Anti Abortion Bill Struck Down
Anti Abortion Bill Struck Down
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION FILE
v. No. 1:19-cv-02973-SCJ
Defendants.
ORDER
(“H.B. 481”), also known as the Living Infants Fairness and Equality (“LIFE”)
Act. H.B. 481 § 1, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2019). H.B. 481, in relevant
part, prohibits abortions after the detection of a fetal heartbeat. Id. § 4. H.B. 481
wherein they challenge the constitutionality of H.B. 481. Doc. No. [1]. Plaintiffs
assert two claims against Defendants: (1) a violation of the Substantive Due
Process right to privacy and liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (Count I); and (2) a violation of Due Process under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count II). Id.
Before the Court now are the parties’ cross motions for summary
that the Court declare H.B. 481 unconstitutional and permanently enjoin all
Defendants and their successors in office from enforcing it. Doc. No. [124]. The
State Defendants also move for summary judgment on both claims, asserting
that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to bring this suit. Doc. No. [125].
Count II of the Complaint and on the ground that the provisions of H.B. 481
1Defendants are composed of: (1) Paul L. Howard, Jr., in his official capacity as
District Attorney for Fulton County; (2) Sherry Boston, in her official capacity as
District Attorney of the Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit; and (3) the State Defendants.
2 Defendants Howard and Boston did not file summary judgment motions.
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not specifically found unconstitutional are severable. Id. Both motions have
been fully briefed by the parties.3 Doc. Nos. [127]; [129]; [135]; [137]. After due
consideration, and with the benefit of oral argument,4 the Court rules as follows.
I. BACKGROUND
motions, the Court finds that an overview of the current state of abortion law,
A. Abortion Law
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973), wherein the Court held that the Due Process
right of access to abortions. Specifically, the Court found that the constitutional
3Defendant Howard does not oppose Plaintiffs’ motion. Doc. No. [126]. Defendant
Boston filed her own response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion, to which Plaintiffs
replied. Doc. Nos. [128]; [136].
4The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the parties’ motions on June 15, 2020.
Doc. No. [143].
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woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. at 153. Yet
the Court also made clear that this right is “not absolute” and thus must be
Nearly twenty years later, the Supreme Court upheld the core ruling in
Roe by reaffirming “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue influence from the State.” Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion). In
doing so, however, the Court recognized that state interests in both a woman’s
health and fetal life are present and “substantial” from the outset of pregnancy.
Id. at 846, 873. Because of this, the Court held that “[o]nly where state
terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability] does the power of the
State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”
Id. at 874; see also id. at 878 (“An undue burden exists, and therefore a
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.”). Thus, in order “to protect the central right recognized by [Roe]
Roe untouched, stating that “[t]he woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy
before viability is the most central principle of [Roe]. It is a rule of law and a
that advances in neonatal care and maternal care have moved viability to an
earlier point, the Court dismissed such factual divergences as having “no
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Id. at 860; see also id. at 846 (“Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong
obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.”); see also
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (“Before viability, a State ‘may not
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her
progeny—is binding upon this Court. See Johnson v. DeSoto Cty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 72 F.3d 1556, 1559 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The binding precedent rule
Turning now to the facts of this case, the Court makes the following
findings of fact for the purpose of resolving the cross motions for summary
judgment. In doing so, the Court derives the facts from the admitted
portions of the parties’ statements of material facts and the Court’s own review
derives the facts from the parties’ joint stipulations.5 Doc. Nos. [124-3]; [125-2]
(“Stip”).
reviewed the record. If a party admitted a fact in part, the Court includes the
material. The Court excludes facts, or parts of facts, that are legal conclusions,
country will have an abortion by age forty-five. PSOMF, ¶ 18; Stip. #1 (citing
Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Population Group Abortion Rates & Lifetime
Incidence of Abortion: United States, 2008–2014, 107 Am. J. Pub. Health 1904
(2017)). Other research has found that a majority of women having abortions
(61%) already have at least one child, while most (66%) also plan to have a child
or additional children in the future. PSOMF, ¶ 19; Stip. #1 (citing News Release,
Guttmacher Inst., Concern for Current and Future Children a Key Reason Women
release/2008/concern-current-and-future-children-key-reason-women-have-
abortions; Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, Abortion Facts: Women Who Have Abortions (last
patient’s last menstrual period (“lmp”). PSOMF, ¶ 21; Stip. #2. Clinicians also
generally date a pregnancy (i.e., indicate how far along a pregnancy has
advanced) with the weeks before the decimal point and the days after: “6.2
weeks lmp” means six weeks and two days lmp. Id. A full-term pregnancy is
measured from the first day of the patient’s last menstrual period (based on
clinical estimate), that is, at or after 6.0 weeks lmp. PSOMF, ¶ 22; Stip. #5.
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after seven completed weeks of pregnancy measured from the first day of the
patient’s last menstrual period (based on clinical estimate), that is, at or after
patients have regular cycles of different lengths; and still others have irregular
cycles. PSOMF, ¶ 23; Stip. #3. In a person with regular four-week cycles,
fertilization typically occurs two weeks after the start of that person’s last
menstrual period. Id. A woman with a highly regular, four-week cycle would
be four weeks lmp when she misses her period. PSOMF, ¶ 24; Stip. #3.
In a typical developing embryo, cells that eventually form the basis for
Stip. #4. Plaintiffs’ position is that cardiac activity is generally detectable at 6.0
weeks lmp, and may be detectable a few days earlier. PSOMF, ¶ 26; Stip. #4.
approximately 6-7 weeks lmp. Id. Regarding viability, i.e., the point at which a
outside the uterus with or without artificial aid, Plaintiffs’ position is that it
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occurs at approximately 24 weeks lmp. PSOMF, ¶ 27; Stip. #6. The State
Some medical care for a pregnant patient aside from abortion and
miscarriage management can harm or end a pregnancy. PSOMF, ¶ 28; Stip. #8.
In some cases of miscarriage that occur before viability, cardiac activity persists
makes pregnancy loss inevitable. PSOMF, ¶ 29; Stip. #7. In those cases, some
treatment to empty her uterus. Id. In other cases, in which miscarriage is only
cardiac activity persists. Id. All medical care entails the risk of unintentional
harm to the patient; clinicians, including clinicians treating patients who are
pregnant, might be pregnant, or might become pregnant, accept that risk and
weigh that risk against the benefits of treatment. DSOMF, ¶ 6; Stip. #9.
The Georgia Legislature passed H.B. 481 on March 29, 2019, and the
Governor signed the bill into law on May 7, 2019. PSOMF, ¶ 1; H.B. 481 § 15.
Section 3 of H.B. 481 amends O.C.G.A. § 1-2-1, which sets forth definitions of
“Persons and their Rights” that apply throughout the Official Code of Georgia
unborn child.” Id. § 3(b). It further defines “unborn child” as “a member of the
species Homo sapiens at any stage of development who is carried in the womb.”
Id. § 3(e)(2).
been determined to have a “detectable human heartbeat.” Id. § 4(b). H.B. 481
6An act is not considered an “abortion,” however, if it is performed with the purpose
of removing an “ectopic pregnancy” or a “dead” fetus “caused by a spontaneous
abortion,” sometimes referred to as a miscarriage. H.B. 481 § 4(a)(1).
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years. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-140(b). A patient may also bring a civil action for a
violation of this section. H.B. 481 § 4(g). Section 4 provides affirmative defenses,
death of an” embryo or fetus, id. §§ 4(h)(1–4), and if “[a] woman sought an
abortion because she reasonably believed that an abortion was the only way to
and abortion reporting statutes to mandate that the information the patient
activity, id. § 8, and to reflect the ban on abortion where there is detectable fetal
cardiac activity. Id. § 11. Section 5 of H.B. 481 requires the father of an “unborn
child,” as defined under Section 3 of H.B. 481, to pay child support for the
“direct medical and pregnancy related expenses of the mother of the unborn
child.” Id. § 5. Section 6 of H.B. 481 sets monetary damages “[f]or the homicide
C. Procedural History
Justice Collective, seven reproductive health care clinics,8 and three individual
whose members include Georgians who can become pregnant and need the
8These clinics are Feminist Women’s Health Canter; Planned Parenthood Southeast,
Inc.; Atlanta Comprehensive Wellness Clinic; Atlanta Women’s Medical Center;
FemHealth USA d/b/a carafem; Columbus Women’s Health Organization, P.C.; and
Summit Medical Associates, P.C. PSOMF, ¶ 3.
9These physicians are Carrie Cwiak, M.D., M.P.H.; Lisa Haddad, M.D., M.S., M.P.H.;
and Eva Lathrop, M.D., M.P.H. PSOMF, ¶ 4.
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freedom to make their own health care decisions, including the decision to end
people. Id. “Plaintiff Providers,” i.e., the named-clinics and physicians, provide
Prior to H.B. 481’s effective date, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against
all Defendants on June 28, 2019. Doc. No. [1]. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved to
preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of H.B. 481 on July 23, 2019. Doc. No. [24].
Doc. Nos. [94]; [97], p. 46. On December 4, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs’
Doc. No. [115]. In doing so, the Court emphasized that “[t]he Supreme Court
what interests the state asserts to support it.” Id. at pp. 2–3. The Court thus
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order, the parties entered into a series of stipulations, as referenced supra, and
agreed to forego expert reports and disclosures. Doc. Nos. [124-3]; [125-2].
On February 20, 2020, the parties filed their cross motions for summary
judgment. Doc. Nos. [124]; [125]. Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on
both claims. Doc. No. [124]. They first assert that Section 4 of H.B. 481, which
with binding Supreme Court precedent and thus violates their right to privacy
and liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Doc. No. [124-1], p. 11.
They further assert that Section 3 of H.B. 481, which amends the definition
that it is unclear if or how the definition amends other provisions of the Code.
Id. at p. 14. Plaintiffs argue that they are therefore entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and move the Court to permanently enjoin the enforcement of
The State Defendants also move for summary judgment on both claims,
asserting that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to bring this suit.
Doc. No. [125-1], p. 15. They alternatively move for partial summary judgment
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on Plaintiffs’ vagueness claim, and on the ground that all provisions of H.B. 481
not specifically found unconstitutional are severable. Id. at pp. 22, 28.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary Matters
the Court must first address the arguments made by Defendant Boston in her
argues that Plaintiffs’ motion should be denied as to her for two reasons:
(1) “because the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiffs do not have
standing to bring their claims against her” and, (2) “even if they did, she is
entitled to immunity from those claims under the Eleventh Amendment to the
arguments in turn.
1. Standing
(11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Dreihaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159
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(2014)). “[P]ersons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are
such cases.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971). When plaintiffs “do not
claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution
Circuit has noted that the “credible threat of prosecution” standard is “quite
forgiving.” Wilson v. State Bar of Ga., 132 F.3d 1422, 1428 (11th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted).
that they fear being prosecuted by D.A. Boston under H.B. 481 or that D.A.
Boston will, intends to, or even might in the future prosecute them under H.B.
481, much less that they face a ‘credible threat of prosecution’” by her office.
Doc. No. [128], p. 3. Because “the undisputed evidence of record shows that
D.A. Boston has at all times vowed not to enforce H.B. 481,” she argues,
“Plaintiffs face no threat of prosecution from D.A. Boston.” Id. 10 “In the
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exceedingly unlikely event that D.A. Boston or her successor ever seeks to
enforce H.B. 481 against any of the Plaintiffs, or gives them any reason to
believe she might do so,” she argues the issue would then be ripe for this Court
to consider. Id. at p. 11. But, “on the current record,” she maintains, “Plaintiffs
have not asserted a claim against D.A. Boston that this Court can properly
adjudicate.” Id.
Doc. No. [136], p. 2 (quoting Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1304) (quoting Driehaus,
573 U.S. at 159)). They maintain that, although Defendant Boston has attached
an affidavit swearing she will not enforce H.B. 481, see Doc. No. [128-1], “that
Defendant Boston’s argument rests primarily upon the fact that she has
intention of enforcing it. But again, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that
“[m]id-litigation assurances are all too easy to make and all too hard to enforce,”
which is why “the Supreme Court has refused to accept them.” W. Ala.
Women’s Ctr. v. Williamson, 900 F.3d 1310, 1328 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 940 (2000)). As this Court stated in its
Doc. No. [97], pp. 19–20. While Defendant Boston is a District Attorney and not
the Attorney General or the State, Stenberg and Williamson are analogous.
180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999) to support her argument that standing cannot lie
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However, the relevant portion of that case dealt with the question of whether
There, no prosecutions had yet been initiated, nor had plaintiffs been directly
threatened with prosecution. Id. at 1339. But as the Eleventh Circuit noted, it
leaving plaintiffs with only the most narrow window in which to initiate suit
in federal court.” Id. at 1338 (noting that, “under the abstention doctrine of
[challenged] statutes, at least in cases where the fetus is viable.” Id. at 1339.
Defendant Boston argues this stated intention was central to the Eleventh
Circuit’s holding. Doc. No. [128], p. 9. The Court disagrees. While a stated
this Court does not read Summit to hold that it is necessary to confer standing.
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In fact, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly noted that, although the Attorney
viability partial birth abortions, “the Attorney General could withdraw the
any time. 11 Plaintiffs state that they provide and will continue to provide
treatment and services which will “undisputedly be criminal under H.B. 481.”
Doc. No. [88], p. 3. They have therefore alleged “an intention to engage in a
“’proscribed by [the] statute’ they wish to challenge.” Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149
at 162–63 (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289,
on neither her nor her eventual successors, Plaintiffs have standing against her.
11 And, as Plaintiffs note, Defendant Boston concedes her successors “may or may not
share her views on H.B. 481.” Doc. No. [95-1], p. 13. “Crimes committed while Boston
is in office can still be prosecuted by her successor within any applicable statute of
limitations.” Doc. No. [136], p. 3 n.2.
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Amendment. Doc. No. [128], p. 8. She further contends that the injunctive relief
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), does not apply because there is no evidence that she
has enforced or even threatened to enforce H.B. 481 against Plaintiffs. Id.
jurisdiction over a lawsuit against a state [and its officers], except where the
state has consented to be sued or waived its immunity, or where Congress has
overridden the state’s immunity.” Cross v. Ala. State Dep’t of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1502 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see
U.S. Const. amend. XI (“[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State . . . .”). However
“[u]nder the doctrine enunciated in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), . . . a
suit alleging a violation of the federal constitution against a state official in [her]
official capacity for injunctive relief on a prospective basis is not a suit against
the state, and, accordingly, does not violate the Eleventh Amendment.” Grizzle
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v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756–57 (1999) (“The rule [of sovereign immunity],
however, does not bar certain actions against state officers for injunctive or
declaratory relief.”) and Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
n.10 (1989) (“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued
actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’”).
immunity defense, which the district court rejected under the Ex parte Young
exception. 180 F.3d at 1333. In affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit
are unconstitutional.” Id. at 1339. The Eleventh Circuit also held that the
law,” even though the state defendants had not yet initiated prosecution or
specifically threatened the plaintiffs with prosecution. Id. In doing so, the
be withdrawn. Id.
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injunction against its enforcement. They also sufficiently allege an ongoing and
fall within the Ex parte Young exception, and Defendant Boston’s arguments to
B. Summary Judgment
The filing of cross motions for summary judgment “does not give rise to
Imaging Systems, LLC v. Visage Imaging, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1336
(N.D. Ga. 2017). Rather, cross motions for summary judgment “must be
matter of law.” Id. (citing Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc., 395 F.3d
533, 538–39 (5th Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, the Court examines the parties’
1. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that “[t]he court shall
grant summary judgement if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
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as to any material act and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a
reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it is “a legal element of the
claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of
the case.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).
materials in the record, that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
that should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256,
1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
showing that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove their case at trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th
Cir. 1993). In determining whether the moving party has met this burden, the
court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005).
Once the moving party has adequately supported its motion, the non-
movant then has the burden of showing that summary judgment is improper
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Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no
“genuine [dispute] for trial” when the record as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Id. All reasonable doubts,
however, are resolved in the favor of the nonmoving party. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d
Complaint, wherein they assert that H.B. 481 violates the Due Process Clause
privacy and liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.” Doc. No. [1], ¶ 73. Plaintiffs argue that Section 4 of H.B. 481,
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p. 11. Upon further review, and in light of binding Supreme Court precedent,
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and unequivocally held that under
prior to viability. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibit any
woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability.”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54; see also Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299 (2016); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921;
a state asserts to support it. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“Before viability, the State’s
While the parties mostly concur in their stipulations, they differ on two
crucial facts—the point at which embryonic cardiac activity can be detected via
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vaginal ultrasound, and the point at which viability occurs. Plaintiffs’ position
detectable a few days earlier. PSOMF, ¶ 26; Stip. #4. The State Defendants’
weeks lmp. PSOMF, ¶ 27; Stip. #6. The State Defendants’ position is that
The State Defendants do not, and cannot, refute this critical finding.
Rather, they suggest that their inability to fully develop the record and proffer
expert testimony regarding the State’s interests underlying H.B. 481 prevents
the Court from granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.12 Doc. No.
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[129], p. 4. Yet as this Court explained in its December 4, 2019 Order, “any
discovery that the State Defendants seek to proffer regarding the purported
state interests underlying H.B. 481 is irrelevant under the current Supreme
Court viability framework.” Doc. No. [115], p. 3. See also MKB Mgmt. Corp. v.
Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 772–73 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2015) (affirming summary
cardiac activity and holding that the district court did not err in affirming a
fifteen-week abortion ban, holding that evidence about “any other issue” than
incur the substantial costs and other burdens of the irrelevant expert discovery
Thus, the State Defendants’ assertion that they were somehow prevented
this case on a four-month discovery track. See Doc. Nos. [94]; [97], p. 46. The
Court’s December 4, 2019 Order only precluded discovery regarding the State’s
precedent, is irrelevant.13 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. As such evidence would
therefore sees no need to deny Plaintiffs’ motion for this reason alone. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48 (stating that only “genuine issues of material fact”
13Additionally, to the extent that the State Defendants later wished to present “state
interest” evidence to attempt to abrogate Supreme Court precedent, they have not
been prevented from doing so. As the Court previously stated, the State Defendants
can rely upon findings and determinations made by the Georgia Legislature, as
reflected in H.B. 481 or its legislative history. See MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick,
No. 1:13-CV-071, 2013 WL 6147204, at *4 (D.N.D. Nov. 15, 2013). They can also rely
upon “legislative facts,” which are “of the type that reviewing courts often rely upon
in considering whether constitutional precedents should be overturned, even when
not developed in the record.” Id.
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redefining the meaning of natural person throughout the entire Georgia [C]ode
Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Doc. No. [1], ¶ 74. Specifically,
Section 3 of H.B. 481 amends the definition of “natural person” to include “any
embryo/fetus “at any stage of development who is carried in the womb.” H.B.
481 § 3. Yet as Plaintiffs correctly point out, this precise definition has been
considered and rejected by the Supreme Court. Doc. No. [124-1], p. 14. In Roe,
Amendment, includes an unborn child. 410 U.S. at 157. The Court found that
United States,” and that the use of the word has application only postnatally.
Id. The Court therefore concluded that the word “person” does not include the
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binding Supreme Court precedent (i.e., the core holdings in Roe, Casey, and
obtain an abortion prior to viability, the Court is left with no other choice but
the State carves out in H.B. 481 §§ 4(b)(1–3)—would be “out of line with the
Amendment’s command.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 n.54.
15The Court is certainly not alone in reaching this conclusion. Other courts have
uniformly struck down similar pre-viability abortion bans. See, e.g., Jackson Women’s
Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 276–77 (5th Cir. 2019) (striking down fifteen-week
abortion ban); Stenehjem, 795 F.3d at 727–73 (striking down six-week ban based on
detectable cardiac activity), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016); Edwards v. Beck, 786
F.3d 1113, 1117–19 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 895 (2016) (striking down
twelve-week ban based on detectable cardiac activity); Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1227, cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014) (striking down twenty-week abortion ban).
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Plaintiffs argue that Section 3 of H.B. 481 is unlawful for the additional
Doc. No. [1], ¶¶ 76–77. Plaintiffs argue that, because Section 3’s Personhood
Definition applies throughout the Code, see H.B. 481 §§ 3(b), (e)(2), the
hundreds of civil and criminal code provisions that include the term “person”
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stage of development. Doc. No. [124-1], p. 15. “Given this broad reach,” they
The State Defendants argue that Plaintiffs “have not come close to
Doc. No. [129], p. 2. They argue the “new definition of ‘natural person’
unquestionably has applications that are clear, precise, and lawful.” Id. “Under
precedent is clear that the law cannot be facially invalidated based on mere
Due process encompasses the concepts of notice and fair warning, and at
its core is the principle “that no man shall be held criminally responsible for
Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, Fla., 634 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011)
that a statute define an offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
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can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982). As the Supreme Court noted in Grayned
v. City of Rockford:
408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (internal citations omitted). Where the legislature
statute may permit “policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
First, the Court finds that Section 3’s Personhood Definition, which by its
own terms amends every appearance of the word “person” or “human being,”
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Definition puts them at the mercy of the State’s discretion, in violation of their
would be guilty of child cruelty. See O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-70 (“A parent . . . commits
the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree when such person willfully
deprives the child of necessary sustenance to the extent that the child’s health
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 for failing to report a pregnant patient living with an abusive
medical personnel mandatory reporters of child abuse). The list goes on. And
characterize them. Doc. No. [129], p. 12. These would be lawful applications of
discretion: under which of these amended statutes will the State decide to bring
Second, the Court declines to require Plaintiffs to “wait and see” how
throughout the Code. The State Defendants cite Indigo Room, Inc. v. City of
Fort Myers, 710 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th Cir. 2013) to support their argument that
invalidity. However, central to that case was the recognition that the ordinance
would not need to guess at its meaning.” Id. The complete sentence, of which
the State Defendants cite only part, states that “if persons of reasonable
intelligence ‘can derive a core meaning from a statute, then the enactment may
validly be applied to conduct within that meaning and the possibility of a valid
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alcoholic beverage establishments in the City of Fort Myers” and “for this
because it—by its own terms—applies throughout the entire Georgia Code. It
protections “persons” enjoy under Georgia law. Clearly, that would render
unlawful at least some actions that are currently lawful, but even the litigants
in this case are forced to guess which. The State Defendants have been unable
to articulate what this will mean for Plaintiffs and Georgians more generally.
Given the severity of the potential penalties, the Court declines to find that
reckless conduct statute is illustrative. Plaintiffs argue the services they provide
unjustifiable risk that [the] act or omission will cause harm or endanger the
safety of another person.” Id. They argue it remains unclear what kind of
No. [124-1], p. 18.17 The State Defendants counter that it is “inconceivable” that
fallen ill” could be charged for taking an “unjustified risk of harm” or being in
“gross deviation from the standard of care.” Doc. No. [129], p. 18.
with medical care would never be charged with reckless conduct, but the
17“[I]t is unclear whether and when clinicians could face criminal prosecution for
providing care to a pregnant patient that could harm an embryo/fetus, regardless of
whether the patient needs the treatment to maintain her health. Comprehensive
gynecological care, including family planning, abortion, miscarriage management,
hormone therapy, and cancer screening and treatment all could harm an
embryo/fetus.” Doc. No. [124-1], p. 20.
18“Mid-litigation assurances are all too easy to make and all too hard to enforce,”
which is why “the Supreme Court has refused to accept them.” Williamson., 900 F.3d
at 1328 (citing Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 940).
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statute itself certainly does not preclude such prosecution. Second, the Court
notes that it is unclear what the governing standard of care would be. As noted
professions would be charged with the care of two individual patients, whose
entirely new standard of care. That these highly sophisticated parties are
intelligence would be forced to guess what conduct might leave them open to
criminal penalty.
it impossible for [P]laintiffs to do their work with ‘fair notice of conduct that is
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). Plaintiffs are
19See Hearing Transcript, Tr. 71:18–23 (“Before, a physician had one patient that they
were considering. Now they clearly have liability for two people. The State
Defendants do not dispute that. The law has been amended and . . . physicians treating
pregnant patients need to treat the embryo or fetus as a separate person.”).
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The State Defendants also move for summary judgment on Counts I and
bring this suit. Doc. No. [125-1], p. 15. They alternatively move for partial
H.B. 481 not specifically found unconstitutional are severable from the
i. Standing
the power of the court to entertain the suit.’” CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v.
City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). Article III of the United States Constitution limits the
courts to hearing actual “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III § 2;
see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). Overall, the
powers principles and “to prevent the judicial process from being used to
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usurp the powers of the political branches.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2014) (describing
standing to sue in their own right.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
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Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). Under the diversion-of-resources
impair the organization’s ability to engage in its own projects by forcing the
establish standing. Doc. No. [125-1], p. 15. They first contend that Plaintiff
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right Id. at p. 16. They further
Defendants’ “illegal acts” impaired its ability to engage in its own projects by
the “defendant’s illegal acts impair its ability to engage in its projects by forcing
the organization to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts.” Fla. State
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Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1165 (11th Cir. 2008). Here,
Plaintiff SisterSong states that the enforcement of H.B. 481 “would force [it] to
divert its scarce time and resources away from many other aspects to focus on
helping Georgians access abortion care out of state and otherwise adjust to H.B.
481’s sweeping impact.” PAF, ¶ 5. It further states that, “[i]n order to educate
its members and the public about H.B. 481’s new restrictions and what they can
do about it,” it has already diverted its “limited staff resources away from
managing trainings,” which are a core part of its advocacy mission and a
educate its members and the public about the impact of H.B. 481.” Id. ¶ 9.20
training to public and media educational efforts, the State Defendants still
categorize its response as “vague” since it does not specify what the responses
entailed or how they differed from regular trainings. Id. at p. 18. The State
voluntary decision and therefore not an injury caused by H.B. 481 sufficient to
confer standing. Id. at p. 19 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“[S]tanding depends
considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or
forgone action) at issue.”)). Finally, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff
activities and thus does not constitute injury adequate to establish standing. Id.
Upon review, the Court agrees with Plaintiff SisterSong and finds that it
SisterSong has articulated the resources it diverted from its trainings “[i]n order
to educate its members and the public about H.B. 481’s new restrictions and
what they can do about it.” PAF, ¶ 7. Two of its high-ranking officers have also
had to dedicate significant portions of their time to responding to H.B. 481. This
“constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social
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interests.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). Whether
voluntary and mandated diversion of resources had “no support in the law,
The State Defendants also argue that Plaintiff Providers have failed to
establish standing. Doc. No. [125-1], p. 19. Specifically, the State Defendants
contend that Plaintiff Providers “are not alleging that any of their own
constitutional rights are violated,” and that they lack third-party standing to
vicariously assert the rights of their non-party patients who seek to obtain an
abortion. Id.
In response, Plaintiff Providers push back on the notion that they are not
Rather, they assert that H.B. 481’s vagueness violates their own due process
rights. Id.; see also Hearing Transcript, Tr. 21:17–23. Plaintiff Providers state
that H.B. 481’s criminal penalties directly threaten them with injury sufficient
to confer standing. Id.; see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 440 n.30 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (“The physician is the
one against whom these criminal statutes directly operate in the event he
procures an abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions and conditions.
personal detriment.”).
patients’ fundamental right to access abortion.” Doc. No. [127], p. 3; see, e.g.,
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t generally
900 F.3d at 1325 n.13 (noting that “all the landmark cases since [Roe] have been
in abortion cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that abortion providers
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party standing in abortion cases in June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Russo, ---
U.S. ----, No. 18-1323, 2020 WL 3492640 (U.S. June 29, 2020). In Russo, the
state law which required them to hold active admitting privileges at hospital
within 30 miles of the place where they perform abortions. Id. at *4. The state
defendants argued, inter alia, that the abortion providers lacked standing and
that the proper plaintiffs were the patients themselves. Id. at *8. In finding that
the state defendants had waived such an argument by failing to raise it earlier,
the Supreme Court went on to state that it has “long permitted abortion
to abortion-related regulations.” Id. at *9. The Court further noted that it has
Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004) (emphasis in original)). Thus, because the
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abortion providers were challenging a law that regulated their own conduct,
the Court found that they were “far better positioned than their patients to
and most “obvious” claimants. Id. at *10 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197) (1976)).
Similarly, here, Plaintiff Providers seek to invoke their own rights as well
H.B. 481. Plaintiff Providers further state that they have “unique physician-
patient relationships with their patients, which are close, intimate, and special,
and create ethical and medical duties.” PAF, ¶ 1. The State Defendants maintain
need not reiterate them here. See supra Section II.B.2.ii (holding that application
their work with fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required, in violation
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iii. Severability
this Court should permanently enjoin H.B. 481 in its entirety. Doc. No. [124-1],
p. 1. By contrast, the State Defendants argue that they are entitled to partial
provisions of H.B. 481 that are not specifically found unconstitutional are
severable and should be allowed to take effect as the law of Georgia. Doc. No.
[125-1], p. 28. More specifically, the State Defendants argue that H.B. 481
tax benefits, tort damages, and other matters) that are capable of standing on
their own and operating independently, even if Sections 3 and 4 of H.B. 481 are
summary judgment briefing shows that they are only challenging Section 3(b)
Section 3 of H.B. 481 that contains definitions of the terms “detectable human
throughout the Georgia Code, which encompasses subsections 3(b) and 3(e) of
plaintiff cannot amend [the] complaint through argument made in [a] brief in
Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 859 (11th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). A
481 as a whole and Plaintiffs do not specifically parse out subsections of Section
3 as being subject to their challenge. See Doc. No. [1], ¶¶ 37, 38, 68, 76, 77, 78,
and 79. In paragraphs 38 and 68, Plaintiffs specifically focus on Section 3’s new
¶¶ 76–77), Plaintiffs reference the “new definitions in Section 3 of H.B. 481.” Id.
¶¶ 38, 68, 76, 77 (emphasis added). From the Court’s review of the Complaint,
Court now considers the substantive law regarding severability. The Court
invalidated.” Artistic Entm’t, Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 331 F.3d 1196, 1204
(11th Cir. 2003); see also Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (“Severability
is . . . a matter of state law.”). In Georgia, “in order to hold one part of a statute
243 Ga. 358, 363, 254 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1979) (citations and quotations omitted).
It is also generally held that a saving or severability clause such as the one in
H.B. 48121 “is only an aid to construction, and is not an absolute command. It
21The severability clause in H.B. 481 states in relevant part, “All provisions of this Act
shall be severable in accordance with Code Section 1-1-3.” O.C.G.A. § 1-1-3 pertains
to invalid or unconstitutional code provisions and states in relevant part:
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the court to give to the statute an effect altogether different from that sought by
it when considered as a whole.” Mangelly, 243 Ga. at 363, 254 S.E.2d at 320
(citations omitted). This presumption is also “overcome where the stricken and
upheld portions of the statute depend on one another.” The Lamar Co. v. City
of Marietta, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (citations omitted).
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-3.
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to severance and remedies, as stated by the United States Supreme Court in its
abortion jurisprudence:
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006)
(citations omitted).22
The Supreme Court in Ayotte set forth three principles that informed
their approach: (1) “try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is
constitutional requirements’ even as [the Court] strive[s] to salvage it”; and (3)
22 In their briefing, the State Defendants refer the Court to non-binding opinions
issued by other out-of-state district courts that appear to provide analysis/application
of Ayotte and other Supreme Court authority. Doc. No. [125-1], p. 31. As the opinions
are non-binding and not the law of Georgia or from the United States Supreme Court,
the Court declines to consider the opinions. See McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328,
1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The general rule is that a district judge’s decision neither binds
another district judge nor binds him . . . . A circuit court’s decision binds the district
courts sitting within its jurisdiction while a decision by the Supreme Court binds all
circuit and district courts.”) (citations omitted).
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“the touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a court
cannot ‘use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.’” Id.
The Court must now consider Georgia law and the United States
4 of the Act on the grounds of violation of the right to privacy and vagueness.
Under Georgia law, the Court must determine whether the invalid
provisions of H.B. 481 are mutually dependent upon any other portions of the
Act. A review of the remaining operative sections of H.B. 481, i.e., Section 5
and Section 12 (relating to tax exemptions) shows that they each contain
23In a notice of supplemental authority (Doc. No. [146]), the State Defendants refer
the Court to a recent Supreme Court opinion, which reiterates these principles in a
non-abortion context/review of an act of Congress. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau, ---U.S. ----, No. 19-7, 2020 WL 3492641 (U.S. June 29, 2020).
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which Section 3 of H.B. 481 amends. Doc. No. [1], pp. 44, 47.24 In other words,
Sections 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12 are mutually dependent on Section 3 of H.B. 481.
If Section 3 is subject to the injunction, Sections 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12 are not
Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195, 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (“In determining whether to sever
consider the remainder of the severability rules and arguments concerning the
24While there are three sections of H.B. 481 that do not incorporate the definitional
language of Section 3, i.e., Section 1 (providing for a title of H.B. 481), Section 2
(providing for legislative findings), Section 9 (repealing penalties section for failure to
comply with Title 31 of the Official Code of Georgia), such does not alter the Court’s
ruling, as the balance of the legislation (i.e., Sections 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12) are incapable
of functioning independently.
25Were the Court to hold otherwise, it would be contradicting itself. As discussed
supra, Section 3’s Personhood Definition violates substantive due process. An embryo
or fetus cannot be a “person,” as that designation would effectively ban all abortions,
even pre-viability. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 157. For the same reason, an embryo or
fetus cannot be a child entitled to tax deductions or child support payments. Had the
legislature conferred these benefits on expectant parents without tying them to a new
definition of personhood, the Court’s analysis would be different.
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Georgia General Assembly’s purpose and intent in enacting H.B. 481. See
Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Ferrante, 281 Ga. 273, 274–75, 637 S.E.2d 659, 661–62
(2006) (indicating that severance is also proper if “the remaining portion of the
Act accomplishes the purpose the legislature intended.’ If, however, ‘the
objectionable part is so connected with the general scope of the statute that,
should it be stricken out, effect cannot be given to the legislative intent, the rest
of the statute must fall with it.’”); see also Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v.
Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 404, 467 S.E.2d 875, 884 (1996)
part when it is reasonably certain that to do so will correspond with the main
purpose which the legislature sought to accomplish by its enactment, if, after
purpose.”).
purpose and intent, the Court notes that the United States Supreme Court has
held that “[i]n ascertaining [legislative] purpose, [the court] may examine the
title of the act, the source in previous legislation of the particular provision in
question, and the legislative scheme or plan by which the general purpose of
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the act is to be carried out.” United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 (1926).26 In
terms of ascertaining intent, the Georgia Code states that “[i]n all
interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of
the General Assembly, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and
legislative intent is determined by reviewing the caption of the statute and the
statute as a whole. 27 See e.g., Sikes v. State, 268 Ga. 19, 21, 485 S.E.2d 206, 209
court may look to the caption of the act and its legislative history.”); West v.
26 Georgia law seems to indicate that the purpose of the law is found in the preamble.
See e.g., City of Marietta v. Summerour, 302 Ga. 645, 652, 807 S.E.2d 324, 330 n.2 (2017)
(finding the statement of legislative purpose in the codified preamble of the statute)
and Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 273 Ga. 702, 704,
544 S.E.2d 158, 160 (2001) (same). There are other Georgia cases that have derived the
purpose of the statute from the face of the act. See e.g., Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667, 670,
212 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1975); cf. Kennedy v. Carlton, 294 Ga. 576, 578, 757 S.E.2d 46, 48
(2014) (indicating that the “intent and purpose of the General Assembly in enacting
the statute” was “obvious” and appearing to derive this information from the face of
the statute).
27“The caption of an act of the legislature is properly an index to the contents of the
statute as construed by the legislature itself,—a summarizing of the act, made right at
the time when the discussion of every phase of the question is fresh in the legislative
mind.” Copher v. Mackey, 220 Ga. App. 43, 45, 467 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1996) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
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City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743, 745, 797 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2017) (“in construing
language in any one part of a statute, a court should consider the entire scheme
of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative intent from the statute as a
whole”); Bennett v. State, 252 Ga. App. 451, 453, 557 S.E.2d 29, 32 (2001) (“In
intention of the legislative mind in the passage of the enactment, than the
However, there is more recent authority which states that the Georgia General
Assembly “does not enact a general intention” and the concept of discerning
the collective intent of the legislators is “pure fiction.” In re Whittle, 339 Ga.
For purposes of this Order, the Court will consider the statute and the
older authority. Sharpe v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 528 F.2d 546, 548 (5th
Cir. 1976) (“Under Georgia law, the rule of stare decisis applies, which means
28In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions rendered prior to the
close of business on September 30, 1981 by the United States Court of Appeals for the
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To this regard, after considering H.B. 481 as a whole, the title, the caption,
the prior legislation, the legislative scheme, the old law, the evil, and the
remedy, the Court rejects the State Defendants’ argument that the statutory
Tr. 46:13–25. Instead, H.B. 481’s specific references to Roe v. Wade 29 and
law (specifically the prior versions of the Georgia statute which tracked the
jurisprudence and the Roe Court’s conclusion that the word “person” does not
include the unborn),30 the evil, and the remedy (the final version of H.B. 481,
Fifth Circuit.
29 See Doc. No. [1], ¶ 3.
30 As stated in the Court’s prior Preliminary Injunction Order,
Section 3 amends O.C.G.A. § 1-2-1 by redefining “natural
person” to include “any human being including an
unborn child” and by defining “unborn child” as an
embryo/fetus “at any stage of development who is carried
in the womb.” H.B. 481 § 3. This precise definition,
however, was considered and rejected by the Supreme
Court in Roe. Specifically, in Roe, the Supreme Court
considered whether a “person,” as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, includes an unborn child. 410 U.S. at 157.
The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment speaks
only of persons “born or naturalized in the United States,”
and that the use of the word has application only
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which changes the old law to give personhood to the unborn) lends support to
Plaintiffs’ argument that the purpose of H.B. 481 was to ban or de facto ban
abortion. Hearing Transcript, Tr. 79:7–9. To this regard, severance is not proper
as the objectional parts of H.B. 481, i.e., Sections 3 and 4, are so connected with
the general scope of the statute that now that they have been invalidated, effect
cannot be given to the legislative intent. See Daimler Chrysler Corp., 281 Ga. at
connected with the general scope of the statute that, should it be stricken out,
effect cannot be given to the legislative intent, the rest of the statute must fall
In sum, the State Defendants have not met either of their summary
judgment burdens (i.e., as movant or non-movant) and their request for partial
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325 (indicating that the moving party’s burden at
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support [an essential element of] the nonmoving party’s case” and the non-
Court declines to sever any portions of H.B. 481. The entire bill is subject to the
permanent injunction.
C. Permanent Injunction
the enforcement of H.B. 481 by all Defendants and their successors in office.
“(1) that he has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that his remedies at law are
inadequate; (3) that the balance of hardships weighs in his favor; and (4) that a
permanent injunction would not disserve the public interest.” Barrett v. Walker
Cty. Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1229 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). The Court addresses each of
1 Irreparable Injury
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2014) (citing Beason Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,
506–07 (1959) (“The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always
See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The only area of constitutional
1289 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (“Accordingly, courts presume that violations to the
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1235 (N.D. Ga.
have suffered an irreparable injury as a result of H.B. 481. and will continue to
satisfied.
The Court also finds that there is no adequate remedy at law for the
by monetary relief.” Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d
328, 338 (5th Cir. Unit B. 1981); see also Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen.
damages. Cf. Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1235. Accordingly, this factor is satisfied.
3. Balance of Hardships
discussed supra. These harms most certainly outweigh any injury Defendants
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may suffer from the imposition of an injunction. See Causeway Med. Suite v.
Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 619 (E.D. La. 1999) (“[T]he threatened injury of
practicing their profession greatly outweighs any damage the injunction may
cause the state.”). To be clear, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state
life.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 875–76 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162). Yet the Court has
also made clear that the “weight [of the state’s interest] is insufficient to justify
4. Public Interest
Finally, the Court finds that a permanent injunction would not disserve
the public interest. Rather, an injunction here would protect the public interest
“by protecting those rights to which it too is entitled.” Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v.
Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2000);
see also Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. For Reg’l
Transp., 698 F.3d 885, 896 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The public interest is promoted by
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is this Court’s duty, to ensure constitutional rights are protected. Because “the
H.B. 481 would not disserve the public interest. Accordingly, this factor is
As they have satisfied all four factors, Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to
successors in office.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. Doc. No. [1]. Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Doc. No. [124]. The State Defendants’
The Court thus declares the rights of the parties as follows: Sections 3
and 4 of H.B. 481 violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
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The Court hereby ORDERS that all Defendants, and all their respective
laws that were in effect prior to the passage of H.B. 481 remain in effect.
___________________________________
HONORABLE STEVE C. JONES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
67