FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 234401. December 5, 2019.]

CONNIE L. SERVO , petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER , J : p

The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Resolution dated September 22,
2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 152398 dismissing petitioner Connie L.
Servo's action for certiorari on ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
By A davit dated August 22, 2014, petitioner led a claim for deposit insurance
with respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). She essentially
alleged that sometime in October 2011, she lent Teresita Gutierrez Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for the repair of the latter's bus units. On January 19,
2012, petitioner met with Gutierrez at the Rural Bank of San Jose Del Monte to receive
the latter's loan payment. For this purpose, petitioner opened a time deposit account
with the bank under Special Savings Deposit (SSD) Account No. 001 03-00904-1. Per
her agreement with Gutierrez, the latter's name was used as the account holder since
she was a preferred bank client. 1
A few years later, however, the bank was closed down. Consequently, petitioner
filed with PDIC her claim for deposit insurance, together with certain documents.
She claimed to have verbally informed Eliza Dela Peña, one of the bank tellers,
that the Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) deposited in SSD Account No.
001 03-00904-1 was held in trust for her by Gutierrez. She also categorically stated
that she was the exclusive owner of SSD Account No. 001 03-00904-1. 2
By letter dated August 27, 2014, PDIC, through its Claims Deposit Department,
denied petitioner's claim for deposit insurance, citing as ground the absence of any
bank records/documents indicating that petitioner, not Gutierrez, owned the account.
On October 30, 2014, petitioner led a Request for Reconsideration (RFR). Under
letter dated July 16, 2015, PDIC denied petitioner's RFR, this time citing as ground
3
petitioner's alleged failure to submit documents showing that the "break-up and
transfer of Legitimate Deposit to the transferee is for a Valid Consideration." PDIC
emphasized that petitioner was not even a relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity of Gutierrez.
Petitioner consequently led the action below, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on PDIC for denying her claim for deposit insurance, albeit she submitted the
necessary documents in support of her claim. Assuming the documents were
incomplete, she was not given the chance to submit additional documents nor called to
a clari catory meeting, as provided in Section 4 (b) and 4 (c) of Regulatory Issuance
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 No. 2011-03
On the other hand, PDIC riposted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition as the same fell exclusively within its
quasi-judicial jurisdiction. It emphasized that there was no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when after evaluation and analysis of
available bank documents, it arrived at the conclusion that petitioner was not entitled to
deposit insurance. 4
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Decision 5 dated July 27, 2017, the trial court sustained PDIC's argument and
dismissed the case on ground of lack of jurisdiction, viz.:
WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing circumstances, judgment is
rendered in favor of Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation. For lack of
jurisdiction, the instant case is ordered DISMISSED without prejudice .
Fittingly, the court holds its hands tightly in not passing upon the other issue.
SO ORDERED. 6 (Emphasis in the original)
The trial court recognized that since PDIC is a quasi-judicial agency which
performed the assailed quasi-judicial action, the case should have been brought up to
the Court of Appeals. 7
The trial court cited Section 5 (g) of Republic Act (RA) 3591 (PDIC Charter), as
amended by RA 10846, providing that actions of PDIC shall be nal and executory, and
may only be restrained or set aside by the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari. 8
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
In her subsequent special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner argued that PDIC was not among the quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court whose decisions and rulings are appealable via
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Also, the mere fact that PDIC performs
quasi-judicial functions does not make it co-equal with the RTCs. Too, considering that
the rulings of the Department of Finance are appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals, the
latter having the same rank as the Court of Appeals, it cannot be said that the rulings of
PDIC, an instrumentality operating under the Department of Finance, are appealable to
the Court of Appeals alone. 9
She also implored the Court of Appeals to treat her petition as a petition for
certiorari against PDIC's denial of her claim in the interest of substantial justice. 1 0
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
By Resolution 1 1 dated September 22, 2017, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the jurisdictional issue involved, being a
pure legal question, should have been led with this Court pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. 1 2
The Present Petition
Petitioner now prays that the aforesaid resolution be reversed and set aside, and
the main case be remanded to the proper court for resolution on the merits.
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the petition for certiorari on ground of
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 lack of jurisdiction?
Ruling
Under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129), the Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, viz.:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus ,
prohibition, certiorari , habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all nal judgements,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission
and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve
factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals
must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless
extended by the Chief Justice. (as amended by R.A. No. 7902) (emphasis
supplied)
Verily, the Court of Appeals here erred when it dismissed petitioner's special civil
action for certiorari on ground that since the case involves a pure question of law, the
same falls within this Court's exclusive jurisdiction.
For one, Section 9 of BP 129 vests concurrent jurisdiction in the regional trial
courts, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court over special civil actions and
auxiliary writs and processes. The law does not distinguish whether the issues involved
are pure factual or legal issues or mixed issues of fact and law for the purpose of
determining which of the courts should take cognizance of the case.
For another, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue extraordinary writs,
such as a petition for certiorari vis-à-vis the hierarchy of courts, was eloquently
enunciated in Gios-Samar, Inc., etc. v. Department of Transportation and
Communications, et al. , 1 3 viz.:
In 1981, this Court's original jurisdiction over extraordinary writs became
concurrent with the CA, pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129) or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. BP 129 repealed RA No. 296 and
granted the CA with "[o]riginal jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus , prohibition, certiorari , habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." x x x
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 xxx xxx xxx
This so-called "policy" was rea rmed two years later in People v.
Cuaresma, which involved a petition for certiorari challenging the quashal by the
City Fiscal of an Information for defamation on the ground of prescription. In
dismissing the petition, this Court reminded litigants to refrain from directly
ling petitions for extraordinary writs before the Court, unless there were special
and important reasons therefor. We then introduced the concept of "hierarchy of
courts," to wit:
x x x This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First
Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly,
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against rst level ("inferior") courts should be
led with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals . A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and speci cally set out in the petition. This is
established policy. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Too, Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation,
Inc. v. Judge Riel 1 4 ordained:
Fourthly, the ling of the instant special civil action directly in this Court
is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari,
direct resort is allowed only when there are special, [extraordinary] or compelling
reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the
hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and
impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental
and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. There being
no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the
observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari. (Citations omitted)
There is no compelling reason for the Court of Appeals here not to adhere to and
observe the hierarchy of courts.
In any event, although the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case, we will
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 no longer remand the case to the Court of Appeals to avert any further delay in its
resolution. The Court, therefore, deems it prudent to resolve once and for all, here and
now, the issue of jurisdiction involving PDIC.
Petitioner asserts that the amendatory provisions under RA 10846 should not be
applied to her case considering that her claim was denied on July 16, 2015 or prior to
the effectivity of RA 10846 on June 11, 2016.
In truth, however, when petitioner initiated the action for certiorari before the trial
court on August 19, 2016, RA 10846 was already effective. Verily, petitioner should
have complied with the procedures laid down thereunder, among them, the grant of
exclusive original jurisdiction to PDIC on matters involving bank deposits and
insurance; and the remedy granted to the claimants in case of an adverse PDIC ruling.
On this score, Section 5 (g) of RA 3591, as amended by RA 10846, provides that
the actions of PDIC on matters relating to insured deposits and deposit liabilities may
only be assailed before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court, viz.:
SECTION 7. Section 4 of the same Act is accordingly renumbered as
Section 5, and is hereby amended to read as follows:
DEFINITION OF TERMS
SEC. 5. As used in this Act. —
xxx xxx xxx
(g) xxx
The actions of the Corporation taken under Section 5(g) shall be nal and
executory, and may only be restrained or set aside by the Court of
Appeals, upon appropriate petition for certiorari on the ground that the
action was taken in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion
as to amount to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may
only be led within thirty (30) days from notice of denial of claim for
deposit insurance . (Emphasis supplied)
I n Peter L. So v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. , 1 5 the Court
pronounced that the Court of Appeals is vested with jurisdiction over matters relating
to the dispositions of PDIC, viz.:
We proceed to determine where such petition for certiorari should be
led. In this matter, We cite the very provision invoked by the petitioner, i.e.,
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC:
Sec. 4. When and where to le the petition. — The petition
shall be led not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration
or new trial is timely led, whether such motion is required or not,
the petition shall be led not later than sixty (60) days counted
from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial
court or of a corporation, a board, an o cer or a person, it shall be
led with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as de ned by the Supreme Court. It may also be
led with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan,
whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a
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 quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be led with and be cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals. x x x
Clearly, a petition for certiorari , questioning the PDIC's denial of
a deposit insurance claim should be led before the CA, not the RTC.
This further nds support in Section 22 of the PDIC's Charter, as amended,
which states that:
Section 22. No court, except the Court of Appeals ,
shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction
or preliminary mandatory injunction against the Corporation for
any action under this Act. x x x.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or
controversies instituted by a private party, the insured bank, or any
shareholder of the insured bank. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, the new amendment in PDIC's Charter under RA 10846,
specifically Section 5(g) thereof, confirms such conclusion, viz.:
The actions of the Corporation taken under Section 5(g)
shall be nal and executory, and may only be restrained or
set aside by the Court of Appeals , upon appropriate petition
for certiorari on the ground that the action was taken in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to
a lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only
be led within thirty (30) days from notice of denial of claim for
deposit insurance. x x x
As it stands, the controversy as to which court has jurisdiction
over a petition for certiorari led to question the PDIC's action is
already settled. Therefore, We nd no reversible error from the ndings and
conclusion of the court a quo. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals should have treated her
petition for certiorari as an original action against the assailed PDIC dispositions. She
has, in fact, allegedly included in her petition an alternative prayer, thus:
In the alternative, petitioner respectfully prays that the instant petition be
treated as a petition for certiorari from the PDIC's denial of petitioner's claim for
deposit insurance and that said x x x petition be granted by ordering PDIC to pay
petitioner the insured amount of P500,000.00 under Special Savings Deposit
Account No. 001 03-00904-1. 1 6
The argument must fail. The Court of Appeals could not have granted petitioner's
prayer to consider her petition to have been led in accordance with the PDIC rules
simply because the petition was led beyond the thirty (30)-day reglementary period
prescribed under RA 10846.
Notably, petitioner's RFR was denied on July 16, 2015. She led her petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals only on September 7, 2017 or more than two (2)
years from PDIC's denial of her claim. When the case was brought before the Court of
Appeals, there was nothing more for it to act on since the assailed trial court's ruling
had already lapsed into finality.
ACCORDINGLY , the petition is DENIED .
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 SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., Caguioa, J.C. Reyes, Jr. and Inting, * JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Additional member per Special Order No. 2726.
1. Rollo, p. 40.
2. Id.

3. Id. at 28.
4. Id. at 41.
5. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Phoeve C. Meer; Id. at 40-44.
6. Id. at 43.
7. Id. at 42.

8. Id. at 43.
9. Id. at 50-53.
10. Id. at 54.
11. Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and concurred in by Now
Supreme Court Associate Justice Rodil Zalameda and Associate Justice Carmelita
Salandanan Manahan; Id. at 22-24.
12. Id. at 23.
13. G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.
14. 750 Phil. 57, 68 (2015).

15. G.R. No. 230020, March 19, 2018.

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