Constitutional Law Review

Art. VI Case Digest Compilation

Silliman University – College of Law

1. Sameer Overseas Placement vs. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, Aug. 5, 2014

ISSUE: Is it within the ambit of legislative power when Congress re-enacted the “or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” clause of R.A. 8042 --- which was already
declared unconstitutional?

RULING: No. When a law or a provision thereof is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision.
No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any matter inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The law passed
incorporates the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial
change in the circumstances. Therefore, the Court finds no reason to change its ruling finding the clause
unconstitutional.

2. Imbong vs. Ochoa, 204819, April 8, 2014

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL)?

RULING: No. Under RA 3720, as amended by RA 9711, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA
are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the RH law. The FDA does not only have
the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the
only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. The reason is
the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention.

3. Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335. February 18, 2014

ISSUE: Did Congress invalidly delegate its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient
standards or parameters for it to follow?

RULING: No. Sec. 24 & 26 of the law regarding the CICC fulfills the two tests for due delegation of
power. Under the Completeness Test, the Cybercrime Law is complete in itself when it directed the
CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. It is complete because the CICC merely
has to enforce the law. Under the Sufficient Standard Test, the law gave sufficient standards for the
CICC’s powers when it defined “cybersecurity” as “collection of tools, policies, risk management
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurances and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and user’s assets.”

4. Grande vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

ISSUE: Are Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar Gen. Adm. Order No. 1, Series of 2004
insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s
recognition of his paternity, accurate and correct interpretation of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by RA 9255?

RULING: No. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an
illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend
the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature.
Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an
administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.

5. Belgica vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. 208566, etc., November 19, 2013
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ISSUES: 1) Are post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund violative of the non-delegability of legislative functions?
2) Does the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power?
3) Does the PDAF lump-sum appropriation render nugatory the "item veto power of the
President?

RULING: 1) Yes. The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority
to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in
Congress.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as
described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform
the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow.

2) No. To constitute a valid appropriation there must be 1) a determinable amount of money placed in a
fund and 2) the designated purpose for which it is applied. No particular form of words is necessary for
the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a
Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any
and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" (a specified public purpose).

3) Yes. In the current system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification
of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system
forces the President to decide between:
(a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of
the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and
(b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

6. Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, etc., July 1, 2014

ISSUES: 1) Is a law required to adopt or implement the Disbursement Acceleration Program?

2) Are unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP savings?
3) Are cross border transfers, constitutionally permissible? Did the DAP violate the prohibition
against cross-border transfers?
4) Was the sourcing of the DAP from unprogrammed funds despite the original revenue targets not
having been exceeded, valid?

7. Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, etc., Feb. 03, 2015

ISSUES: 1) Is “savings”, as a concept, an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative,
instead of judicial, determination?
2) Can the power to augment be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA?
3) Does the prohibition against cross-border transfer apply to appropriation and not to savings?
4) In an appropriation measure, is there is constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment
classes within an item?

8. Giron vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and 14
(Repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code) in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1),
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Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one subject-one title” rule. Petitioner avers that these
provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Sec. 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Sec. 26(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one subject-one title” rule?

RULING: No. The proscription under the “one subject-one title rule” merely calls for all parts of an act
relating to its subject finding expression in its title. Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter
and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple the power of legislation. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object.

After careful analysis, the Court found that the assailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and
Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed germane to the subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An
Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices. The title was worded broadly enough to include the measures embodied in the assailed
sections.

9. Imbong vs. Ochoa, 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS: The petitioners question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Sec. 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for
reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.

ISSUE: Does R.A. 10354, “The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012,” violate
Sec. 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one subject-one title” rule?

RULING: No. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put
on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act.

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears
to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents
of the assailed legislation.

10. St. Luke’s vs. BIR Commissioner, G.R. 195909, Sept. 21, 2012

FACTS: St. Luke's is a hospital organized as a non-stock and non-profit corporation. The BIR assessed
St. Luke's deficiency taxes for 1998, comprised of deficiency income tax, value-added tax, withholding
tax on compensation and expanded withholding tax.

The BIR argued that Sec. 27(B) of the NIRC, which imposes a 10% preferential tax rate on the income of
proprietary non-profit hospitals, should be applicable to St. Luke's. According to the BIR, Sec. 27(B) is a
specific provision which prevails over the general exemption on income tax granted under Section 30(E)
and (G) for non-stock, non-profit charitable institutions and civic organizations promoting social welfare.

St. Luke's maintained that it is a non-stock and non-profit institution for charitable and social welfare
purposes under Section 30(E) and (G) of the NIRC. It argued that the making of profit per se does not
destroy its income tax exemption.

ISSUE: Does “non-profit” necessarily mean “charitable”? Is St. Luke’s Medical Center, which is
organized as a non-stock and non-profit charitable institution, automatically tax-exempt?
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RULING: 1) No. “Non-profit” does not necessarily mean “charitable.” An organization may be
considered as non-profit if it does not distribute any part of its income to stockholders or members. To be
a charitable institution, however, an organization must meet the substantive test of charity in the Lung
Center doctrine. It provides for the test of charity in our jurisdiction. Charity is essentially a gift to an
indefinite number of persons which lessens the burden of government. In other words, charitable
institutions provide for free goods and services to the public which would otherwise fall on the shoulders
of government. Thus, as a matter of efficiency, the government forgoes taxes which should have been
spent to address public needs, because certain private entities already assume a part of the burden. This is
the rationale for the tax exemption of charitable institutions. 

2) No. There is no dispute that St. Luke's is organized as a non-stock and non-profit charitable institution.
However, this does not automatically exempt St. Luke's from paying taxes. This only refers to the
organization of St. Luke's. Even if St. Luke's meets the test of charity, a charitable institution is not ipso
facto tax exempt. To be exempt from real property taxes, Section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution
requires that a charitable institution use the property "actually, directly and exclusively" for charitable
purposes. To be exempt from income taxes, Section 30(E) of the NIRC requires that a charitable
institution must be "organized and operated exclusively" for charitable purposes. Likewise, to be exempt
from income taxes, Section 30(G) of the NIRC requires that the institution be "operated exclusively" for
social welfare.

St. Luke's fails to meet the requirements under Section 30(E) and (G) of the NIRC to be completely tax
exempt from all its income. However, it remains a proprietary non-profit hospital under Section 27(B) of
the NIRC as long as it does not distribute any of its profits to its members and such profits are reinvested
pursuant to its corporate purposes. St. Luke's, as a proprietary non-profit hospital, is entitled to the
preferential tax rate of 10% on its net income from its for-profit activities.

11. Dimagiba vs. Espartero, G.R. No. 154952, 16 July 2012

ISSUE: Are Sec. 27, R.A. No. 6770 and Sec. 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7, violative of Sec. 30, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution?

RULING: Yes. They are unconstitutional insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC. The provisions violate Sec. 30, Article
VI of the Constitution as it expanded the SC’s appellate jurisdiction without their advice and concurrence.
They were also inconsistent with Sec. 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for
review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of judgments or final orders of the CA, the
Sandiganbayan, the CTA, the RTC, or other courts authorized by law.

In line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

2 0 1 2 B A R MCQ. Which of the following best exemplifies how the system of checks and balances
is carried out: ____.
A. the legislature passes a law that prohibits the president from commuting a judicially imposed
sentence, as a check of the president;
B. the President pardons a convict as a way to set aside or modify a judgment of the judiciary;
C. the judiciary overturns a pardon granted by the President as a check on executions;
D. the President pardons an accused after arraignment in the interest of justice .

2 0 1 2 B A R MCQ. Which phrase best completes the statement--- The starting point of the principle
of separation of powers is the assumption of the division of the functions of government
into three distinct classes: _____.
A. the bill of rights, state policies, and social justice and human rights;
B. the accountability of public officers, the constitutional commissions, and the national economy and
patrimony;
C. the self-executing provisions, the non-self-executing provisions, and the self-evident social justice
provisions;
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D. the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.

2010 BAR Rudy Domingo, 38 years old, natural-born Filipino and a resident of the Philippines
since birth, is a Manila-based entrepreneur who runs KABAKA, a coalition of peoples’ organizations
from fisherfolk communities. KABAKA’s operations consist of empowering fisherfolk leaders through
livelihood projects and trainings on good governance. The Dutch Foundation for Global Initiatives, a
private organization registered in The Netherlands, receives a huge subsidy from the Dutch Foreign
Ministry, which, in turn is allocated worldwide to the Foundation’s partners like KABAKA. Rudy seeks
to register KABAKA as a party-list with himself as a nominee of the coalition. Will KABAKA and Rudy
be qualified as a party-list and a nominee, respectively? Decide with reasons.

ANSWER: NO, Kabaka and Rudy will not be qualified as party-list and nominee because KABAKA is a
partner of Dutch Foreign Ministry a foreign based organization. KABAKA is indirectly receiving support
from Dutch Ministry. It is therefore disqualified to be registered as a party-list. (Section2(5), Article IX-C
of the Constitution).
Under the law, the following are grounds for disqualification for registration in the party-list system:
1. It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
3. It is a foreign party or organization;
4. It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.”

2012 BAR Article V1, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires that for a city to be entitled to have
at least one representative , its population shall be at least: _____.
A. 250,000; C. 100,000;
B. 150,000; D. 175,000.

2 0 1 2 B A R Which of the following can be changed by an ordinary law enacted by Congress?

A. Commencement of the term of office of Senators: _____.
B. Date of regular election for President and Vice Presidential;
C. Authority to transfer appropriation;
D. Regular election of the members of Congress.

2 0 1 2 B A R MCQ. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall be privileged from

arrest while Congress is in session for all offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than: _____.
A. life imprisonment; C. six years imprisonment;
B. reclusion perpetua; D. four years imprisonment.

2010 BAR Congresswoman A is a co-owner of an industrial estate in Sta. Rosa, Laguna which she
had declared in her Statement of Assets and Liabilities. A member of her political party authored a bill
which would provide a 5-year development plan for all industrial estates in the Southern Tagalog Region
to attract investors. The plan included an appropriation of 2 billion pesos for construction of roads around
the estates. When the bill finally became law, a civil society watchdog questioned the constitutionality of
the law as it obviously benefitted Congresswoman A’s industrial estate. Decide with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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The law is a valid exercise of police power although it may indirectly benefited a Congresswoman but the
purpose of the law to provide a 5-year plant for all industrial estates is reasonable thus, it conform to the
twin requisite of lawful subject and lawful means for a valid exercise police power. However, the
congresswoman could be sanctioned by the House of Representative for failure to notify the House of a
potential conflict of interest in the filing of the proposed legislation of which they author.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The law is constitutional. Section 12, Article VI of the Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of a
law which will benefit the business interests of a member of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
It only requires that if the member of Congress whose business interests will be benefited by the law is
the one who will file the bill, he should notify the House concerned of the potential conflict of interest.

2 0 1 3 B A R In the May 2013 elections, the Allied Workers' Group of the Philippines (AWGP),
representing land-based and sea-based workers in the Philippines and overseas, won in the party list
congressional elections. Atty. Abling, a labor lawyer, is its nominee. As part of the party's advocacy and
services, Congressman Abling engages in labor counseling, particularly for local workers with claims
against their employers and for those who need representation in collective bargaining negotiations with
employers. When labor cases arise, AWGP enters its appearance in representation of the workers and the
Congressman makes it a point to be there to accompany the workers, although a retained counsel also
formally enters his appearance and is invariably there. Congressman Abling largely takes a passive role in
the proceedings although he occasionally speaks to supplement the retained counsel's statements. It is
otherwise in CBA negotiations where he actively participates. Management lawyers, feeling that a
congressman should not actively participate in cases before labor tribunals and before employers because
of the influence a congressman can wield, filed a disbarment case against the Congressman before the
Supreme Court for his violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for breach of trust, in
relation particularly with the prohibitions on legislators under the Constitution. Is the cited ground for
disbarment meritorious?

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Being a congressman, Atty. Abling is disqualified under Article VI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution
from personally appearing as counsel before quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies handling labor
cases constitutes personal appearance before them (Puyat vs. De Guzman, 135 SCRA 33). His
involvement in collective bargaining negotiations also involves practice of law, because he is making use
of his knowledge for the benefit of others (Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210). The Bureau of Labor
Relations is involved in collective bargaining negotiations (Article 250 of the Labor Code).

Atty. Abling should not be disbarred but should be merely suspended from the practice of law.
Suspension is the appropriate penalty for involvement in the unlawful practice of law (Tapay vs. Bancolo,
694 SCAR 1).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

No, Congressman Abling cannot be disbarred. A retained counsel formally appears for AWGP. His role is
largely passive and cannot be considered as personal appearance. His participation in the collective
bargaining negotiations does not entail personal appearance before an administrative body (Article VI,
Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

No, the ground for disbarment is not meritorious. The Supreme Court said that the determination of the
acts which constitute disorderly behavior is within the discretionary authority of the House concerned,
and the Court will not review such determination, the same being a political question (Osmeña v.
Pendatun, 109 Phil 863).
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2 0 1 0 B A R The House Committee on Appropriations conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation into

alleged irregular and anomalous disbursements of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) and
Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA) of Congressmen as exposed by X, a Division Chief of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Implicated in the questionable disbursements are high
officials of the Palace. The House Committee summoned X and the DBM Secretary to appear and testify.
X refused to appear, while the Secretary appeared but refused to testify invoking executive privilege.
A. May X be compelled to appear and testify? If yes, what sanction may be imposed on him?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YES. Individuals invited to a legislative inquiry can be anybody whether an executive head or not. The
inquiry is in aid of legislation which is to elicit information useful for legislation not for prosecution or
persecution. The attendance of the resource person is mandatory and can be compelled through
compulsory processes. Only the President or the Executive Secretary by order of the President can invoke
executive privilege (Senate of Philippines vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 13 [2006]). He may be cited for
contempt if he fails to attend.
B. Is the Budget Secretary shielded by executive privilege from responding to the inquiries of the House
Committee? Explain briefly. If the answer is no, is there any sanction that may be imposed upon him?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO, executive privilege is granted to the President himself not to anybody else. It is the president who
shall invoke the privilege. The inquiry is in aid of legislation and neither the President nor Executive
Secretary by order of the President invoke executive privilege (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, 438
SCRA 1 [2006]). Citation for contempt can be imposed.

2 0 1 2 B A R MCQ. Congress shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war by a
vote of: _____.
A. three-fourths of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting jointly;
B. two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting jointly;
C. two-thirds of both Houses in separate session assembled, voting jointly;
D. two-thirds of both Houses in joint session, voting separately.

2 0 1 0 B A R MCQ. If by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed: _____.
A. referred; C. refilled;
B. unacted; D. re-enacted.

2 0 1 2 B A R MCQ. The power of the President to veto any particular part in an appropriation revenue,
or tariff bill, is called the: _____.
A. specific veto; C. item veto;
B. revenue veto; D. monetary veto.

2 0 1 2 B A R Provisions unrelated to an appropriation bill are considered prohibited. These are called:
_____.
A. interlopers; C. outriggers;
B. riders; D. add-ons.

2 0 1 3 B A R MCQ. Senator GSC proposed a bill increasing excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol
products. The generated incremental revenues shall be used for the universal health care program for all
Filipinos and for tobacco farmers' livelihood. After the Senate passed the bill on third reading, it was
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transmitted to the House of Representatives which approved the bill in toto. The President eventually
signed it into law. Atty. JFC filed a petition before the Supreme Court, questioning the constitutionality of
the new law. Is the law constitutional? _____.
A. The law is constitutional because it is for a public purpose and has duly satisfied the three-readings-on-
separate-days rule in both Houses.
B. The law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; it is
limited only to alcohol and liquor products.
C. It is constitutional because of the Enrolled Bill Theory.
D. It is constitutional because it is valid in form and substance and complied with the required
lawmaking procedures.
E. None of the above is correct.

2 0 1 3 B A R MCQ. Who has control of the expenditure of public funds? _____.

A. The Office of the President through the Department of Budget and Management.
B. The House of Representatives from where all appropriation bills emanate.
C. The Senate through its Committee on Finance.
D. The Congress of the Republic of the Philippines.
E. Both the members of Congress and the President acting jointly, if so provided by the General
Appropriations Act.

2 0 0 9 B A R To address the pervasive problem of gambling, Congress is considering the following

options: (1) prohibit all forms of gambling; (2) allow gambling only on Sundays; (3) allow gambling only
in government-owned casinos; and (4) remove all prohibitions against gambling but impose a tax
equivalent to 30% on all winnings. If Congress chooses the last option and passes the corresponding law
imposing a 30% tax on all winnings and prizes won from gambling, would the law comply with the
constitutional limitations on the exercise of the power of taxation? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: NO. Because the lawful means is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of its objective. It adds more burden upon individuals.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A tax of 30% on winnings from gambling does not violate due process as
to the reasonableness of the rate of the tax imposed. Taxes on non-useful enterprises may be increased to
restrain the number of persons who might otherwise engage in it (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operatos Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). Taxes may be imposed for
the attainment of the objective of police power (Lutz vs. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 [1955]).

2 0 1 2 B A R MCQ. A tax is progressive when: _____.

A. the rate fluctuates as the tax base decreases;
B. the rate increases as the tax base remains the same;
C. the rate increases as the tax base increases;
D. the rate decreases as the tax base increases.

2 0 1 0 B A R The “Poverty Alleviation and Assistance Act” was passed to enhance the capacity of the
most marginalized families nationwide. A financial assistance scheme called “conditional cash transfers”
was initially funded 500 million pesos by Congress. One of the provisions of the law gave the Joint-
Congressional Oversight Committee authority to screen the list of beneficiary families initially
determined by the Secretary of Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to the
Department implementing rules. Mang Pandoy, a resident of Smokey Mountain in Tondo, questioned the
authority of the Committee. Is the grant of authority to the Oversight Committee to screen beneficiaries
constitutional? Decide with reasons.
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SUGGESTED ANSWER

The grant of authority to the oversight Committee to screen beneficiaries is unconstitutional. It violates
the principle of separation of powers. By being involved in the implementation of the law, the Oversight
Committee will be exercising executive power. (Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251
[2008]).

(ALTERNATIVE ANSWER)

No. While it is true that the Oversight power of congress is to scrutinize, investigate, and supervise that
the laws that it enacted is fully implemented, to secure authority to screen beneficiaries is an unfair
interference with the personal liberty or property of individual. It is more of an intrusion than an
overseeing.

2 0 1 2 B A R MCQ. A statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to

present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through
a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they may take effect, is a: _____.
A. legislative encroachment; C. legislative oversight;
B. legislative veto; D. legislative scrutiny.
2012 BAR MCQ. The constitutional provision on initiative and referendum is not self-
executory. This is so because it requires: _____.
A. an implementing resolution from the COMELEC ;
B. an implementing resolution from the Supreme Court;
C. an implementing legislation;
D. an implementing resolution from the party-list representatives of the House of Representatives.

2 0 1 4 B A R Several citizens, unhappy with the proliferation of families dominating the political
landscape, decided to take matters into their own hands. They proposed to come up with a people’s
initiative defining political dynasties. They started a signature campaign for the purpose of coming up
with a petition for that purpose. Some others expressed misgivings about a people’s initiative for the
purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, however. They cited the Court’s decision in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), as authority for their position that there is
yet no enabling law for such purpose. On the other hand, there are also those who claim that the
individual votes of the justices in Lambino v. Commission on Elections, 505 SCRA 160 (2006), mean
that Santiago’s pronouncement has effectively been abandoned. If you were consulted by those behind the
new attempt at a people’s initiative, how would you advise them?

ANSWER

I will advise the proponents to go ahead with the Initiative pursuant to RA 6735 and to strictly comply
with the requirements of law enumerated in the Court’s ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC and reiterated in
the Lambino case (where the SC stated that there is no need to revisit the sufficiency of RA 6735 under
Santiago v. COMELEC). In other words, any discussion on the sufficiency of RA 6735 is an obiter
dictum. The subsequent “reiteration” of the separate opinions of the 10 members of the Supreme Court
does not change that fact. Besides, the People’s Initiative that is being contemplated here is not for the
purpose of amending the constitution pursuant to RA 6735 declared by the Supreme Court as
“Inadequate, ineffective and wanting of essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause
on proposal to amend the constitution,” but on initiative on statute that is, to propose a law defining
“political dynasty.”
People’s initiative to propose a national statute is allowed under RA 6735. Thus, a law defining Political
Dynasty may be proposed thru a petition signed by at least 10% of the total number registered voters, of
which every legislative districts is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof, and such
petition is to be filed with the COMELEC.
Constitutional Law Review
Art. VI Case Digest Compilation
Silliman University – College of Law
(ADDITIONAL INFO/MAY BE OMITTED: It must be noted that the proposed legislative measure
which seeks to define political dynasties must be made applicable only to those elected officers whose
qualifications are provided by law, not to those whose qualifications are provided in the Constitution, e.g.
President, VP, Senators, HoR members. A disqualification is a qualification expressed in a negative way.
Hence, to include these constitutionally qualified officers might be a constitutional amendment upon their
qualifications.)