial on the ground of alleged newly
discovered evidence without, however, necessarily
withdrawing their petition.

At the outset, the petitioners' motion for new trial is


denied.

Clearly, the Rules of Court proscribe the availment


of the remedy of new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence at this stage of appeal. Section
1 of Rule 121 states:

At any time before a judgment of


conviction becomes final, the court may,
on motion of the accused or at its own
instance but with the consent of the
accused, grant a new trial or
reconsideration.

Under Section 14 of Rule 124, a motion for new trial


on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be
filed at any time after the appeal from the lower court
has been perfected and before the judgment of the
CA convicting the appellant becomes final. Further,
Rule 45, Section 1 clearly provides that a motion for
new trial is not among the remedies which may be
entertained together with a petition for appeal
on certiorari.

More importantly, the alleged newly discovered


evidence is not worthy of the Court's consideration.

The petitioners allege that in the MTC proceedings,


P02 Carandang failed to positively identify who
actually hit him and/or the persons involved in the
killing of P/C Insp. Camacho and SP02 Andaya
which is a complete tum-around from his testimony
in the case at bar where he positively identified the
petitioners as the perpetrators. At any rate, aside
from this alleged glaring inconsistency of P02
Carandang's testimony, said subsequent testimony
is marred by inconsistencies in itself For instance, in
his cross-examination on May 14, 2008, he stated
that when he came to his full consciousness after
being unconscious or dizzy for about two minutes,
he saw P/C Insp. Camacho and SP02 Andaya lying
down; then, during his re-cross examination on July
30, 2008, he stated that when he regained
consciousness after being unconscious or dizzy for
about five minutes, he did not see where P/C Insp.
Camacho or his other teammates were. Still, on
numerous occasions, he failed to categorically
answer questions as he could not recall. Considering
the value of P02 Carandang's testimony, he being
the only eyewitness to the said fateful event, there
would have been no sufficient evidence to prove the
guilt of the petitioners.34

However, the Court cannot agree with the


petitioners' contention that the testimony of P02
Carandang before the MTC effectively cast doubt
upon his previous testimony or makes it a falsity.
The MTC testimony was given after 10 years from
the time P02 Carandang testified in the case at bar.
Considering the length of time that had elapsed and
the frailty of human memory, the Court gives more
credence to P02 Carandang's testimony in the
instant case which was given after a year and 10
months from the incident testified upon. In fact, the
drama. of the fateful incident appeared so fresh to
P02 Carandang that in the course of his direct
examination on April 22, 1997 and while he was
demonstrating how Alfredo embraced P/C Insp.
Camacho, he became 'emotional' when asked about
the next thing that happened to P/C Insp.
Camacho.35

Jurisprudence dictates that even if a witness says


that what he had previously declared is false and
that what he now says is true is not sufficient ground
to render the previous testimony as false. No such
reasoning has ever crystallized into a rule of
credibility. The rule is that a witness may be
impeached by a previous contradictory statement
not that a previous statement is presumed to be
false merely because a witness now says that the
same is not true. Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set
aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken
before a court of justice in an open and free trial and
under conditions precisely sought to discourage and
forestall falsehood simply because one of the
witnesses who had given the testimony later on
changed his mind. Such a rule will make solemn
trials a mockery and place the investigation of the
truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 36

Thus, the Court finds no reason to give merit to the


petitioners' contentions of alleged new evidence.

In Sison v. People of the Philippines,37 the Court has


held that:

[W]hen the decision hinges on the


credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial court's
observations and conclusions deserve
great respect and are often accorded
finality, unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated and which, if properly
considered, would alter the result of the
case. The trial judge enjoys the
advantage of observing the witness'
deportment and manner of testifying, x x
x all of which are useful aids for an
accurate determination of a witness'
honesty and sincerity. The trial judge,
therefore, can better determine if such
witness were telling the truth, being in
the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, its assessment must
be respected for it had the opportunity to
observe the conduct and demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying and detect
if they were lying. The rule finds an even
more stringent application where said
findings are sustained by the [CA].38

For this reason alone, the petition must fail.

However, the Court cannot totally affirm the rulings


of the courts below. As forthwith stated, an appeal in
a criminal case opens the entire case for review; the
Court can correct errors unassigned in the appeal.
The Court finds that the Informations in this case
failed to allege all the elements which constitute the
crime charged.

The petitioners are being charged with the complex


crime of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48,
of the RPC.

The RPC provides:

Art. 148. Direct assaults. -Any person or


persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purpose
enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition, or shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of
his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance, shall
suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding
₱l,000.00 pesos, when the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the
offender is a public officer or employee,
or when the offender lays hands upon a
person in authority. If none of these
circumstances be present, the penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding ₱500.00
pesos shall be imposed.

Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who,


not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another without the
attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the next preceding article,
shall be deemed guilty of homicide and
be punished by reclusion temporal.

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -


When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum
period.

While the elements constituting the crime of


Homicide were properly alleged in the two
Informations and were duly established in the trial,
the said Informations, however, failed to allege all
the elements constitutive of the applicable form of
direct assault. To be more specific, the Informations
do not allege that the offenders/petitioners knew that
the ones they were assaulting were agents of a
person in authority, in the exercise of their duty.

Direct assault, a crime against public


order, may be committed in two
ways: first, by "any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition"; and second, by
any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, "shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such
performance."39 (Citation omitted)

Indubitably, the instant case falls under


the second form of direct assault. The
following elements must be present, to
wit:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack,


(b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious
resistance;

2. That the person assaulted is a person


in authority or his agent;

3. That at the time of the assault, the


person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of
official duties, or (b) is assaulted by
reason of the past performance of official
duties;

4. That the offender knows that the


one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise
of his duties; and

5. That there is no public uprising.

In the instant case, the Informations40 alleged the


following, to wit:

1. That on or about the 4th day of June


1995, at about 5:00 p.m., in Barangay
Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province
of Batangas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, acting in
common accord and mutually helping
one another, Nestor while armed with an
armalite rifle, with intent to kill and
without any justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
the said firearm the victims, SP02
Andaya/P/C Insp. Camacho;

2. That the said victims are bona fide


members of the PNP assigned at
Tanauan Police Station, and one of them
was the current Chief of Police
ofTanauan, Batangas; and

3. That at the time of the incident, they


were engaged in the performance of their
official duties.

In the course of the trial, the evidence presented


sufficiently established the foregoing allegations
including the fact that the petitioners came to know
that the victims were agents of a person in authority,
as the latter introduced themselves to be members
of the PNP.

Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the


petitioners came to know that the victims were
agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack
of allegation in the Informations that such fact was
known to the accused which renders the same
defective. In addition, neither can this fact be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
under paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the RPC for acts
committed with insult or in disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of his rank to
justify the imposition of an increased penalty against
the petitioners.

As the Court held in People v. Rodil:41

While the evidence definitely


demonstrated that appellant knew
because the victim, who was in civilian
clothing, told him that he was an agent of
a person in authority, he cannot be
convicted of the complex crime of
homicide with assault upon an agent of a
person in authority, for the simple reason
that the information does not allege the
fact that the accused then knew that,
before or at the time of the assault, the
victim was an agent of a person in
authority. The information simply alleges
that appellant did "attack and stab PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana while the latter was in
the performance of his official duties, ... "
Such an allegation cannot be an
adequate substitute for the essential
averment to justify a conviction of the
complex crime, which necessarily
requires the imposition of the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense. Like a qualifying
circumstance, such knowledge must be
expressly and specifically averred in the
information; otherwise, in the absence of
such allegation, the required knowledge,
like a qualifying circumstance, although
proven, would only be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance.
Applying this principle, the attack on the
victim, who was known to the appellant
as a peace officer, could be considered
only as aggravating, being "in contempt
of/or with insult to public authorities"
(Par. [2], Art. XIV of the [RPC], or as an
"insult or in disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of his
rank, ... "(Par. 3, Art. XIV, [RPC]).

It is essential that the accused must have


knowledge that the person attacked was
a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of his duties, because the
accused must have the intention to
offend, injure, or assault the offended
party as a person in authority or agent of
a person in authority.42

"The Constitution mandates that the accused, in all


criminal prosecutions, shall enjoy the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. From this fundamental precept
proceeds the rule that the accused may be convicted
only of the crime with which he is charged. " 43 This
right is accorded by the Constitution so that the
accused can prepare an adequate defense against
the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground
not alleged while he is concentrating on his defense
against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair
and underhanded. 44 It must be noted that said
constitutional right is implemented by the process of
arraignment45 in which the allegations in the
document charging an offense is read and made
known to the accused. Accordingly, a Complaint or
Information which does not contain all the elements
constituting the crime charged cannot serve as a
means by which said constitutional requirement is
satisfied. Corollarily, the fact that all the elements of
the crime were duly proven in trial cannot cure the
defect of a Complaint or Information to serve its
constitutional purpose.

Pursuant to the said constitutional precept, the 2000


Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that
every element of the offense must be alleged in the
complaint or information so as to enable the accused
to suitably prepare his defense. Corollarily,
qualifying circumstances or generic aggravating
circumstances will not be appreciated by the
Court unless alleged in the Information. This
requirement is now laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of
Rule 110, to wit:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. -


The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made
to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The


acts or om1ss1ons complained of as
constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as
well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure


explicitly mandates that qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language in the complaint or information.
When the law or rules specify certain circumstances
that can aggravate an offense or that would attach to
such offense a greater penalty than that ordinarily
prescribed, such circumstances must be both
alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition
of the increased penalty.46 Due to such requirement
being pro reo, the Court has authorized its
retroactive application in favor of even those
charged with felonies committed prior to December
1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied
the requirement).47

In People v. Flores, Jr., 48 as reiterated in the more


recent cases of People v. Pangilinan49 and People v.
Dadulla,50 the Court ruled that the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him cannot be
waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is
imperative that the complaint or information filed
against the accused be complete to meet its
objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state
the elements of the specific offense alleged to have
been committed. For an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless
it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint
or information.51 In other words, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged, the accused being presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense. 52 Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an
accused's failure to raise an objection to the
insufficiency or defect in the information would not
amount to a waiver of any objection based on said
ground or irregularity.

Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on


Criminal procedure reads:

Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any


ground therefor.-The failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the
same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of
any objections EXCEPT THOSE based in the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and
(i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

Indeed, the foregoing provision provides


that if an accused fails to assert all the
grounds available to him under Section 3
of Rule 117 in his motion to quash, or if
he, altogether, fails to file i motion a
quash - any I objection based on the
ground or grounds he failed the raise
through a motion to quash shall be
deemed waived, except the following,
thus:

SEC. 3. Grounds. - x x x: I

(a) That the facts charged do not


constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no


jurisdiction over the offense charged;

x x xx !

(g) That the criminal action or liability has


been extinguished; [and] x x xx

(i) That the accused has been previously


convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

Therefore, the petitioners can only be convicted of


the crime of Homicide instead of the complex crime
of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Homicide due to the simple reason
that the Informations do not sufficiently charge the
latter.

[T]he real nature of the criminal charge is


determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information ... it is not the
technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the
title of the information that determines the character
of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the
Information. 53
Nevertheless, by reason of the fact that the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of acts
committed with insult or in disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of his rank was
proven in the course of the trial, exemplary damages
should be awarded in each case in addition to such
other damages that were already awarded by the
courts below. Exemplary damages are justified
regardless of whether or not the generic or qualifying
aggravating circumstances are alleged in the
information. The grant in this regard should be in the
sum of ₱30,000.00.54 In the case of People v.
Catubig,55 the Court elucidated on the nature of
exemplary damages, thus:

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive"


damages, exemplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrong doings, and
as a vindication of undue sufferings and
wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. x x x In common
law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is
to account for injury to feelings and for
the sense of indignity and humiliation
suffered by a person as a result of an
injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that
there should be compensation for the
hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant - associated
with such circumstances as willfulness,
wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud
or gross fraud - that intensifies the injury.
The terms punitive or vindictive damages
are often used to refer to those species
of damages that may be awarded
against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case,
these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and
others like him from similar conduct in
the future. 56 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)

Accordingly, since the petitioners are all found to be


principally liable for the crimes committed as
conspiracy was duly proven, exemplary damages in
the amount of ₱30,000.00 should be awarded
against each of them.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED


with MODIFICATION. Petitioners Nestor Guelos,
Rodrigo Guelos, Gil Carandang and SP02 Alfredo
Carandang y Prescilla are hereby found GUILTY of
Homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (I) DAY of prision
mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The fine of ₱ l,000.00 is DELETED. In
addition to the amount of damages and civil
indemnity that were already awarded by the courts
below to the respective heirs of Police Chief
Inspector Rolando Camacho and Senior Police
Officer 2 Estelito Andaya, each of the petitioners are
also directed to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages to each of the victims.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA


Associate Justice Associate Justice
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision


had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the


Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO


Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
 Rollo, pp. 11-39.
2
 Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes Jr.,
with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and
Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo concurring; id. at 42-59.
3
 Rendered by Judge Voltaire V. Rosales: id. at 76-
85.
4
 Id. at 62.
5
 Id. at 72-73, 74-75.
6
 Id. at 72-73.
7
 Id. at 74-75.
8
 Id. at 77.
9
 Id. at 46.
10
 Id. at 46-4 7.
11
 Id. at 47, 79-80.
12
 Id. at 77-78.
13
 Id. at 78.
14
 Id. at 48.
15
 Id.
16
 Id. at 78.
17
 Id. at 49.
18
 TSN, August 28, 2001, pp. 3-9.
19
 TSN, August 31, 2000, pp. 9-15.
20
 TSN, February 13, 2001, pp. 4-14.
21
 Rollo, pp. 76-85.
22
 Id. at 85.
23
 Id. at 83.
24
 Id. at 84.
25
 Id. at 42-59.
26
 Id. at 59.
27
 Id. at 21.
28
 Id. at 25-26.
29
 Id. at 26-27.
30
 Id. at 27-28.
31
 Id. at 206-227.
32
 Id. at 211-221.
33
 People v. Tambis, 582 Phil. 339, 344 (2008).
34
 Rollo, pp. 211-221.
35
 TSN,April 22, 1997, pp. 11-12.
36
 Firaza v. People, 547 Phil. 572, 584 (2007).
37
 682 Phil. 608 (2012).
38
 Id. at 622, citing People v. Espino, Jr., 577 Phil.
546, 562-563 (2008).
39
 People v. Recto, 419 Phil. 674, 689-690 (2001 ).
40
 Rollo, pp. 72-73, 74-75
41
 196 Phil. 79 (198 l ).
42
 Id. at 99- 100.
43
 Navarrete v. People, 542 Phil. 496, 504 (2007).
44
 People v. Mendigurin, 456 Phil. 328, 344 (2003).
45
 See Luman/aw v. Judge Peralta, Jr., 517 Phil.
588, 597 (2006).
46
 People v. Corral, 446 Phil. 652, 667-668 (2003).
47
 People v. Dadu/la, 657 Phil. 442, 451 (2011 ).
48
 442 Phil. 561 (2002).
49
 676 Phil. 16 (2011).
50
 657 Phil. 442 (2011 ).
51
 People v. Flores, Jr., supra note 48, at 569-570.
52
 Id. at 572.
53
 Velasco v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 704 Phil. 302,
314 (2013), citing Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, 293
Phil. 368, 378 (1993).
54
 People v. Reyes, 714 Phil. 300, 309-310 (2013).
55
 416 Phil. 102 (2001).
56
 Id. at 118-119.

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