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FEDERALIST NO.

15

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union


For the Independent Journal.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow-citizens, to place before
you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to your political safety and
happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed,
should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together be severed or
dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the
inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated will
receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which
you will still have to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will
recollect that you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which can
engage the attention of a free people, that the field through which you have to travel is in itself
spacious, and that the difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes
with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles from your
progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done, without sacrificing utility to despatch.
In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of the subject, the point next in
order to be examined is the "insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the
Union." It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position
which is not either controverted or doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of all
classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the
friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ
in other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are
material imperfections in our national system, and that something is necessary to be done to
rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of
speculation. They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at
length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal share in precipitating the
extremity at which we are arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the
scheme of our federal government, which have been long pointed out and regretted by the
intelligent friends of the Union.
We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last stage of national
humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an
independent nation which we do not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of
which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and
unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time
of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper
or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in
the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been
surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights.
Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury,
nor government.1 Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on
our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature
and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from
it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have
abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national
wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a
safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them
to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a
violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price of
improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the
quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and
public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct
tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry?
That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest
limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten
an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general
be demanded, what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance that could
befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form
a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?
This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those very maxims and
councils which would now deter us from adopting the proposed Constitution; and which, not
content with having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the
abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to
influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our
dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from
the paths of felicity and prosperity.
It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be resisted, have produced a
species of general assent to the abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our
national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of
federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles
that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government of the United States is
destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to
supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an
augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the
Union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind
devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the
principal defects of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we experience
do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure
of the building, which cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles
and main pillars of the fabric.
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of
LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though
this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and
governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment,
the United States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but they
have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America.
The consequence of this is, that though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are
laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere
recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their option.
It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that after all the admonitions
we have had from experience on this head, there should still be found men who object to the new
Constitution, for deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and which
is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it
is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the
mild influence of the magistracy.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent
nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time,
place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its
execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized nations,
subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the
interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century
there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from which the politicians
of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the
equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were
exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before
they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is
to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and
which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate
interest or passion.
If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and
to drop the project of a general DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would
indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated
under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable
Abandoning all views towards a confederate government, this would bring us to a simple alliance
offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends and enemies of
each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations,
should prescribe to us.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of
a national government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the
direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients
which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a
government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, --the only
proper objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be
attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be
no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will,
in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may
be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by
military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind
can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies
politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process of a court by which the
observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced
against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution
by the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of
the communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and
military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can
certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his
happiness to it.
There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the regulations of the
federal authority were not to be expected; that a sense of common interest would preside over
the conduct of the respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the
constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present day, would appear as wild
as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have
received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times betrayed an
ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original
inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted at all?
Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without
constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater
disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate
observers of the conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons.
Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided
among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle
its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are
composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a private capacity.
In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an impatience of control, that
disposes those who are invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external
attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in every political
association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser
sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs,
by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common
centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power.
Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is
controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect,
that the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of a
confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the
public weal, to execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this
results from the constitution of human nature.

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