[ G.R. No.

233747, December 05, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NILA MALANA Y SAMBOLLEDO,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Nila Malana y Sambolledo (accused-appellant Malana) assailing the
Decision[2] dated March 24, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07988, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated
August 28, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 10 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. II-10837, finding accused-
appellant Malana guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[4] otherwise known as
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended.

The Facts

An Information[5] was filed against accused-appellant Malana in this case, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about October 19, 2011, in the municipality of Camalaniugan, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, without any legal authority thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver, dispense, give away one (1) [piece] of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline substance which
gave POSITIVE results to the tests for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, locally known as SHABU, weighing
an aggregate of 0.02 gram to a poseur buyer of the elements of the Philippine National Police force stationed in Camalaniugan,
Cagayan, said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is prohibited for any person to sell, deliver, dispense, give away to another
or transport any dangerous drugs regardless of the quantity or, purity thereof, unless authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant Malana pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the case ensued.[7] The
prosecution's version, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: SPO1 Kenneth Urian (SPO1 Urian), P/S Insp. Glen Ly Tuazon (P/S Insp. Tuazon)
and SPO2 Jessie Alonzo (SPO2 Alonzo).

SPO1 Urian testified that on 18 October 2011, he was on duty at Camalaniugan Police Station. At approximately 1 in the afternoon, an
informer reported that a female individual, later identified to be Malana, was engaged in rampant selling of shabu at Brgy. Dugo,
Camalaniugan, Cagayan. He then relayed the information to Chief of Police P/C Insp. George Cablarda (P/C Insp. Cablarda), who
immediately conducted a briefing. This briefing was attended by him, SPO2 Alonzo and P/C Insp. Cablarda to discuss the conduct of an
entrapment operation against Malana. The informer, Rex Cortez (Cortez), was designated as the civilian poseur buyer.

Cortez ordered shabu worth P2,500.00 from Malana to be delivered at Brgy. Dugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan at 2:30 in the afternoon on
the same date. He ordered shabu by sending a text message to Malana. Unfortunately, Malana failed to appear. Hence, P/C Insp.
Cablarda directed the team to execute another entrapment operation the following day, at the same place and time.

On 19 October 2011, Cortez ordered P500.00 worth of shabu from Malana to be delivered at around 3 in the afternoon. Cortez
informed the team that he will meet Malana at a waiting shed in Brgy. Dugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan.

At around 4:14 in the afternoon, a multicab from Aparri stopped near the designated waiting shed where Malana alighted. SPO1 Urian
observed that Cortez and Malana had a brief conversation. Malana then handed something to Cortez, who in turn, handed something
to Malana. From where he was standing, SPO1 Urian could neither identify the things being exchanged by the two individuals because
they were covering each other nor did he overhear their conversation. During the entrapment operation, he positioned himself within the
perimeter fence of Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Arce, which was about 10 to 12 meters away from the waiting shed, the place of transaction.
Meanwhile, the other members of the team stood approximately 4 to 6 meters [a]way from the waiting shed. When Cortez gave the pre-
arranged signal, which was the removal of his hat, members of the team ran towards the waiting shed. SPO2 Alonzo immediately
frisked Malana and recovered the P500.00 marked money. P/C Insp. Cablarda took possession of the plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance handed by Malana to Cortez.

For documentation, they sought the assistance of Brgy. Captain Philip Arce, and kagawads Wilma Gonzaga and Perlita Arellano, who
witnessed the inventory as evidenced by the Confiscation Receipt and photographs on record. SPO1 Urian marked the seized plastic
sachet with "KDU," his initials. After, they proceeded to the Camalaniugan Police Station and prepared the Request for Laboratory
Examination.[8]
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as likewise summarized by the CA, is as follows:
On 19 October 2011, she was at her house at San Antonio, Aparri, Cagayan. At noon, Cortez called her demanding that she pay her
outstanding debt in the amount of P1,500.00. She begged that she be allowed to give half of the amount. Cortez related that his wife
was angry and if she could not pay the debt in its entirety, explain herself to his wife.

Cortez called and instructed her to meet them near Vicky's Grocery at Dugo, Camalaniugan. She proceeded to the designated place
with her four year old son. At about 2 in the afternoon, she arrived and sent a text message to Cortez. She requested Cortez to hurry as
she would be returning home to Aparri, Cagayan after their conversation. Cortez neither replied to her text message nor arrive at the
agreed upon meeting place. While anticipating the arrival of Spouses Cortez, she observed three (3) men running towards her at the
waiting shed where she stood. She was surprised when one of them remarked, "BAGIM DAYTOY! BAGIM DAYTOY" meaning "Is this
yours?" while exhibiting a small plastic sachet. She replied "Why are you asking me if that is mine, you are the one holding it?'' Then,
one of the men approached her, frisked her and stated that she had a P500.00 bill in her pocket. She denied this as she only had
P20.00 for her return fare to Aparri. The men then instructed her to reveal the names of the people whom she knew were engaged in
the sale of illegal drugs so that she could be set free. When she failed to provide any names, she was brought to the Camalaniugan
Police Station with her son. Soon after their arrival at the police station, she rode another police vehicle and returned to the waiting
shed. There, the police officers talked to a person whom they let sign a piece of paper. She and her son were brought to the Aparri
Police Station where she asked the police to contact her brother Nanding to fetch her son. Then she was returned to the Camalaniugan
Police Station where she was detained for two nights.

On 21 October 2011, she was brought to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Aparri, Cagayan to undergo inquest proceedings for
allegedly selling illegal drugs. She denied all the accusations against her.[9]
Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Decision[10] dated August 28, 2015, the RTC convicted accused-appellant Malana of the crime charged.
The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused NILA MALANA y SAMBOLLEDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
charged for violation of Section 5 of Article II of R.A. 9165, (selling of dangerous drug) and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (Php500,000.00) pesos.

The subject matter of this case is hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of as provided by law.

SO DECIDED.[11]
The RTC ruled that the evidence on record sufficiently established the presence of the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The
RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the apprehending officers to establish that what was conducted against accused-appellant
Malana was a valid buy-bust operation. It reasoned that "[c]redence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold this presumption."[12] The RTC further stated that the "integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with."[13]

The RTC also said that accused-appellant Malana's defenses of denial and frame-up were weak defenses, and could not prevail over
the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant Malana appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision[14] dated March 24, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-appellant Malana, holding that
the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crimes charged. The CA declared that the elements of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs were properly established as "RA 9165 and its implementing rules do not require strict compliance with the rule on chain of
custody."[15] The CA explained:
x x x While representatives of the media and the Department of Justice were absent, in their place, there were two kagawads and Brgy.
Captain Philip Arce not to mention, Malana herself to witness the same. As to the absence of other details aside from the initials of
SPO1 Urian, neither RA 9165 nor its implementing rules require such matters to be affixed on the seized item. Even
assuming arguendo that these are required under the Philippine National Police Manual on Illegal Drugs Operation and Investigation,
We find that for purposes of maintaining the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized specimen, what takes precedence is
compliance with the mandate of RA 9165 which in this case, was substantially complied with.[16]
Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue

For resolution of the Court is the issue of whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Malana of the crime
charged.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits accused-appellant Malana for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant Malana was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[17]

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these elements, but also of proving the corpus
delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.[18] While it is
true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and
distributors,[19] the law nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are
safeguarded.

In all drugs cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that follows such operation. Chain
of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.[20] The rule is imperative,
as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt.
[21]

In this connection, Section 21,[22] Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, lays down
the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

This must be so because with "the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great."[23]

Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and the
photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the
aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were
intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In this connection, this also means that the
three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension - a requirement that can easily be
complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Verily, a buy-
bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring with them the said witnesses.[24]

In the present case, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and apprehension, and only one of them
was present during the conduct of the inventory. As SPO1 Kenneth Urian (SPO1 Urian), part of the apprehending team, testified:
Q: You also said during your direct that you called for the Barangay Council, at what time did this Barangay
Council arrived, Mr. witness?
A: Just after the female person was arrested, ma'am.

Q: And after the arrest, Mr. witness, what did you do with the female person?
A: After the documentation ma'am, we immediately brought the female person at the police station.

Q: And during this documentation that you are talking about, who were present at that that (sic) time?
A: The Barangay Council, ma'am.

Q: Do you know the person of this Barangay Council, that you are talking about, Mr. witness?
A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: What are the names, Mr. witness?

A: Philip Arce and Barangay Kagawad Wilma Gonzaga and Perlita Arellano, ma'am.

Q: May we know again, what was their participation with respect to the documentation, Mr. witness?
A: Witness the inventory and documentation of the recovered items, ma'am.[25]
The foregoing testimony was corroborated by the testimony of SPO2 Jessie Alonzo who was also part of the apprehending team.
[26]
 None of the prosecution witnesses offered any explanation as to why two of the three required witnesses - a representative from the
DOJ and a media representative - were not present in the buy-bust operation conducted against accused-appellant Malana. The
prosecution did not also address the issue in its pleadings and the RTC and the CA instead had to rely only on the presumption that
police officers performed their functions in the regular manner to support accused-appellant Malana's conviction.

It bears emphasis that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the
said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose. In People v. Tomawis,[27] the Court elucidated on the purpose of
the law in mandating the presence of the required witnesses as follows:
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of
planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza,[28] without the insulating
presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official

during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-
busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.

The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the
warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of
seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation
is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the
witnesses would be able to testify that the buy bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in
accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.

The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so - and
"calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has
already been finished - does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of
drugs.

To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with
at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be
ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation".
[29]
 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring in the original)
It is important to point out that the apprehending team in this case had more than ample time to comply with the requirements
established by law. As SPO1 Urian himself testified, they received the tip from their confidential informant at around 1:00 p.m. on
October 18, 2011.[30] They then planned to immediately conduct the buy-bust operation more or less an hour later, but accused-
appellant Malana supposedly failed to deliver the shabu.[31] Thus, they planned to conduct another buy-bust operation the next day, in
which operation accused-appellant Malana was successfully apprehended.[32]

The officers, therefore, had one whole day to secure the attendance of all the required witnesses. They could thus have
complied with the requirements of the law had they intended to. However, the apprehending officers in this case did not exert even
the slightest of efforts to secure the attendance of any of the three required witnesses. In fact, the required witness present - the elected
official - was only "called in" after accused-appellant Malana had already been apprehended. Worse, the police officers and the
prosecution - during the trial - failed to show or offer any explanation for their deviation from the law.

It is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure
laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is
with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.[33] The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses.[34]

Verily, courts cannot, as the CA did in this case, make a blanket justification that "[g]iven the nature of [the] operation, it is
understandable that [the required witnesses'] immediate presence could not be immediately secured at the place of seizure or the
nearest police station."[35] As the Court held in People v. De Guzman,[36] "[t]he justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a
fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist."[37]

Moreover, courts cannot rule, as the RTC and the CA did in this case, that the presence of the three elected officials in the inventory (as
opposed to the media person and the DOJ official) constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of RA 9165. Section 21,
RA 9165 was unequivocal in its requirement: that the inventory must be done "in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
[DOJ], and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof."

The law is plain and clear. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[38]

It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient
explanation in case of non-compliance. As the Court en banc unanimously held in the recent case of People v. Lim:[39]
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug
seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for
and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within
the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who
face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations,
which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtain in the presence of the required
witnesses even before the offenders could escape.[40] (Underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original)
In this connection, it was error for both the RTC and the CA to convict accused-appellant Malana by relying on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duties supposedly extended in favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. [41] Otherwise, a mere rule
of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.[42] As the Court, in People v. Catalan,[43] reminded
the lower courts:
Both lower courts favored the members of the buy-bust team with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, mainly
because the accused did not show that they had ill motive behind his entrapment.

We hold that both lower courts committed gross error in relying on the presumption of regularity.

Presuming that the members of the buy-bust team regularly performed their duty was patently bereft of any factual and legal basis. We
remind the lower courts that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger
presumption of innocence favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed
innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like here, the proof
adduced against the accused has not even overcome the presumption of innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duty could not be a factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.

Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the policemen because
the records were replete with indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a
police officer must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it differently, it is the
established basic fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any hint of irregularity committed by the
police officers in arresting the accused and thereafter, several of which we have earlier noted, there can be no presumption of regularity
of performance in their favor.[44] (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's blatant disregard of the established
procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165.

What further militates against according the apprehending officers in this case the presumption of regularity is the fact that even the
pertinent internal anti-drug operation procedures then in force were not followed. Under the 1999 Philippine National Police Drug
Enforcement Manual,[45] the conduct of buy-bust operations requires the following:
ANTI-DRUG OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

xxxx

V. SPECIFIC RULES

xxxx

B. Conduct of Operation: (As far as practicable, all operations must be officer led)

1. Buy-Bust Operation - in the conduct of buy-bust operation, the following are the procedures to be observed:

a. Record time of jump-off in unit's logbook;

b. Alertness and security shall at all times be observed[;]

c. Actual and timely coordination with the nearest PNP territorial units must be made;

d. Area security and dragnet or pursuit operation must be provided[;]

e. Use of necessary and reasonable force only in case of suspect's resistance[;]

f. If buy-bust money is dusted with ultra violet powder make sure that suspect ge[t] hold of the same and his palm/s contaminated with
the powder before giving the pre-arranged signal and arresting the suspects;

g. In pre-positioning of the team members, the designated arresting elements must clearly and actually observe the
negotiation/transaction between suspect and the poseur-buyer;

h. Arrest suspect in a defensive manner anticipating possible resistance with the use of deadly weapons which maybe concealed in his
body, vehicle or in a place within arms['] reach;

i. After lawful arrest, search the body and vehicle, if any, of the suspect for other concealed evidence or deadly weapon;
j. Appraise suspect of his constitutional rights loudly and clearly after having been secured with handcuffs;

k. Take actual inventory of the seized evidence by means of weighing and/or physical counting, as the case may be;

1. Prepare a detailed receipt of the confiscated evidence for issuance to the possessor (suspect) thereof;

m. The seizing officer (normally the poseur-buyer) and the evidence custodian must mark the evidence with their initials and
also indicate the date, time and place the evidence was confiscated/seized;

n. Take photographs of the evidence while in the process of taking the inventory, especially during weighing, and if possible
under existing conditions, the registered weight of the evidence on the scale must be focused by the camera; and

o. Only the evidence custodian shall secure and preserve the evidence in an evidence bag or in appropriate container and thereafter
deliver the same to the PNP CLG for laboratory examination. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court has ruled in People v. Zheng Bai Hui[46] that it will not presume to set an a priori basis on what detailed acts police authorities
might credibly undertake and carry out in their entrapment operations. However, given the police operational procedures and the fact
that buy-bust is a planned operation, it strains credulity why the buy-bust team could not have ensured the presence of the required
witnesses pursuant to Section 21 or at the very least marked, photographed and inventoried the seized items according to the
procedures in their own operations manual.[47]

At this juncture, it is well to point out that while the RTC and the CA were correct in stating that denial is an inherently weak defense, it
grievously erred in using the same principle to convict accused-appellant Malana. Both courts overlooked the long-standing legal tenet
that the starting point of every criminal prosecution is that the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent.[48] And this
presumption of innocence is overturned only when the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof in criminal cases and has proven
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,[49] with each and every element of the crime charged in the information proven to
warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.[50] Differently stated, there must exist no
reasonable doubt as to the existence of each and every element of the crime to sustain a conviction.

It is worth emphasizing that this burden of proof never shifts. Indeed, the accused need not present a single piece of evidence in his
defense if the State has not discharged its onus. The accused can simply rely on his right to be presumed innocent.

In this connection, the prosecution therefore, in cases involving dangerous drugs, always has the burden of proving compliance with
the procedure outlined in Section 21. As the Court stressed in People v. Andaya:[51]
x x x We should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the crimes they have been charged with. The
State must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of ill motive to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them, then that
would be the end of our dutiful vigilance to protect our citizenry from false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware that there
have been in the past many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that should heighten our resolve to strengthen the
ramparts of judicial scrutiny.

Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just because the lawmen are shielded
by the presumption of the regularity of their performance of duty. The presumed regularity is nothing but a purely evidentiary
tool intended to avoid the impossible and time-consuming task of establishing every detail of the performance by officials
and functionaries of the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much stronger and much firmer presumption of
innocence in favor of every person whose life, property and liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture on the strength of a
false accusation of committing some crime.[52] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To stress, the accused can rely on his right to be presumed innocent. It is thus immaterial, in this case or in any other cases involving
dangerous drugs, that the accused put forth a weak defense.

The Court emphasizes that while it is laudable that police officers exert earnest efforts in catching drug pushers, they must always be
advised to do so within the bounds of the law.[53] Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media and the DOJ, and
any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the sachet of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of
the evidence again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachet
of shabu that was evidence herein of the corpus delicti. Thus, this adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.[54]

Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be effective, however, the prosecution must (1)
recognize any lapse on the part of the police officers and (2) be able to justify the same.[55] In this case, the prosecution neither
recognized, much less tried to justify, its deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165.

Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State,
militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised.[56] As the Court explained in People v. Reyes:[57]
Under the last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, a saving mechanism has been provided to ensure that
not every case of non-compliance with the procedures for the preservation of the chain of custody will irretrievably prejudice the
Prosecution's case against the accused. To warrant the application of this saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution must
recognize the lapse or lapses, and justify or explain them. Such justification or explanation would be the basis for applying
the saving mechanism. Yet, the Prosecution did not concede such lapses, and did not even tender any token justification or
explanation for them. The failure to justify or explain underscored the doubt and suspicion about the integrity of the evidence
of the corpus delicti. With the chain of custody having been compromised, the accused deserves acquittal. x x x[58]
In People v. Umipang,[59] the Court dealt with the same issue where the police officers involved did not show any genuine effort to
secure the attendance of the required witness before the buy-bust operation was executed. In the said case, the Court held:
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the marking of the seized items does not per se render
the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to
contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they contacted other elected
public officials. Neither do the records show whether the police officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ representative. Nor does the
SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for failing to do so - especially considering that it had sufficient time from the moment it
received information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest.

Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police officers to look for the said
representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable - without so
much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances - is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to
establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165,
or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so. [60] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section
21 of RA 9165. The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has thus been compromised. In light of this, accused-appellant
Malana must perforce be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated March 24, 2017 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07988 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Nila Malana y
Sambolledo is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY
RELEASED from detention unless she is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate
implementation. The said Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the
action she has taken.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 226679

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not
be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3

The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and
custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline
substance, which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not
guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates:
(1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23
of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.
Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea
bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express
mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the
accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an
Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed,
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only
the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea
bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the
operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal
cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused
of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However,
by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous
drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the
relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is,
to rehabilitate the offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165,
which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is
not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the
potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as
follows:

I.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE
SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF
THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright
for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition
for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to
satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no
actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be
underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full
and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged
procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.11

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance
are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and
"harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the
hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent
as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of
the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly
accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes,
the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of
drug lords, pushers and users.16

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not deter Us from having to make
the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the
Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.18

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its
power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must
not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme

Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S.
Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to
this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose
that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested
this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of
its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952
bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed
law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only
this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that
the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this
Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of
this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxxx

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration
of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power
to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of
this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto
Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

xxxx

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus
solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and
more independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's
rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the
Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a
compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional
participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the
Legislature, have their inherent powers."

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x
x x.24

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass
upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated
by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its
legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken
to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot
replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and
NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts
except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish
new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.34

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect.
Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser
offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule 118
(Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser
offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable
by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)

As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)

The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in
1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense
charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2
of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-
trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment
but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter
period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive
rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines
and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for
their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this
Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive
in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional
system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges,
or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the
rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.41

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For example, in People v.
Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of
the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates
to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.43 Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the
Court opined:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal
cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases
with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to
due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the
period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to
enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the
deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly,
either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were
times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because
of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim
or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit
another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the
crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that
the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice
system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.44

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who
failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take
away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under
the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only
works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple
expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of
justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are
obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.
For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain
the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases
in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of
the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the
public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the
time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his
case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and
prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses
who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit
the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the
apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense
charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental
rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to
bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of
guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is
not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid
plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full
control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain.59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known.
Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best
to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal
charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have
been "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to
allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that
actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its
case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse
thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules
allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only
basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more
and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion,
it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused
made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose
the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's
acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal
protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it
proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional
for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.