3) Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
3) Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
3) Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
In the decision now on appeal, the lower court, after referring to a documentary
evidence introduced by plaintiff-appellant continued: "From the evidence adduced by
defendant bus firm, it appears that as early as August 28, 1958, the National Treasurer
upon whom devolves the function of administering the Back Pay Law in his letter to the
Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office who in turn quoted and circularized same in his
Circular No. 5 to draw the attention thereto of all Motor Vehicle Supervisors, Registrars
and employees . . ., had approved the acceptance of negotiable certificates of
indebtedness in payment of registration fees of motor vehicles with the view that such
certificates 'should be accorded with the same confidence by other governmental
instrumentalities as other evidences of public debt, such as bonds and treasury
certificates'. Significantly, the Auditor General concurred in the said view of the National
Treasurer.
The argument of plaintiff-appellant that only the holders of the backpay certificates
themselves could apply the same to the payment of motor vehicle registration fees did
not find favor with the lower court. Thus, "[Plaintiff] Republic urges that defendant bus
firm being merely an assignee of the negotiable certificates of indebtedness in question,
it could not use the same in payment of taxes.
ISSUE/S:
No. A tax refers to a financial obligation imposed by a state on persons, whether natural
or juridical, within its jurisdiction, for property owned, income earned, business or
profession engaged in, or any such activity analogous in character for raising the
necessary revenues to take care of the responsibilities of government. An often-quoted
definition is that of Cooley: "Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions from
persons and property levied by the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of
government and for all public needs."
As distinguished from other pecuniary burdens, the differentiating factor is that the
purpose to be subserved is the raising of revenue. A tax then is neither a penalty that
must be satisfied or a liability arising from contract. Much less can it be confused or
identified with a license or a fee as a manifestation of an exercise of the police
power.
The registration fee which defendant-appellee had to pay was Imposed by Section 8 of
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. Its heading speaks of "registration fees." The term is
repeated four times in the body thereof. Equally so, mention is made of the "fee for
registration." A subsection starts with a categorical statement "No fees shall be
charged." The conclusion is difficult to resist therefore that the Motor Vehicle Act
requires the payment not of a tax but of a registration fee under the police power.
Hence the inapplicability of the section relied upon by defendant-appellee under the
Back Pay Law. It is not held liable for a tax but for a registration fee. It therefore
cannot make use of a backpay certificate to meet such an obligation.
Any vestige of any doubt as to the correctness of the above conclusion should be
dissipated by Republic Act No. 5448. A special science fund was thereby created and
its title expressly sets forth that a tax on privately-owned passenger automobiles,
motorcycles and scooters was imposed. The rates thereof were provided for in its
Section 8 which clearly specifies that "additional tax" was to be paid as distinguished
from the registration fee under the Motor Vehicle Act. There cannot be any clearer
expression therefore of the legislative will, even on the assumption that the earlier
legislation could be stretching the point be susceptible of the interpretation that a tax
rather than a fee was levied. What is thus most apparent is that where the legislative
body relies on its authority to tax it expressly so states, and where it is enacting a
regulatory measure, it is equally explicit.