Martelino Vs Alejandro
Martelino Vs Alejandro
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Martelino vs Alejandro
Facts:
Petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and the officers and men under him were tried under the jurisdiction of the military court, for violation
of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some
Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. Petitioners sought for
the relief against the orders of the general court-martial, alleging that the President of the general
court-martial should be disqualified, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of
the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that the case had received such an amount of
publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in
connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial.
In their answer the respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof
has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been
impaired. They even claim, that the petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity,
experience and background" of the members of the court.
Issue:
Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a
fair trial
Ruling:
No. In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners
but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim
trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government.
Absent here is a showing of failure of the could-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity
encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of
information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial
publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under
circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which
have come to be identified with due process.