FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 193150. January 23, 2017.]

LOIDA M. JAVIER , petitioner, vs. PEPITO GONZALES , respondent.

DECISION

SERENO , C.J : p

Two Decisions were promulgated by the trial court in this case: the rst one for
conviction, and the second for acquittal. We are called upon to resolve the procedural
question of whether the promulgation in absentia of the earlier judgment of conviction
was valid. HTcADC

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks a reversal of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 and Resolution 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97629. The CA a rmed
the Decision 3 of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija (the
RTC of Palayan City) in Criminal Case No. 1066-P, penned by Judge Corazon D. Soluren
(Judge Soluren). Judge Soluren reversed a previous Decision 4 penned by Judge Erlinda
P. Buted (Judge Buted). In the earlier Decision, respondent was convicted of murder
with frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, and was meted the death
penalty.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
This case originated from a criminal case for murder with frustrated murder and
multiple attempted murder lodged in Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Baler,
Aurora (the RTC of Baler). The Information charged respondent Pepito Gonzales as
follows:
That on December 25, 1997 at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening in
Barangay Diarabasin, Municipality of Dipaculao, Province of Aurora, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused with intent to kill
and with the use of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously throw a grenade inside the house of one
Leonardo Hermenigildo while the latter and his companions Ru no Concepcion,
who sustained mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter; that as further consequence of said explosion, Leonardo
Hermenigildo was also hit and sustained physical injuries fatal enough to cause
his death without immediate and able medical attendance; that Julio Toledo,
Ariel Cabasal and Jesus Macatiag were also hit and likewise sustained physical
injuries, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of multiple murder as a consequence, by
reason of causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, the
injuries sustained by said Julio Toledo, Ariel Cabasal and Jesus Macatiag were
not necessarily mortal. 5
Gonzales led a Motion for Bail 6 with the RTC of Baler. Private complainant
Carmen Macatiag (Macatiag) — sister of the deceased victim, Ru no Concepcion —
filed her Opposition 7 to Gonzales's Motion for Bail. Gonzales then filed a Comment 8 to
which Macatiag led her Reply. 9 The RTC Baler issued an Order 1 0 granting Gonzales
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 bail.
Thereafter, Macatiag led with this Court an Urgent Petition for Transfer of
Venue. 1 1 While her petition was pending, she led a Motion for Reconsideration 1 2 of
the Order of the RTC of Baler granting bail to Gonzales, who led his Opposition 1 3 to
her motion. The RTC of Baler denied 1 4 the Motion for Reconsideration and upheld its
Order granting bail. Macatiag also led with the RTC of Baler a Manifestation and
Motion to Suspend Proceedings 1 5 pending the resolution of her previous petition for
transfer of venue.
On 17 August 1999, the Court granted the transfer of venue and reassigned the
case to the RTC of Palayan City, which was then presided by Judge Erlinda Buted. 1 6
Trial on the merits ensued.
The RTC admitted the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence. 1 7 Gonzales led
an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. 1 8 To this motion he attached
a Demurrer to Evidence, 1 9 which the RTC denied. 2 0 Following the denial, Gonzales
presented his evidence and witnesses and filed his Formal Offer of Evidence. 2 1
Thereafter, on 30 November 2005, the RTC issued an Order 2 2 setting the
promulgation of the case on 15 December 2005. The Return of Service 2 3 indicated that
the Order dated 30 November 2005 and the Notice of Promulgation dated 6 December
2005 were received on 7 and 12 December 2005 by the sister of private respondent,
who refused to sign the Return.
On 15 December 2005, the scheduled date of promulgation, Gonzales failed to
appear. His lawyer, Atty. Mario Benitez (Atty. Benitez), personally led a "Withdrawal of
Counsel" 2 4 with his client's conformity. 2 5 The promulgation was rescheduled to 22
December 2005. 2 6 On the same date, a warrant of arrest 2 7 was issued and the bond
forfeited in view of the nonappearance of the accused, who was deemed to have
jumped bail. aScITE

A Notice of Hearing/Subpoena and Notice of Promulgation of Judgment 2 8 was

issued on 15 December 2005 commanding the parties to appear before the Court on
22 December 2015. Notices were sent to Gonzales and Macatiag. 2 9
On 22 December 2005, Gonzales still failed to appear without any justi cation.
Judge Buted appointed a counsel de o cio in lieu of Atty. Benitez. 3 0 The Branch Clerk
of Court thereafter read the dispositive portion of Judge Buted's Decision in the
presence of the public prosecutor, the counsel de o cio, and the heirs of Macatiag.
Macatiag had been killed on 14 December 2005, just a day before the rst
promulgation date, and Gonzales was also an accused in her killing. Gonzales was
convicted of the murder charges:
WHEREFORE, the Accused is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of MURDER with FRUSTRATED MURDER and
MULTIPLE ATTEMPTED MURDER and is hereby sentenced to a single
indivisible penalty of DEATH. 3 1
Thereafter, the Clerk of Court was directed to enter the judgment of conviction in
the RTC's criminal docket pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3 2 Since the death penalty was still in force at the time the
judgment was promulgated, Judge Buted also ordered that the records of the case be
immediately forwarded to the CA for automatic review. 3 3 DETACa

In less than a month after the judgment of conviction was rendered, or on 6

January 2006, private respondent Gonzales led, through Atty. Benitez, an Omnibus
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 M o t io n 3 4 asking that the judgment promulgated on 22 December 2005 be
reconsidered and set aside. Gonzales argued that he had not been properly noti ed of
the promulgation of judgment; that he had not been represented by counsel; and that
the RTC had proceeded with deliberate haste in convicting him.
The trial court, now presided by Judge Soluren, gave due course to the motion of
Gonzales and granted it through an Order dated 18 April 2006. The Order set aside the
judgment of conviction and reinstated his bail. 3 5
On 20 November 2006, petitioner Javier, Macatiag's daughter, discovered that
the RTC had rendered a Decision 3 6 dated 31 October 2006 acquitting Gonzales of all
charges. 3 7 On 16 January 2007, she led a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before
the CA, citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of Judge Soluren. The O ce of the Solicitor General led a Comment 3 8 dated
12 October 2007 praying that the Petition be denied due course and dismissed for lack
of merit. The OSG opined that Judge Soluren did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in reversing the earlier Decision of Judge Buted.
THE CA RULING
In its assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. It ruled out
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Soluren in granting private
respondent's Omnibus Motion and rendering a new judgment of acquittal. It agreed
with the theory of the OSG that the promulgation was void, because respondent
Gonzales had not been validly noti ed of the rescheduled promulgation of judgment on
22 December 2005; that since Gonzales's lawyer, Atty. Benitez, had already withdrawn
his representation on the rst scheduled date of promulgation, respondent had no
knowledge that the promulgation had been rescheduled to 22 December 2005; that
since he was no longer Gonzales's lawyer, Atty. Benitez was relieved of the duty to
inform his client of court notices and processes; that since respondent was not
personally noti ed of the rescheduled promulgation, Judge Buted's promulgation in
absentia was invalid. HEITAD

The CA further adopted the OSG's stance that before resorting to a Rule 65
petition for certiorari to question respondent judge's act of acquitting private
respondent, petitioner should have rst led a motion for reconsideration. It ruled that
a motion for reconsideration is not only a plain and adequate remedy available under
the law, but is an indispensible condition that must be satis ed before an aggrieved
party can resort to a special civil action for certiorari. The appellate court held that
since the remedy of ling a motion for reconsideration was available to petitioner, and
none of the exceptions to the ling of that motion existed, the Petition must be
dismissed.
THE ISSUES
The main issue in this case is whether the CA erred in a rming the Decision of
acquittal issued by Judge Soluren, who had ruled that there was no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part when she gave due
course to the Omnibus Motion of private respondent questioning his prior conviction.
In order to resolve the main issue, the following issues have to be addressed:
A. Whether there was a valid promulgation of judgment by Judge Buted in her
prior Decision of conviction;
B. Whether Judge Soluren's subsequent judgment of acquittal is valid;
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 C. Whether a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper
remedy to question a decision of acquittal.
THE COURT'S RULING
The Petition is impressed with merit.
As a prologue to our ruling, We take cognizance of the unusual circumstances
surrounding this case. Petitioner is the daughter of the original private complainant,
Carmen Macatiag, who was in turn the sister of the rst victim, Ru no Concepcion.
When petitioner led the instant Petition for Review with this Court, the OSG led a
Manifestation and Motion 3 9 praying that the People of the Philippines be removed as a
co-petitioner because the OSG was not joining petitioner in this Petition. The pertinent
portion 4 0 of the OSG's Manifestation and Motion reads:
[T]he records will show that the OSG already took on a position different
from that of the petitioner Loida M. Javier when the case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals. Speci cally, the OSG in its Comment dated October 12, 2007
and Memorandum dated November 24, 2008 was of the position that Honorable
Judge Soluren did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she ruled to
acquit Pepito Gonzales. In this regard, the arguments raised by the OSG in the
aforementioned pleadings were in fact, adopted by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated May 22, 2010.
While the OSG ordinarily represents the People in proceedings before this Court,
We have in the past allowed private parties to le certiorari petitions assailing rulings
and orders of the RTC in criminal cases. 4 1 As early as 1969, in Paredes v. Gopengco, 4 2
the Court already held that offended parties in criminal cases have su cient interest
and personality as "persons aggrieved" to le a special civil action of prohibition and
certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. That ruling was in line with the underlying
spirit of adopting a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their
object. Recently, We reiterated this ruling in Almero v. People. 4 3 Similarly, in the case at
bar, We nd that the ends of substantial justice would be better served and the issues
determined in a more just, speedy, and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the present
Petition.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
There are two divergent RTC Decisions: one for conviction, and another for
acquittal. Our resolution of this Petition for Review hinges on the validity of the second
RTC Decision.
After review of the case and the records, We rule that the Court of Appeals, in
a rming Judge Soluren's Decision of acquittal, committed reversible error, which can
be remedied by granting this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Judge Buted's Decision convicting
respondent was validly promulgated.
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to
promulgate a judgment in absentia and gives the accused the opportunity to le an
appeal within a period of fteen (15) days from notice to the latter or the latter's
counsel; otherwise, the decision becomes final.
Records show that respondent was properly informed of the promulgation
scheduled on 15 December 2005. The RTC Order dated 30 November 2005 4 4
documents the presence of his counsel during the hearing. It is an established. doctrine
that notice to counsel is notice to client. 4 5 In addition, the Return of Service states that
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 the Order and Notice of Promulgation were personally delivered to respondent's
address.
During the promulgation of judgment on 15 December 2005, when respondent
did not appear despite notice, and without offering any justi cation for his absence, the
trial court should have immediately promulgated its Decision. 4 6 The promulgation of
judgment in absentia is mandatory pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 6, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court: ATICcS

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.

xxx xxx xxx
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last
known address or thru his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
If the accused has been noti ed of the date of promulgation, but does not
appear, the promulgation of judgment in absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to
obviate a repetition of the situation in the past when the judicial process could be
subverted by the accused by jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. 4 7
The only essential elements for its validity are as follows: (a) the judgment was
recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy thereof was served upon the accused or
counsel.
I n Almuete v. People, 4 8 petitioner's counsel informed the trial court that the
accused were either ill or not noti ed of the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment. The RTC, however, found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to
promulgate its Decision as scheduled. The accused went up to the CA, which acquitted
them of the charge. This Court reversed the CA and upheld the validity of the
promulgation.
In Estrada v. People, 4 9 this Court also a rmed the validity of the promulgation
of judgment in absentia, given the presence of the essential elements.
Judge Buted's Order dated 22 December 2005 5 0 ful lled the requirements set
forth by the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence. Pertinent portions of the Order read:
The judgment of conviction which carries the death penalty was
pronounced in the presence of the Public Prosecutor, the counsel de o cio of
accused and the heirs of complainant Carmen Macatiag, the dispositive portion
of which, the OIC Clerk of Court is directed to enter into the Criminal Docket.
xxx xxx xxx
Let copy of the Decision furnished each the Public Prosecutor, the
counsel de o cio of the accused, Atty. Bembol Castillo, and the accused at his
last known address.
Respondent was not left without remedy. The fth paragraph of Section 6, Rule
120, states:
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justi able cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fteen (15)
days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and
le a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
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 absence was for a justi able cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
However, instead of surrendering and ling a motion for leave to explain his
unjusti ed absence, respondent, through Atty. Benitez, led an Omnibus Motion before
the RTC praying that the promulgation be set aside. 5 1 We cannot countenance this
blatant circumvention of the Rules.
Judge Soluren's Decision acquitting
respondent is void and has no legal
effect.
Judge Soluren acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when she gave due course to respondent's Omnibus Motion. Aside from
being the wrong remedy, the motion lacked merit.
The ling of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction
can only be resorted to if the accused did not jump bail, but appeared in court to face
the promulgation of judgment. Respondent did not appear during the scheduled
promulgation and was deemed by the judge to have jumped bail. The fth paragraph of
Section 6, Rule 120, states that if the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justi able cause, he shall lose the remedies available in
the Rules against the judgment, and the court shall order his arrest.
The Court underscores the fact that following Gonzales's waiver of the remedies
under the Rules, Judge Buted issued an Order dated 22 December 2005. According to
the Order, the case records shall be immediately forwarded to the CA for its automatic
review of convictions meting out the death penalty. 5 2 This automatic review was
pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-2005 (dated 15 April 2005) as
implemented by OCA Circular No. 57-2005 (dated 12 May 2005). TIADCc

Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-2005 mandates as follows:

[A]ll Regional Trial Courts concerned, through the Presiding Judges and Clerks
of Court, are hereby DIRECTED to henceforth DIRECTLY forward to the COURT
OF APPEALS (Manila for Luzon cases, Cebu Station for Visayas cases, and
Cagayan de Oro Station for Mindanao cases) the records of criminal cases
whose decisions are subject to (a) automatic review because the penalty
imposed is death or (b) ordinary appeals (by notices of appeal) because the
penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
notwithstanding a statement in the notice of appeal that the appeal is to the
Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, OCA Circular No. 57-2005 gives the following directive:
[A]ll Judges and Clerks of Court of the Regional Trial Courts are hereby
reminded that failure to comply with the above-cited Administrative Circular
shall warrant appropriate disciplinary action pursuant to Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. 01-8-10-SC, which took effect on 11 September
2001, as well as the pertinent rules and regulations of the Civil Service
Commission.
This Administrative Circular took effect on 19 April 2005, strict
compliance herewith is hereby enjoined.
In utter disregard of this Court's circulars, Judge Soluren capriciously,
whimsically, and arbitrarily took cognizance of private respondent's Omnibus Motion,
granted it, and rendered a totally opposite Decision of acquittal. What she should have
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 done was dismiss the Omnibus Motion outright, since Judge Buted's Decision of
conviction was already subject to automatic review by the CA. By acting on the wrong
remedy, which led to the reversal of the conviction, Judge Soluren contravened the
express orders of this Court. Her blatant abuse of authority was so grave and so severe
that it deprived the court of its very power to dispense justice.
We take this opportunity to correct a capricious, patent, and abusive judgment by
reversing and setting aside the Decision.
Judge Soluren retired compulsorily in 2012. Had she still been in the service,
some members of this Court would have been minded to refer this matter to the O ce
of the Court Administrator for investigation into and evaluation of the question of
whether the above acts call for the application of administrative sanctions.
Double jeopardy is not triggered
when the order of acquittal is void.
Grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction
prevents double jeopardy from attaching. 5 3
I n People v. Hernandez, 5 4 this Court explained that "an acquittal rendered in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really
'acquit' and therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy
based on a void indictment."
Considering that Judge Soluren's order of acquittal was void from the very
beginning, it necessarily follows that the CA ruling dismissing the Petition for Certiorari
must likewise be reversed and set aside.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97629 dated 22 March 2010 and Resolution dated
30 July 2010 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija
dated 31 October 2006 and Order dated 18 April 2006, rendered by public respondent
Judge Corazon D. Soluren acquitting respondent Pepito Gonzales, are likewise
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Decision dated 22 December 2005
rendered by Judge Erlinda P. Buted is REINSTATED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to conduct the mandatory and automatic
review of the Decision dated 22 December 2005 pursuant to Sections 3 and 10, Rule
122 of the Rules of Court. Let the entire records of Criminal Case No. 1066-P entitled
People of the Philippines v. Pepito Gonzales be immediately TRANSMITTED to the
Court of Appeals.
The bail granted to respondent Pepito Gonzales is CANCELLED . Let copies of
this Decision be furnished the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Director-General of the Philippine National Police. The National Bureau of Investigation
and the Philippine National Police are hereby DIRECTED to cause the IMMEDIATE
ARREST and DETENTION of respondent Pepito Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., see concurring opinion.

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 Separate Opinion

CAGUIOA , J., concurring:

I concur wholly with the ponencia as penned by Chief Justice Sereno. This
opinion merely serves to further emphasize the exceptional circumstances which
render the rule on double jeopardy particularly inapplicable to this case.
SDAaTC

The rule on double jeopardy espouses that when a person is charged with an
offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal, conviction or any other manner
without the consent of the accused, he cannot be charged again with the same or
identical offense. 1
For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (i) the
information against the accused must have been valid, su cient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (ii) the information must have been led
with, and judgment rendered by, a court of competent jurisdiction, (iii) the accused
must have been arraigned and had pleaded, and (iv) the accused must have been
convicted or acquitted, or the case must have been dismissed without his express
consent. 2
In order to satisfy the fourth element, it is necessary that the prior judgment of
conviction, acquittal or dismissal be valid, and rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
In this case, it has been established that: (i) respondent was duly noti ed of the
December 15, 2015 hearing scheduled for the promulgation of Judge Buted's decision,
(ii) respondent was absent during said hearing despite due notice, (iii) notwithstanding
his absence, respondent was represented by his counsel in said hearing, (iv) Judge
Buted promulgated his decision convicting respondent in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 120, which allows promulgation of judgment in absentia, (v) Judge Buted
immediately ordered the transmission of the case records to the CA for automatic
review as respondent's conviction involved the imposition of the death penalty, (vi)
respondent's counsel thereafter led an Omnibus Motion with the RTC praying that the
conviction be set aside, and (vii) Judge Soluren, the new presiding judge of the RTC,
subsequently granted the Omnibus Motion, set aside respondent's conviction, and
issued an order acquitting respondent.
Proceeding from these facts, the ponencia holds that the order of acquittal
issued by Judge Soluren is void and has no legal effect. The ponencia thus orders the
reinstatement of respondent's conviction, nding the rule on double jeopardy
inapplicable to this case.
I agree.
In the case of Villareal v. People , 3 the Court convicted four (4) of the accused
thereunder for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, despite their
previous conviction for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. The Court found that
the extraordinary circumstances of the case precluded the application of the rule on
double jeopardy:
The CA's application of the legal framework governing physical
injuries — punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies
and Article 365 for culpable felonies — is therefore tantamount to a
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 whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and
legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the
framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under
Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies,
and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two
types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in
that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when
actual death occurs.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon — as if
only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa
— is contrary to the CA's own ndings . From proof that the death of the
victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only
logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those
who have been proven to have directly participated in the in iction of physical
injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to
suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we nd that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
nding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double
jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No.
154954 . 4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this case, Judge Soluren issued the order of acquittal after a prior judgment of
conviction had been validly promulgated. Moreover, she issued said order after the
records of the case were transmitted to the appellate court for automatic review. Not
only did Judge Soluren completely disregard a decision validly promulgated in
accordance with the Rules of Court, she subverted the same by issuing an opposing
judgment after the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case.
These exceptionally "unusual" circumstances show that the order of acquittal
was void from the beginning, as indeed, this patently erroneous judgment was issued
without any jurisdiction. Thus, the fourth element necessary for double jeopardy to
attach was not satisfied. acEHCD

Footnotes
1. Dated 22 March 2010, rollo, pp. 34-44; penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
2. Dated 30 July 2010, id. at 45.
3. Dated 31 October 2006, id. at 209-238.
4. Dated 22 December 2005; id. at 157-198.

5. Id. at 12.
6. Id. at 48.
7. Id. at 53.
8. Id. at 61.
9. Id. at 66.

10. Dated 8 December 1998; id. at 71.

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 11. On 25 February 1999; id. at 73.
12. Id. at 95.
13. Id. at 102.
14. Id. at 107.

15. Id. at 105.

16. Id. at 111.
17. In an Order dated 5 October 2004; id. at 135.
18. Id. at 136.
19. Id. at 138.

20. In an Order dated 17 May 2005; id. at 143.

21. Id. at 148-150. "Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits for the Accused."
22. Id. at 151-152.
23. Id. at 318.

24. Id. at 153.

25. Id. at 154.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 155.
28. Id. at 319.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 156.
31. Id. at 197.
32. Rule 120, Sec. 6, par. 4 — In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording
the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or through his counsel.

33. Rollo, p. 156.

34. Id. at 199.
35. Id. at 204.
36. Id. at 209-238.

37. Id. at 238.

38. Id. 260-278.
39. Id. at 330-333.
40. Id. at 331.
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 41. See Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208-224 (2000); People v. Calo, Jr., 264 Phil.
1007-1015 (1990).
42. 140 Phil. 81-94 (1969).

43. G.R. No. 188191, 12 March 2014, 718 SCRA 698.

44. Rollo, pp. 151-152.
45. Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, Inc., 552 Phil. 226 (2007).
46. See Chua v. Court of Appeals, 549 Phil. 494-504 (2007).

47. Id.
48. G.R. No. 179611, 12 March 2013, 693 SCRA 167.
49. 505 Phil. 339 (2005).
50. Rollo, p. 156.
51. Id. at 199.

52. Id. at 156.

53. Villareal v. People, 680 Phil. 527 (2012) citing People v. Hernandez, 531 Phil. 289 (2006).

54. Supra note 53.

CAGUIOA, J., concurring:

1. Villareal v. People, 680 Phil. 527, 555 (2012).

2. Wilfred N. Chiok v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 179814 & 180021, December 7, 2015,
p. 11.

3. Supra note 1.
4. Id. at 562.

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