REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

SIGNAL KNITTING MILLS,

INC. and ANGELITO UY TAN,
Petitioners,
CA-G.R.SP.No._______________
For: Certiorari with
-versus- Application for Issuance of
Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
MARILYN D. SEVILLA,
JECELYN B. ARNESTO and
the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
(NLRC), Second Division,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------x

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction

COME NOW, PETITIONERS, through the undersigned

counsel and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully file
this verified special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court to assail as having been issued
with utter grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction the Decision dated 31 May 2018 of the
National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division in
NLRC LAC-05-001643-18(4); NLRC NCR CN. 04-04951-17
entitled “Rosie Hilotin Welgas, Et. Al. Complainants, vs. Signal
Knitting Mills, Inc./Angelo Tan, Respondents”. The Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision was denied in
a 10 September 2018 Resolution the dispositive portion of
which reads --

ACCORDINGLY, respondents’ Motion for

Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

No further Motions of similar nature shall be

entertained.

SO ORDERED.

1
 The Parties

Petitioner Signal Knitting Mills, Inc. (hereinafter, SKMI

or Petitioner) is a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws with principal office address at with
principal office address at Phase II, Pearl Island Industrial
Compound, Punturin, 1447 Valenzuela City. It is engaged in
the garment and textile manufacturing business. Co-
Petitioner Mr. Angelito Uy Tan is its President.

On the other hand, private Respondents (hereinafter,

‘Respondents’) Marilyn D. Sevilla (Ms. Sevilla) and Jecelyn B.
Arnesto (Ms. Arnesto) were former contractual employees of
SKMI with joint residence address at No. 1155 Ilang-Ilang St.,
Karuhatan, 1441 Valenzuela City. Public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Second Division holds
office at PPSTA Building No. 5, Banawe Avenue corner P.
Florentino St., 1114 Quezon City.

Timeliness of the Filing of the Present Petition

Petitioners through the undersigned counsel received a

copy of public respondent’s 10 September 2018 Resolution on
16 November 2018. Under Rule 65, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court
Resolution A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (effective 01 September
2000), Petitioners had sixty (60) days from notice of said
Resolution to bring the present action or until 15 January
2019. Hence, the instant Petition, as it is so filed with this
Honorable Court by way of registered mail on 15 January
2019, is so filed within the reglementary period (hereto
appended is the requisite ‘Affidavit of Filing and Service by
Registered Mail with Explanation’).

Statement of the Case

This is a Petition for Certiorari With a Prayer for a

Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that
seeks the annulment of the Decision dated 31 May 2018
rendered by public respondent NLRC, Second Division, as well
as its 10 September 2018 Resolution which denied
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the same. Certified
true copies of the questioned Decision and Resolution are

2
hereto attached as Annexes “A” and “B”, respectively, and
made integral parts hereof.

The present dispute brings to the fore the right of an

employer to be protected from unscrupulous claims of former
contractual employees who, after being accommodated by the
employer on a desperate plea for work, have turned the tables
against the employer despite the latter’s generosity and
beneficence by raising preposterous claims of illegal dismissal,
falsely asserting their alleged regular employment status and
unwarrantedly seeking payment of supposedly underpaid
benefits.

Sometime in July 2015, private respondents, along with

five (5) other individuals, were hired as contractual employees
of SKMI for a term of nearly five (5) months or up to December
2015. Hired together with Ms. Sevilla and Ms. Arnesto was
Ms. Rosie Hilotin Welgas (Ms. Welgas) -- one of the three
original complainants who instituted the initiatory illegal
dismissal complaint before the Labor Arbiter, the other two
being private Respondents herein. Their engagement as
contractual employees was intended to augment the regular
workforce during that second semester of the calendar year
that is usually the peak season in the garment industry.
(copies of Respondents’ and Ms. Welgas’ respective
employment contracts to work as knitting machine operators
of SMKI are attached as Annex “A”, “B” and “C” of Petitioners’
Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter). Their contracts
ended by 05 December 2015. This contract termination was
evidenced by a confirmation-cum-quitclaim individually signed
by Respondents stating to the effect that they have ceased to
be connected with SKMI and that the latter no longer owed
them any payables (these confirmation/quitclaim documents
are Annexes “D”, “E” and “F” of Petitioner’s Position Paper).

In January 2016 and no longer in the employ of

Petitioner, Ms. Welgas, Ms. Arnesto and Ms. Sevilla pleaded
Respondents, through SKMI’s Production Head, Ms. Remia
Vallejo, to re-employ them again on another round of job stint
with Petitioner Corporation as contractual employees.
Petitioner refused as business was usually not robust and
purchase orders are scarce at the start of the year such that
there was no need for additional workforce in the form of
contractual personnel. Respondents, however, were insistent
as they were in grave need for jobs or continuing gainful
employment. Taking pity on the three women, Petitioners gave

3
in to their entreaties but because SKMI could no longer afford
the rate they were paid for the July-to-December 2014 period,
Respondents agreed to take lesser pay for a day’s work.
Hence, their tenure at SKMI got extended on a month-to-
month basis that totaled to one (1) year or the entire calendar
year of 2016. At the onset of CY 2017, Petitioner SKMI
decided to no longer re-hire them as the usual downturn in its
business again impacted the company. Not having been
engaged under fresh contracts of employment, Respondents
and Ms. Welgas, thus, sought to punish and take vengeance
on Petitioner SKMI by filing their illegal dismissal complaint
with monetary claims with the Labor Arbiter on 05 April 2017
(attached hereto as Annex “C” is a copy of the consolidated
Complaint of Respondents and Ms. Welgas).

Conciliation proceedings under the SEnA or Single-Entry

Approach was commenced but the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. Having again failed to peaceably settle
before the Labor Arbiter, the parties were thus made to submit
their position papers. In their 07 June 2017 Position Paper, a
certified copy is hereto attached as Annex “D”, Respondents
through counsel essentially alleged that Petitioner SKMI
engaged them under several successive 5-month employment
contracts to work as operator of weaving-powered tools and
perform weaving/knitting-related tasks. They argued that this
hiring scheme of Petitioners was supposedly designed to
prevent them from acquiring the status of regular employees
and so illegal. As they were already deemed regular
employees, the employment of Respondents and Ms. Welgas
was allegedly unlawfully terminated when Petitioner ended
their tenure by the close of CY 2016. Respondents also prayed
for other monetary claims such as night differential pay,
overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, separation pay,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Petitioners herein filed their own Position Paper, Annex

“E” hereof, pointing out that ab initio, Respondents and Ms.
Welgas were hired only for a fixed period tenure as the
underlying purpose for their engagement was for them to serve
as additional personnel during the peak season of SKMI’s
business. Petitioners underscored the fact that when SKMI
engaged Respondents to work in July 2015, there was no
intention of hiring them on a probationary status with the end
in view of regularizing their employment if they hurdled the
probationary period. This was because their hiring was meant
merely to provide for needed personnel during the business’s
peak months of the year. Likewise, Petitioners challenged
4
Respondents’ seeking of monetary claims, insisting that during
their contract period in SKMI’s employ from July 2015 to
December 2015, they were duly paid all labor standards
benefits. Petitioners herein lamented the fact that it was Ms.
Welgas, Ms. Arnesto and Ms. Sevilla who pleaded for them to
be rehired even when SKMI’s business no longer demanded
additional manpower requirements; that were it not for
Petitioners’ understanding of Respondents’ plight and pleas,
they would not have been rehired as contractual employees
from month to month in calendar year 2016 as it was beyond
SKMI’s corporate budget to cover the corresponding manpower
cost; that for Respondents to later make money claims against
SKMI is nothing short of an act of betrayal and unfairness on
the part of Respondents at Petitioners’ expense.

Respondents through counsel filed their ‘Reply’ to the

Position Paper of Petitioners, certified copy of which Reply is
hereto attached as Annex “F”, claiming that although they
were indeed hired by SKMI as contractual employees at the
start, the parties did not deal with each other on equal terms
so much so that the alleged successive renewal of their five-
month employment contract was merely a scheme to prevent
them from attaining regular employment status. On the other
hand, Petitioners submitted their corresponding Reply Position
Paper, Annex “G” hereof, that stressed the inadequacy of
Respondents evidence to establish that they were or became
regular employees of SKMI. Respondents still filed a
Rejoinder, Annex “H” hereof.

In a Decision dated 16 March 2018, a certified copy of

which is hereto attached as Annex “I”, Labor Arbiter Vivian
Magsino-Gonzalez dismissed the complaint of Respondents
and Ms. Welgas, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is

rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.

Respondents appealed the aforesaid Decision of the Labor

Arbiter by filing a ‘Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on
Appeal’ of which a certified copy is hereto attached as Annex
“J”. Petitioners countered with their ‘Answer to Complainant-
Appellants’ Memorandum of Appeal’ a copy of which is hereto
appended as Annex “K”. Docketed with the Second Division
of the NLRC (‘Second Division’ for brevity), Respondents’
appeal was adjudged shortly after the Labor Arbiter’s aforesaid
Decision. To the shock and surprise of Petitioners, the NLRC’s
Second Division overturned the Labor Arbiter’s ruling in a 31

5
May 2018 Decision (Annex “A” hereof) the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is granted. The decision is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one issued finding
illegal dismissal.

Respondent Signal Knitting Mills, Inc. is ordered to

pay only complainants Marilyn Sevilla and Jecelyn Arnesto
the following, computed as follows:
1) MARILYN SEVILLA
A) Backwages

1) Basic Salary
12/15/16 – 10/4/17
500x26x9.67 125,710.00
10/5/17 – 6/19/18
502x26x8.47 110,550.44 236,260.44

2) 13th Month Pay

236,260.44/12 19,688.37 255,948.81

B) Separation Pay
1/9/16 – 6/19/18
502x26x2 26,104.00

C) Proportionate 13th Month Pay

1/9/16-12/14/16
500x26x11.17/12 12,100.83
294,153.64

2) JECELYN ARNESTO
A) Backwages

3) Basic Salary
12/15/16 – 10/4/17
500x26x9.67 125,710.00
10/5/17 – 6/19/18
502x26x8.47 110,550.44 236,260.44

4) 13th Month Pay

236,260.44/12 19,688.37 255,948.81

D) Separation Pay
2/4/16 – 6/19/18
502x26x2 26,104.00

E) Proportionate 13th Month Pay

2/4/16-12/14/16
500x26x10.33/12 11,190.83
293,243.64
587,397.28

Attorney’s Fee 10% 58,739.73

TOTAL AWARD P646,137.01

===========

complainant Rosie Hilotin Welgas failed to sign the

Memorandum of Appeal:

SO ORDERED.

6
 Aggrieved that time around, Petitioners seasonably
lodged their Motion for Reconsideration, hereto attached as
Annex “L”, of the Second Division’s adverse decision but to no
avail. The same was denied in the Second Division’s 10
September 2018 Resolution (Annex “B”) which has already
been referred to earlier in the instant Petition. Losing no time,
Respondents (sans Ms. Welgas who was already excluded in
the award under the 31 May 2018 Decision of the NLRC’s
Second Division for having failed to then sign Respondents’
Appeal Memorandum) through counsel promptly filed their 03
December 2018 ‘Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution’,
hereto Annex “M”, to enforce the award so made by the
Commission’s Second Division, citing the Entry of Judgment
dated 03 December 2018, Annex “N” hereof.

Grounds for the Grant of the Petition

I. THE NLRC’s SECOND DIVISION COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING
THAT RESPONDENTS WERE REGULAR
EMPLOYEES AND WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED
FROM EMPLOYMENT; and

II. THE NLRC’s SECOND DIVISION COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
RENDERING A DECISION THAT IN EFFECT
FORCES PETITIONERS TO REGULARIZE THE
EMPLOYMENT OF INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM
THERE WAS NEVER AN INTENT TO HIRE AS
REGULAR EMPLOYEES.

Discussion

I. The finding that Respondents were regular employees

and were thus illegally dismissed is not supported by the
evidence on record, flawed in its reasoning, runs contrary
to the sound findings of fact and law of the Labor Arbiter
and is contrary to established jurisprudential doctrines.

The Second Division’s 31 May 2018 Decision reversing

Labor Arbiter Vivian Magsino-Gonzalez’s 16 March 2018
Decision and instead finding Petitioners liable for the
supposed illegal termination of Respondents’ employment and
consequently for payables due and owing to the latter leaves

7
 so much to be desired. Labor Arbiter Magsino-Gonzales
justifiably ruled that Respondents failed to prove that that
they were regular employees of SKMI, noting inconsistencies in
their stance that militate against their self-serving claims. 1
And yet, public respondent NLRC on the contrary found
Respondents regular employees of SKMI through the following
flawed reasoning:

When they were hired in January 2016 without any

employment contract for a fixed period, complainants were
considered regular employees starting from day one. They
were performing duties necessary and desirable to the
respondents’ business. The respondents’ claim that the
complainants knew from the start that the extension of their
employment was for a fixed duration lacks legal basis. The
circumstances surrounding the extension of their
employment on a month-to-month basis is of no moment.
They failed to present a single iota of evidence that their
employment was indeed on a month-to-month basis. 2

Petitioners vehemently beg to disagree with the

aforequoted disquisition. Not only does it ignore the context
with which Petitioners hired Ms. Sevilla and Ms. Arnesto -- a
context that Respondents themselves did not at all dispute or
contest. The reasoning runs contrary to basic common sense.
To illustrate: it is undisputed that based on their respective
employment contracts, Ms. Sevilla (including Ms. Welgas) had a
job term of 14 July 2015 to December 2015 while Ms. Arnesto’s
was 20 July 2015 to December 2015. Their employment with
SKMI also undisputably ended on 05 December 2015. As
Petitioners truthfully and consistently narrated, when they were
no longer in the employ of SKMI, Respondents sometime in
January 2016 pleaded Petitioner Corporation, through SKMI’s
Production Head, Ms. Remia Vallejo, to re-employ them again
on another round of job stint as contractual employees.
Petitioners refused as business is usually on the downturn and
purchase orders scarce at the start of the year such that there
was no need for additional workforce in the form of contractual
personnel. But Respondents were insistent as they were in
grave need for job or continuing gainful employment. Taking
pity on Respondents, Petitioners gave in to their entreaties but
because SKMI could no longer afford the rate they were paid for
the July-to-December 2015 period, Respondents agreed to take
lesser pay for a day’s work. Hence, Respondents’ tenure at
SKMI got extended on a month-to-month basis that totaled to
one (1) year or the entire calendar year of 2016. However, at
the onset of the current year, Respondents decided to no longer
1
Labor Arbiter’s 16 March 2018 Decision, p.6.
2
NLRC Second Division’s DECISION, p.9.

8
re-hire them as the usual slump in its business again impacted
SKMI.

This was the underlying reason why Respondents were

engaged on a month-to-month basis in CY 2016 -- because
even though they ceased to be employees anymore beginning 05
December 2015, they begged Petitioners to re-employ them
once more. Even if there was no need for their addition to the
workforce of SKMI that needed no augmentation in the face of a
low volume of business at the commencement of the calendar
year. And yet, in the words of public Respondent: “The
circumstances surrounding the extension of their
employment on a month-to-month basis is of no moment.”
Indeed, the assailed Decision of the Second Division precisely
cast aside the circumstances behind Respondents’
employment’s month-to-month extension, to the utter prejudice
of Petitioners and at the expense of truth and fairness. How
could these circumstances be immaterial when they are the
very reason why Ms. Sevilla and Ms. Arnesto were re-hired by
SKMI at the beginning of CY 2016. It was because of their
pleas and cries to be taken in once again into SKMI’s employ
that Petitioners, upon the latter’s humane considerations, re-
hired them. Petitioners did not want to re-employ them but
because of their insistence, they capitulated.

And for reemploying Respondents, for taking pity on

them, Petitioner Corporation got penalized -- crucified so to
speak instead -- for its act of mercy, empathy and benevolence.
It was like a double whammy of sorts. First, Appellants
brought the initiatory illegal dismissal complaints against SKMI
decided to no longer re-hire them. Second, when the Second
Division rendered the now appealed Decision, giving credence
to these complaints. Petitioners’ proverbial question to public
Respondent Second Division of the NLRC is this: Why would
Petitioner unnecessarily expose itself to risks by hiring
Respodnets on a month-to-month basis without any
documentation? Petitioners were already fully aware of the
necessity to document the hiring of Ms. Sevilla and Ms. Arnesto
(and even Ms. Welgas) as contractual personnel as borne by the
existence of their Contracts of Employment. Petitioners already
knew of the legal protection that comes from providing for a
written agreement for the hiring of a contractual employee
specifying the fixed duration of his or her employment. Why
would SKMI run the huge risks now of Respondents being
deemed regular employees in the contemplation of the law by
allowing their month-to-month or so engagement in 2016 to go
undocumented? The answer is not because SKMI intended
9
Respondents to become regular personnel, or violate their
security of tenure but because, Petitioner Corporation yielded
to their pleas to be given work out of sheer compassion.

It does not make sense for Petitioners to unwittingly

accord regular employment status to Ms. Sevilla and Ms.
Arnesto by agreeing to hire them at the beginning of 2016
without the concomitant employment contracts. Petitioners
could have just caused the preparation of contracts of regular
employment, have the same printed out and handed over to
Respondents for their signature if it was Petitioners’ intent to
treat them as regulars at the start of 2016. But it was not what
SKMI wanted. Petitioners have maintained their consistent
stance throughout the proceedings of the case before the labor
authorities as to why Respondents came to be hired at the start
of 2016, to wit:

Though their fixed period jobs were meant to end by 05

December 2015, it was complainants’ initiative to convince
SKMI’s Production Head, Ms. Remia Vallejo, to give them
monthly stints as contractual employees beyond 2015. This
is precisely the underlying reason why, compared to their
July-to-December 2015 tenure, complainants’ reemployment
in 2016 as month-to-month contractual personnel was no
longer properly documented. Because Respondents initially
did not want to rehire them anymore but eventually gave in
to their then innocent pleas.3

If the truth were otherwise, Petitioners could have ended into a

lot of inconsistencies or serious contradictions. The absence
of a written contract does not automatically confer regular
status upon an individual’s employment. Public Respondents’
argument in its Decision that Respondents Sevilla and Arnesto
performed work that was necessary and desirable to SKMI’s
business has long been debunked as untenable in questioning
the validity of fixed-period employment. Said the Honorable
Supreme Court in Universal Robina Sugar Milling
Corporation vs. Acibo,4

The indispensability or desirability of the activity

performed by the employee will not preclude the parties from
entering into an otherwise valid fixed term employment
agreement; a definite period of employment does not
essentially contradict the nature of the employees’ duties as
necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade of the
employer.
3
Petitioners’ ‘Reply to Complainants’ Position Paper, p. 2, Annex “G” hereof.
4
G.R. No. 186439 [15 January 2014].

10
 Hence, Petitioners herein come to this Honorable Court
for its judicious review of the circumstances that led to SKMI
hiring Respondents on a month-to-month basis after their
contractual employment had ceased in December 2015. That
contractual employment stint of Ms. Sevilla and Ms. Arnesto
was unquestionably valid. Contrary to Respondents’
insistence in its pleadings, there was also no solid proof that
SKMI practiced a dubious pattern of re-hiring them for the
purpose of circumventing their right to security of tenure. In
fact, Ms. Sevilla’s 14 July 2015 to December 2015 employment
and Ms. Arnesto’s 20 July 2015 to December 2015 work were
their first tenure with SKMI. Labor Arbiter Magsino-Gonzalez
found Petitioners’ evidence to be substantial enough while
finding that Respondents failed in the discharge of their own
burden of evidence. Should not the Labor Arbiter’s findings
matter in this case?

II. The assailed Decision unduly compels Petitioner

Corporation to regularize the employment of individuals
whom it does not intend at all to hire as regular
employees in the first place.

The Decision of the Second Division has the effect of

forcing SKMI into taking on board individuals as its regular
employees even when there is no plan or consent to do so.
The Decision substitutes the Second Division’s judgment in
place of employer SKMI’s management prerogative to choose
who its regular personnel would be. Treating Respondents as
ipso jure regular employees of SKMI against the latter’s
consent constitutes a breach of the business judgment rule
that the Honorable Supreme Court has expounded in this
wise:

The Court has always respected a company's exercise

of its prerogative to devise means to improve its operations.
Thus, we have held that management is free to regulate,
according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects
of employment, including hiring, work assignments,
supervision and transfer of employees, working methods,
time, place and manner of work.5 (Underscoring ours)

If the Decision is made to stand, this would entitle

Respondents to attain the status of regular employees without
going through say a probationary period and other internal
rules that SKMI has utilized over time to determine the fitness
5
Bankard, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 171664, 06 March 2013.

11
of a person for regular employment with it. This in turn would
not only wreak havoc on company policies but would also
discriminate against all existing regular employees of the
Corporation. Such are the grave ramifications of the Decision
of NLRC’s Second Division subject matter of the case at bar.

The Plea for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ

of Preliminary Injunction

Included in the present petition is Petitioners’ prayer for

the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners beseech this Honorable
Court that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be granted to prevent the immediate
execution of the assailed 31 May 2018 Decision of public
respondent. An Entry of Judgment (Annex “N”) has already
been issued. For the information of this Honorable Court,
both parties attended a pre-execution conference before the
Labor Arbiter just this January 9 th. On the other hand, in
Section 10 of Rule XI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC, supra, a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of
the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued by
said courts. The enforcement of the 31 May 2018 Decision of
public Respondent Second Division of the NLRC via a writ of
execution now becomes reasonably clear and imminent to the
prejudice of Petitioners. Invoking the provisions of Section 7,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, Petitioners earnestly
seek the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction so as to preserve Petitioners’ rights
while the instant action is pending. Any enforcement of public
Respondent’s Decision in this case would only work injustice
to Petitioners.

To reiterate, the assailed Decision is completely opposed

to and at variance with the Labor Arbiter’s 16 March 2018
Decision which dismissed Respondents’ illegal termination
case against Petitioners. Hence, the issues in the case at bar
as well as the rights of the parties hereto are far from settled
so much so that maintaining the status-quo between the
parties is the appropriate judicial recourse by way of a
restraining order or preliminary injunction.

More importantly, this Honorable Court can now take

judicial notice of numerous cases or situations wherein
decisions of the NLRC’s different Divisions that are adverse to

12
employers are enforced due to the absence of a TRO or
injunction only for such decisions to be later reversed by this
Honorable Court a few years later. Yet the adverse rulings had
already been implemented, employee-litigants already paid.
How in the world can employers now recover their funds so
paid to their former employees who, only because there was no
TRO or injunction, managed to have NLRC decisions promptly
executed even if such decisions are reversed later in time?
This scenario or practice has to stop once and for all in the
interest of truth and justice to employers or companies who
also are entitled to due process and the protection of our laws.

Petitioner Corporation implores this Honorable Court to

protect it from injustice and grave, irreparable damage or
injury that would arise from the undue execution of the
assailed Decision of public Respondent. Petitioners have duly
paid the requisite fee to cover the prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

Prayer

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, Petitioners

herein most respectfully pray that this Honorable Court render
judgment ANNULING AND SETTING ASIDE AS NULL AND
VOID for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the assailed
Decision dated 31 May 2018 of public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission, Second Division in NLRC LAC-
05-001643-18(4); NLRC NCR CN. 04-04951-17, as well as its
Resolution dated 10 September 2018, together with all the
unwarranted judgment awards decreed therein.

It is likewise prayed of this Honorable Court that upon

the filing of this Petition, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or a
Temporary Restraining Order be ISSUED forthwith, enjoining
public Respondent National Labor Relations Commission,
Second Division and all officers acting under its authority from
enforcing or implementing the Decision subject matter of this
action.

Petitioners pray for such other reliefs just and equitable

under the premises.

Quezon City for Manila, 11 January 2019.

ATTY. ERIC R. CORTES

Counsel for Petitioners

13
 Roll No. 45345
IBP No. 098359/10 Jan. 2019/Rizal
PTR No. 7485645/28 May 2018/Manila
MCLE Compliance No. V – 0020221/20 Apr. 2016
G/F Tanbel Center, 1601 E. Rodriguez Sr., Ave.
Brgy. Pinagkaisahan, Cubao 1109, Quezon City

Copy Furnished by Registered Mail deposited

At Binangonan, Rizal Post Office on 15 January 2019:

With Registry Receipt No. __________________________:

The PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

(Private Respondents’ counsel)
Department of Justice
6/F, Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma Hall
DOJ Building, Diliman
1101 Quezon City

With Registry Receipt No. __________________________:

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

(NLRC)
Second Division
PPSTA Building No. 5, Banawe Avenue corner
P. Florentino St.
1114 Quezon City

EXPLANATION

In compliance with Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, undersigned counsel respectfully manifests that service of the
foregoing Petition upon public and private respondents was done by
registered mail owing to severe time, distance and messengerial
constraints.

ATTY. ERIC R. CORTES

14