Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Crim Rev Case
Crim Rev Case
PARDO, J : p
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito
Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused.
However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the
unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is
a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private
complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim
reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of another's property.
True, witness Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the
boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission
or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only
against the person admitting or confessing. 15 Even on this, if given extra-
judicially, the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the
admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so
admitting. 16 Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given
with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither
may such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against
accused. 17 There must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain
a finding of guilt. 18 Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of the crime,
and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually
committed." 19 The "essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with
intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000)." 20 In
theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by
the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. 21 In this case, the theft
was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public
authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former
employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from
the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is
insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti. 22
What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should
have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. "One is
deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or
awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the
acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with
certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist.
On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of
his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the
court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is
contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt
acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional
presumption of innocence." 23
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be
guilty of "fencing". 24
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential
elements of fencing, and thus petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
prcd
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J : p
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated 27 March 2009, which affirmed the Orders dated 31 March
2006 2 and 26 June 2006 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City.
The RTC found that Neil E. Suyan (petitioner) had violated the conditions of his
probation and thus, ordered that his probation be revoked. The instant petition
likewise assails the Resolution dated 9 September 2009, 4 which denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision dated 27
March 2009.
The facts as found by the CA are summarized as follows:
On 27 October 1995, an Information was filed against petitioner, charging
him with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425. 5 During arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The RTC thereafter
proceeded with trial.
On 22 November 1995, petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional and to
pay the costs. On even date, he filed his application for probation.
On 16 February 1996, the RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period
of six (6) years. 6
While on probation, petitioner was arrested on two occasions, more
specifically on 2 September and 20 October 1999 7 for violating Section 16,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Two separate Informations were filed against him,
both of which were filed with the RTC of Dagupan City. One of these cases was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-03073-D before Branch 43 (Branch 43 case),
and the other case as Criminal Case No. 99-03129-D before Branch 41.
On 1 December 1999, Atty. Simplicio A. Navarro, Jr. (Atty. Navarro), then
the Chief Probation and Parole Officer of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke
Probation (Motion to Revoke). 8 Atty. Navarro alleged that petitioner has been
apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation. The former further
alleged that petitioner was considered a recidivist, whose commission of other
offenses while on probation was a serious violation of the terms thereof. Atty.
Navarro also pointed out that petitioner was no longer in a position to comply with
the conditions of the latter's probation, in view of his incarceration. 9
STIHaE
ISSUE
The sole issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether the probation
was validly revoked.
THE COURT'S RULING
We rule that the probation of petitioner was validly revoked.
On the procedural grounds, we do not subscribe to his contention that his
right to due process was violated after the RTC had already conducted a full-
blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in compliance with the directive of the CA.
Based on record, he had ample opportunity to refute the allegations contained in
the Violation Report.
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard in support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits
is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. 31 When the party seeking
due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his
side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances,
then his cry for due process must fail. 32
We adopt the ruling of the CA in that petitioner squandered his own
opportunity when, instead of rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation
Report, he merely questioned the absence of any such report when his probation
was first revoked.
On substantive grounds, we believe that there was sufficient justification
for the revocation of his probation.
Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he
has served out his sentence for another offense while on probation.
Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct violation of Condition
No. 9 of his Probation Order, 33 and the effects are clearly outlined in Section 11
of the Probation Law.
Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another
offense shall render the probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. — A probation order shall
take effect upon its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the
offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to
comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his
commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed
for the offense under which he was placed on probation. (Emphasis
supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the probation of
petitioner and ordering him to serve the penalty for the offense for which he was
placed on probation.
As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to
observe full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation
order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege. 34 Regrettably, petitioner
wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison bars,
and must now suffer the consequences of his violation. 35 The Court's discretion
to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society
and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 36 Having the power to grant
probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation
in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances. 37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 27 March 2009 and Resolution dated 9 September 2009
in CA-G.R. SP No. 95426 are both AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Suyan v. People, G.R. No. 189644, [July 2, 2014], 738 PHIL 233-243)
DECISION
TINGA, J : p
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying
the law to the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally
disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after
serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served
their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not
be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from
running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging
Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he
final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost
or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when
Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the
terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him,
including the right to run for public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code which gives room for judicial interpretation, 14 our conclusion
will remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government
Code afford us no clue as to the intended meaning of the phrase "service of
sentence," i.e., whether the legislature also meant to disqualify those who have
been granted probation. The Court's function, in the face of this seeming
dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local
Government Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus
interpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace
and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law
for the offense of which he was convicted. 15 Thus, the Probation Law lays out
rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance,
it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
convicted of any offense against the security of the State; those who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not
less than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who are
already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation
Law became applicable. 16
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of
this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a
local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into
the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not
covered by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government
Code was enacted in 1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was
decided. When the legislature approved the enumerated disqualifications under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of
our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification
from holding public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the
purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to
disqualify probationers. CDAcIT
PHIL 279-292)