G.R. No.

146664            February 28, 2002

JOHN ANGCACO, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision,1 dated November 29, 2000, of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the decision,2 dated January 31, 1996, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Puerto Princesa City, finding petitioner John Angcaco
guilty of murder and sentencing him accordingly. 

Petitioner John Angcaco and his co-accused in the trial court, namely, Ramon Decosto,
Protacio Edep, Lydio Lota, and Mario Felizarte, were members of the Integrated National
Police of Taytay, Palawan. At the time of the incident, they were serving a warrant of arrest
issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay on Restituto Bergante, who was wanted in
connection with a robbery case. Edep was acting station commander, while Restituto
Bergante was the barangay captain of Bato, Taytay, Palawan. The information against
petitioner and his co-accused alleged —

That on or about the 25th day of September, 1980, more or less 4:00 o'clock in the
morning in barangay Bato, municipality of Taytay, province of Palawan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with
guns, and with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, fire at and shoot
FREDDIE GANANCIAL, hitting the latter with gunshots on vital parts of his body and
inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his instant death.3

When arraigned on June 3, 1981, all of the accused, with the exception of Ramon Decosto,
entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.4 Decosto, who failed to attend the hearing
on that date, was later arraigned on June 23, 1981, during which he entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter trial ensued.

The prosecution presented seven witnesses: Noe Bergante,5 Noel Bergante, Dr. Alberto Lim,
Honorato Flores, Henry Pulga, Antonio Arosio, and Adolfo Jagmis. The gist of their
testimonies is as follows: 

At around 4 o'clock in the morning of September 25, 1980, Noe Bergante and his brother
Noel Bergante and his cousin Freddie Ganancial were awakened by the sound of gunfire
while they were asleep in their house in Bato, Taytay, Palawan. Their mother, who was
frightened, fainted and had to be helped by Noe. Noel went to the kitchen and, from there,
saw Protacio Edep fire his carbine, as he shouted, "Kapitan, you come down, this is [a]
peace officer." He was apparently referring to Restituto Bergante. Noel answered that his
father was not in the house, having gone to Puerto Princesa. Edep then ordered the men in
the house to come out. Noel accordingly went to the gate and later called Noe to also come
out of the house. Noe and his cousin, Freddie Ganancial, did as bidden.

Once they were outside the house, Noe and Freddie were flanked by petitioner Angcaco on
the right side and accused Ramon Decosto on the left side. Decosto pointed an armalite at
the two and warned them not to run. Noe and Freddie joined Noel Bergante. Protacio Edep
approached Freddie saying, "You are tough," and pushed him. Then, shots rang out from the
armalite and short firearm of Decosto and Edep, as a result of which Freddie Ganancial
turned around and dropped to the ground face down. Decosto was around three meters
away from Freddie.

In fright, Noe and Noel ran inside the house. After a few seconds, Noe saw, through the
window, Lota and Angcaco turning over the body of Freddie Ganancial. After briefly leaving
the body, both came back 15 minutes later. Noe said Lota brought with him an object
wrapped in a newspaper, which Noe surmised was a knife. Lota placed the object in the right
hand of Freddie Ganancial. Noel, on the other hand, said that he returned to the crime scene
and recovered two empty shells which he gave to a certain Major Silos. Noe reported the
matter to Barangay Tanods Sabino Mahinay and a certain Ramon.6

Antonio Arosio, a neighbor of the Bergantes, corroborated the testimonies of Noe and Noel
Bergante. According to Arosio, at around 4:30 a.m. of September 25, 1980, while he was
asleep in his house in Bato, Taytay, Palawan, he was awakened by the sound of gunfire. He
said he heard a commotion outside, followed by another volley of shots. He claimed he
recognized by their voices some of the persons involved, namely, Protacio Edep, Noel
Bergante, and Freddie Ganancial.

Arosio claimed that accused Decosto and Felizarte fetched him from his house a short time
later and took him to Edep, who was then in the house of the barangay captain. Arosio was
asked about the whereabouts of the barangay captain. He told Edep that Restituto Bergante,
the barangay captain, had gone to Puerto Princesa two days earlier.

Arosio testified that on his way home he saw a person lying on the ground in a prone
position. He later learned it was Freddie Ganancial. Arosio identified in court the policemen
whom he saw that morning, that is, Edep, Decosto, Felizarte, Lota, and Angcaco.

On cross-examination, Arosio claimed that he was investigated by a police officer, whose

name he could not remember, three years after the incident. The investigation was held in
the house of Barangay Captain Restituto Bergante, who told him that he would testify in this
case. Although he was reluctant to testify because of fear, Arosio said he finally agreed to do
so in 1984. Prior to the incident, he had not heard Edep's voice but only assumed that the
voice he heard that morning was that of Edep as the latter was the highest-ranking
policeman he later saw.7

Although Dr. Romeo D. Valino conducted the postmortem examination on the body of
Freddie Ganancial, it fell to Dr. Alberto H. Lim, Assistant Provincial Health Officer in
Palawan, to identify the medico-legal report of Dr. Valino and to explain its contents in view
of Dr. Valino's death pending the trial of the case.

Dr. Valino's report stated in pertinent parts:

Physical Examination:

1. Gunshot wound lateral aspect D/3rd arm right (entrance) with contusion

collar thru and thru passing thru the medial aspect arm right, entering to the
lateral aspect mid axillary line at the level of the 9th rib hitting ascending colon
and small intestine.
 2. Gunshot wound at the level of the 7th rib at anterior axillary line right with
contusion collar (entrance) to the epigastric region (exit) 10 cm[s]. x 3 cm[s].
hitting the liver (mascerated).

3. Gunshot wound subcostal region right at the level of mid clavicular line
(entrance) right side to the subcostal region left side (exit at the level of mid
mammary line).

4. Stomach with alcoholic smell.

5. Clotted blood at abdominal cavity, about 500 cc.

Cause of Death:

- Shock secondary to internal and external hemorrhage due to gunshot

wounds - body and abdomen.8

Dr. Lim identified the medical report signed by Dr. Valino because he was familiar with the
handwriting of the latter. As regards the contents of the medical certificate, Dr. Lim stated
that Freddie Ganancial, alias Edgar Gallego, 25 years of age, died as a result of shock
secondary to internal and external hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds on the body and
abdomen, which means that the victim died because of loss of blood resulting in shock due
to a gunshot wound in the abdomen. He testified that the victim sustained three gunshot
wounds. The first gunshot entered the body at the lateral aspect distal third arm with
contusion collar, the bullet entering the lateral aspect midaxillary line at the level of the ninth
rib and hitting the colon and small intestine. The second gunshot wound was located at the
right side of the body at the seventh rib at right anterior axillary line with contusion collar
(entrance), the bullet passing through the epigastric region and hitting the liver, which was
mascerated. The third gunshot wound was in the right subcostal region at the level of the
midclavicular line (entrance) right side to the left side of the subcostal region, the bullet
exiting below the nipple.

On cross-examination, Dr. Lim said that based on the findings of the medical report, the
victim had been taking liquor prior to his death. He also admitted that he had not undertaken
studies on the identification of handwriting. Dr. Lim claimed that he identified the signature of
Dr. Valino in the medical report on the basis of the other reports the latter had submitted to
their office.9

Honorato Flores, senior ballistician of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila,
identified the ballistics report he had prepared and the shell fragments presented to him for
examination. He said that the fragments could have possibly been caused by the impact of
the bullet on a human being.

When cross-examined, Flores said that no armalite rifle was given to him but only shell
fragments were presented to him for examination. He said that the gun and the lead would
have to be examined by using the bullet comparison microscope to determine whether the
lead was fired from the same gun. A bone or a cement flooring could have caused the shell
fragments to break, according to Flores. Upon inquiry by the trial court, he said it was
possible that a piece of copper and the lead formed part of one bullet, but it was also
possible that they did not.10
Sgt. Henry Pulga, acting station commander of Taytay, Palawan, testified that on October 6,
1980, he investigated the complaint filed by Barangay Captain Bergante regarding the killing
of the latter's nephew, Freddie Ganancial. He identified the affidavits of Mario Felizarte (Exh.
H) and Ramon Decosto (Exh. I), which he himself prepared. According to Pulga, he informed
Felizarte and Decosto of their rights to counsel and to remain silent and explained to them
the import of these rights. He said that Felizarte and Decosto voluntarily gave their
statements before him, although Pulga also admitted that the two did not have counsel to
assist them during the investigation.11

The last witness for the prosecution was Adolfo D. Jagmis, the chief investigator of the
Palawan Constabulary based in Tiniguiban. He testified that on October 6, 1980 he
investigated Edep, Lota, and Angcaco. He said that after Angcaco was apprised of his
constitutional rights, the latter executed a statement (Exh. J),12 which Jagmis identified in
court. But Jagmis admitted that the statement was made without the assistance of counsel.13

On cross-examination by counsel for accused Decosto, Jagmis was confronted with the
affidavit of Angcaco, in which the latter identified an armalite which he allegedly used at the
time of the incident. Jagmis said the armalite and the lead recovered from the scene were
both given to the Provincial Fiscal's Office.

The defense presented as its witnesses Protacio Edep, Ramon Decosto, John Angcaco, and
Lydio Lota, whose testimonies are as follows:

In the early morning of September 25, 1980, petitioner and his co-accused, led by Edep,
went to the house of Restituto Bergante in Bato, Taytay, Palawan to serve a warrant for the
latter's arrest. When they reached the house, Edep and his men took positions as they had
been warned that Restituto Bergante might resist arrest. Decosto and Angcaco were each
armed with armalites, Lota had a carbine, Felizarte a revolver, and Edep a carbine and a
revolver. Decosto was on the left side of Edep, around seven to 10 meters from the latter.
Angcaco, on the other hand, was on right side of Edep, around four to seven meters from the
latter. Edep called Restituto Bergante to come out of the house as he (Edep) had a warrant
for his arrest. Restituto's wife replied that her husband was not in the house, having gone to
Puerto Princesa. A commotion then took place inside the house and, shortly after, petitioner
saw a man coming down the house. They fired warning shots to stop the man, but petitioner
saw another person with a bolo near Edep. He shouted, "Sarge, this is the man who tried to
hack you!," and shot the unidentified man, who fell to the ground face up. At the time of the
incident, Decosto was on the left side of Edep, while petitioner, Felizarte, and Lota were on
the right side of Edep. They later learned that the person killed was Freddie Ganancial.

Edep conducted an investigation and recovered from the scene of the crime empty shells
from armalite bullets, which he turned over to the provincial fiscal. Edep and his men were
then taken to Taytay and investigated by P/Sgt. Adolfo Jagmis. Thereafter, Edep and his
men learned that they were charged with murder. An administrative complaint for grave
misconduct was likewise filed against them in the National Police Commission, but the case
was dismissed.14

On January 31, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the evidence on record, this court is of

the considered opinion, and so holds, that accused John Angcaco, is GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized in Article 248
 of the Revised Penal Code. With the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intention to commit so grave a wrong and with the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, this Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the
heirs of Freddie Ganancial the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as death
indemnity.

Co-accused Protacio Edep, Ramon Decosto, Lydio Lota and Mario Felizarte are
ordered ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.15

Petitioner Angcaco filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the trial court's decision. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
reads: 

WHEREFORE, with the modification only that the mitigating circumstance of

incomplete fulfillment of a lawful duty should be appreciated in determining the
imposable penalty, not lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the trial court
had correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment ranging from seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum the questioned decision is affirmed in all other
respects.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.16

Hence this appeal. Petitioner raises the following issues —

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND/OR

MISCONSTRUED THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE THAT ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF DEFENSE OF [THE] PERSON OR RIGHTS OF A STRANGER ARE
PRESENT.

II. WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS OR THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONER-

ACCUSED HAS BEEN VIOLATED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS OVERLOOKED OR FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE WEAKNESS OF
THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND ITS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING

[PETITIONER] APPELLANT.17

First. Petitioner Angcaco argues that the prosecution evidence failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He points out inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies and affidavits of prosecution witnesses Noel and Noe Bergante.

We agree with accused-appellant's contention. Generally, contradictions between the

contents of the witness' affidavit and his testimony in court do not impair his credibility
because affidavits are usually taken ex parte and, for that reason, often incomplete and
inaccurate.18 An affidavit will not always disclose all the facts and will even at times, without
being noticed by the witness, inaccurately describe the occurrences related therein. Thus,
we have time and again held that affidavits are generally inferior to testimonies in court.
Affidavits are often prepared only by the investigator without the affiant or witness having a
fair opportunity to narrate in full the incident which took place, whereas in open court, the
latter is subjected to cross-examination by counsel for the accused.19

However, where the discrepancies between the affidavit and the witness' testimony on the
stand are irreconcilable and unexplained and they refer to material issues, such
inconsistencies may well reflect on the witness' candor and even honesty and thus impair his
credibility.20 Hence, we have recognized as exceptions to the general rule instances where
the narration in the sworn statement substantially contradicts the testimony in court or where
the omission in the affidavit refers to a substantial detail which an eyewitness, had he been
present at the scene at the time of the commission of the crime, could not have failed to
mention.21 The case at bar is such an instance.

Noe Bergante pointed to Decosto and Edep as the ones who shot Freddie
Ganancial.22 However, in his affidavit, dated November 24, 1980, Noe pointed to Decosto as
the lone assailant. Noe also failed to mention the presence of Angcaco at the scene at the
time of the commission of the crime.23 Noe tried to explain these material omissions in his
affidavit by claiming that he mentioned these details to the fiscal but the latter must have
forgotten to include them in the affidavit because he (the fiscal) was in a hurry to leave that
day.24 This explanation is too pat to be accepted. To begin with, Noe admitted that the
investigating fiscal, Fiscal Vergara, explained to him the contents of the affidavit before he
(Noe) signed it.25 Noe, therefore, could have noticed the omission of such vital matters which
concerned the identification of the persons responsible for his cousin's death and called
attention to such omission. The identity of the malefactors is too important a detail for anyone
who allegedly witnessed the incident to overlook its omission in the very statement of the
incident one is giving. The omissions suggest Noe's ignorance of the details of the incident
as well as his readiness to perjure himself in order to implicate all of the accused in this case.

Noel Bergante fared no better than his brother on the witness stand. On direct examination,
Noel, like his brother, identified Edep and Decosto as the assailants of Freddie
Ganancial.26 However, Noel's affidavit, dated November 24, 1980, only mentioned Decosto
as the person responsible for the killing of Freddie Ganancial.27 Worse, Noel executed an
affidavit earlier on September 26, 1980, in which he identified Jardiolin,28 Mario Toledo, Lydio
Lota, and Mario Gonzales as the companions of Decosto at the time of the commission of
the crime.29 But, in his testimony, Noel said that Decosto's companions were Edep, Angcaco,
Felizarte, and Lota.30 When confronted with the discrepancy, Noel said that he really meant
to refer to Angcaco, instead of Jardiolin, and to Ramon Decosto instead of Toledo. When
further questioned, Noel said that he was referring to Lota when he mentioned the name of
Toledo,31 thus creating more confusion with his answers. These contradictions, when taken
together with Noel's claim that he had known Jardiolin, Felizarte, and Angcaco for a long
time, cast serious doubts on his credibility.

Thus, prosecution witnesses Noel and Noe Bergante failed to give a credible and consistent
account of the identity of the person or persons responsible for the killing of Freddie
Ganancial. There is apparent from a reading of their testimonies a manifest tendency to
improvise, modify, and even contradict themselves in order to implicate each of the accused.
It is in fact doubtful whether Noe and Noel saw what they testified about. Even the trial court
disregarded the testimonies of Noe and Noel Bergante and acquitted Edep and Decosto in
spite of their identification by these witnesses.
We are thus left with no clear picture of the events that transpired on September 25, 1980
and of the identity of the shooter or shooters. It cannot be overemphasized that the
constitutional presumption of innocence demands not only that the prosecution prove that a
crime has been committed but, more importantly, the identity of the person or persons who
committed the crime.32 But in the case at bar, what passed for the prosecution evidence was
a befuddling amalgamation of half-truths and lies obviously fabricated by these supposed
eyewitnesses to hold responsible each of the accused in this case for the killing of their
cousin. For this reason, we hold that the prosecution evidence failed to meet the quantum of
proof beyond reasonable doubt necessary for conviction in a criminal case.

Second. The conviction of petitioner Angcaco must, however, be upheld in view of his

admission that he shot Freddie Ganancial. The rule is that while the prosecution has the
burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, once the defendant admits commission of the
act charged, although he invokes a justification for its commission, the burden of proof is
shifted to him to prove the said justifying circumstance.33 Petitioner Angcaco cannot rely on
the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution, for even if it is weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after he has admitted the killing itself.34 This is because a judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order. It is presumed that no sane person would deliberately
confess to the commission of an act unless moved by the desire to reveal the truth.35

Petitioner claims that he acted in defense of Sgt. Protacio Edep, whom Freddie Ganancial
was about to strike with a bolo. We do not agree. For petitioner to successfully claim the
benefit of Art. 11, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be proof of the following
elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or
other evil motive.

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, which must be sufficiently proven by the
defense,36 is present when there is actual or imminent peril to one's life, limb, or right. There
must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon by the victim himself.37 In this case, it
is contended that the victim, who was armed with a bolo, approached Edep menacingly. But,
there is no other competent evidence to corroborate this self-serving claim. Edep testified
that he heard petitioner's warning that an armed man was behind him.38 However, when
asked about the weapon allegedly held by the victim, Edep replied that he did not see any as
he turned around to face his supposed assailant.39 It was only later that Edep claimed seeing
a knife in the area where the victim fell.40 One is thus led to suspect that Edep's claim that he
saw a knife was a mere afterthought designed to exculpate his fellow officer from the
charges against him.

Petitioner's own testimony suffers from inconsistencies and improbabilities on material

points.

First, there was no reason for the victim, Freddie Ganancial, to attack Sgt. Edep, who was
looking for Restituto, because the latter was not there in his house, having earlier gone to
Puerto Princesa. In fact, Edep admitted he was about to order his men to leave the premises
when they found that their quarry was not there. The victim himself was not wanted by the
police. Dr. Lim said Ganancial was drunk. In that condition, he could have easily have been
overpowered by any member of the arresting team, if he made any aggressive move, without
shooting him to prevent him from doing harm to the latter.

Second, when cross-examined about the bolo, petitioner said he could not remember who
took it away.41 However, at a later hearing, petitioner stated that it was he who picked up the
bolo and turned it over to Edep, his superior officer.42 But how could he not remember who
took the bolo if he was the one who did so? Once again, petitioner was prevaricating.

Third, petitioner said that he merely intended to fire a warning shot when he saw Ganancial.
This claim is belied by the fact that the victim sustained three gunshot wounds on the chest
and abdomen. It is apparent that petitioner intended to kill the victim and not merely to warn
him.

Indeed, even assuming that the victim was charging at Sgt. Edep, it would have been
sufficient for petitioner to warn Sgt. Edep of the danger. Not that petitioner was not expected
to pause for a moment while his colleague was in danger.43 However, the rules of
engagement do not, on the other hand, require that he should immediately draw or fire his
weapon if the person accosted did not heed his call.44 But rather than confront the victim as
to his intended purpose, petitioner immediately shot the former without further thought.

Petitioner claims the victim was armed with a bolo. The circumstances, however, indicate
otherwise. Petitioner was questioned by the prosecutor on the existence of the bolo during
the hearing held on October 7, 1986. The bolo was presented in court only on October 17,
1986. At the hearing on that date, petitioner and Lydio Lota both claimed that they could
identify the bolo by the markings placed on it by Sgt. Edep.45 But Sgt. Edep made no mention
of having recovered a bolo, much less of marking it. In fact, Edep at one point testified that
he did not see any weapon near the victim. It is doubtful, therefore, that the bolo offered in
evidence by the defense was the one actually recovered from the scene of the crime.46 It is
more likely that the idea to offer the bolo in question was a mere afterthought by the defense
brought about by the fiscal's own reminder that the presentation of the weapon was crucial to
petitioner's plea of defense of stranger.47

Nor can petitioner's claim that the killing was done in fulfillment of a lawful duty be sustained,
as the Court of Appeals ruled. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the
following must be established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a
duty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such right or office.48

In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto
Bergante. As Edep himself explained, the standard procedure in making an arrest was, first,
to identify themselves as police officers and to show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform
him of the charge against him, and, second, to take the arrestee under custody.49 But, it was
not shown here that the killing of Ganancial was in furtherance of such duty. No evidence
was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and
his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as
to how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to
arrest the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. As
regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial
was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.

Reliance by the Court of Appeals on the case of People v. Oanis50 is misplaced. In Oanis,
the accused, who were police officers, shot and killed the victim under the erroneous notion
that the latter was the person they were charged to arrest. The Court held that the first
requisite - that the offenders acted in performance of a lawful duty - was present because the
offenders, though overzealous in the performance of their duty, thought that they were in fact
killing the man they have been ordered to take into custody dead or alive. In this case,
petitioner did not present evidence that he mistook Freddie Ganancial for Restituto Bergante
and, therefore, killed him (Ganancial) perhaps because he placed the lives of the arresting
officers in danger.

Third. On the other hand, we think the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery against petitioner. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might take.51 For treachery to exist, two conditions
must be present: (1) there must be employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted.52 As has been discussed, the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Noe and Noel Bergante cannot be given credence. As we already
stated, even the trial court acquitted accused Decosto and Edep, both of whom were
implicated as the assailants. Without evidence of the manner the aggression was made or
how the act resulting in the death of the victim began and developed, it is not possible to
appreciate the qualifying circumstance of treachery.53

Nor can evident premeditation be appreciated in this case. Evident premeditation requires
proof of the following elements: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime;
(2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) a
sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect upon
the consequences of his act.54 None of these elements has been shown in this case.

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner is liable only for homicide, for which the penalty under
Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the penalty must be
imposed in its medium period, pursuant to Art. 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty on accused-appellant falls
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, or from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed on accused-
appellant must be fixed within the range of prision mayor, or from six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve years (12) years, as minimum, to reclusion temporal medium, or from fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months,
as maximum.

Petitioner should also be made to pay the heirs of the victim, Freddie Ganancial, the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages,55 in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals as indemnity.56 The purpose of making such an award of
moral damages is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate them for injuries to
their feelings.57

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 29, 2000,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is found guilty of the crime of homicide
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Freddie Ganancial, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.