672 Phil.

191

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011 ]

ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. Y CERBO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] dated
October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846, which in turn
affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City,
in Criminal Case No. C-66765 convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

In an Information[2] dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged
for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 08th day of November 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the
authority of law, did then and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control [Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride (SHABu) weighing 0.24
gram, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited
law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)[3]

Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.  Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa
(P/Insp Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo
Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the Caloocan Police Station - Drug Enforcement Unit.  The
testimony of the police investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was dispensed with
after petitioner's counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution.

On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness.  The testimonies of
Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister, respectively, of the
petitioner was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed that their testimonies were
corroborative in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution

First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa, Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police
Station who, on the witness stand, affirmed his own findings in Physical Science
Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. "D," "D-1," and "D-2") that per qualitative examination
conducted on the specimen submitted, the white crystalline substance weighing 0.05
gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06 gram then contained inside four (4) separate
pieces of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. "D-4" to "D-7") gave
positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.

Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police Station-Drug
Enforcement Unit, Samson Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution further endeavored to
establish the following:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose Valencia of
the Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called upon his subordinates after the (sic)
receiving an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame relative to the illicit and down-right
drug-trading activities being undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong,
Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias "Bokbok" and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs.
"E," "E-1," and (sic) "E-3," and "E-4"). Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a
surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is composed of five (5) more
operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina,
PO2 De Ocampo, and herein witness PO3 Antonio.  After a short briefing at their
station, the team boarded a rented passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to
verify the said informant and/or memorandum.

When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at around
3:50 o'clock that same afternoon, they were [at] once led by their informant to the
house of one Alias "Abe."  PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the
house, while the rest of the members of the group deployed themselves nearby.  Thru a
small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at
a distance of 1½ meters, he saw "Abe" arranging several pieces of small plastic
sachets which he believed to be containing shabu.  Slowly, said operative inched his
way in by gently pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon
gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while
"Abe," on the other hand, after being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed
over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier
sorting out.  PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him
and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance to their
headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for proper disposition.  The
suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a "ABE," 19 years old, single,
jobless and a resident of Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan
City.[4]

Evidence for the Defense

On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident completely
opposed to the theory of the prosecution.  On the witness stand, he alleged that at about
 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, while he, together with his sister
and father, were at the upper level of their house watching the television soap "Cindy,"
they suddenly heard a commotion downstairs prompting the three (3) of them to go
down.  There already inside were several male individuals in civilian clothes who
introduced themselves as raiding police operatives from the SDEU out to effect his
(Abe) arrest for alleged drug pushing.  [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case
to these officers, but to no avail. Instead, one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner]
at the back when he tried to resist the arrest.  Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed
and together with his father, they were boarded inside the police vehicle.  That on their
way to the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a
small piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances allegedly
recovered by the raiding police team from their house.  At around 9:00 o'clock in the
evening, [petitioner] was transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was
finally detained. That upon [petitioner's] transfer and detention at the said headquarters,
his father was ordered to go home.[5]

On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements
of the offense charged, rendered a Decision[6] convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA No. 9165,  the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the accused ABRAHAM
MICLAT Y CERBO "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
possession of a dangerous drugs (sic) defined and penalized under the provision of
Section 11, sub-paragraph No. (3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby
imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years of imprisonment, in view of the absence of aggravating circumstances. The
Court likewise orders the accused to pay the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php300,000.00) as fine.

Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[7]

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 28846.

On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision[8] affirming in toto the decision of the RTC,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto.  Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]

In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the
evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against him.  Moreover, it was
established that he was informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest.  Hence,
the CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements
necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

Hence, the petition raising the following errors:

1. WHETHER OR NOT A POLICE SURVEILLANCE TEAM SENT TO

DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF A CAMP CRAME MEMORANDUM OF
SHABU TRADING ACTIVITY AT CALOOCAN CITY, WHICH
CONVERTED THEIR MISSION FROM SURVEILLANCE TO A RAIDING
TEAM, CAN VALIDLY MAKE AN ARREST AND SEARCH WITHOUT A
VALID WARRANT HAVING BEEN FIRST OBTAINED FROM A COURT
OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED
WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF "PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE" FOR
A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE BELIEF OF PO3 ANTONIO THAT THE FOUR (4)
PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS ALLEGEDLY BEING ARRANGED BY
PETITIONER CONTAINED SHABU JUSTIFIED HIS ENTRY INTO THE
HOUSE AND ARREST PETITIONER WITHOUT ANY WARRANT.
4. WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC
SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED (SIC) OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF THE CAUSE
AND NATURE OF HIS ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY
COUNSEL DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST AND CONTINUED
DETENTION.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION BY THE LOWER COURT OF THE
PETITIONER, AS AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ON THE BASIS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND ARREST, IS
CORRECT.[10]

Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the subsequent seizure of
the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs from him.  Petitioner insists
that he was just watching television with his father and sister when police operatives
suddenly barged into their home and arrested him for illegal possession of shabu.

Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets inside their
house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not sufficient
reason for the police authorities to enter his house without a valid search warrant and/or
warrant of arrest.  Arguing that the act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is
not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team into his
house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a validly
issued search warrant.  Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be
contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the warrantless
arrest unlawful.

Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was highly
questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at the place of the arrest
and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the said evidence.
Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his constitutional
rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during his detention.  Hence, for this
infraction, the arresting officer should be punished accordingly.

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment.  Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case,
jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.[11]  An accused is estopped from assailing
any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. [12]

In the present case, at the time of petitioner's arraignment, there was no objection raised as to
the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the
trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and
effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the
illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of
the conviction of the accused. [13]

True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of
an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued
warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5.  Arrest without warrant; when lawful. ? a peace office of a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a)  When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;[14]

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. [15]
In the instant case, contrary to petitioner's contention, he was caught in flagrante delicto and
the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest.  The established facts reveal
that on the date of the arrest, agents of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the
Caloocan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance operation in the area of Palmera
Spring II to verify the reported drug-related activities of several individuals, which included
the petitioner.  During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioner's window, saw
petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to be shabu in the living
room of their home.  The plastic sachets and its suspicious contents were plainly exposed to
the view of PO3 Antonio, who was only about one and one-half meters from where petitioner
was seated.  PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the house by gently pushing the door. Upon
gaining entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police officer.  After which, petitioner
voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets.  PO3 Antonio then placed
petitioner under arrest and, contrary to petitioner's contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of
his constitutional rights.[16]  PO3 Antonio then took the petitioner and the four (4) pieces of
plastic sachets to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Moran.  Thereafter, the
evidence were marked "AMC 1-4," the initials of the name of the petitioner.  The heat-sealed
transparent sachets containing white crystalline substance were submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for drug examination, which later yielded positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.

Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the
petitioner, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a
crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting officer.

As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established
exceptions.

Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure
must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [17] The
right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. [18]

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a

judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.[19]

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic
sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon
learning that he is a police officer.  The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic
sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within
the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to

have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be
introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye
and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Since petitioner's arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before
effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting
officer,the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove
petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.

As to petitioner's contention that the police failed to comply with the proper procedure in the
transfer of custody of the seized evidence thereby casting serious doubt on its seizure, this too
deserves scant consideration.

Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
 x x x x.

Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing

Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.

x x x x.[21]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with the
rule is not fatal.  It does not render petitioner's arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against
him inadmissible.[22] What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused."[23]

Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity of the
drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved.  More importantly, an unbroken chain of
custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was sufficiently established.  The
factual antecedents of the case reveal that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic
sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized
from him were immediately brought to the police station and upon arriving thereat, were
turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer.  There the evidence was marked.  The
turn-over of the subject sachets and the person of the petitioner were then entered in the
official blotter.  Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose Ramirez
Valencia, endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the National Police District
PNP Crime Laboratory.  The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police
Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa.[24] After a qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4)
plastic sachets by the latter, the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.[25]

An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by the
prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the forensic
chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized from the petitioner at his residence were also
the same items marked by the investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must
be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. [26]  Based on the
evidence submitted by the prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the
present case.  Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory
explanation of such possession - the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the
absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.[27]

It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed
to have performed their duties in a regular manner.[28]  Although not constrained to blindly
accept the findings of fact of trial courts, appellate courts can rest assured that such facts were
gathered from witnesses who presented their statements live and in person in open court. In
cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the trial courts are in the best position to
recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from rehearsed spiel, straightforward
assertion from a stuttering claim, definite statement from tentative disclosure, and to a certain
degree, truth from untruth.[29]

In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact of the trial
court.  No evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the
prosecution witnesses of the events which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner.  After
a careful evaluation of the records, We find no error was committed by the RTC and the CA
to disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged against him.

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely denied the
accusations against him and raised the defense of frame-up.  The defense of denial and frame-
up has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and
is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.  In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and
convincing evidence.[30]

As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate sentence imposed
should, however, be modified.

Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, provides:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to

death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities,
regardless of the degree of purity thereof:

x x x x.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties
shall be graduated as follows:

x x x x.

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
 ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of
opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous
drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and
those similarly designed or newly-introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.[31]

From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00)
to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).  The evidence adduced by the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.24 gram of shabu,
or less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal authority.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty
shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed
the maximum period allowed under the law; hence,the imposable penalty should be within
the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October
13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad,  Mendoza, and Sereno,* JJ., concur.

* Designated additional member, per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.

Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices Vicente Q.

[1]

Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 140-51.

[2]
Id. at 40.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id. at 76-77.
[5]
Id. at. 78.
[6]
Id. at 75-82.
[7]
Id. at 81-82.
[8]
Supra  note 1.
[9]
Id. at 151.
[10]
Id. at 209-210.
[11]
Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611, 622.
[12]
Rebellion v. People, G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 343, 348.
[13]
People v. Santos, G.R. No. 176735, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 578, 601.
[14]
Emphasis supplied.
[15]
People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003).
[16]
TSN, (PO3 Rodrigo Antonio), April 21, 2003, p. 5; rollo, p. 60.
[17]
1987 Constitution, Article III, Sections 2 and 3 (2).
[18]
People v. Racho, G.R. No.  186529, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 633, 641.
[19]
People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 476.

People v. Lagman, G.R. No. 168695, December 8, 2008, 573 SCRA 224, 236, citing
[20]

People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 633-634 (1999).

[21]
Emphasis supplied.

People v. Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 202, 218, citing
[22]

People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 448.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Rollo, p. 37.
[25]
Id. at 38.
[26]
People v. Teddy Batoon and Melchor Batoon, G.R. No. 184599, November 24, 2010.
[27]
People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848, August 16, 2010, 628 SCRA 328, 343.
[28]
People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 187070, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 556, 564.
[29]
People v. Willie Midenilla, et al., G.R. No. 186470, September 27, 2010.
[30]
People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 625, 642.
[31]
Emphasis supplied.