14. Cabaobas vs. Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil., Inc.

G.R. No. 176908, March 25, 2015

Principle: Settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial
evidence.Certainly, it is not the Court's function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again, particularly where the findings of
both the CA and the NLRC coincide

Facts:

Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) allegedly incurred business losses. PCPPI implemented a company-wide retrenchment
program denominated as Corporate-wide Rightsizing Program (CRP) from 1999 to 2000, and retrenched forty-seven (47) employees of
its Tanauan Plant. Employees filed an illegal dismissal case. LA rendered a decision finding the dismissal illegal and consequently
rendered reinstatement. NLRC reversed. CA affirmed the NLRC claiming that dismissal was a valid exercise of management
prerogative and there was a valid retrenchment.

RULING:
CA was correct.

Guided by the jurisprudence on stare decisis, the remaining question is whether the factual circumstances of this present case are
substantially the same as the Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon case. Following the principle of stare decisis. There is no
dispute that the issues, subject matters and causes of action between the parties in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon26
and the present case are identical, namely, the validity of PCPPI's retrenchment program, and the legality of its employees' termination.
There is also substantial identity of parties because there is a community of interest between the parties in the first case and the parties
in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case. 27 The respondents in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v.
Molon28 are petitioners' former co-employees and co-union members of LEPCEU-ALU who were also terminated pursuant to the
PCPPI's retrenchment program. The only difference between the two cases is the date of the employees' termination, i.e., Molon, et al.
belong to the first batch of employees retrenched on July 31, 1999, while petitioners belong to the second batch retrenched on
February 15, 2000.

The Court thus agrees with the CA and the NLRC that the letter of SGV & Co., accompanied by a consolidated Statement of Income
and Deficit showing a net loss of P29,167,000. in the company's Tanauan Operations as of June 30, 1999, and P22,328,000 as of June
2000,36 is sufficient and convincing proof of serious business losses which justified PCPPI's retrenchment program. After all, the settled
rule in quasi-judicial proceedings is that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the legality of an employer's
dismissal of an employee, and not even a preponderance of evidence is necessary, as substantial evidence is considered sufficient. 37
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

Finally, this case does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions 42 to the rule that only questions of law are proper in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to
have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind
us when supported by substantial evidence.Certainly, it is not the Court's function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again,
particularly where the findings of both the CA and the NLRC coincide.

15. Manila Mining Corporation vs. Amor

G.R. No. 182800, April 20, 2015
Principle:
 By and of itself, the fact that the copy of memorandum of appeal intended for respondents was served upon them by
registered mail only on 7 February 2005 does not necessarily mean that petitioner’s appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s decision
was filed out of time. On the principle that justice should not be sacrificed for technicality,it has been ruled that the failure of a
party to serve a copy of the memorandum to the opposing party is not a jurisdictional defect and does not bar the NLRC from
entertaining the appeal.
 It has been ruled that the employer should comply with the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be
based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant,
otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. In this case,
check was dishonored, thereby ineffectual. Failure to post a reasonable amount is a fatal defect.
Facts:
Corporation had a temporary suspension of its operation for six months and the temporary lay-off of its employees. The petitioner
temporarily shut down its mining operations pending approval of its application to increase mine tailing’s (waste storage) capacity by the
DENR. After the lapse of said period, petitioner notified the DOLE on 11 December 2001 that it was extending the temporary shutdown
of its operations for another six months. 6 Adversely affected by petitioner’s continued failure to resume its operations, respondents filed
the complaint for constructive dismissal and monetary claims which was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-13-10-00226-2003 before
the Regional Arbitration Branch No. XIII of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On 25 October 2004, Executive Labor
Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez rendered a Decision holding petitioner liable for constructive dismissal in view of the suspension of its
operations beyond the six-month period allowed under Article 2867 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Finding that the cause of
suspension of petitioner’s business was not beyond its control, 8 the Labor Arbiter applied Article 283 9 of the same Code and disposed
of the case. LA claimed they were illegally dismissed.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal before the NLRC11 and moved for the reduction of the appeal bond to
₱100,000.00, on the ground that its financial losses in the preceding years had rendered it unable to put up one in cash and/or surety
equivalent to the monetary award. 12 In opposition, respondents moved for the dismissal of the appeal in view of the fact that, despite
receipt of the appealed decision on 24 November 2004, petitioner mailed their copy of the memorandum of appeal only on 7 February
2005. Respondents also argued that the appeal bond tendered by petitioner was so grossly disproportionate to monetary award for the
same to be considered substantial compliance with the requirements for the perfection of an appeal from a Labor Arbiter’s decision.
But, NLRC reversed LA’s decision.

CA ruled that petitioner failed to perfect its appeal therefrom considering that the copy of its 3 December 2004 Memorandum of Appeal
intended for respondents was served the latter by registered mail only on 7 February 2005. Aside from posting an unusually smaller
sum as appeal bond, petitioner was likewise faulted for replenishing the check it issued only on 1 April 2005 or 24 days before the
rendition of the assailed NLRC Decision. Applying the principle that the right to appeal is merely a statutory remedy and that the party
who seeks to avail of the same must strictly follow the requirements therefor, the CA decreed that the Labor Arbiter’s Decision had
already attained finality and, for said reason, had been placed beyond the NLRC’s power of review.

RULING:
Insofar as appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter are concerned, Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides that,
"(d)ecisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the [NLRC] by any or both parties within
ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of such decisions, awards or orders." In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, the
same provision mandates that, "an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by
a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the [NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed
from." Alongside the requirement that "the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other party," the foregoing
requisites for the perfection of an appeal.

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount
in relation to the monetary award.

The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of
the period to perfect an appeal.

Having received the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on 24 November 2004, 26 petitioner had ten (10) calendar days or until 4 December 2004
within which to perfect an appeal. Considering that the latter date fell on a Saturday, petitioner had until the next working day, 6
December 2004, within which to comply with the requirements for the perfection of its appeal. Our perusal of the record shows that,
despite bearing the date 3 December 2004, petitioner’s memorandum of appeal was subscribed before Notary Public Ronald Rex
Recidoro only on 6 December 2004.27 Without proof as to the actual date of filing of said pleading being presented by both parties, the
CA discounted the timeliness of its filing in light of the established fact that the copy thereof intended for respondents was only served
by registered mail on 7 February 2005. 28 Since proof of service of the memorandum on appeal is required for the perfection of an
appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the CA ruled that "respondents filed its appeal not earlier than 07 February 200[5], which
is way beyond the ten-day reglementary period to appeal.

As the parties claiming the non-perfection of petitioner’s appeal, it was, therefore, respondents who had the burden of proving that said
memorandum of appeal was, indeed, filed out of time. By and of itself, the fact that the copy of memorandum of appeal intended for
respondents was served upon them by registered mail only on 7 February 2005 does not necessarily mean that petitioner’s appeal from
the Labor Arbiter’s decision was filed out of time. On the principle that justice should not be sacrificed for technicality, 31 it has been ruled
that the failure of a party to serve a copy of the memorandum to the opposing party is not a jurisdictional defect and does not bar the
NLRC from entertaining the appeal.32 Considering that such an omission is merely regarded as a formal lapse or an excusable
neglect,33 the CA reversibly erred in ruling that, under the circumstances, petitioner could not have filed its appeal earlier than 7
February 2005.

RE: BOND
As supposed measure of its good faith in complying with the Rules, petitioner attached to its motion Philam Bank Check No.
0000627153, dated 6 December2004, in the amount of ₱100,000.00 only. As pointed out by respondents, however, said check was
subsequently dishonored upon presentment for payment for insufficiency of funds. In its 1 April 2005 Ex-Parte Manifestation, petitioner
informed the NLRC that it "only learned belatedly that the same check was dishonored" as there appeared to be "an inadvertent mix-up
as other checks issued for [its] other obligations were negotiated ahead [thereof], leaving an insufficient balance in its account." As a
consequence, petitioner claimed that "the deficiency in deposit has been promptly and immediately replenished as soon as the check's
dishonor was reported" and that the same may already be re-deposited at any of NLRC's depositary banks.

It has been ruled that the employer should comply with the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on
meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of
the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.

There is meritorious grounds. However, the check submitted by petitioner was dishonored upon presentment for payment, thereby
rendering the tender thereof ineffectual. Although the NLRC chose not to address the issue of the perfection of the appeal as well as
the reduction of the bond in its Resolution dated 25 April 2005, the record shows that petitioner only manifested its deposit of the funds
for the check 24 days before the resolution of its appeal or 116 days after its right to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision had expired.
Having filed its motion and memorandum on the very last day of the reglementary period for appeal, moreover, petitioner had no one
but itself to blame for failing to post the full amount pending the NLRC’s action on its motion for reduction of the appeal bond. If
redundancy be risked it must be emphasized that the posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases
involving monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since it is the posting of a cash or surety bond which confers
jurisdiction upon the NLRC,40 the rule is settled that non-compliance is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and
executory.

16. Beduya vs. Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation

G.R. No. 195513, June 22, 2015

Facts:
Petitioners had a contract with Ace Promotion as merchandisers and assigned them to various retail outlets and supermarkets under
fixed-term employment contracts for DELFI. The last contracts of employment that petitioners signed were until January 30, 2007. In a
letter10 dated December 27, 2006, Delfi notified APMC that their Promotional Contract will expire effective January 31, 2007. On
January 29, 2007, APMC informed petitioners, among other workers, that their last day of work would be on January 30, 2007.
Complainants alleged that they are regular employees and expiration of the contract does not terminate their relations with the
employer. The respondent countered that indeed, complainants were previously engaged as merchandisers for a client, Goya, Inc.
(Goya). But when Goya’s business interest was sold to Delfi, complainants’ fixed-term employment contracts also accordingly expired.
They were then rehired and reassigned to Delfi, again on a fixed-term basis, which employment was necessarily terminated upon the
end of the term. Hence, they claimed that they should not be liable for the claims.

LA decided that they were illegally dismissed. Respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal with Motion for Reduction of Bond with the
NLRC. Respondents attached a supersede as bond in the amount of 437,210.00 along with their appeal.Without acting on respondents’
motion for reduction of bond and the complainants’ opposition thereto, the NLRC rendered a Decision saying there was no illegal
dismissal but only expiration of the contract. They went to the CA insisting that NLRC erred in rendering a decision when appeal was
not perfected due to the insufficiency of the bond. CA found respondents’ willingness and good faith in complying with the requirements
as sufficient justification to relax the rule on posting of an appeal bond. Moreover, the CA agreed with the NLRC in finding that
complainants were not illegally dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal bond was sufficient

RULING:
YES.
The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the requisites in the preceding paragraphs shall not stop the running
of the period to perfect an appeal.It is thus clear from the foregoing that the filing of supersede as bond for the perfection of an appeal is
mandatory and jurisdictional and failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.

The rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. 30 The
Court may relax the rule under certain exceptional circumstances which include fundamental consideration of substantial justice,
prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment and special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and
the amount and the issue involved.31 Indeed, in meritorious cases, the Court was propelled to relax the requirements relating to appeal
bonds such as when there are valid issues raised in the appeal32 and in the absence of any valid claims against the employer.

In the case at bench, the Court finds that respondents’ motion to reduce appeal bond was predicated on meritorious and justifiable
grounds. First, the fact that eight complainants failed to verify or affix their signatures on the position paper filed before the Labor Arbiter
merits the exclusion of the monetary awards adjudged to them. In Martos v. New San Jose Builders, Inc., 34 it was held that the failure of
some of the complainants therein to verify their position paper submitted before the Labor Arbiter brought about the dismissal of the
complaint as to them who did not verify. The Court went on to say that their negligence and passive attitude towards the rule on
verification amounted to their refusal to further prosecute their claims. Second, the withdrawal of seven complainants 35 in this case
likewise warrants the reduction of the monetary award rendered against respondents. Suffice it to say that the said seven complainants
are bound by the Affidavits of Desistance which are presumed to have been freely and voluntarily executed by them. Accordingly, they
no longer participated in the subsequent proceedings after having received their last salaries and due benefits.

In the recent case of Mcburnie v. Ganzon, 36 the Court has set a provisional percentage of 10% of the monetary award, exclusive of
damages and attorney’s fees, as a reasonable amount of bond that an appellant should post pending resolution by the NLRC of a
motion to reduce bond. It is only after the posting of this bond that an appellant’s period to perfect an appeal is suspended. Here, after
deducting from the total monetary award the amount of attorney’s fees and the amounts awarded to those complainants who did not
verify their position papers and those who had withdrawn their complaints, the total monetary award amounts to only more than 3
million.37 Hence, the appeal bond of 437,210.00 posted by respondents is in fact even more than 10% of the said total monetary award.
Thus, applying the same parameter set in Mcburnie, the Court finds the amount of bond posted by respondents in the present case to
be reasonable.

17. Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Solidum

G.R. No. 204646, April 15, 2015
Principle: Employees are entitled to their accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses until the NLRC’s reversal of
the labor arbiter’s order of reinstatement becomes final and executory, as shown on the entry of judgment. A petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a temporary restraining order is
issued by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

Facts:
Smart hired respondent Jose Leni Z. Solidum (Solidum) as Department Head for Smart Buddy Activation.  Smart Buddy Activation is
under the Product Marketing Group which is headed by Isla. Isla gave Solidum a memorandum 5 informing him of alleged acts of
dishonesty, directing him to explain why his employment should not be terminated, and placing him under preventive suspension
without pay for 30 days. He explained, but nonetheless, the result of the investigation was his dismissal. Solidum filed against Smart a
complaint10 for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, non-payment of salaries, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees.

The Labor Arbiter found that Solidum’s preventive suspension and dismissal were illegal and that he was entitled to full back wages,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

On 25 July 2006, Smart appealed to the NLRC.  On 13 November 2006, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution ordering the sheriff
to collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93, representing Solidum’s accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses from
21 July to 20 October 2006.  On 15 August and 25 October 2007, 11 February, 28 April, 23 July and 11 November 2008, and 22
January 2009, the Labor Arbiter issued seven other alias writs of execution ordering the sheriff to collect from petitioners Solidum’s
accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses.

But the NLRC reversed the decision. He still asked for an ex-parte motion praying that an alias writ of execution be issued directing the
sheriff to collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93.

LA refused, but NLRC claimed that “Notably, there is no showing in the records that respondents reinstated complainant to his former
position.  Hence, pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, relative to the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision, respondents are obligated to pay complainant’s salaries and benefits, computed from July 13, 2006, when respondents
received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision which, among others, ordered the reinstatement of complainant, up to the date of finality
of the Commission’s resolution reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, which, for this purpose, is reckoned on May 29, 2009, when the
Commission denied complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration.”

The Court of Appeals granted employer’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and set aside the NLRC’s 31 May 2010 Decision and 30 July 2010 Resolution
for the ex-parte motion is an interlocutory order. In his alias writ of execution dated 18 May 2011, the Labor Arbiter ordered the sheriff to
collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93, representing Solidum’s accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses from 21
April to 20 July 2009.  Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a motion29 to order Solidum to return P2,881,335.86, representing the
total amount under the 22 October 2010 and 18 May 2011 alias writs of execution.

ISSUE: Petitioners raised as issues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that (1) the NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final
and executory on 10 August 2009, and (2) Solidum was entitled to P2,881,335.86, representing the total amount under the 22 October
2010 and 18 May 2011 alias writs of execution.

RULING:
The petitioner’s argument is untenable.

The NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final and executory on 10 August 2009 as shown on the entry of judgment.

Since the NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final and executory on 10 August 2009, Solidum is entitled to P2,881,335.86,
representing his accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses for the period 21 January to 20 July 2009.

In Bago v. NLRC,37 the Court held that employees are entitled to their accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses
until the NLRC’s reversal of the labor arbiter’s order of reinstatement becomes final and executory, as shown on the entry of judgment.

A petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a
temporary restraining order is issued by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

18. Gadia vs. SykesAsia, Inc.

G.R. No. 209499, January 28, 2015
Principle: Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. To be considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when its findings are not supported by substantial evidence.

Facts:

Sykes Asia was a BPO company who accommodated the needs of Alltell, UK based telecommunications firm clients. Thus, Sykes hired
petitioners as customer service representatives, team leaders, and trainers for the Alltel Project. By the time that Alltell wanted to
terminate their contract, Sykes informed the petitioners for their dismissal. The aggrieved petitioners filed an illegal dismissal case. LA
said they were project-employees, thus, the dismissal was proper. The NLRC modified the LA Decision, ruling that petitioners are
regular employees but were validly terminated due to redundancy. 29 Accordingly, petitioners, except Viloria and Acosta whose
complaints were dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute, 30 were awarded their separation pay with interest of 12% per
annum reckoned from the date of their actual dismissal until full payment, plus attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the total monetary
award. In addition, the NLRC awarded nominal damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00 each to petitioners Gadia, Remo, Quesea,
Balingit, Castrence, Lapuz, and Lord for respondents’ failure to furnish them the required written notice of termination within the
prescribed period. CA reinstated the LA ruling.
Issue:
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly granted respondents’ petition for certiorari, thereby
setting aside the NLRC’s decision holding that petitioners were regular employees and reinstating the LA ruling that petitioners were
merely project-based employees, and thus, validly dismissed from service.

Ruling:
CA was correct.

At the outset, it must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show
that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment
exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered "grave," discretion must be
exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached
thereby are not supported by substantial evidence. This requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.

Tested against these considerations, the Court finds that the CA correctly granted respondents’ certiorari petition before it, since the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioners were regular employees of Sykes Asia when the latter had established by
substantial evidence that they were merely project-based.

19. Milan vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 202961, February 4, 2015

20. Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. vs. Fuentes

G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015
Principle: The National Labor Relations Commission has the power to overturn the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter. The errors in the
findings of fact that will justify a modification or reversal of the Labor Arbiter's decision must be "serious" and, if left uncorrected, would
lead to "grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant."

Facts:
Celso E. Fuentes (Fuentes) was hired as a security guard by Protective sometime in November 1999. At the time of Fuentes'
employment, Protective assigned him to Picop Resources, Inc. He was posted to a security checkpoint designated as Post 33 in Upper
New Visayas, Agusan del Sur.On July 20, 2000, a group of armed persons ransacked Post 33 and took five (5) M-16 rifles, three (3)
carbine rifles, and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, all with live ammunition and magazines. Agency-issued uniforms and personal
items were also taken.6 These armed persons inflicted violence upon Fuentes and the other security guards present at Post 33.

After its initial investigation, the Philippine National Police found reason to believe that Fuentes conspired and acted in consort with the
New People's Army. He was then detained. His case was dismissed due to lack of probable cause. He then filed an illegal dismissal
case. Fuentes claimed that "right after the criminal complaint for robbery against [him] was dismissed ... he demanded to return to work
but he was . . . refused entry by [a certain] Mr. [Regildo] Espinosa on the ground that [Fuentes] [was] a member of the NPA and that his
position had already been filled up by another security guard.

LA said there was no illegal dismissal. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Decision of Labor Arbiter
Legaspi and found that Fuentes was illegally dismissed. CA affirmed for there was no abandonment of work.

ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC are bound by the findings of the LA

RULING:
No. The National Labor Relations Commission has the power to overturn the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter.

Petitioner asserts that the findings of fact of Labor Arbiter Legaspi are binding and conclusive. Petitioner raises that, between the
determination of facts of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Arbiter, the findings of the latter must prevail.

Contrary to petitioner's claims, the National Labor Relations Commission is not bound by the findings of the Labor Arbiter.

Article 223 provides that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is final and executory, unless appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission within ten (10) calendar days by any or both of the parties. The Labor Code vests in the National Labor Relations
Commission the authority to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter, provided that the appellant can prove the existence of one of the
grounds in Article 223 namely:

1. If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
2. If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;
3. If made purely on questions of law; and
4. If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
 The errors in the findings of fact that will justify a modification or reversal of the Labor Arbiter's decision must be "serious" and, if left
uncorrected, would lead to "grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant."

Serious errors refer to inferences of facts without evidence, or mistakes in the interpretation of the evidence that border on arbitrariness
or similar circumstances. Not only must the error be palpable, but there must also be a showing that such error would cause grave and
irreparable injury to the appellant. It should affect the disposition of the cause of the appellant. The error must impact on the main
issues and not some tangential matter. Evidently, a showing of bias on the part of the Labor Arbiter or a lack of due regard for the
procedural rights of the parties are indicia that serious errors may be present.

In this case, the National Labor Relations Commission decided that there was a serious error in the factual findings of Labor
Arbiter Legaspi. The errors in the findings of fact directly would affect the primary issues raised by the parties and their
respective claims. If the errors in the findings of fact were not corrected, respondent's right to security of tenure would have
been violated. The National Labor Relations Commission acted well within the discretion provided by Article 223 in deciding
appealed cases from the Labor Arbiter.

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. The rule, however, is not without exception. Thus,
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court in the following instances, none of which obtain
in the instant petition:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257
[1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.);** (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan,
142 SCRA 593 [1986]);** (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by
the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

It is the petitioner's burden to justify the existence of one of the exceptions to the general rule for this court to conduct a factual review.
In this case, we find that petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

21. Unicol Management Services, Inc. vs. Malipot

G.R. No. 206562, January 21, 2015.

Facts:
Glicerio Malipot was a seaman who suffered depression and emotional strain when he was not allowed to go home and be with his
family. Even when his 4-month contract expired on December 18, 2008, he was still not allowed to join his family for Christmas.
Respondent stressed that his death was compensable because his emotional trauma was caused by the conditions of his job and
aggravated by the acts of the Port Captain. Regrettably, before the end of his employment contract, or on January 13, 2009, petitioners
received information that seaman Glicerio committed suicide by hanging in the store room of the Heredia Sea.

The wife of the deceased filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter claiming death compensation under seaman Glicerio’s POEA
contract. The LA awarded the death benefit. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners failed to satisfactorily prove by substantial evidence
that seaman Glicerio committed suicide as it relied on the inconclusive report of the medico-legal consultant, which merely gave the
cause of death. NLRC reversed claiming that his death was caused by suicide, hence not compensable. CA reversed NLRC and
awarded the death benefits.

ISSUE: Whether seaman Glicerio committed suicide during the term of his employment contract which would exempt petitioners from
paying the death compensation benefits to his beneficiaries.

RULING:
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it under Rule 45 16 of the Rules of Court is
limited only to reviewing errors of law. However, this rule is subject to certain exceptions, namely:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;17
(6) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
(8) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(10) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or
(11) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.18

Normally, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. However, since the findings of the CA and the NLRC were conflicting, it is incumbent
upon this Court to wade through the records to find out if there was enough basis for the CA’s reversal of the NLRC decision.

In this case, the CA ruled out the commission by seaman Glicerio of suicide on the ground that the evidence presented by petitioners,
such as the Medico-Legal Report and Death Certificate, did not state the circumstances regarding the cause of seaman Glicerio’s
death. Also, the CA held that the Investigation Report, log book extracts, and Master’s Report were submitted for the first time on
appeal to the NLRC, and thus, should not have been admitted by the NLRC.

First, this Court would like to underline the fact that the NLRC may receive evidence submitted for the first time on appeal on the ground
that it may ascertain facts objectively and speedily without regard to technicalities of law in the interest of substantial justice. The
submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure considering that rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and Labor Arbiters are directed to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all
in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as
documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, if we take into consideration the Investigation Report, log book extracts and Master’s Report submitted by petitioners, the
same all strongly point out that seaman Glicerio died because he committed suicide.

Second, both the Medico-Legal Report and Death Certificate indicate that the actual cause of death of seaman Glicerio is “suicidal
asphyxia due to hanging.”

The heirs are not entitled to death compensation because the cause of the death is suicide and employer cannot be held liable.

22. Sutherland Global Services vs. Labrador

G.R. No. 193107, March 24, 2014

Facts: Labrador, call center agent working in Sutherland (BPO). Labrador was finally charged with violation for transgressing the “Non–
Compliance Sale Attribute” policy clause stated in the Employee Handbook. Allegedly, on May 13, 2008, one of Sutherland’s customers
complained that Labrador initially asked for her credit card account, but only for purposes of verification. As it turned out, a second
account was created and a new order was placed under the same customer’s name. Thus, two sets of packages were shipped to the
customer who had to pay twice for the same product. After investigation, he resigned and filed a case of illegal dismissal.

LA dismissed the case because of his resignation. NLRC reversed. The NLRC applied a liberal interpretation of the rules and admitted
Labrador’s Memorandum on Appeal. It further ruled that Labrador’s resignation was involuntary. Thus, it ordered Labrador’s
reinstatement with payment of backwages and allowances. Sutherland filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC likewise
denied in a resolution18 dated July 14, 2009. Sutherland filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC. On December 18, 2009, the CA dismissed the petition, ruling that technical rules are not binding in labor cases.
Thus, it concluded that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it applied a liberal application of the rules since
the issue involved was the legality of Labrador’s dismissal.

ISSUE: WON CA erred because of the failure to follow the NLRC Rules of Procedure
RULING:

At the time this case was appealed to the NLRC, the then governing rule was the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005
NLRC Rules) whose Section 4, Rule VI provided:
Section 4. Requisites For Perfection Of Appeal. – a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of
this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for,
and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or
printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in
Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non–forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the other parties.19
Sutherland insists that the failure to state the material dates is fatal to Salvador’s appeal to the NLRC and to his present position in this
case.

We do not find Sutherland’s argument meritorious as technical rules are not necessarily fatal in labor cases; they can be
liberally applied if – all things being equal – any doubt or ambiguity would be resolved in favor of labor. 20 These technicalities
and limitations can only be given their fullest effect if the case is substantively unmeritorious; otherwise, and if the defect is
similar to the present one and can be verified from the records (as in this case), we have the discretion not to consider them
fatal.
The same reasoning applies to the failure to attach a certificate of non–forum shopping. We can likewise relax our treatment
of the defect. Additionally, while the 2005 NLRC Rules specifically stated that a certificate of non–forum shopping should be
attached, the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure 21 no longer requires it. Jurisprudence, too, is replete with instances when the
Court relaxed the rules involving the attachment of the certificate of non–forum shopping. 22 Under these circumstances, we
see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in admitting the petition.

We, however, do not agree with the findings of the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, that Labrador was illegally dismissed.

In this jurisdiction, the findings of the NLRC are generally binding and should be treated with finality. The CA only looks at the facts to
determine if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi–judicial functions acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in appreciating the facts.

The failure to faithfully comply with the company rules and regulations is considered to be a just cause in terminating one’s
employment, depending on the nature, severity and circumstances of non–compliance.

23. Unibersidad de Sta. Isabel vs. Sambajon, Jr.

G.R. No. 196280 and 196286, April 2, 2014

Facts:
Marvin-Julian L. Sambajon, Jr. (respondent) is a full-time college faculty member with the rank of Assistant Professor on probationary
status. After earned his Master’s degree, he demanded for salary adjustments and demanded for retroactive pay. The school refused
because he was only in probationary status. Instead of heeding to his request, he was terminated. Thus, he filed an illegal dismissal
case. LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal and ordered, “Accordingly, and consistent with Article 279 of the Labor Code, respondent
school is hereby directed to pay complainant full backwages covering the period/duration of the 1st semester of academic year 2005-
2006. Reinstatement being rendered moot by the expiration of the probationary period, respondent school is directed to pay
complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement computed at one (1) month’s pay for every year of service. An award of 10%
attorney’s fees in favor of complainant is also held in order.”

He appealed in the NLRC for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that LA ruled on an issue not raised in the complaint. NLRC merely
affirmed the LA ruling.

By Decision dated March 25, 2011, the CA sustained the conclusion of the NLRC that respondent had already acquired permanent
status when he was allowed to continue teaching after the expiration of his first appointment-contract on March 30, 2003. However, the
CA found it necessary to modify the decision of the NLRC to include the award of back wages to respondent.

ISSUE:
In fine, petitioner asks this Court to rule on the following issues: (1) whether the NLRC correctly resolved an issue not raised in
petitioner’s appeal memorandum; and (2) whether respondent’s probationary employment was validly terminated by petitioner.

RULING:
Section 4(d), Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC says:
(d) Subject to the provisions of Article 218 of the Labor Code, once the appeal is perfected in accordance with these Rules, the
Commission shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding only the specific issues that were elevated on appeal.

In reviewing the Labor Arbiter’s finding of illegal dismissal, the NLRC concluded that respondent had already attained regular status
after the expiration of his first appointment contract as probationary employee. Such conclusion was but a logical result of the
NLRC’s own interpretation of the law. Since petitioner elevated the questions of the validity of respondent’s dismissal and the
applicable probationary period under the aforesaid regulations, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in fully
resolving the said issues.

For the entire duration of this three-year period, the teacher remains under probation. During the said probationary period, he cannot be
terminated except for just or authorized causes, or if he fails to qualify in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by petitioner
for the acquisition of permanent status of its teaching personnel. He was illegally dismissed.

24. Sara Lee Phils., Inc. vs. Macatlang

G.R. No. 180147, June 4, 2014

Facts:
Before us are six (6) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari pertaining to the ₱3,453,664,710.66 (₱3.45 Billion) appeal bond,
which, as mandated by Article 233 of the Labor Code, is equivalent to the monetary award adjudged by the labor arbiter in the cases.

Aris closed operations. Complaints alleged that FAPI was organized to continue the business of Aris. On 30 October 2004, the Labor
Arbiter rendered judgment finding the dismissal of 5,984 complainants as illegal and awarding them separation pay and other monetary
benefits amounting to ₱3,453,664,710.86.

Upon receipt of a copy of the aforesaid decision, the Corporations filed their Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond and
To Admit Reduced Amount with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). They asked the NLRC to reduce the appeal bond to
₱1 Million each on the grounds that it is impossible for any insurance company to cover such huge amount and that, in requiring them
to post in full the appeal bond would be tantamount to denying them their right to appeal. Together with FAPI, the Corporations posted
a total of ₱4.5 Million. Emilinda D. Macatlang, et al., opposed the motion by asserting that failure to comply with the bond requirement is
a jurisdictional defect since an appeal may only be perfected upon posting of a cash bond equivalent to the monetary award provided
by Article 223 of the Labor Code.

The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond. The NLRC issued an Order dated 31 March 2006 20 directing the Corporations to
post an additional ₱4.5 Million bond, bringing the total posted bond to ₱9 Million.

Macatlang filed certioriorari in the CA with the issue that the appeal bond is insufficient. The Court of Appeals proceeded to reverse and
set aside the 31 March 2006 NLRC Resolution and deemed it reasonable under the circumstances of the case to order the posting of
an additional appeal bond of ₱1 Billion.

RULING:
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.

The requisites for perfection of appeal as embodied in Article 223, as amended, are: 1) payment of appeal fees; 2) filing of the
memorandum of appeal; and 3) payment of the required cash or surety bond. 47 These requisites must be satisfied within 10days from
receipt of the decision or order appealed from.

It is presumed that an appeal bond is only necessary in cases where the labor arbiter’s decision or order contains a monetary award.
Conversely, when the labor arbiter does not state the judgment award, posting of bond may be excused.

In sum, the NLRC may dispense of the posting of the bond when the judgment award is: (1) not stated or(2) based on a patently
erroneous computation. Sans these two (2) instances, the appellant is generally required to post a bond to perfect his appeal.

Clearly therefore, the Rules only allow the filing of a motion to reduce bond on two (2) conditions: (1) that there is meritorious
ground and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. Compliance with the two conditions stops the running of the period
to perfect an appeal provided that they are complied within the 10-day reglementary period.

All motions to reduce bond that are to be filed with the NLRC shall be accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent
to 10% of the monetary award that is subject of the appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the reasonable amount of the bond in
the meantime that an appellant’s motion is pending resolution by the Commission. In conformity with the NLRC Rules, the monetary
award, for the purpose of computing the necessary appeal bond, shall exclude damages and attorney’s fees. Only after the posting of a
bond in the required percentage shall an appellant’s period to perfect an appeal under the NLRC Rules be deemed suspended

The decision to reduce the amount of appeal bond is not a blanket power to the NLRC, because the discretion is not unbridled and is
subject to strict guidelines because Art. 223 of the Labor Codeis a rule of jurisdiction that affords little leeway for liberal interpretation.
The order of the NLRC reducing the required appeal bond from Php 3.453 BILLION Pesos to only Php 9 MILLION Pesos is in grave
abuse of its discretion and therefore void, not to mention that it is per se unreasonable and without factual basis.
We have considered the circumstances and evidence presented in this case relative to the motion to reduce appeal bond. 1âwphi1 We
have taken into consideration the Php 419 MILLION unpaid commitment plus the Php 9 Million already paid-up cash appeal bond, and
the resulting unpaid appeal bond which is still Php 3.025 BILLION. We still deem it proper under the law and the Constitution for the
protection of labor that private respondents be required as pre-requisite to perfecting appeal, to POST, within thirty (30) days from
finality of this judgment, additional appeal bond of Php 1 BILLION Pesos, in cash or surety, which amount is even less than one-third
(1/3) of the original appeal bond required by law, which We hold to be reasonable under the circumstances and to be based on the
evidence presented in this case. The additional appeal bond of Php 1 BILLION is equivalent to an average of Php 130,941.46 (instead
of the original average of Php452,140.00) for each of the alleged illegally dismissed 7,637 workers. 85 Notably, the computation of the
judgment award in this case includes damages.

Under the applicable rules, damages and attorney’s fees are excluded from the computation of the monetary award to
determine the amount of the appeal bond. We shall refer to these exclusions as "discretionaries," as distinguished from the
"mandatories" or those amounts fixed in the decision to which the employee is entitled upon application of the law on wages.
These mandatories include awards for backwages, holiday pay, overtime pay, separation pay and 13th month pay.

The judgment award in the instant case amounted to an immense ₱3.45 Billion. The award is broken down as follows: backwages,
separation pay, moral and exemplary damages. For purposes of determining the reasonable amount of the appeal bond, the total
amount is ₱2.9 Billion.

We sustain the Court of Appeals in so far as it increases the amount of the required appeal bond. But we deem it reasonable to reduce
the amount of the appeal bond to ₱725 Million. This directive already considers that the award if not illegal, is extraordinarily huge and
that no insurance company would be willing to issue a bond for such big money. The amount of ₱725 Million is approximately 25% of
the basis above calculated. It is a balancing of the constitutional obligation of the state to afford protection to labor which, specific to this
case, is assurance that in case of affirmance of the award, recovery is not negated; and on the other end of the spectrum, the
opportunity of the employer to appeal.
By reducing the amount of the appeal bond in this case, the employees would still be assured of at least substantial compensation, in
case a judgment award is affirmed. On the other hand, management will not be effectively denied of its statutory privilege of appeal.
25. Belza vs. Canonero
G.R. No. 192479, January 27, 2014

Facts:
Belza, owner of DNB hired respondents as technician. DNB lost in the bidding for the services it was rendering to the medical
center.1âwphi1 As a consequence, DNB terminated respondent technicians from employment without giving them new assignments or
paying them separation pays. Hence, they filed an illegal dismissal case.

On December 28, 2006, following DNB’s failure to file its position paper in the case despite notice, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision holding it liable for illegal dismissal.

DNB appealed but on April 18, 2007 the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissed the same as a non-perfected
appeal given that DNB did not accompany its memorandum of appeal with the required certification of non-forum shopping.

On April 30, 2007 DNB filed, through new counsel, Atty. J. Antonio Z. Carpio, a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC’s dismissal
order with a belated certification of non-forum shopping. A few days later or on May 4, 2007 the original counsel of record, Atty.
Aventino B. Claveria, filed for DNB a separate motion for reconsideration of the same order.

On July 3, 2007 the NLRC issued a Resolution a) ignoring the motion for reconsideration that Atty. Carpio filed for DNB considering that
Atty. Claveria, the counsel of record, had not yet withdrawn from the case; and b) denying the motion for reconsideration that the latter
counsel filed for lack of merit. This prompted DNB to appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed NLRC.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to hold that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the motion for
reconsideration that Atty. Carpio filed for it and instead acting on the motion for reconsideration that Atty. Claveria, its former counsel of
record, filed; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to hold that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing its appeal on the ground that
its memorandum of appeal was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping.

RULING:
1. A client has of course the right to dismiss and replace his counsel of record as provided in the second paragraph of Section 26
above. But this assumes that such client has given counsel a notice of dismissal so the latter could immediately cease to
represent him. Clearly, the fault in this case did not lie with the NLRC but with DNB which failed in its duty to inform Atty.
Claveria of his dismissal. Acting on Atty. Claveria’s motion is not a grave abuse of discretion.
2. CA is correct for NLRC was right in dismissing the appeal without certificate of non- forum shopping. Section 4. Requisites for
Perfection of Appeal. a) The appeal shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule; 2)
verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; 3) in the form of a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for,
and with a statement of the date the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in three (3) legibly
typewritten or printed copies; and 5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or
surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of service upon the
other parties.
b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the
period of perfecting an appeal.

The fact that DNB had not actually engaged in forum shopping is not an excuse for its failure to comply with the requirement,
an omission that allowed the period for perfecting the appeal to run inexorably. 1 The NLRC was, therefore, justified in
dismissing DNB’s appeal.

DNB points out that the requirement of certification of non-forum shopping has no meaning in relation to its appeal from the Decision of
the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC since such a certification is required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court only in initiatory
pleadings and since it was respondent technicians, not DNB, who initiated the labor case with their complaint. But insisting on such
requirement even on appeal is a prerogative of the NLRC under its rule making power considering the great volume of
appeals filed with it from all over the country. In Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 2 the Court
held that substantial compliance with the requirement may be allowed when justified under the circumstances but the Court
finds no grave abuse of discretion on NLRC's part when it found no such justification in this case.

26. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corp. vs. Icao

G.R. No. 196047, January 15, 2014

Facts:
Respondent working in a mining company was then charged with "highgrading" or the act of concealing, possessing or unauthorized
extraction of highgrade material/ore without proper authority. Private respondent vehemently denied the charge. Consequently, he was
dismissed from his work. He then filled an illegal dismissal case.
LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal because it was only fabricated. The company filed a Memorandum of Appeal in the NLRC.
Instead of posting the required appeal bond in the form of a cash bond or a surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award
of ₱345,879.45 adjudged in favor of Icao, they filed a Consolidated Motion For Release Of Cash Bond And To Apply Bond Subject For
Release As Payment For Appeal Bond (Consolidated Motion).8 They requested therein that the NLRC release the cash bond of
₱401,610.84, which they had posted in the separate case Dangiw Siggaao v. LCMC, 9 and apply that same cash bond to their present
appeal bond liability. They reasoned that since this Court had already decided Dangiw Siggaao in their favor, and that the ruling therein
had become final and executory, the cash bond posted therein could now be released. They said it was because of their financial
condition. NLRC however dismissed the case for non-perfection. CA affirmed the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner complied with the appeal bond requirement under the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules by filing a
Consolidated Motion to release the cash bond it posted in another case, which had been decided with finality in its favor, with
a view to applying the same cash bond to the present case.

RULING:
The Court finds that petitioner substantially complied with the appeal bond requirement.

While it is true that the procedure undertaken by petitioner is not provided under the Labor Code or in the NLRC Rules, we answer the
question in the affirmative. We reiterate our pronouncement in Araneta v. Rodas, 22 where the Court said that when the law does not
clearly provide a rule or norm for the tribunal to follow in deciding a question submitted, but leaves to the tribunal the discretion to
determine the case in one way or another, the judge must decide the question in conformity with justice, reason and equity, in view of
the circumstances of the case. Applying this doctrine, we rule that petitioner substantially complied with the mandatory requirement of
posting an appeal bond for the reasons explained below.

First, there is no question that the appeal was filed within the 10-day reglementary period

Second, it is also undisputed that petitioner has an unencumbered amount of money in the form of cash in the custody of the NLRC.
Since the case was already terminated, the cash bond ought to have been released.

Third, the cash bond in the amount of ₱401,610.84 posted in Dangiw Siggaao is more than enough to cover the appeal bond in the
amount of ₱345,879.45 required in the present case.

Fourth, this ruling remains faithful to the spirit behind the appeal bond requirement which is to ensure that workers will receive the
money awarded in their favor when the employer’s appeal eventually fails.

We are simply liberally applying the rules on what constitutes compliance with the requirement, given the special circumstances
surrounding the case as explained above.

Having complied with the appeal bond requirement, petitioner s appeal before the NLRC must therefore be reinstated.1âwphi1

Finally, a word of caution. Lest litigants be misled into thinking that they may now wantonly disregard the rules on appeal bond in labor
cases, we reiterate the mandatory nature of the requirement. The Court will liberally apply the rules only in very highly exceptional
cases such as this, in keeping with the dictates of justice, reason and equity.

27. Olores vs. Manila Doctors College

G.R. No. 201663, March 31, 2014

Facts:
[Petitioner], a faculty/college instructor submitted the final grades of his students to Mr. Jacinto Bernardo, Jr. (Bernardo), the chair of the
Humanities Area. On 13 April 2010, Bernardo charged [petitioner] with gross misconduct and gross inefficiency in the performance of
duty. [Petitioner] was accused of employing a grading system not in accordance with the system because he: a) added 50 pts to the
final examination raw scores; b) added 50 pts to students who have not been attending classes; c) credited only 40% instead of 60% of
the final examination; d) did not credit the essay questions; and e) added further incentives (1-4 pts) aside from 50 pts. In so doing,
[petitioner] gave grades not based solely on scholastic records.

He underwent administrative hearing, and terminated from work. Aggrieved, he filed an illegal dismissal case.

LA found him illegally dismissed. Respondent appealed to the NLRC. NLRC denied for the appeal was not accompanied by neither a
cash nor surety bond, thus, no appeal was perfected from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. MR in the NLRC reversed earlier ruling.
Petitioner went to the CA for certiorari. The CA held that since petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration against the NLRC
decision before seeking recourse to it via a certiorari petition, the CA dismissed petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUES:

(1) whether respondent’s appeal with the NLRC was perfected despite its failure to post a bond;
(2) whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s Rule 65 petition.

RULING:
1. The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decisions of the
Labor Arbiter.1a\^/phi Here, it is undisputed that respondent’s appeal was not accompanied by any appeal bond despite the clear
monetary obligation to pay petitioner his separation pay in the amount of P100,000.00. Since the posting of a bond for the perfection of
an appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the decision of the Labor Arbiter sought to be appealed before the NLRC had already
become final and executory. Therefore, the NLRC had no authority to entertain the appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the
Labor Arbiter.

2. There is no need for an MR in the case at bar.

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the
court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an
indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.

The rationale for the requirement of first filing a motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari is that the law
intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the
courts of justice can be had.

However, said rule is subject to several recognized exceptions:

(a)Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b)Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c)Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d)Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e)Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f)Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g)Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h)Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i)Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.19
In the instant case, the NLRC had all the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself.

The NLRC issued a ruling on February 10, 2011 in favor of petitioner dismissing respondent’s appeal on the ground that the latter failed
to file an appeal bond. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the NLRC completely reversed itself and set
aside its earlier resolution dismissing the appeal. The NLRC had more than enough opportunity to pass upon the issues raised by both
parties on appeal of the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and the subsequent motion for reconsideration of its resolution disposing the appeal.
Thus, another motion for reconsideration would have been useless under the circumstances since the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have already been duly raised and passed upon by the NLRC.

In the present case, the NLRC was already given the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself when the respondent
filed its motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's initial ruling in favor of petitioner. In fact, it granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent and reversed its previous ruling and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the complaint of the petitioner. It would be an exercise in futility to require the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration since the very issues raised in the petition for certiorari, i.e., whether or not the petitioner was constructively
dismissed by the respondent and whether or not she was entitled to her money claims, were already duly passed upon and
resolved by the NLRC. Thus, the NLRC had more than one opportunity to resolve the issues of the case and in fact reversed
itself upon reconsideration.

28. Princess Joy Placement and General Services, Inc. vs. Binalla
G.R. No. 197005, June 4, 2014

Facts:

Binalla, a registered nurse, alleged that in April 2002, he applied for employment with Princess Joy who referred him to Reginaldo
Paguio and Cynthia Latea for processing of his papers. After completing his documentary requirements, he was toldthat he would be
deployed to Al Adwani. On April 12, 2002, he signed a four-year contract 7 with Al Adwani as staff nurse. He paid Latea ₱4,500.00 and
Paguio, ₱3,000.00, although no receipts were issued to him. Later, he was given a telegram notifying him of his departure on April 19,
2002. Binalla further alleged that on the day of his departure, Paguio met him at the airport and gave him a copy of his employment
contract, plane ticket, passport, a copy of his Overseas Employment Certificate from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and other documents. It was only after boarding his Saudi Arabia Airlines plane that he examined his papers
and discovered that CBM was his deploying agency. Under the contract certified by the POEA, 8 his salary was supposed to be
US$550.00 for twenty-four (24) months or for two years. Binalla also saw that under the four-year contract he signed, his monthly salary
was only 1,500 Saudi Riyals (SR) equivalent to $400. Left with no choice as he was then already bound for Saudi Arabia, he worked
under his contract for only two years and returned to the Philippines in April 2004 after posting a bond of SR 3,000.00, supposedly to
guarantee that he would come back to finish his contract. Upon his return to the Philippines, Binalla verified his employment contract
with the POEA. He learned that the POEA indeed certified a different contract for him, with CBM as his recruiting or deploying agency.
He disowned the contract, claiming that his supposed signature appearing in the document was a forgery. Out of frustration, he opted
not to return to Saudi Arabia to complete his four-year contract.
LA Aurellano considered the complaint a money claim and therefore within his jurisdiction under the law. LA Aurellano found that
Princess Joy and CBM jointly undertook Binalla’s recruitment and deployment in Saudi Arabia through "reprocessing, thereby both are
liable.

Princess Joy appealed the LA’s ruling by filing with the NLRC a Notice of Appeal,13 a Memorandum of Appeal,14 and a Motion to
Reduce and Fix Bond,15 all dated November 24, 2005, accompanied by a surety bond of ₱250,000.00 for LA Aurellano’s monetary
award of ₱800,875.00, exclusive of damages. Binalla opposed the motion, contending that the appeal was made in violation of the
NLRC rules.

On May 12, 2006, the NLRC issued an order 16 allowing Princess Joy to post the balance of the appeal bond to make it equal to
₱800,875.00. Binalla moved for reconsideration and opposed the posting of the additional bond. Through a Compliance17 dated July 21,
2006, Princess Joy posted with the NLRC the required additional bond of ₱550,875.00. The NLRC then acted on the appeal and issued
a resolution18 dated July 27, 2007 reversing LA Aurellano’s decision. NLRC reversed LA’s ruling. MR was denied. CA found that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided the appeal on the merits despite Princess Joy’s failure "to comply with the
essential requirement to perfect an appeal." It must be noted that the NLRC did not act on Princess Joy’s motion to reduce and fix bond
within the 10-day period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal was perfected

RULING:
Yes.
The NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of and acting on Princess Joy’s motion to reduce the appeal
bond as it is allowed under Rule VI, Section 6 of the NLRC 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure, 29 and the motion was filed within the ten-
day appeal period, together with the notice of appeal and the memorandum of appeal. Also, the motion was accompanied by a surety
bond of ₱250,000.00, an indication of a genuine effort on the part of the agency to comply with the bond requirement.

Compared with LA Aurellano’s award of ₱800,875.00 to Binalla, we find the initial bond posted by Princess Joy reasonable, considering
that it is questioning the unusually large amount of the awarded damages. Significantly, the agency posted an additional bond as
required by the NLRC in its May 12, 2006 order, 30 thus, bringing the amount equal to the labor arbiter’s monetary award. We take this
occasion to impress upon the parties that the Court takes a liberal approach on the appeal bond requirement in "the broader interest of
justice and with the desired objective of deciding cases on the merits."

29. Grand Asian Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Galvez

G.R. No. 178184, January 29, 2014

Facts:
Petitioners William How and Eduardo Francisco are its President and General Manager, respectively. Respondents, on the other hand,
are crewmembers of one of GASLI’s vessels, M/T Dorothy Uno (engaged in transporting LPG). They later found out that the
respondents are engaged in an illegal activity of selling the fuel oil. Meanwhile, GASLI placed respondents under preventive
suspension. After conducting administrative hearings, petitioners decided to terminate respondents from employment. Respondents
(except Sales) were thus served with notices22 informing them of their termination for serious misconduct, willful breach of trust, and
commission of a crime or offense against their employer. Aggrieved, they filed in the LA.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision26 finding the dismissal of all 21 complainants illegal. As regards the dismissal of herein
respondents, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against them did not justify their termination from
employment. It ordered reinstatement or full pay in the total amount of ₱7,104,483.84.

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal With A Very Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond 30 before the NLRC and posted a cash bond in the
amount of ₱500,000.00.In a Supplemental Motion to Reduce Bond,31 petitioners cited economic depression, legality of the employees’
termination, compliance with labor standards, and wage increases as grounds for the reduction of appeal bond.

The NLRC issued an Order32 dated February 20, 2002 denying petitioners’ motion to reduce bond and directing them to post an
additional bond in the amount of ₱4,084,736.70 in cash or surety within an unextendible period of 10 days; otherwise, their appeal
would be dismissed. Petitioners failed to comply with the Order. Thus, on February 3, 2003, complainants moved for the dismissal of
the appeal since petitioners had thus far posted only ₱1.5 million supersedeas bond and ₱500,000.00 cash bond, short of the amount
required by the NLRC.

In a Decision34 dated September 10, 2003, the NLRC, despite its earlier Order denying petitioners’ motion for the reduction of bond,
reduced the amount of appeal bond to ₱1.5 million and gave due course to petitioners’ appeal. NLRC reversed LA.

Respondents, excluding the other complainants, filed a Petition for Certiorari38 with the CA, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC in entertaining the appeal despite the insufficiency of petitioners’ appeal bond. It held that the NLRC’s act of
entertaining the appeal is a jurisdictional error since petitioners’ failure to post additional bond rendered the Labor Arbiter’s Decision
final, executory and immutable. CA affirmed LA ruling of illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was compliance of the appeal bond
RULING:

There was substantial compliance with the rules on appeal bonds.

In order to perfect an appeal from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting monetary award, the Labor Code requires the posting of a
bond, either in cash or surety bond, in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.

Nonetheless, we have consistently held that rules should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sense. 45 This is especially true in labor
cases wherein the substantial merits of the case must accordingly be decided upon to serve the interest of justice. 46 When there has
been substantial compliance, relaxation of the Rules is warranted.4
In the case at bench, petitioners appealed from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter awarding to crewmembers the amount of
₱7,104,483.84 by filing a Notice of Appeal with a Very Urgent Motion to Reduce Bond and posting a cash bond in the amount of
₱500,000.00 and a supersedeas bond in the amount of ₱1.5 million. We find this to be in substantial compliance with Article 223 of the
Labor Code. It is true that the NLRC initially denied the request for reduction of the appeal bond. However, it eventually allowed its
reduction and entertained petitioners’ appeal. We disagree with the CA in holding that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion
as the granting of a motion to reduce appeal bond lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of the reasonableness of
the bond tendered and the merits of the grounds relied upon. 51 Hence, the NLRC did not err or commit grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance of petitioners’ appeal before it.

30. Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. vs. Amurao III

G.R. No. 167225, October 22, 2014

Facts:
Amurao was hired as radio broadcaster by Radio Mindanao Network. Years later, RMN decided to reformat and restructure the
programming of its DWKC-FM station to meet the demands of the broadcasting industry. They had a meeting discussing to Amurao
that his employment will be affected, but he will be provided with benefits.

However, Michael and the other personnel refused to sign in receipt when the letters were served on them. Not long after, however,
they accepted the offer of RMN and executed affidavits relinquishing all their claims against the employer. 5 months after receiving his
benefits and his execution of the quitclaim, Michael filed a complaint against RMN for illegal dismissal with money claims.

LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal. RMN appealed to the NLRC, contending that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was premature
for being rendered without first issuing an order either setting the case for hearing or declaring the same submitted for decision in
violation of Rule V, Section II of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended; 8 that the quitclaim signed in its favor was valid and
binding because it represented a voluntary and reasonable settlement of Michael’s claims; and that Michael was estopped from filing
the illegal dismissal case against it. The NLRC found no merit in the contention of RMN that the appealed decision was prematurely
rendered. It noted that the constancia dated October 28, 2002, which stated "counsel for respondent appeared and asked for a period
of ten (10) days from today within which to file reply and after the lapse of the allotted period, with or without said pleading, case shall
be submitted for resolution," clearly showed that RMN was sufficiently apprised that the case would be decided after the lapse of the
10-day period RMN prayed for regardless of whether it filed its reply or not. It held that the quitclaim was null and void for not being
voluntarily executed.

CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid quitclaim

RULING:

Yes.
That Michael was illegally dismissed from his employment is beyond question. RMN does not dispute this. Its only submission now is
that it was discharged from whatever claims Michael had against it arising from his employment by virtue of the Affidavit of
Release/Quitclaim he signed in its favor. Accordingly, the remaining question to resolve is whether the quitclaim was valid and binding.
This Court recognizes that the issue concerning the validity of the quitclaim was a question of fact that isnot within the province of a
review on certiorari under Rule 45. However, there is reason to hold that the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed
facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion herein. On that basis, the Court has to delve into the factual issue,
and has to review the evidence again to ensure that its ruling on the issue jibes with the evidence on record. 16 Its doing so is an
acceptable exception to the general rule of nonreview of factual matters.17
The CA was quick to rule that Michael had been coerced into signing the quitclaim. It did so because he had assailed the voluntariness
of the execution of the quitclaim. It noted thatthe fact that Michael had refused to sign the May 14, 2002 letter and thereby indicate his
acceptance of the terms of his termination stated therein was proof enough of the quitclaim not being freely signed.18
The Court finds and considers the CA’s ruling unfounded.
RMN consistently contended that a series of negotiations between Michael and the management preceded the giving of the settlement
pay that they had considered as reasonable.19 Not once did Michael refute this contention. Worth noting is that Michael signed the
quitclaim to release RMN from any and all claims that could be due to him by reason of his employment after he receiving the agreed
settlement pay of ₱311,922.00.

Not all quitclaims are per sein valid or against public policy. A quitclaim is invalid or contrary to public policy only: (1) where there is
clear proof that the waiver was wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (2) where the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on their face. In instances of invalid quitclaims, the law steps in to annul the questionable waiver. Indeed, there are
legitimate waivers that represent the voluntary and reasonable settlements of laborers’ claims that should be respected by the Court as
the law between the parties. Where the party has voluntarily made the waiver, with a full understanding of its terms as well as its
consequences, and the consideration for the quitclaimis credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and
binding undertaking, and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.20 A waiver is essentially contractual.
In our view, the requisites for the validity of Michael’s quitclaim were satisfied.1âwphi1 We explain.

Firstly, Michael acknowledged in his quitclaim that he had read and thoroughly understood the terms of his quitclaim and signed it of his
own volition. Being a radio broadcaster and production manager, he occupied a highly responsible position in the company.It would be
implausible to hold, therefore, that he could be easily duped into simply signing away his rights. Besides, the language and content
ofthe quitclaim were clear and uncomplicated such that he could not claim that he did not understand what he was signing.

Secondly, the settlement pay of ₱311,922.00 was credible and reasonable considering that Michael did not even assail such amount as
unconscionably low, or even state that he was entitled to a higher amount.

Thirdly, that he was required to sign the quitclaim as a condition to the release of the settlement pay 21 did not prove that its execution
was coerced. Having agreed to part with a substantial amount of money, RMN took steps to protect its interest and obtain its release
from all obligations once it paid Michael his settlement pay, which it did in this case.

And, lastly, that he signed the quitclaim out of fear of not being able to provide for the needs of his family and for the schooling of his
children did not immediately indicate that he had been forced to sign the same. 22 Dire necessity should not necessarily be an
acceptable ground for annulling the quitclaim, especially because it was not at all shown that he had been forced to execute it. Nor was
it even proven that the consideration for the quitclaim was unconscionably low, and that he had been tricked into accepting the
consideration.23

With the quitclaim having been freely and voluntarily signed, RMN was released and absolved from any liability in favor of Michael.
Suffice it to say that the quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of an employee's rights only when the transaction
is shown to be questionable and the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable.24 Such is not true here.

Different case:
The following requisites for a valid quitclaim, to wit: (1) the employee executes a deed of quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or
deceit on the part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (4) the contract is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.