DAVID v.

MARQUEZ

Eileen P. David Vs. Glenda S. Marquez

G.R. No. 209859

June 5, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent Glenda Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc, Manila and that
sometime in March 2005, petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and represented that she could
recruit her to work abroad. It was further alleged that petitioner demanded payment of placement fees
and other expenses from the respondent for the processing of the latter's application, to which the
respondent heeded. Respondent's application was, however, denied and worse, the money that she put
out therefore was never returned. In her Counter-Affidavit and Counter Charge, petitioner averred that
it was physically impossible for her to have committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the alleged
time of recruitment as evidenced by the entries in her passport. Petitioner further averred that she was
never engaged in the recruitment business. The petitioner alleged that the amount deposited in her
account was not for her but was just coursed through her to be given to her friend in Canada who was
the one processing respondent's application, as evidenced by a certification to that effect issued by the
said friend. Further, petitioner argued before the Prosecutor that assuming arguendo that the
allegations of recruitment were true, the case should be filed in Kidapawan City and not in Manila.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa.

2. Whether or not the respondent, on her own, have legal personality to file the petition for certiorari
before the CA.

HELD:
1. Yes. The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. The express
provision of the law is clear that the filing of criminal actions arising from illegal recruitment before the
RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense is allowed. Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising from such illegal recruitment activities,
the outright dismissal thereof due to lack of jurisdiction was not proper, considering that as per the
allegations in the Information, the same was within the jurisdiction of Manila. During the• preliminary
investigation of the cases, respondent even presented evidence that some of the essential elements of
the crime were committed within Manila, such as the payment of processing and/or placement fees,
considering that these were deposited in certain banks located in Manila.

2. Yes. The respondent has the legal personality to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Court has
ruled that a private offended party can file a special civil action for certiorari questioning ttie trial court's
order acquitting the accused or dismissing the case, viz: In such special civil action for certiorari filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the
petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so
he/she may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of
Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in the name of said complainant.

2. DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA v. EMMANUEL D. SAPIGAO, GR No. 223844, 2017-06-28

Facts:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint Affidavit[5] filed by Cariaga... accusing
respondents Emmanuel D. Sapigao (Sapigao) and Ginalyn C. Acosta (Acosta; collectively,
respondents) of the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification, and
Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
Cariaga alleged that respondents, in their respective capacities as Barangay Chairman and
Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan, made two (2) spurious entries in
the barangay blotter,... , (a) Entry No. 00054[6] dated August 3, 2012[7]... stating that an
unnamed resident reported that someone was firing a gun inside Cariaga's compound, and
that when Sapigao went thereat, he was able to confirm that the gunfire came from inside
the compound and was directed towards the adjacent ricefields;... and (b) Entry No.
00057[8] dated September 26, 2012 stating that a concerned but unnamed resident
reported to Sapigao that Cariaga and his companions attended the funeral march of former
Kagawad Rodrigo Calivo, Sr. (Calivo, Sr.) with firearms visibly tucked in their waists (blotter
entries).
the police authorities used the blotter entries to obtain a warrant for the search and seizure
operation made inside his residence and cattle farm on December 18, 2012. While such
operation resulted in the confiscation of a firearm and several ammunitions, the criminal
case for illegal possession of firearms consequently filed against him was dismissed by the
Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City.[
Cariaga filed the said complaint, docketed as NPS-I-01e-INV-14B-00084.[10] In his
defense,[11] Sapigao denied the accusations against him, maintaining that the blotter
entries were true, as he personally witnessed their details.
OPP dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.
the OPP pointed out that Cariaga's complaint and supporting affidavits, which mainly
consist of a general and blanket denial of the incidents described in the blotter entries, could
not prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of Sapigao and his witnesses.[17]
Aggrieved, he filed a petition for review[20] before the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor (ORSP) - Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.[21]... the ORSP affirmed the OPP's ruling.
The ORSP found that absent any showing of ill-motive on respondents' part in making the
blotter entries, there can be no basis to charge them of Falsification of Private Documents.
the ORSP ruled that the blotter entries were not intended to malign, dishonor, nor defame
Cariaga; as such, respondents could not be said to have committed the crime of Slander by
Deed.[24]
Undaunted, Cariaga moved for reconsideration,[26] but the same was denied in a
Resolution[27] dated March 14, 2015. Thus, he filed a petition for review[28] before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 140206.
CA dismissed Cariaga's petition before it.
It held that the ORSP is not the final authority in the hierarchy of the National Prosecution
Service, as one could still appeal an unfavorable ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice
(SOJ).
As such, Cariaga's direct and immediate recourse to the CA to assail the ORSP ruling
without first filing a petition for review before the SOJ violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, the dismissal of Cariaga's petition for review is warranted.
[30]
Issues:
whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Cariaga's petition for review before it on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling:
The petition must be denied.
This is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling should
the former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice.
In the instant case, Cariaga filed a complaint before the OPP in Pangasinan (i.e., outside
the NCR) accusing respondents of committing the crimes of Falsification of Public
Documents, False Certification, and Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles
171, 174, and 359 of the RPC. Of the crimes charged, only False Certification and Slander
by Deed are cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs,[38] while Falsification of Public
Documents is cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.[39]
Applying the prevailing rule on the appeals process of the NPS, the ruling of the ORSP as
regards Falsification of Public Documents may still be appealed to the SOJ before resort to
the courts may be availed of. On the other hand, the ruling of the ORSP pertaining to False
Certification and Slander by Deed should already be deemed final - at least insofar as the
NPS is concerned - and thus, may already be elevated to the courts.
Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition before it on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents may be referred to the SOJ, while the ORSP ruling
regarding the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed may already be elevated
before the courts.
In the instant case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the ORSP correctly ruled
that there is no probable cause to indict respondents of the crimes of Slander by Deed and
False Certification.
there was no improper motive on the part of respondents in making the blotter entries as
they were made in good faith; in the performance of their official duties as barangay
officials; and without any intention to malign, dishonor, or defame Cariaga.
On the other hand, Cariaga's insistence that the blotter entries were completely false
essentially rests on mere self-serving assertions that deserve no weight in law.[43] Thus,
respondents cannot be said to have committed the crime of Slander by Deed.
Furthermore, suffice it to say that the mere act of authenticating photocopies of the blotter
entries cannot be equated to committing the crime of False Certification under the law. In
sum, the ORSP correctly found no probable cause to indict respondents of the said crimes.
Principles:
all petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
except in the National Capital Region, shall be filed with the Regional State Prosecutor
concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality
Appeals from resolutions of Provincial or City Prosecutors, except those from the National
Capital Region, in all other cases shall be by way of a petition for review to the Office of
Secretary of Justice.
"However, when there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits
may be had — as in this case — the Court may dispense with the time-consuming
procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to
better serve the ends of justice."[40]
A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause — that is, one made for the purpose
of filing an information in court — is essentially an executive function and, therefore,
generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such
determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible
through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It is fundamental that the concept of grave abuse
of discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it properly pertains to a jurisdictional
aberration.

3. PEOPLE v. BARTE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDDIE BARTE Y MENDOZA, Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 179749

March 1, 2017

Facts:

Under review is the decision promulgated on September 26, 2006, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision rendered on May 18, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28, in
Mandaue City convicting the accused-appellant of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
as amended, and sentencing him accordingly. Eddie Barte Y Mendoza was charged in the RTC with a
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, following his arrest for selling a quantity of
shabu worth P l00.00 to a police officer-poseur buyer in the evening of August 10, 2002 during a buy-
bust operation conducted in Consuelo Village, Mandaue City.

P02 Rico Cabatingan, a witness for the Prosecution, declared that he and other police officers conducted
the buy-bust operation at about 9:30 in the evening of August 10, 2002 on the basis of information
received to the effect that the accused-appellant was engaged in the sale of shabu. During the pre-
operation conference, P02 Cabatingan was designated as the poseur buyer, and his back-up officers
were P02 Baylosis and P03 Ompad. P/Insp. Grado provided the buy-bust money with marked serial
number to P02 Cabatingan. The buy-bust team then proceeded to Consuela Village at about 9:10 of that
evening on board a Suzuki multicab driven by P03 Ompad. At the target area, P02 Cabatingan met with
the accused-appellant, and informed the latter that he wanted to buy shabu worth "a peso." Upon the
accused-appellant's assent to his offer, P02 Cabatingan handed the buy¬bust money to him, and in turn
the latter gave to him a small sachet with white colored contents. P02 Cabatingan then gave the pre-
arranged signal by touching his head. The other officers rushed forward and identified themselves to the
accused-appellant as policemen. They frisked and arrested him, and brought him to the police station.
In his defense, the accused-appellant declared that he was sitting alone near the chapel of Basak,
Mandaue City near their house in Consuela Village at around 9:30 in the evening of August 10, 2002
when police officers suddenly came and arrested him. In undertaking his arrest, the officers pointed
their guns at him and forced him to go with them. They brought him to the police precinct on a Suzuki
multicab, and upon their reaching the station, the arresting officers searched his person and found his ID
inside his wallet. He was not informed of the reason for his arrest. He was subsequently detained. The
arresting officers only informed him of the charges against him on the next day.

RTC rendered its decision on May 18, 2004 convicting the accused-appellant, and giving full credence to
the testimony of P02 Cabatingan, and ruled that the Prosecution thereby established that the accused-
appellant had sold shabu to P02 Cabatingan. Upon the appeal of the accused-appellant, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC decision and likewise denied his motion for reconsideration on August 8, 2007.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged in violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling:

No, the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged in violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Evidently, it is the Court’s jurisdiction that it convicts the
accused only when his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. Conformably with this standard, it
is mandated as an appellate court to sift the records and search for every error, though unassigned in
the appeal, in order to ensure that the conviction is warranted, and to correct every error that the lower
court has committed in finding guilt against the accused.

Courts are cognizant of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of public officers.
This presumption can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove either of two things, namely: ( 1)
that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper
motive. It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are "susceptible to police abuse, the
most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion." The high possibility of abuse was precisely the
reason why the procedural safeguards embodied in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 have been put up as a
means to minimize, if not eradicate such abuse. The procedural safeguards not only protect the
innocent from abuse and violation of their rights but also guide the law enforcers on ensuring the
integrity of the evidence to be presented in court. In the prosecution of the crime of selling a dangerous
drug, the following elements must be proven, to wit: ( 1) the identities of the buyer, seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other
hand, the essential requisites of illegal possession of dangerous drugs that must be established are the
following, namely: (1) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.

Such non-compliance with the procedural safeguards under Section 21 was fatal because it cast doubt
on the integrity of the evidence presented in court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust
operation. The failure to prove the chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the Prosecution did
not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during the trial was the very
same one delivered by the accused-appellant to the poseur buyer.

Therefore, the Court acquits accused EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA of the violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, as amended; and directs the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to release
EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA from custody unless he is detained thereat for another lawful cause.

4. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO v. PEOPLE
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Vs. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan/Benigno B. Aguas Vs.
Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 220598/G.R. No. 220953
April 18, 2017

FACTS:

On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision disposing: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners'
respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the
immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the reconsideration
of the decision.

In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and granting
of the motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or
revival of the charge against them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy.
Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Court to deny the motion for
reconsideration.

In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was
denied its day in court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts
and pieces of evidence in order to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the
information sufficiently included all that was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the accusations
against them.

ISSUE:

Wheteher or not the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State will amount
to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

HELD:

Yes. Granting the motion for reconsideration would violate the Constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.

Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution states:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.

The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars
not only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had
attached. As such, every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled
for correction or amendment.

In the present case, the Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the
petitioners for insufficiency of evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged
against them. With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration in
this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition.

It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to
the accused three related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense

5. PEOPLE v. SALI

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LORENA OMAPAS SALI

G.R. No. 206023

April 3, 2017

Facts:
Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition, dated November 26, 2008, for Correction of Entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC with the following material averments:

Petitioner is a Filipino, of legal age, single and a resident [of] 941 D. Veloso St.[,] Baybay, Leyte;

The respondent is located in Baybay City, Leyte and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
where it can be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court;

All parties herein have the capacity to sue and be sued;

Petitioner is the daughter of Spouses Vedasto A. Omapas and Almarina A. Albay who was born on April
24, 1968 in Baybay, Leyte.

Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth, the personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay,
Leyte thru inadvertence and mistake erroneously entered in the records the following: the first name of
the petitioner as “DOROTHY” instead of “LORENA” and, the date of birth of the petitioner as “June 24,
1968” instead of “April 24, 1968.”

The petitioner has been using the name “Lorena A. Omapas[“] and her date of birth as “April 24, 1968”
for as long as she since she could remember and is known to the community in general as such;

To sustain petitioner’s claim that the entries in her Certificate of Live Birth pertaining to her first name
and date of birth should be corrected so that it will now read as “LORENA A. OMAPAS” and “April 24,
1968” respectively,; and

This petition is intended neither for the petitioner to escape criminal and/or civil liability, nor affect the
hereditary succession of any person whomsoever but solely for the purpose of setting the records of
herein petitioner straight.

On February 23, 2010, the trial court issued the assailed Decision in favor of Sali. On March 24, 2010, the
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC Decision for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo because the title of the petition and the order setting the
petition for hearing did not contain Sali’s aliases.

The CA denied the appeal, ruling that: (1) the records are bereft of any indication that Sali is known by a
name other than “Lorena,” hence, it would be absurd to compel her to indicate any other alias that she
does not have; (2) Sali not only complied with the mandatory requirements for an appropriate
adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 of the Rules but also gave the Republic an opportunity to timely
contest the purported defective petition; and (3) the change in the first name of Sali will certainly avoid
further confusion as to her identity and there is no showing that it was sought for a fraudulent purpose
or that it would prejudice public interest.

Issues:

Whether or not the Petition of Lorena Omapas Sali is for a change of name as contemplated under Rule
103 of the Rules and not for correction of entries under Rule 108.

Whether or not the Regional Trial Ciurt has jurisdiction over the petition.

Ruling:

No, the Petition of Lorena Omapas Sali is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of
the Rules but for correction of entries under Rule 108.What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors
which were committed in the recording of her name and birth date. The Court has held that not all
alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors
may be set right under Rule 108. The evidence presented by Sali shows that, since birth, she has been
using the name “Lorena.” Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change her name.

However, at the time Sali’s petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect. Section 1 of the law
states: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has
been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that
first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either
appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.

In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali’s first name, was not within the RTC’s
primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e., filing of
the petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the
RTC should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali’s first name.

On the other hand, anent Sali’s petition to correct her birth date from “June 24, 1968” to “April 24,
1968,” R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into
law amending R.A. No. 9048. As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and month in the date of birth
and sex of a person.

Hence, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The February 11, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed in toto the February 23, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay
City, Leyte, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Petition for Correction of entry in the certificate of
live birth of dorothy a. omapas with respect to her first name is dismissed without prejudice to its filing
with the local civil registrar concerned.

6. People vs. Mariano

G.R. No. L-40527, 71 SCRA 600, June 30, 1976

FACTS: Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI of Bulacan because of
misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power cord and electric cables being the
person in authority to receive the same in behalf of mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan. Respondent
Mariano then moved to quash the information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He claimed that the
items were the same items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military commission for Malversation
of public property to which mayor Nolasco were found guilty, hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.

The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the Estafa case against Mariano.
RULING: YES. The CFI has jurisdiction “In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos” Section 44,
paragraph E, Judiciary reorganization act of 1948. The offense of estafa charged against respondent
Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. By
reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have
been committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts
of first instance.

Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case
against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the
Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case
now before Us the accused in one is different from the accused in the other.

“Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the
punishment for it.

7. People v. Lagon [May 18, 1990]

7:50 AM    No comments
Nature: Petition for Review filed by the People as represented by the Fiscal arguing
that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction and that it had erred in
issuing its Order dismissing the case.
Facts:
·         Libertad Lagon was charged with estafa under par2(d) RPC 315 in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for
goods or merchandise.
·         April 1975 - alleged commission of the crime [arresto mayor max to PC min] 
·         Oct 22 1975 – PD 818 was enacted increasing the penalty to PM med
·         July 1976 –criminal information filed at City Court
·         Dec 1976 - City Court dismissed the information because the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged was beyond the court's authority to impose.
·         City Court: at the time of the institution of the action
·         OSG: agreed with the City Court

Issues/Ruling:
1. WON the City Court has jurisdiction. Whether the court jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at a) the
time of the institution of the action or at b) the time of the commission of the crime?
·         Court jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the institution of the action. Therefore, the City
Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Petition for review dismissed.
·         Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948:  jurisdiction of municipal and city courts... offense… in which the
penalty… does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or
fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both  . . . ."
2. Would application of the doctrine not result in also applying PD 818, in disregard of the rule
against retroactivity of penal laws?
·         RPC 22 permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who
is not a habitual criminal, . . . "
·         Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under
the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information.
·         In People v.Purisima and  People v. Buissan:
o    . . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal
prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the
offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of
the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint…”. 

·         Should the information be refiled in the RTC, that court may only impose the penalty provided in the law at the
time of the commission of the crime.

People vs Lagon (185 SCRA 442)

Doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measure by the law in effect
at the time of the commencement of a criminal action rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of
the offense charged firmly settled.
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured
by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time
of the commission of the offense charged. Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case
pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable
penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty which a city
court could impose.
Subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty
imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information.
In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to
the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of
the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts
recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the
complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.
Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a
penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would
warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple
seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the reason
already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal court.

8. People vs. ChupecoG.R. No. L- 19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640Facts:On February 2, 1951 Jose
Chupeco was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of the
SAWMILL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT infavor of Agricultural and Industrial Bank located in
Bataan whose capital, assets, accounts,contracts and chooses in action were subsequently transferred to
Rehabilitation FinanceCorp. herein complainant with principal office in Manila.Thereafter, without having fully
satisfied the mortgage and during the term withoutt he consent of t he m ort gagee bank and wi t h int ent
t o defraud R ehabi li t at i on Fi nance Corporation, pledge and encumber the said property to one Mateo Pinile.
Accused moved toquash the information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that
thecourt had no jurisdiction.

Issue:Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the case

9. OCTOBER 30, 2011

Fukuzume vs People (2005) G.R. 143647

Facts:

Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires, accompanied
by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter
that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.
Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under
the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap
wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his undertaking
to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to file an estafa case.

Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as charged.
Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial courts’ decision modifying
only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.

Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling that
the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed by
Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it
is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in
Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that he
gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is
located in Parañaque.

Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in
court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to
testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any
money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or
within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in
criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals:  However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn
statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to
corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense
charged was committed in Makati. From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that
Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took
place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should
be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the
court of competent jurisdiction.

10. Alva vs. CA G.R. No. 157331 April 12,

2006 Bail
OCTOBER 16, 2017

 FACTS:

Arnold Alva was accused of defrauding YUMI VERANGA HERVERA by means of false
manifestation and fraudulent representation to the effect that he could process the latter’s
application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00, and by means of
other similar deceit, induced and succeeded in inducing said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to
give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P120,000.00 on
the strength of said manifestation and representation said accused well knowing that the same
were false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount of P120,000.00 which amount once in his possession
with intent to defraud, he wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
the said YUMI VERANGA HERVERA in the aforesaid amount of P120,000.00, Philippine
Currency.

Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa.

ISSUE:

Having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, has the accused lost his right to appeal his
conviction?

RULING:

Yes. Under Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court: Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or
failure to prosecute. – The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or its own motion
and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during
the pendency of the appeal.

The act of jumping bail will result in the outright dismissal of petitioner’s appeal. As pointed out
by the Court in the case of People v. Mapalao, the reason for said rule is that: “once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he losses his
standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed
to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.”

Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner
impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final
and executory.

By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, petitioner
revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his
chances for a reversal. This, we cannot condone. Once more, by jumping bail, petitioner has
waived his right to appeal. In the case of People v. Ang Gioc, the court enunciated that:”There
are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right
of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may
avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the
accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to
have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him.”
11.
G.R. No. 158763                                March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO

FACTS:
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1
Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez for the deaths
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to
be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review
where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On
25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners
and SPO2 Maderal.          
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.      
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners
and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

HELD:
Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following
cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the
custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.
Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information
due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

12. PEOPLE v. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, GR No. 154473, 2009-04-24

Facts:
Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),... delivered a
speech in... at
University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus,... Quezon City.
was subsequently published in
Manila Bulletin.
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent... filed,...
an Affidavit-Complaint... for libel.
an impeachable office
Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information... for libel against... the
respondent,... respondent... moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus,
could not be criminally prosecuted before any court... during his incumbency... assuming he
can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate
him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
trial court... dismissing Criminal Case... considering that the alleged libel was committed by
respondent in relation to his office--he delivered the speech in his official capacity as
COMELEC Chair.
Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of
all other courts.
Issues:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE
WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;" AND
Ruling:
rticle 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),... as amended by Republic Act No. 4363... is
explicit on... which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus:... criminal
and civil action for damages in cases of written defamation... shall be filed simultaneously...
or separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court]... f the province
or city where... the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense... criminal and civil
actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts.
A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply...
override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the
RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar
means.
The grant to the Sandiganbayan... of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to
(public) office,... did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written
defamation cases regardless of whether the... offense is committed in relation to office.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification,
it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in
relation to office.
Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent... committed the alleged
libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of
jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error.
Principles:
13.

14. C ASE DI GES T: LAC S ON VS .

EXEC UTI VE S EC R ETARY
9:45 PM

301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: 

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime

syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment
for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal,
and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman
filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they
did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the
phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun
as of the approval hereof.

Issues: 

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination
whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
RULING:

Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed
reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials
and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan
but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect
of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975,
as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which
is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the
amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge
set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is
alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbaya

15……..

16.

AUG 17

CRESPO VS MOGUL CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case
was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but
the arraignment was deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the
appellate court.

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the
CA. The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the
Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the
resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the
arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the
order and lifted the restraining order.

Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders fro, the
Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and
control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be
controlled by the complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to
the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe
elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be
filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court