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Amicus Brief - Former Officials of The CRD
Amicus Brief - Former Officials of The CRD
No. 20-12003
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
—————————————————————————————————
BRIEF OF FORMER OFFICIALS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION OF
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE
——————————————————————————————————
Olivia Kelman
Steven R. Weinstein
Victoria Oguntoye
K&L GATES LLP
200 S. Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 3900
Miami, Florida 33131
Telephone: (305) 539-3300
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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Rule 26.1, undersigned counsel certifies that (1) because all amici are individual
persons, the Corporate Disclosure Statement is not applicable, and (2) the Certificate
C-2
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C-3
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..........................................C-1
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 6
--i--
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Federal Cases
Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups,
554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2009) ....................................................................20, 21
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,
553 U.S. 181 (2008) ............................................................................................ 18
Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U.S. 24 (1974) ........................................................................................21, 22
§ 142.01 ............................................................................................................... 17
§ 775.083(2) ........................................................................................................ 18
§ 938.04 .........................................................................................................17, 18
§ 938.05 ............................................................................................................... 17
§ 938.05(1) .......................................................................................................... 17
§ 938.055 ............................................................................................................. 17
§ 939.185(1)(a).................................................................................................... 17
§ 960.21 ............................................................................................................... 18
--iii--
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Other Authorities
Larry J. Sabato & Howard R. Ernst,
Encyclopedia of American Political Parties and Elections 461
(Facts on File, updated ed. 2007).......................................................................... 8
--iv--
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United States Department of Justice who had responsibility for enforcing federal
laws protecting the right to vote, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”)
as well as earlier laws. Some amici held the position of Assistant Attorney General
confirmation by the United States Senate. Other amici served in “career” positions
in the CRD with responsibility for the enforcement of federal voting-rights laws.
The average tenure in the CRD for the amici who held career positions was over 22
years, and 11 of those persons served for 30 years or more. The collective time period
of amici’s service extends from 1960 to 2018. A complete list of amici, their periods
CRD in its early years was enforcement of those voting-rights laws then in effect.
The CRD’s responsibility for enforcement of voting rights was greatly expanded by
the VRA and extensions and amendments to the Act in 1970, 1975, 1982 and 2006.
Amici’s interest in this appeal arises from their experience enforcing federal voting-
1
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experience of several amici who litigated early challenges to the continued use of
poll taxes to disenfranchise African Americans and poor persons of all races. The
enactment and prohibited the use of any poll tax as a precondition to voting in federal
and expressly found that a poll tax prevents the poor from voting, does not have any
kind of relevance for checking for voting qualification, and often unfairly targets
legislative provision that “authorized and directed” the Attorney General to file
After President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the VRA, the CRD immediately
filed complaints challenging the poll tax laws in Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and
Elections, the Supreme Court found poll tax laws unconstitutional in state and local
elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Amici Stephen J. Pollak, Brian K. Landsberg, John
2
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M. Rosenberg, and Alexander C. Ross prepared and tried these lawsuits as counsel
Several amici have relevant experience prior to passage of the VRA litigating
the legality of preconditions to registration and voting that informed many of the
provisions of the VRA. This pre-VRA work of amici and other CRD officials
discrimination. Although the lawsuits were ultimately successful, they were almost
always followed by new laws and procedures drawn to accomplish the same purpose
Section 5 of the VRA, the core provision of the Act, was designed to address this
problem by precluding any change in voting laws and practices in jurisdictions with
long histories of discrimination until it could be demonstrated that the change did
not have the intent or, most importantly, the effect of unconstitutionally denying or
responsibility of amici.
Based on this long and deep experience enforcing federal voting-rights laws,
amici are unanimous in their view that under the Constitution no state or local
amici have a strong interest in opposing measures that operate effectively as poll
3
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taxes and unconstitutionally impede the right to vote, like the pay-to-vote measure
now at issue.
authored the brief in whole or in part. No party or party’s counsel, or any person
other than amici and their counsel, contributed money intended to fund preparing
payments of fees authorized by Florida Statutes for the express purpose of generating
to vote in federal elections on the payment of a “poll tax or other tax.” U.S. Const.
continued to charge a fee for voting but simply used another label. This is confirmed
4
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voting and the link between those efforts and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, since
it provides the proper context for considering the pay-to-vote requirement in this
appeal. The right to vote is the most fundamental of rights that citizens possess, and
federal courts now have an even more enhanced role than they did in earlier years in
The District Court gave this case the careful consideration mandated by the
important right at stake, and properly concluded that Florida’s requirement that
felons pay fees and costs associated with their case to be eligible to vote is properly
classified as a tax. That ends the inquiry, since it is beyond question that the Twenty-
Amici offer additional descriptions of the Florida law provisions that required
the costs and fees at issue since the statutes themselves confirm that they are imposed
regardless of the label applied by the State, is consistent with, if not required by, the
The correctness of the decision of the District Court, as well as the link
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Court and this Court in cases challenging state laws requiring certain types of
that the required form of identification be available for free. States have not
“tax,” is permissible.
apply” to felons has no merit. No decision from the Supreme Court or this Court
long as they apply only to felons. That makes no legal sense. Florida must abide by
all provisions of the Constitution even as it takes action to restore voting rights.
ARGUMENT
history, the hallmark of which is the “variety and persistence” of new state
mechanisms impeding the right to vote. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 308, 311 (1966). Case-by-case litigation under the voting-rights provisions of
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the 1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil Rights Acts1 failed to cure the problem for a well-
documented reason: “Even when favorable decisions have finally been obtained,
some of the States affected have merely switched to discriminatory devices not
covered by the federal decrees or have enacted difficult new tests.” Id. at 314
(emphasis added).
Amici have first-hand experience on the front lines of the battle against
Alabama that has been “repeatedly referred to as the pre-eminent example of the
observed, the “earnest efforts of the Justice Department and of many federal judges”
were no match for the whack-a-mole “perpetuated in certain parts of our country
through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.” Id. at 309, 313.
One of the methods states used to disenfranchise Black persons and poor
persons was conditioning the right to vote on monetary payments of a poll tax. 2 To
1
See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637-38
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1971 to provide means of further securing and protecting the
right to vote); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, § 601, 74 Stat. 86, 88
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1971 to strengthen judicial enforcement of the right to vote);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241, 241-42 (amending
42 U.S.C. § 1971 to prohibit discrimination in voting, condemning literacy tests, and
strengthen judicial enforcement of the right to vote).
2
“Although frequently thought of as a tax on the privilege of voting, the poll tax is
actually a head tax”—i.e., a uniformly-imposed tax—and in “this context, ‘poll’
means ‘head’ rather than the term customarily used to describe a place of voting.”
United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 238 (W.D. Tex. 1966). Amici do not
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combat such pay-to-vote devices, three-fourths of the states had by 1964 ratified the
Lauding the ratification, President Johnson declared: “There can be no one too poor
The term “other tax” in the Twenty-Fourth Amendment evidences its purpose
by the Supreme Court in Katzenbach. Seeking a powerful cure-all for both federal
and state elections, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to “banish the
aimed at ending the poll tax in the VRA, notwithstanding the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment. Section 10(a) reports the following key congressional findings about
the wealth and race discrimination inherent in pay-to-vote poll tax laws:
suggest that states lack the authority to impose a poll tax in general, so long as the
tax is not imposed as a prerequisite to voting.
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The Congress finds that the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as
a precondition to voting (i) precludes persons of limited means from
voting or imposes unreasonable financial hardship upon such persons
as a precondition to their exercise of the franchise, (ii) does not bear a
reasonable relationship to any legitimate State interest in the conduct of
elections, and (iii) in some areas has the purpose or effect of denying
persons the right to vote because of race or color. Upon the basis of
these findings, Congress declares that the constitutional right of citizens
to vote is denied or abridged in some areas by the requirement of the
payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting.
Congress then in Section 10(b) “authorized and directed” the Attorney General to
file actions to seek “relief against the enforcement of any requirement of the payment
(a) and the purpose of this section.” With the words “or substitute therefor” in
Section 10(b), the congressional mandate specifically recalled state efforts to thwart
VRA. Within four days of the signing of the VRA, the CRD sued Alabama,
requirements. Amici developed the facts and legal arguments in each case, and
expended significant efforts to prepare factual records for trial. The Attorney
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United States Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Attorney General of the
United States 195 (1966). Three-judge federal courts struck the taxes as
on race and wealth. 252 F. Supp. at 242. The three-judge court found that a “primary
purpose” of “making payment of a poll tax a precondition to the right to vote was
the desire to disenfranchise the Negro and the poor white[s].” Id. at 245. While not
a “sufficient reason today for declaring it unconstitutional,” the court held that “the
right to vote is one of the fundamental personal rights included within the concept
of liberty” and it “clearly constitutes one of the most basic elements of our freedom.”
Id. at 245, 250. Because “only those who wish to vote pay the poll tax, the tax as
regarding the poll tax’s discriminatory origins dating back to “the Constitutional
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Convention of 1901.” 252 F. Supp. 95, 101 (M.D. Ala. 1966). Relying on this
history, the three-judge court held that the poll tax abridges the right to vote because
white supremacy and a segregated society. … In this environment the poll tax,
right to vote and would have struck the poll tax under the Fourteenth Amendment as
well:
[I]n my opinion, the fundamental issue in this case and one that should
be decided prior to reaching the Fifteenth Amendment issue is whether
any tax levied on voting and carrying the sanction of disfranchisement
for nonpayment is constitutionally permissible under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I am of the firm opinion that it is
not. The poll tax is invalid in its very conception; the principle of a tax
on the right to vote is constitutionally indefensible.
Id. at 105.
Before the Virginia or Mississippi poll tax cases were resolved, the Supreme
Court decided Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
Marshall presented the views of the CRD as amicus curiae. See id. at 664. The Court
held that “a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
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Section 10(a)(ii) of the VRA, the Court held that “wealth or fee paying has, in our
view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too
presiding over CRD’s poll tax cases against Mississippi and Virginia thereafter ruled
in conformance with Harper. See United States v. Mississippi, 11 Race Rel. L. Rep.
837 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 1966); United States v. Virginia, 11 Race Rel. L. Rep. 853
In sum, amici’s experience preparing and trying these poll tax cases confirms
Congress’ findings in Section 10 of the VRA. That experience teaches that imposing
financial cost on suffrage, a cost that poor people can ill afford and that has a
preclearance for any future voting prerequisites—allowed amici to ensure that pay-
to-vote schemes did not resurface under different banners after eliminating the
formal poll tax. These prophylactic measures remained until the Supreme Court
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still exists; no one doubts that.” Id. at 536. But national circumstances had changed
markedly since 1965, and “these improvements are in large part because of the
Voting Rights Act. The Act has proved immensely successful at redressing racial
discrimination and integrating the voting process.” Id. at 548 (original emphasis).
provisions of Section 5 had not changed over the years, and the Supreme Court found
it no longer met constitutional standards. At the same time, the Supreme Court took
care to emphasize that the “decision in no way affects the permanent, nation-wide
The practical import of Shelby County is that the role performed by amici from
1965 until 2013—i.e., scrutinizing under Section 5, as the surrogate of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, any new “voting qualification or
3
Prior to the Shelby County decision, five Florida counties (Collier, Hardee, Hendry,
Hillsborough and Monroe) were subject to the Section 5 preclearance requirements.
United States Department of Justice, Jurisdictions Previously Covered By Section 5
at the Time of the Shelby County Decision, https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-
previously-covered-section-5 (last updated Mar. 11, 2020). Because state-wide
changes in voting procedures would be implemented in those counties, the Florida
law at issue here would have been reviewed under Section 5. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.23
(2020).
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to federal courts in the various states. Amici emphasize the importance of this new
role of federal courts analyzing new state prerequisites to voting. Here, the Court
must play that role in scrutinizing Florida’s pay-to-vote law under the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment, which forbids conditioning the right to vote on the payment of
Though cloaked in new labels, Florida’s pay-to-vote system is simply another poll
tax substitute imposing a financial bar to voting that the Constitution bans and that
courts rejected long ago. The District Court saw this voter paywall for what it is and
correctly held that (1) court fees and costs constitute “taxes,” and therefore (2) the
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to
pay any poll tax or other tax.” No showing of any type of ‘intent,’ discriminatory or
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otherwise, is required to establish a violation, only proof that a law conditions voting
on payment of a tax.4
Thus, the “only real issue is whether the financial obligations now at issue are
taxes.” A1106. As this Court noted at the preliminary injunction stage of the case,
part, on “facts about the function of these fees in the criminal justice system.” Jones
v. Governor of Florida, 950 F.3d 795, 807 n.8 (11th Cir. 2020). The District Court
conducted a detailed analysis of the evidence presented at trial regarding the function
of these fees, and reasonably found that they are plainly “taxes.”5 See A1109-A1113.
That finding ends the inquiry.6 Florida does not dispute that the payment is a
precondition to voting in the upcoming election for President and other federal
4
The relief afforded by the District Court below may well be too narrow. The
Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits conditioning the right to vote on any tax, not
only on taxes a person cannot afford to pay.
5
The District Court’s careful analysis comports with guidance issued by this Court
less than two weeks ago in the context of claim challenging the constitutionality of
an Alabama law requiring voters to present a free photo identification card. See
Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Alabama, No. 18-10151, 2020 WL 4185801 (11th
Cir. July 21, 2020). Writing for this Court, Judge Branch emphasized: “We approach
this case with caution, bearing in mind that these circumstances involve one of the
most fundamental rights of our citizens: the right to vote.” Id. at *8 (internal citations
omitted).
6
Florida agrees that “[t]his Court reviews factual findings for clear error.”
Appellants’ En Banc Opening Br. at 12.
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offices, and any tax that is imposed as a precondition to voting in that election
The District Court’s determination that the fees are taxes follows from the
approach” looks beyond the legislature’s “choice of label” for these exactions,
acknowledges that contrary labels do “not alter their essential character as taxes,”
Id. at 565-66. The most significant factor is whether the subject “process yields the
essential feature of any tax: It produces at least some revenue for the Government.”
Id. at 564.
“essential feature of any tax.” Id. As the District Court found, they “are assessed for
the sole or at least primary purpose of raising revenue to pay for government
A1112. The fees also contain no scienter requirement, and are assessed for any
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felony regardless of whether the underlying criminal offense required proof of intent.
These facts are plain on the face of the authorizing statutes and confirms that the fees
are taxes. Each fee statute is expressly drawn by the Florida Legislature to generate
revenue, to mandate a specific operational purpose for which the revenue must be
used, and to require collection of the revenue for any felony regardless of intent. For
example:
section shall be remitted to the Department of Revenue for deposit in the Crimes
Compensation Trust Fund.” Id. (emphasis added). The funds must be used “for
the payment of all necessary and proper expenses incurred by the operation of
the department.” § 960.21, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The sole purpose of this
court cost is raising revenue to pay for the government’s operational costs of
collecting fines.
Section 775.083(2), Florida Statutes. The “court costs imposed by this section
shall be $50 for a felony.” § 775.083(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). These funds
“shall be deposited by the clerk of the court into an appropriate county account
for disbursement for the purposes provided in this subsection.” Id. In particular,
the government “must expend such funds for crime prevention programs.” Id.
(emphasis added). The sole purpose of this $50 fee is raising revenue to pay for
crime prevention programs.
The plain terms of the fee statutes written by the Florida Legislature establish that
identification requirements supports the conclusion that court fees function as “other
by the government.” 553 U.S. 181, 185 (2008). Critically, Indiana’s statute had no
pay-to-vote component because “the State offers free photo identification cards.” Id.
at 186. The Court analyzed the “burdens” associated with the law and found them
constitutionality.” Id. at 197. But in reaching that holding, the Court cited Harper v.
Indiana required payment of a fee to obtain the identification card, rather than
The fact that most voters already possess a valid driver’s license, or
some other form of acceptable identification, would not save the statute
under our reasoning in Harper, if the State required voters to pay a
tax or a fee to obtain a new photo identification. But just as other
States provide free voter registration cards, the photo identification
cards issued by Indiana's BMV are also free.
4185801, at *12-13. Writing for the Court, Judge Branch correctly relied upon the
Crawford” the challenged law “provides free photo voter ID cards to any Alabamian
who wants one.” Id. at *13 (emphasis added). In upholding the Alabama law, this
Court repeatedly emphasized the fact that the Supreme Court deemed critical—that
the ID cards were made available to the public free of charge. Id. at *6 (“Alabama
has advertised the photo ID requirement and the availability of free voter IDs”); *10
(“free IDs are issued”); *17 (the law “offers free photo IDs to Alabama citizens who
wish to obtain one”); *20 (“any Alabamian who wants one could obtain a free photo
ID from the state”); *28 (Alabama makes it “free for voters who lack a valid ID but
wish to obtain one”). The outcome would have been different if Alabama required
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Alabamians to pay money for the ID card, as Florida requires Floridians to pay fees
to vote here.
Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2009) also
provides support for holding that Florida’s fee requirement must fail as a tax under
be obtained for a fee of $20 to $35.” Id. at 1346. The plaintiffs “alleged that the
statute imposed a poll tax in violation of the Twenty–Fourth Amendment.” Id. The
success on the merits of their claims that the statute unduly burdened the right to
vote and constituted a poll tax.” Id. During the pendency of the appeal, the state
abandoned the $20-$35 fee and enacted a new statute that “requires each county to
issue free of charge a ‘Georgia voter identification card.’” Id. (emphasis added).
The appeal continued on other issues, but the plaintiffs “sought attorney’s fees and
expenses for their challenge of the earlier statute that charged a fee for voter
identification cards” under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the “district court
determined that the NAACP and voters were prevailing parties as to their challenge
of that statute as a poll tax, and it awarded attorney's fees.” Id. at 1349. This Court
claim at the preliminary injunction stage and the award of “attorney’s fees for [the]
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challenge of the earlier statute that charged a fee for a voter identification card.” Id.
at 1355. Implicit in this Court’s holding is the recognition that conditioning voting
Twenty-Fourth Amendment.
This Court should also reject Florida’s argument that the “Twenty-Fourth
Amendment does not apply” because only felons must pay the fees as a prerequisite
to voting. Appellant’s Br. at 44. That cannot be a defense. If it were, then it would
mean that Florida could enact legislation requiring felons to certify payment of state
a voting booth, or any other imaginable paywalls to voting—so long as they apply
Supreme Court precedent in finding it “clear that the abridgement of a felon’s right
to vote is still subject to constitutional limitations; states do not have carte blanche
to deny access to the franchise to some felons and not others.” Jones, 950 F.3d at
822 (emphasis added). That conclusion flows from the only logical interpretation of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v. Ramirez, where the Court upheld a
state’s whole-cloth exclusion of convicted felons but remanded for further analysis
of the “alternative contention that there was such a total lack of uniformity in county
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denial of equal protection.” 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974). The same basic principle
underlies Johnson v. Governor of Florida, where this Court upheld the Florida’s law
excluding all felons not granted clemency, but noted that “[u]nder Florida’s Rules
of Executive Clemency, however, the right to vote can still be granted to felons who
cannot afford to pay restitution” and “Florida does not deny access to the restoration
of the franchise based on ability to pay.” 405 F.3d 1214, 1216–1217 n.1 (11th Cir.
2005) (en banc). The Johnson Court never held that laws conditioning a felon’s right
Having repealed the exclusion of all felons from the franchise, the
Constitution prohibits Florida from now selectively withholding the franchise under
a “system which excludes those … who fail to pay.” Harper, 383 U.S. at 668. The
the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation
of Rule 29(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure because the brief
contains 6,051 words, excluding the parts of the brief excepted by 11th Cir. R. 29-
3.
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the type style requirements of Rule
32(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure because this brief has been
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 3, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of Court through the CM/ECF system. I further certify that
the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record via
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EXHIBIT A
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EXHIBIT A
1
The first line under each name identifies the attorney’s period of service in the Civil
Rights Division. Remaining lines identify the position(s) involving voting-rights
enforcement that the person held for all or some of her/his period of service.
A-1
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A-2
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A-3