Police Power keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration

G.R. No. L-24693             July 31, 1967 forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided
1. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or
MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
vs. unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being
MANILA, respondent-appellant. vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee. invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent- incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
appellant. classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee. of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a
FERNANDO, J.: telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower similarly offends against the due process clause for being
court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which
of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class
lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of
therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years
forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses,
requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity. tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper
on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease
Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for
of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that
of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing
and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion once again a transgression of the due process clause.
and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and
"operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void
businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ
regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain
less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8,
than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963.
1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice- of the personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor
Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel
the City of Manila. (par. 3). or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on
forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the
powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police
reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged power and that only the guests or customers not before the court
ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and
violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the
per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to
motels; that the provision in the same section which would require law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a dismissal of the petition.
hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which
quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the reads:
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in 1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and
the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and
the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor
be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to
well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification sue and be sued;
that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and 2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent
affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged
with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the
of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that
execution and enforcement of such ordinances; attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor
of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the
Manila; people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the
compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property
the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the rights under the guise of police regulation.2
reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
(Annex B); validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the
Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than
Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
attached hereto as Annex C; Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly
(including herein petitioners) operating in the City of within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it
Manila.1äwphï1.ñët void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts,
validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what the ordinance set aside.
was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due
a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
injunction issued. petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
petitioners association, and referring to the alleged constitutional immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and police power which has been properly characterized as the most
thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, 4 extending as
appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would be, to paraphrase
parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety
alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that
and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary society.7
injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
appeal. morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the
regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
ought to have admonished the lower court against such a fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine
cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for
been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then
procedural and substantive aspects. proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and
guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and
lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should
other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific,
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records,
facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to
ordinance, argues eloquently for it. an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any
with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment
classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a license tax of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the
halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain
12
monte;  prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees
machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels,
or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class
smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class
public morals. motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into
local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises,
cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, enterprises and for revenue purposes only. 22 As was explained
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the
constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of
power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general
the courts. rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
which the objection is raised to the question of due otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally
process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind
process. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and have rarely been declared unreasonable.23
a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American
infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local
To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation
result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25
official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude
been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. 17 It exacts fealty "to has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given
those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were
of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this
thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could
into fundamental principles of our society." 20 Questions of due deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it
form or phrases.21 appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under
enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact,
that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due
present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot process?
prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another
persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public due process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or
need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself
embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is
may result from the legal exercise of that power."27 that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a
challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of
lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent the necessity for determining whether the companion or
room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or
proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at
different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join
a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso
premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether
being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease
there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be
of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently
thought which runs through all these different conceptions of upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an
liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating:
general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal
man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in mean."35
the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due
or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28 allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds appealed decision.
of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline,
so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying
legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a
living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the right of Judicial Proceedings
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public 1. CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN, Petitioner,
interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty vs.
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI
the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and BANK), Respondent.
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights RESOLUTION
of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is VELASCO, JR, J.:
Nature of the Case
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions invariably Thereafter, upon BDO's motion, the Makati RTC declared the
assailing the foreclosure sale of a property without properly defendants in CC No. 03-0713, including Carmelita, in default.
serving the summons upon its owners. BDO soon after proceeded to present its evidence ex-parte.
Factual Antecedents On November 29, 2007, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision
Sometime in 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. (Eliseo) and his wife holding the defendants in CC No. 03-0713 liable to pay BDO
Carmelita, acquired a real property located at No. 111, ₱32,543,856.33 plus 12% interest per annum from the time of the
Sampaguita St., Valle Verde II, Pasig City covered by Transfer filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees. The
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 0421 (the subject property). In Makati RTC decision was published on June 9, 2008.
2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a On August 20, 2008, the Makati RTC issued a Writ of Execution
copy of the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the upon BDO's motion. The Order states that in the event that the
subject property. To their surprise, the title contained an judgment obligors cannot pay all or part of the obligation, the
annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an sheriff shall levy upon the properties of the defendants to satisfy
execution sale in Civil Case (CC) No. 03-0713 pending before the award.
Branch 134 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Makati On October 28, 2008, the Makati R TC' s sheriff filed a Report
RTC). stating that he tried to serve the Writ of Execution upon the
Petitioner immediately procured a copy of the records of CC No. defendants at Fumakilla Compound but he was not able to do so
03- 0713 and found out that respondent Banco de Oro (BDO), since the defendants were no longer holding office thereat. The
formerly Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for sum of money Sheriff also reported that, on the same day, he went to the subject
against Tancho property to serve the execution but likewise failed in his attempt
Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained since Carmelita was no longer residing at the said address.
from the bank. Likewise impleaded were several persons, On November 11, 2008, BDO filed a Motion to Conduct Auction
including Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4) security of the subject property. The motion was granted by the Makati
agreements totaling ₱l3,500,000 to guarantee the obligations of RTC on May 5, 2009 so that the subject property was sold to
Tancho Corporation. BDO, as the highest bidder, on October 6, 2009.
It appears from the records of CC No. 03-0713 that on July 2, Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo
2003, the Makati R TC issued an Order directing the service of executed an affidavit of adverse claim and, on January 21, 2013,
summons to all the defendants at the business address of Tancho filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of
Corporation provided by BDO: Fumakilla Compound, Amang Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents,
Rodriguez Avenue, Brgy. Dela Paz, Pasig City (Fumakilla docketed as CC No. 73761, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
Compound). City (Pasig RTC). 1
Parenthetically, the records of CC No. 03-0713 show that He alleged in his Complaint that the subject property is a family
respondent BDO already foreclosed the Fumakilla Compound as home that belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains he
early as August 21, 2000, following Tancho Corporation's failure established with his wife. He further averred that the alleged
to pay its obligation, and BDO already consolidated its ownership surety agreements upon which the attachment of the property was
of the property on November 16, 2001. anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and did not
Understandably, on July 31, 2003, the process server filed an redound to benefit their family. Thus, he prayed that the surety
Officer's Return stating that summons remained unserved as the agreements and all other documents and processes, including the
"defendants are no longer holding office at [Fumakilla ensuing attachment, levy and execution sale, based thereon be
Compound]." nullified.
On October 27, 2003, after the single attempt at personal service BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, asserting that the
on Carmelita and her co-defendants, BDO moved for leave to Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's Complaint, the case
serve the summons by publication. On October 28, 2003, the RTC was barred by res judicata given the Decision and orders of the
granted the motion. Makati RTC, and, finally, the Complaint failed to state a cause of
On August 10, 2004, BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the action.
Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against the defendants, In an Order dated May 31, 2013, the Pasig R TC dismissed the
including Carmelita. During the hearing on the motion, BDO case citing lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that it could not
submitted a copy of the title of the subject property. The Makati pass upon matters already brought before the R TC Makati and,
RTC thereafter granted BDO's motion and a Writ of Attachment citing Spouses Ching v.Court of Appeals,2 the husband of a
was issued against the defendants in CC No. 03-0713, effectively judgment debtor is not a stranger to a case who can file a separate
attaching the subject property on behalf of BDO. and independent action to determine the validity of the levy and
On December 20, 2005, BDO filed an ex-parte motion praying, sale of a property.
among others, that the summons and the complaint be served On a motion for reconsideration filed by Eliseo, the Pasig RTC
against Carmelita at the subject property. The Makati RTC reinstated the case with qualification. Relying on Buado v. Court
granted the motion. On February 9, 2006, the Sheriff filed a return of Appeals,3 the Pasig RTC held that since majority of Eliseo's
stating that no actual personal service was made as Carmelita "is causes of action were premised on a claim that the obligation
no longer residing at the given address and the said address is for contracted by his wife has not redounded to their family, and,
'rent,' as per information gathered from the security guard on thus, the levy on their property was illegal, his filing of a separate
duty." action is not an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Makati R
On May 30, 2006, however, BDO filed a manifestation stating TC, which ordered the attachment and execution in the first place.
that it had complied with the October 28, 2003 Order of the The Pasig RTC clarified, however, that it cannot annul the surety
Makati RTC having caused the publication of the alias summons agreements supposedly signed by Carmelita since Eliseo was not
and the complaint in People's Taliba on May 15, 2006. a party to those agreements and the validity and efficacy of these
contracts had already been decided by the Makati RTC.
Both Eliseo and BDO referred the Pasig RTC's Decision to the the other hand, the issue in G.R. No. 218540 revolves around
Court of Appeals (CA). whether the Pasig RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide a case
In its petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133994, BDO filed by the non-debtor husband to annul the levy and execution
contended that it was an error for the Pasig RTC to apply Buado sale of the subject property ordered by the Makati RTC against his
as it does not apply squarely to the circumstances of the case and wife.
has not superseded Ching. BDO maintained that by reinstating the Our Ruling
complaint, Pasig R TC has violated the rule prohibiting non- A reexamination of the antecedents and arguments in G.R. Nos.
interference by one court with the orders of a coequal court. 217617 and 218540 compels the reversal of the appellate court's
In its January 20, 2015 Decision, 4 the appellate court granted resolutions in both cases.
BDO's petition and ordered the Pasig RTC to cease from hearing G.R. No. 217617
CC No. 73761 commenced by Eliseo. In so ruling, the CA held The Issuance of a TRO/WPI is not a
that Eliseo is not a stranger who can initiate an action independent prejudgment of the main case
from the case where the attachment and execution sale were On the propriety of CA' s refusal to issue a TRO/WPI, it is worthy
ordered. Thus, the CA concluded that in opting to review the to note that Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the
validity of the levy and execution sale of the subject property grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, viz:
pursuant to the judgment of the Makati RTC, the Pasig RTC acted Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A
without jurisdiction. preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
Eliseo moved for, but was denied, reconsideration by the appellate (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
court. Hence, he came to this Court via a Petition for Review whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
as G.R. No. 218540. performance of an act or acts either for a limited period or
On August 19, 2015, the Court issued a Resolution denying perpetually;
Eliseo's petition. Eliseo begs to differ and takes exception from (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the
the said holding in his motion for reconsideration dated October 5, act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably
2015, which is presently for Resolution by this Court. work injustice to the applicant; or
Meanwhile, on an ex-parte omnibus motion filed by BDO, the (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or
Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession and the is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some
issuance of a new TCT covering the subject property in favor of act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
the respondent bank. respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
Arguing that the Makati R TC had not acquired jurisdiction over render the judgment ineffectual.
her person as the service of the summons and the other processes From the foregoing provision, it is clear that a writ of preliminary
of the court was defective, Carmelita filed a Petition for injunction is warranted where there is a showing that there exists a
Annulment of Judgment (With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary be directed violate an established right. Otherwise stated, for a
Injunction) with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 134664. court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI, it
Before the CA can act on the Petition for Annulment, the must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and
Borlongans found posted on the subject property a Writ of unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
Possession dated August 1, 2014 and a Notice to Vacate dated paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
August 29, 2014. In Levi Strauss (Phils.) Inc. v. Vogue Traders Clothing
In its Resolution dated November 12, 2014, 5 the appellate court Company,6 the Court already explained that the issuance of a
denied Carmelita's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary TRO is not conclusive of the outcome of the case as it requires but
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction a sampling of the evidence, viz:
(WPI). Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely
Aggrieved, Carmelita interposed a motion for the reconsideration on initial and incomplete evidence adduced by the applicant
of the CA's November 12, 2014 Resolution. On March 23, 2015, (herein petitioner). The evidence submitted during the hearing
however, the appellate court denied her motion for of the incident is not conclusive, for only a "sampling" is
reconsideration, holding that "upon the expiration of the needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for its
redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits. As
the foreclosed property becomes absolute." such, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the
Thus, on April 27, 2015, Carmelita filed a Petition for Review, writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature.
docketed as G.R. No. 217617, before this Court, ascribing to the Moreover, the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to
appellate court the commission of serious reversible errors. The preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
Court denied the petition on June 22, 2015. Hence, on September heard. Since Section 4 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
1, 2015, Carmelita interposed a Motion for Reconsideration gives the trial courts sufficient discretion to evaluate the
urging the Court to take a second hard look at the facts of the case conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ which
and reconsider its stance. often involves a factual determination, the appellate courts
Considering that both cases originated from the same facts and generally will not interfere in the absence of manifest abuse of
involved interrelated issues, on January 25, 2016, the Court such discretion. A writ of preliminary injunction would
resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 218540 with G.R. No. 217617. become a prejudgment of a case only when it grants the main
Issues prayer in the complaint or responsive pleading, so much so
The question posed in G.R. No. 217617 is whether or not the CA that there is nothing left for the trial court to try except merely
erred in refusing to issue a TRO and/or WPI stopping the incidental matters. (emphasis supplied)
consolidation of BDO's ownership over the subject property. On
Notably, the primary prayer of the Petition for Annulment before SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable,
the appellate court is the declaration of the nullity of the the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
proceedings in the R TC and its Decision dated November 29, defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
2007; it is not merely confined to the prevention of the issuance of tendering it to him.
the writ of possession and the consolidation of the ownership of SEC. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the
the subject property in BDO's name-the concerns of the prayer for defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
the TRO and/or WPI. in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
Indeed, the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
WPI was intended to preserve the status quo ante, 7 and not to pre- person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
empt the appellate court's decision on the merits of her petition for by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
annulment. Thus, it was a grievous error on the part of the CA to business with some competent person in charge thereof.
deny her of this provisional remedy. xxxx
The appellate court's error is readily apparent given the stark SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts
existence of the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary are unknown. - In any action where the defendant is designated as
injunction. an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
On the first ground, petitioner has a clear and unmistakable right unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service
that must be protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
over the subject property but her constitutionally protected right newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such
to due process before she can be deprived of her property. No time as the court may order.
less than Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution It is, therefore, proper to state that the hierarchy and rules in the
mandates that: service of summons are as follows:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without (1) Personal service;
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal (2) Substituted service, if for justifiable causes the defendant
protection of the laws. (emphasis supplied) cannot be served within a reasonable time; and
In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with (3) Service by publication, whenever the defendant's whereabouts
interest to the thing in litigation must be notified and given an are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
opportunity to def end that interest. 8 Thus, as the essence of due Simply put, personal service of summons is the preferred mode.
process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to And, the rules on the service of summons other than by personal
submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her service may be used only as prescribed and only in the
defense, she must be properly served the summons of the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the impossibility of
court. In other words, the service of summons is a vital and prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts
indispensable ingredient of due process 9 and compliance with the have been made to find the defendant personally and that such
rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of efforts have failed before substituted service may be
due process as it is of jurisdiction. 10 Unfortunately, as will be availed. 11 Furthermore, their rules must be followed strictly,
discussed, it would seem that the Constitutional right of the faithfully and fully as they are extraordinary in character and
petitioner to be properly served the summons and be notified has considered in derogation of the usual method of service.
been disregarded by the officers of the trial court. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 12 the Court enumerated and
At this very juncture, the existence of the second ground for the explained the requirements to effect a valid service of summons
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI is self-evident. Without a TRO other than by personal service, viz:
and/or WPI enjoining the respondent bank from continuing in the (1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
possession and consolidating the ownership of the subject xxxx
property, petitioner's right to be afforded due process will Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of
unceasingly be violated. summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable
It need not be stressed that a continuous violation of constitutional promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
rights is by itself a grave and irreparable injury that this or any dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best
court cannot plausibly tolerate. efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other
Without a doubt, the appellate court should have acted intrepidly hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade
and issued the TRO and/or WPI posthaste to protect the service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering,
constitutional rights of petitioner, as it is duty-bound to do. canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For
The performance of official duty was substituted service of summons to be available, there must be
not regular several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
Regrettably, the appellate court fell short in the fulfillment of its summons within a reasonable period [of one month) which
mandate and instead relied on the disputable presumption that eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
"official duty has been regularly performed." The Court cannot service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
subscribe to the position taken by the appellate court. preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the
As a rule, summons should be personally served on a sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only
defendant. When summons cannot be served personally within a then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
reasonable period of time, substituted service may be resorted to. accepted.
Service of summons by publication can be resorted to only if the (2) Specific Details in the Return
defendant's "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
by diligent inquiry." The relevant sections of Rule 14 of the Rules and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
of Court provide, thus: service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the
reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail
in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal considering that there is an action that questions the validity of the
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of bank's acquisition over the same property.
the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and In Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 13 we explained that
all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on the expiration of the redemption period does not automatically
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted vest in the auction purchaser an absolutely possessory right over
service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted the property, viz:
Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the writ of
Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts possession may issue in favor of a purchaser in an execution sale
made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure. when the deed of conveyance has been executed and delivered to
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, him after the period of redemption has expired and no redemption
1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be has been made by the judgment debtor.
shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant A writ of possession is complementary to a writ of execution (see
personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be Vda. de Bogacki v. Inserto, 111 SCRA 356, 363), and in an
made in the proof of service. execution sale, it is a consequence of a writ of execution, a public
In the case now before Us, the summons was served on the auction sale, and the fulfillment of several other conditions for
petitioner by publication. Yet, the circumstances surrounding the conveyance set by law. The issuance of a writ of possession is
case do not justify the resort. dependent on the valid execution of the procedural stages
Consider: in July 2003, the sheriff attempted to serve the preceding it. Any flaw afflicting any of its stages, therefore, could
summons on the defendants, including petitioner Carmelita, at affect the validity of its issuance.
Fumakilla Compound, i.e., at the property already foreclosed, In the case at bar, the validity of the levy and sale of the
acquired, and possessed by the respondent bank as early as properties is directly put in issue in another case by the
August 2001. Immediately after this single attempt at personal petitioners. This Court finds it an issue which requires pre-
service in July 2003, the respondent bank moved in October 2003 emptive resolution. For if the respondent acquired no interest
for leave to serve the summons by publication (and not even in the property by virtue of the levy and sale, then, he is not
substituted service), which motion the RTC granted. entitled to its possession.
Clearly, there was no diligent effort made to find the petitioner The respondent appellate court's emphasis on the failure of The
and properly serve her the summons before the service by petitioner to redeem the properties within the period required by
publication was allowed. Neither was it impossible to locate the law is misplaced because redemption, in this case, is
residence of petitioner and her whereabouts. inconsistent with the petitioner's claim of invalidity of levy
It should be noted that the principal obligor in CC No. 03-0713 and sale. Redemption is an implied admission of the regularity
was Tancho Corporation and petitioner Carmelita was impleaded of the sale and would estop the petitioner from later
only because she supposedly signed a surety agreement as a impugning its validity on that ground. (emphasis supplied)
director. As a juridical person, Tancho Corporation is required to Thus, even given the expiration of the redemption period, a TRO
file mandatory corporate papers with the Securities and Exchange and/or WPI is still obtainable and warranted where the validity of
Commission (SEC), such as its General Information Sheet (GIS). the acquisition of the possession is afflicted by Constitutional and
In 1997 and 2000, the GIS filed by Tancho Corporation with the procedural infirmities.
SEC provided the names of its directors and their addresses. One G.R. No. 218540
of these directors included petitioner Carmelita with her address Eliseo can file an independent action
listed at 41 Chicago St., Quezon City. The GIS of Tancho for the annulment of the attachment
Corporation was readily available to the public including the of their conjugal property
RTC's process server and respondent bank. As to the question of the Pasig RTC' s jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's
Patently, it cannot be plausibly argued that it was impossible to complaint, we cannot subscribe to BDO' s contention that Eliseo
find the petitioner and personally serve her with summons. In like cannot file a separate and independent action for the annulment of
manner, it can hardly be stated that the process server regularly the levy on their conjugal property.
performed his duty. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third-party
The subject property was not claimants of properties under execution to vindicate their claims
foreclosed by the respondent bank; to the property in a separate action with another court. It states,
right of BDO to the possession of the thus:
subject property is questionable SECTION 16. Proceedings Where Property Claimed by Third
Still unwilling to issue the TRO and/or WPI fervently prayed for Person. - If the property levied on is claimed by any person other
by petitioner, the appellate court held that "upon the expiration of than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an
the redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof,
of the foreclosed property becomes absolute." This Court cannot stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon
affirm the appellate court's ruling. the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the subject property was obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless
never mortgaged to, much less foreclosed by, the respondent such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond
bank. Thus, it was error for the CA to refer to the subject property approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a
as "foreclosed property." sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of
Rather, as disclosed by the records, the possession of the subject disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by
property was acquired by BDO through attachment and later by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for
execution sale. However, it is presumptive to state that the right of the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the
BDO over the possession of the subject property is now absolute bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private
keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No
is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the
or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement
in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third- thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to
party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal
(emphasis supplied) partnership.
Clearly, the availability of the remedy provided under the It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of
foregoing provision requires only that that the claim is a third- the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty
party or a "stranger" to the case. The poser then is this: is the stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-
husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal husband and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be
property was executed on account of the other spouse's debt, a rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the petitioner-
"stranger" to the suit? In Buado v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court husband's career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive
had the opportunity to clarify that, to resolve the issue, it must because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not
first be determined whether the debt had redounded to the benefit the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil
of the conjugal partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a Code. The benefits must be those directly resulting from the
stranger to the suit who can file an independent separate action, loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the
distinct from the action in which the writ was issued. We held, loan itself.
thus: This is different from the situation where the husband borrows
A third-party claim must be filed [by] a person other than the money or receives services to be used for his own business or
judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled that it is such a contract
the case may file a third-party claim. that is one within the term "obligation for the benefit of the
This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party conjugal partnership." Thus:
to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on xxxx
account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, The Court held in the same case that the rulings of the Court in
considered a "stranger?" Cobb-Perez and G-Tractors, Inc. are not controlling because the
xxxx husband, in those cases, contracted the obligation for his own
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled business. In this case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a
whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private
the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not. respondent. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her Furthermore, it is not apparent from the records of this case that
criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal BDO had established the benefit to the conjugal partnership
partnership.1âwphi1 We do not agree. flowing from the surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Thus, Eliseo's claim over the subject property lodged with the
Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment RTC Pasig is proper, with the latter correctly exercising
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or jurisdiction thereon.
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal Besides, BDO's reliance on Spouses Ching v. Court of
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the Appeals16 (2003) is improper. In the present case, Eliseo and his
family. wife discovered the attachment of their conjugal property only
xxxx after the finality of the decision by the R TC Makati. There was,
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded therefore, no opportunity for Eliseo to intervene in the case before
that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander the R TC Makati which attached the conjugal property, as a
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal motion to intervene can only be filed "at any time before rendition
partnership. of judgment by the trial court." 17 This spells the whale of
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the difference between the case at bar and the earlier Spouses Ching.
personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some Unlike in the present case, the debtor in the case cited by BDO
advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal was properly informed of the collection suit and his spouse had
partnership. the opportunity to question the attachment of their conjugal
xxxx property before the court that issued the levy on attachment, but
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and simply refused to do so. Thus, to now deny Eliseo the opportunity
jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. (emphasis supplied) to question the attachment made by the R TC Makati in a separate
In the present case, it is not disputed that the conjugal property and independent action will be to, again, refuse him the due
was attached on the basis of a surety agreement allegedly signed process of law before their property is taken. As this Court is
by Carmelita for and in behalf of Tancho Corporation. In our duty-bound to protect and enforce Constitutional rights, this we
2004 Decision in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, 15 we cannot allow.
elucidated that there is no presumption that the conjugal WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
partnership is benefited when a spouse enters into a contract (1) The January 20, 2015 Decision and May 26, 2015 Resolution
of surety, holding thusly: of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133994 are
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the of Pasig, Branch 155 is ordered to continue with the proceedings
petitioner-husband's act of executing a continuing guaranty and and decide Civil Case No. 73761 with reasonable dispatch.
suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf
(2) The November 12, 2014 and March 23, 2015 Resolutions of The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered
the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 by the court on accused-appellant's behalf. 5
are REVERSED and SETASIDE. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr.
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City who
enjoining, prohibiting, and preventing respondent Banco De Oro, issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the
its assigns, transferees, successors, or any and all other persons victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3)
acting on its behalf from possessing, selling, transferring, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended
encumbering or otherwise exercising acts of ownership over the accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victim's
property subject of the controversy. Said TRO shall remain valid sister. The prosecution established the following facts:
and effective until such time as the rights and interests of the In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. John's Cathedral,
parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 shall have been determined Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation was being
and finally resolved. performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the
SO ORDERED. children of Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a
thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the
Bishop went down the altar to give his final blessing to the
2. G.R. No. 130487               June 19, 2000 children in the front rows. While the Bishop was giving his
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the
appellee, center of the altar. He stopped beside the Bishop's chair, turned
vs. around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant. Bishop's chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-
accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, appellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested
Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. 1 We nullify the him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Gripping the chair's armrest,
proceedings in the court a quo and remand the case for proper accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: "No matter what will
disposition. happen, I will not move out!" Hearing this, Santillan moved
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant away. 6
Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the crime of murder Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the
for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near accused-
Information reads: appellant and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Accused-
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of appellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his
Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellant's hand on the
Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the
LOPEZ, being then armed with a butcher's knife, with intent to latter's hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again
kill one ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed when suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back,
in a holy place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left
and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and
latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with tried to stab him again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-
the said weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due appellant looked up and around him. He got up, went to the
to "Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one can
Stab Wound" as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both beat me here!). He returned to the Bishop's chair and sat on it
issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself
City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said down the altar. 7
deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic
than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine outside, received a report of a commotion inside the cathedral.
currency, and other consequential damages. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand
Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994. 2 sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused-
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's appellant and advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant
counsel, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon,
Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan
Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that accused- City, who was attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral,
appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because went near accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly,
he was suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two
of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the wrestled with each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able to
Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the subdue accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked
suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of an order appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his
confining him at the said hospital. 3 waist. 8 He was brought to the police station and placed in jail.
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the
court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on accused- hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. He died of
appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab
answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the motion that wound." 9 He was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds:
same day. 4 one just below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The
autopsy reported the following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS informing him of appellant's irrational behavior and seeking the
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd issuance of a court order for the immediate psychiatric and mental
intercostal space, left, 1 1/2" x 1 1/2" penetrating. The edge of one examination of accused-appellant. 17 The second letter, dated
side of the wound is sharp and pointed. February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from the
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, 1/2" x Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the
1/4" x 1/2". The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by the president, secretary
pointed. and adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of
INTERNAL FINDINGS appellant's unusual behavior and requested that immediate action
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the be taken against him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail. 18
upper and lower lobe of the left lung. The left pulmonary blood On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of
vessel was severely cut. 10 the order denying the "Demurrer to Evidence." The court ordered
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave accused-appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996. 19
of court, filed a "Demurrer to Evidence." He claimed that the Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his
prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad
no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there Gawidan, 20 a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry
was unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped accused- at the Baguio General Hospital, and accused-appellant's medical
appellant's hand with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant and clinical records at the said hospital. 21 Dr. Gawidan testified
did not have sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts that appellant had been confined at the BGH from February 18,
because he was of unsound mind. 11 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered from
The "Demurrer to Evidence" was opposed by the public "Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia,
prosecutor. He alleged that the accused "pretended to be weak, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type;" 22 and after four (4) days of
tame and of unsound mind;" that after he made the first stab, he confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and mental
"furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish condition. 23 The medical and clinical records consisted of the
him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer,
religious ceremony was being conducted;" and the plea of Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH
unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the trial court in its referring accused-appellant for admission and treatment after "a
order of January 6, 1995. 12 relapse of his violent behavior;" 24 (2) the clinical cover sheet of
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. appellant at the BGH; 25 (3) the consent slip of appellant's wife
Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH; 26 (4) the Patient's
Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was Record; 27 (5) the Consent for Discharge signed by appellant's
confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General wife; 28 (6) the Summary and Discharges of appellant; 29 (7)
Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be appellant's clinical case history; 30 (8) the admitting notes; 31 (9)
transferred to some other institution. The other prisoners were Physician's Order Form; 32 (10) the Treatment Form/medication
allegedly not comfortable with appellant because he had been sheet; 33 and (11) Nurses' Notes. 34
exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the
he could escape and see his family. 13 prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:
Comment to the jail warden's letter. He reiterated that the mental WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez
condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already been guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and in
determined; unless a competent government agency certifies view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty
otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail warden was which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is
not the proper person to determine whether accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs
mentally ill or not. 14 of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing
"Demurrer to Evidence". 15 Accused-appellant moved for actual expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
reconsideration. SO ORDERED. 25
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
26, 1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a "Motion to I
Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
Examination." Appellant's counsel informed the court that APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE
accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and cause panic SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.
among the jail inmates and personnel; that appellant had not been II
eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING
not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by him while THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH OF ROGELIO
asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out all MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND
his personal effects and waste matter and burned them inside the AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY,
cell which again caused panic among the inmates. Appellant's GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
counsel prayed that his client be confined at the National Center PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN
for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE. 36
Hospital. 16 Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One, The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is
dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail criminally liable for a felony committed by him. 37 Under the
Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the
basis of criminal liability is human free Will. 38 Man is essentially Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the
a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between altar and sit in the Bishop's chair while the Bishop was
good and evil. 39 When he commits a felonious or criminal act administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in
(delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary
voluntarily, 40 i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. 41 Man, behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from the
therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental
acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. 42 rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He
every person is of sound mind 43 and that all acts are nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public
voluntary. 44 The moral and legal presumption under our law is address system, uttered words to the faithful which the rational
that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person would have been made. He then returned to the Bishop's
person. 45 This presumption, however, may be overthrown by chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor Accused-appellant's history of mental illness was brought to the
from criminal liability. 46 court's attention on the day of arraignment. Counsel for accused-
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides: appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — that his client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due
The following are exempt from criminal liability: to his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
during a lucid interval. Procedure which provides:
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. — The arraignment shall be
which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his suspended, if at the time thereof:
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
without first obtaining the permission of the same court. understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination
acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be (b) x x x           x x x          x x x
acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time
asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An thereof he appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully
rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
accused to a mental institution. 47 thereto. Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete proceedings and order the mental examination of the accused, and
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere if confinement be necessary for examination, order such
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full
imputability. 48 The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable possession of his mental faculties at the time he is informed at the
of entertaining a criminal intent." 49 He must be deprived of reason arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
and act without the least discernment because there is a complete the process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend
absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea
of the will. 50 thereto. 58
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the
invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by discretion of the trial court. 59 And the test to determine whether
clear and positive evidence. 51 And the evidence on this point must the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would
moment of its execution. 52 have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the
permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind proceedings against an accused person on the ground of present
within a reasonable period both before and after that insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration
time. 53 Direct testimony is not required. 54 Neither are specific acts of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to
of derangement essential to establish insanity as a justify such suspension. The test is to be found in the question
defense. 55 Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, whether the accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance
suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that under a
acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be system of procedure like ours where every accused person has
evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so particular as it used to be
conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 56 in England where the accused had no advocate but himself. 60
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accused's "present
was afflicted with insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The insanity" or insanity at the time of the court proceedings is
absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount separate and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of
the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial
From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan 57 attached to the concerns the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
Information, there are certain circumstances that should have crime's commission. "Present insanity" is commonly referred to as
placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been "competency to stand trial" 61 and relates to the appropriateness of
in full possession of his mental faculties when he attacked conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the defendant's
present inability to participate meaningfully and effectively. 62 In societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be frustrated
competency cases, the accused may have been sane or insane when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who
during the commission of the offense which relates to a cannot comprehend its significance. 74
determination of his guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing
stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he may should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial
be found competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; court. 75 Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be
it merely postpones the trial. 63 evidence or circumstances that raise a "reasonable doubt" 76 or a
In determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, the test is "bona fide doubt" 77 as to defendant's competence to stand trial.
whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, defendant's irrational behavior, history of mental illness or
to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for mental
communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end that any disturbance, demeanor of the defendant, and psychiatric or even
available defense may be interposed. 64 This test is prescribed by lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a particular
state law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the case. 78
rule at common law. 65 Thus: In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension
[I]f is not enough for the . . . judge to find that the defendant [is] of the arraignment on the ground of accused's mental condition,
oriented to time and place, and [has] some recollection of events, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions
but that the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational court declared:
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual x x x           x x x          x x x
understanding of the proceedings against him. 66 It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) Judge asked questions on the accused, and he (accused) answered
whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born,
counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a he answered, in Tayug.
defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the
significance of the trial and his relation to it. 67 The first requisite questions asked of him.
is the relation between the defendant and his counsel such that the WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend
defendant must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at
second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
proceedings, i.e., that he must have a rational as well as a factual SO ORDERED. 79
understanding of the proceedings. 68 The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was
protection of the accused, rather than of the public. 69 It has been competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section
held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition that
God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. 70 To put a "effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the
legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto." It is not
is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial 71 and due clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to
process of law; 72 and this has several reasons underlying it. 73 For fully understand the charge against him. It is also not certain
one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an whether his plea was made intelligently. The plea of "not guilty"
incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial court "because
may not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his of his refusal to plead." 80
innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of
the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized
behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental health.
are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the To determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial,
fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the
basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the
defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is his latter's history of mental illness.
plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt
an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the in the judge's mind of accused-appellants competency to stand
courtroom in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the
court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City
comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial wrote the trial judge informing him of accused-appellant's unusual
process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial behavior and requesting that he be examined at the hospital to
proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent determine whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some
participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later,
interaction between an individual and his community and accused-appellant's counsel filed a "Motion to Confine Accused
becomes an invective against an insensible object. Fourth, it is for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Attached to
important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a this motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of
comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members
understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the
may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The two (2) attached letters, 81 the judge ignored the "Motion to
Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him
Examination." The records are barren of any order disposing of to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for
the said motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant,
to present his evidence. 82 a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further
Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., proceedings.1âwphi1.nêt
schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a "lifetime illness" and that this SO ORDERED.
requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses. 83 After
accused-appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never
returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up. 84
Administrative and Quasi-Judicial
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel Proceedings
manifested that accused-appellant was waiving the right to testify 1. SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner,
in his own behalf because he was "suffering from mental vs.
illness." 85 This manifestation was made in open court more than THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and
two (2) years after the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA
was ignored by the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming CACABELOS, respondents.
indications of accused-appellant's state of mind, the judge
persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered TEEHANKEE, J.:
subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it
The Court reverses the appellate court's decision affirming in
all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death! toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Sec. 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure declaring plaintiffs-respondents the lawful owners of the land in
speaks of a "mental examination." 86 The human mind is an entity, question and ordering defendant (herein petitioner) to pay P30.00
and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but monthly rentals until possession of the property is surrendered to
depends to a large degree upon emotional and psychological respondents, for unless there is partition of the estate of the
appreciation. 87 Thus, an intelligent determination of an accused's deceased, either extra judicially or by court order, a co-heir cannot
capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and validly claim title to a specific portion of the estate and send the
more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than same. Title to any specific part of the estate does not
laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once automatically pass to the heirs by the mere death of the decedent
a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal and the effect of any disposition by a co-heir before partition shall
question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the
time, the accused's abilities may be measured against the specific dissolution of the communal estate. What a co-heir can validly
demands a trial will make upon him. 88 dispose of is only his hereditary rights.
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been Private respondents, who are husband and wife, had instituted a
promptly and properly made, it may have served a dual complaint before the Court of First Instance for ejectment and
purpose 89 by determining both his competency to stand trial and recovery of possession against herein petitioner, docketed as Civil
his sanity at the time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the Case No. T-1163, alleging that they are the owners in fee simple
medical and clinical findings of insanity made immediately after of a parcel of commercial land, pro-indiviso, consisting of 150.8
the commission of the crime served as one of the bases for the sq. meters, more or less, situated in Poblacion, Tayug,
acquittal of the accused. 90 The crime in the instant case was Pangasinan, having bought the same from Evaristo G. Espique by
committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on April 15, 1964.
At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible They also demand that petitioner pay a monthly rental for the use
for us to evaluate appellant's mental condition at the time of the of the property all P40.00 until the property is surrendered to
crime's commission for him to avail of the exempting them.
circumstance of insanity. 91 Nonetheless, under the present The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754 sq. qmeter land
circumstances, accused-appellant's competence to stand trial must
originally owned by Hermogenes Espique and his wife, both dead.
be properly ascertained to enable him to participate, in his trial After their death their five children, namely: Maria, Evaristo,
meaningfully.
Faustina, Estefanio and Tropinia succeeded them in the ownership
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court of the whole lot.
effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial.1awphil The trial
Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the whole lot
court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique children. Petitioner alleges
process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court
that he purchased the northern one-half portion of the lot he is
must be nullified. In People v. Serafica, 92 we ordered that the occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio
joint decision of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded
Espique and that the southern one-half portion of the lot he is
to the court a quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who was occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio
charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of
Espique and that the southern one-half portion is leased to him by
frustrated murder, entered a plea of "guilty" to all three charges Tropinia Espique. The land subject of the controversy is the most
and was sentenced to death. We found that the accused's plea was
southern portion of the whole lot inherited by the Espique
not an unconditional admission of guilt because he was "not in children which petitioner claims he had bought from Estefanio on
full possession of his mental faculties when he killed the victim;"
April 26, 1967 and which respondents claim they had bough from
and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary medical Evaristo on April 15, 1964.
examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of
Both sales were made while the petition for partition filed by
commission of the crime. 93
Evaristo Espique was still pending before the Court of First
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Instance of Pangasinan, docketed therein as Civil Case No. T-966.
Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D
The Court finds merit in the petition for setting aside respondent each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, neither petitioner
appellate court's decision finding for respondents-plaintiffs, for nor respondents can rightfully claim that what they bought is the
the following considerations: part in dispute.
The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by Accordingly, respondent court's judgment is set aside and
herein respondents in the lower court is premature, for what must judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint of
be settled frist is the action for partition. Unless a project of respondents-plaintiffs in the court below. No pronouncement as to
partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a costs.
definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
agreement between the parties of by judicial proceeding, a co-heir Fernandez, J., took no part.
cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there
are two or more heirs, the whole estate such heirs. 1 Upon the 2. TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM
death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner ZEÑAROSA, Petitioners,
of the whole estate left wtih respect to the part of portion which vs.
might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being FELICIANO Z. PAJARON and LARRY A.
thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it CARBONILLA, Respondents.
remains undivided. 2 DECISION
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner DEL CASTILLO, J.:
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and The liberal interpretation of the rules applies only to justifiable
benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or causes and meritorious circumstances.
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, By this Petition for Review on Certiorari,  1 petitioner Turks
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co- Shawarma Company and its owner, petitioner Gem Zeñarosa
owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the (Zeñarosa), assail the May 8, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121956, which affirmed the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate Orders dated March 18, 20113 and September 29, 20114 of the
a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissing their
the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the appeal on the ground of non-perfection for failure to post the
thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any required bond.
physical adjudication. 3 An individual co- owner cannot Factual Antecedents
adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as
land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by service crew and Larry A. Carbonilla (Carbonilla) in April 2007
agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co- as head crew. On April 15, 2010, Pajaron and Carbonilla filed
owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in their respective Complaints5 for constructive and actual illegal
the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. 4 What a dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday
co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot premium, rest day premium, service incentive leave pay and
share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to 13th month pay against petitioners. Both Complaints were
him upon partition. 5 Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his consolidated.
successional rights. 6 Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010, Zeñarosa asked him to sign
In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. a piece of paper6 stating that he was receiving the correct amount
qqqEspique in favor of respondents and the sale executed by of wages and that he had no claims whatsoever from petitioners.
Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the Disagreeing to the truthfulness of the statements, Pajaron refused
partition of the property among the co-heirs does not annul or to sign the paper prompting Zeñarosa to fire him from work.
invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. However, the Carbonilla, on the other hand, alleged that sometime in June 2008,
interests thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are he had an altercation with his supervisor Conchita Marcillana
limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to (Marcillana) while at work. When the incident was brought to the
Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the attention of Zeñarosa, he was immediately dismissed from
estate 7 subject to provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs service. He was also asked by Zeñarosa to sign a piece of paper
to the rights of the stranger-purchaser provided in Article 1088 of acknowledging his debt amounting to ₱7,000.00.
the Civil Code. 8 Respondent court's ruling that the sale by Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or
Estefanio in favor of petitioner is not valid because of lack of authorized cause for their dismissal and that petitioners also failed
notice to his co-heirs is erroneous. Such notice in writing is not a to comply with the requirements of due process. As such, they
requisite for the validity of the sale. Its purpose is merely to prayed for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to strained
apprise the co-heirs of the sale of a portion of the estate, for them relations with petitioners and backwages as well as nominal,
to exercise their preferential right of subrogation under Article moral and exemplary damages. Petitioners also claimed for
1088 of the New Civil Code, that is, the right to redeem the nonpayment of just wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday
property sold within one month from the time they were notified premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.
in writing of the sale by a co-heir. (There is nothing in the record
Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they
to indicate that such right of subrogation was in effect sought to
averred that they actually abandoned their work. They alleged that
be exercised upon the co-heirs' having learned of the sale, which
Pajaron would habitually absent himself from work for an
is not in issue here.)
unreasonable length of time without notice; and while they rehired
Thus, respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand him several times whenever he returned, they refused to rehire
payment of rentals for the use of the property in dispute. Until the him this time after he abandoned work in April 2009. As for
partition of the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance of Carbonilla, he was reprimanded and admonished several times for
Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the share of misbehavior and disobedience of lawful orders and was advised
that he could freely leave his work if he could not follow Bond 11 with the NLRC. Along with this, Zeñarosa posted a
instructions. Unfortunately, he left his work without any reason partial cash bond in the amount of ₱15,000.00,12 maintaining that
and without settling his unpaid obligation in the amount of he cannot afford to post the full amount of the award since he is a
₱78,900.00, which compelled them to file a criminal case 7 for mere backyard micro-entrepreneur. He begged the NLRC to
estafa against him. In addition, criminal complaints 8 for slander reduce the bond.
were filed against both Pajaron and Carbonilla for uttering The NLRC, in an Order13 dated March 18, 2011, denied the
defamatory words that allegedly compromised Zeñarosa's motion to reduce bond. It ruled that financial difficulties may not
reputation as a businessman. Petitioners, thus, insisted that their be invoked as a valid ground to reduce bond; at any rate, it was
refusal to rehire Pajaron and Carbonilla was for valid causes and not even substantiated by proof. Moreover, the partial bond in the
did not amount to dismissal from employment. Finally, petitioners amount of ₱15,000.00 is not reasonable in relation to the award
claimed that Pajaron and Carbonilla failed to substantiate their which totalled to ₱197,936.27. Petitioners' appeal was thus
claims that they were not paid labor standards benefits. dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection.
Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter On April 7, 2011, petitioners, through a new counsel, filed a
In a Decision9 dated December 10, 2010, the Labor Arbiter found Motion for Reconsideration (with plea to give due course to the
credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them appeal)14 averring that the outright dismissal of their appeal was
constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. The Labor harsh and oppressive considering that they had substantially
Arbiter found it suspicious for petitioners to file criminal cases complied with the Rules through the posting of a partial bond and
against Pajaron and Carbonilla only after the complaints for their willingness to post additional bond if necessary. Moreover,
illegal dismissal had been filed. Pajaron and Carbonilla were thus their motion to reduce bond was meritorious since payment of the
awarded the sum of ₱148,753.61 and ₱49,182.66, respectively, full amount of the award will greatly affect the company's
representing backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, operations; besides the appeal was filed by Zeñarosa without the
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13 th month pay. The assistance of a counsel. Petitioners thus implored for a more
dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision reads: liberal application of the Rules and prayed that their appeal be
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby given due course. Along with this motion for reconsideration,
rendered declaring respondent TURKS SHAWARMA petitioners tendered the sum of ₱207,435.53 representing the
COMPANY, [liable] to pay complainants as follows: deficiency of the appeal bond.15
I. FELICIANO Z. P AJARON, JR. In an Order16 dated September 29, 2011, the NLRC denied the
1. Limited backwages computed from April 9, 2010 up to the date Motion for Reconsideration, reiterating that the grounds for the
of this Decision, in the amount of SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND reduction of the appeal bond are not meritorious and that the
NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT PESOS & 74/100 partial bond posted is not reasonable. The NLRC further held that
(Php68,998. 74) the posting of the remaining balance on April 7, 2011 or three
2. Separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one months and eight days from receipt of the Labor Arbiter's
month's salary for every year of service computed from May 1, Decision on December 30, 2010 cannot be allowed, otherwise, it
2007 up to the date of this decision, in the amount of THIRTY will be tantamount to extending the period to appeal which is
ONE THOUS[A]ND FIVE HUNDRED TWELVE PESOS (Php3 limited only to 10 days from receipt of the assailed Decision.
l,5l2.00); Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
3. Holiday pay, in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND SIX Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for Writ
HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE PESOS (Php12,681.00); of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 17 with
4. Service incentive leave pay, in the amount of FIVE the CA. They insisted that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THREE PESOS & 46/100 in dismissing the appeal for failure to post the required appeal
(Php5,403.46); bond.
5. Thirteenth month pay, in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND On May 8, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision 18 dismissing the
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT PESOS & 41/100 Petition for Certiorari. It held that the NLRC did not commit any
(Php30,158.41). grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for non-
II. LARRY A CARBONILLA perfection because petitioners failed to comply with the requisites
1. Separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one in filing a motion to reduce bond, namely, the presence of a
month's salary' for every year of service computed from April 1, meritorious ground and the posting of a reasonable amount of
2007 up to the date of this decision, in the amount of FORTY bond. The CA stated that financial difficulties is not enough
TWO THOUSAND AND SIXTEEN PESOS (Php42,016.00); justification to dispense with the mandatory posting of a bond
2. Holiday pay in the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS inasmuch as there is an option of posting a surety bond from a
(Php2,000.00); reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC, which,
3. Service incentive leave pay, in the amount of EIGHT unfortunately, petitioners failed to do. The CA noted that the lack
HUNDRED THIR1Y THREE PESOS & 33/100 (Php833.33); of assistance of a counsel is not an excuse because petitioners
and ought to know the Rules in filing an appeal; moreover, ignorance
4. Thirteenth month pay, in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND of the law does not excuse them from compliance therewith.
THREE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE PESOS & 33/100 Hence, this present Petition.
(Php4,333.33). Issue
Other claims herein sought and prayed for are hereby denied for Petitioners insist that the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's
lack of legal and factual bases. dismissal of their appeal for the following reasons: first, there was
SO ORDERED.10 substantial compliance with the Rules on perfection of appeal;
Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission second, the surrounding facts and circumstances constitute
Due to alleged non-availability of counsel, Zeñarosa himself filed meritorious grounds to reduce the appeal bond; third, they
a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum and Motion to Reduce exhibited willingness and good faith by posting a partial bond
during the reglementary period; and lastly, a liberal interpretation No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on
of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired meritorious grounds, and upon the posting of a bond in a
objective of resolving controversies on the merits. Petitioners reasonable amount. The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond
claim that there is a necessity to resolve the merits of their appeal without complying with the requisites in the preceding paragraphs
since the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron and shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
Carbonilla illegally terminated from employment was not based "It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of
on substantial evidence. Procedure that there is legislative and administrative intent to
Our Ruling strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should
The Petition has no merit. give utmost regard to this intention." 21 The posting of cash or
The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to
neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor
mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner Arbiter final and executory.22 This indispensable requisite for the
and in accordance with the provisions of the law." 19 "The party perfection of an appeal ''is to assure the workers that if they finally
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements prevail in the case[,] the monetary award will be given to them
of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost."20 upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal [and] is further meant
Article 223 of the Labor Code, which sets forth the rules on to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade
appeal from the Labor Arbiter's monetary award, provides: payment of their obligations to the employees."23
ART. 223. Appeal. --- Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor However, the Court, in special and justified circumstances, has
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the relaxed the requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days perfection of an appeal on technical considerations to give way to
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal equity and justice.24 Thus, under Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005
may be entertained only on any off the following grounds: NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, the reduction of the appeal
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the bond is allowed, subject to the following conditions: (1) the
part of the Labor Arbiter; motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is
coercion, including graft and corruption; posted by the appellant. Compliance with these two conditions
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and will stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
(d) If serious errors in the finding of facts are raised which would In the case at bar, petitioners filed a Motion to Reduce Bond
cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the together with their Notice of Appeal and posted a cash bond of
appellant.1âwphi1 ₱15,000.00 within the 10-day reglementary period to appeal. The
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal CA correctly found that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reduce bond as such
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company motion was not predicated on meritorious and reasonable grounds
duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent and the amount tendered is not reasonable in relation to the award.
to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. The NLRC correctly held that the supposed ground cited in the
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied) motion is not well-taken for there was no evidence to prove
Meanwhile, Sections 4 and 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Zeñarosa's claim that the payment of the full amount of the award
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which were in effect when would greatly affect his business due to financial setbacks.
petitioners filed their appeal, provide: Besides, "the law does not require outright payment of the total
monetary award; [the appellant has the option to post either a cash
Section 4. Requisites for perfection of appeal. - (a) The Appeal
or surety bond. In the latter case, appellant must pay only a]
shall be: 1) filed within the reglementary period as provided in
moderate and reasonable sum for the premium to ensure that the
Section 1 of this Rule; 2) verified by the appellant himself in
award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail." 25 Moreover,
accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as
the absence of counsel is not a valid excuse for non-compliance
amended; 3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall
with the rules. As aptly observed by the CA, Zeñarosa cannot
state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
feign ignorance of the law considering that he was able to post a
thereof: the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the
partial bond and ask for a reduction of the appeal bond. At any
appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order; 4) in
rate, petitioners did not advance any reason for the alleged
three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and 5)
absence of counsel except that they were simply abandoned.
accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii)
Neither did petitioners explain why they failed to procure a new
posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this
counsel to properly assist them in filing the appeal. Moreover, the
Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping; and iv) proof of
partial bond posted was not reasonable. In the case of McBurnie
service upon the other parties.
v. Ganzon,  26 the Court has set a provisional percentage of 10% of
b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other
the monetary award (exclusive of damages and attorney's fees) as
requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for
reasonable amount of bond that an appellant should post pending
perfecting an appeal.
resolution by the NLRC of a motion for a bond's reduction. Only
xxxx
after the posting of this required percentage shall an appellant's
Section 6. Bond. - - - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or
period to perfect an appeal be suspended. Applying this
the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by
parameter, the ₱15,000.00 partial bond posted by petitioners is not
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond,
considered reasonable in relation to the total monetary award of
which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond
₱197,936.27.
equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of
Petitioners, nevertheless, rely on a number of cases wherein the
damages and attorney's fees.
Court allowed the relaxation of the stringent requirement of the
xxxx
rule. In Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corporation,  27 the Court consideration the substantial merits of the appealed cases in
reversed the NLRC's denial of the appellant's motion to reduce giving due course to the appeals. It, in fact, reversed the Labor
bond upon finding adequate evidence to justify the reduction. Arbiters' rulings in both cases. In contrast, petitioners in the case
In Rada v. National Labor Relations Commission 28and Blancaflor at bench have no meritorious appeal as would convince this Court
v. National Labor Relations Commission,  29 the NLRC allowed to liberally apply the rule.
the late payment of the bond because the appealed Decision of the Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its merits even
Labor Arbiter did not state the exact amount to be awarded, hence if we are to allow their appeal to be given due course. After
there could be no basis for determining the amount of the bond to scrupulously examining the contrasting positions and arguments
be filed. It was only after the amount of superseades bond was of the parties, we find that the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring
specified by the NLRC that the appellants filed the bond. In YBL Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally dismissed was supported by
(Your Bus Line) v. National Labor Relations Commission,  30 the substantial evidence. While petitioners vehemently argue that
Court was propelled to relax the requirements relating to appeal Pajaron and Carbonilla abandoned their work, the records are
bonds as there were valid issues raised in the appeal. In Dr. devoid of evidence to show that there was intent on their part to
Postigo v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.,  31the respondent forego their employment. In fact, petitioners adamantly admitted
therein deferred the posting of the bond and instead filed a motion that they refused to rehire Pajaron and Carbonilla despite
to reduce bond on the ground that the Labor Arbiter's computation persistent requests to admit them to work. Hence, petitioners
of the award is erroneous which circumstance justified the essentially admitted the fact of dismissal. However, except for
relaxation of the appeal bond requirement. In all of these cases, their empty and general allegations that the dismissal was for just
though, there were meritorious grounds that warranted the causes, petitioners did not proffer any evidence to support their
reduction of the appeal bond, which, as discussed, is lacking in claim of misconduct or misbehavior on the part of Pajaron and
the case at bench. Carbonilla. "In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the
Petitioners, furthermore, claim that the NLRC's outright dismissal employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause." 37 For lack
of their appeal was harsh and oppressive since they should still be of any clear, valid, and just cause in terminating Pajaron and
given opportunity to complete the required bond upon the filing of Carbonilla's employment, petitioners are indubitably guilty of
their motion for reconsideration. Thus, they insist that their illegal dismissal.
immediate posting of the deficiency when they filed a motion for All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in ruling that the
reconsideration constituted substantial compliance with the Rules. NLRC did not gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
The contention is untenable. petitioners' appeal for non-perfection due to non-compliance with
The NLRC exercises full discretion in resolving a motion for the the requisites of filing a motion to reduce bond.
reduction of bond32 in accordance with the standards of [T]he merit of [petitioners'] case does not warrant the liberal
meritorious grounds and reasonable amount. The "reduction of the application of the x x x rules x x x. While it is true that litigation
bond is not a matter of right on the part of the movant [but] lies is not a game of technicalities and that rules of procedure shall not
within the sound discretion of the NLRC x x x."33 be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice, it must be
In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to reduce emphasized that procedural rules should not likewise he belittled
bond, the appellant must be allowed to wait for the ruling of the or dismissed simply because their non-observance might result in
NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-day period to perfect an prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Like all rules, they are
appeal. If the NLRC grants the motion and rules that there is required to be followed, except only for the most persuasive of
indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted reasons.38
is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 8, 2013
motion, the appellant may still file a motion for reconsideration as Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121956
provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the Rules. If the NLRC is AFFIRMED.
grants the motion for reconsideration and rules that there is indeed SO ORDERED.
meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the Associate Justice
motion, then the decision of the Labor Arbiter becomes final and
executory.34
Academic Discipline
The rulings in Garcia v. KJ Commercial35and Mendoza v. HMS 1. ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA,
Credit Corporation36cannot dissuade this Court from relaxing the NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON,
rules. In Garcia, the NLRC initially denied the appeal of LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO,
respondent therein due to the absence of meritorious grounds in EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY MORENO,
its motion to reduce bond and unreasonable amount of partial GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS
bond posted. However, upon the posting of the full amount of SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES, petitioners,
bond when respondent filed its motion for reconsideration, the vs.
NLRC granted the motion for reconsideration on the ground of HON. SANCHO DANES II, in his capacity as the
substantial compliance with the rules after considering the merits Presiding Judge of 5th Regional Trial Court, Br. 38,
of the appeal. Likewise, in Mendoza, the NLRC initially denied Daet, Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES,
respondents' Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond with a partial bond. INC., represented by its president ROMULO
Respondents thereafter promptly complied with the NLRC's ADEVA and by the chairman of the Board of
directive to post the differential amount between the judgment Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN, respondents.
award and the sum previously tendered by them. The Court held Antonio A. Ayo Jr. and Soliman M. Santos, Jr., for petitioners
that the appeal was filed timely on account of respondents' Pedro A. Venida Agustin A. Ferrer and Gil F. Echaro for private
substantial compliance with the requirements on appeal bond. In respondents.
both Garcia and Mendoza, however, the NLRC took into
CORTES, J.: In addition, for the same semester, petitioners duly signed pledges
Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the which among others uniformly reads:
doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School of In consideration of my admission to the Mabini College and of
Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988, my privileges as student of this institution, I hereby pledge/
161 SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted by promise under oath to abide and comply with all the rules and
the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and, regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College
hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as Department or School in which I am enrolled. Specifically:
the contract between the student and the school is deemed x x x           x x x          x x x
terminated. 3. I will respect my Alma Matter the Mabini College, which I
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. represent and see to it that I conduct myself in such a manner that
in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the the college wig not be put to a bad light;
school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or x x x           x x x          x x x
participating in student mass actions against the school in the 9. I will not release false or unauthorized announcement which
preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, tend to cause confusion or disrupt the normal appreciation of the
made clear in the pleadings. college.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a
readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court petition for mandamus to prosper (Sec. 3, Rule 65). It being a
dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988; the mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or
dispositive portion of which reads: reenrolled, respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact that the ruling admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic
in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly on the point at issue in this case freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with the Supreme
but the authority of the school regarding admission of students, Court rulings in the cases of Garcia vs. Faculty [Admission
save as a matter of compassionate equity — when any of the Committee] (G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975) and Tangonon
petitioners would, at the least, qualify for re-enrollment, this vs. Pano, et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985).
petition is hereby DISMISSED. WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence considered, and for
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 12-A.] lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration of the order of this
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the Court dated August 8, 1988 is hereby DENIED.
trial court on February 24, 1989 in this wise: SO ORDERED. [Rollo pp. 15-16.]
Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of Joaquin G. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with
Bernas S.J., and that really there must be a better way of treating prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.
students and teachers than the manner ruled (not suggested) by the The case was originally assigned to the Second Division of the
Supreme Court, the Termination of Contract at the end of the Court, which resolved on April 10, 1989 to refer the case to the
semester, that is. Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition. The
But applicable rule in the case is that enunciated by the Supreme Court of Appeals ordered respondents to comment on the petition
Court in the case of Sophia Alcuaz, et al. vs. Philippine School of and set the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., mandatory injunction for hearing. After considering the comment
G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988; that of the termination at the end of and hearing the injunction application, the Court of Appeals
the semester, reason for the critical comments of Joaquin G. resolved on May 22, 1989 to certify the case back to the Supreme
Bernas and Doods Santos, who both do not agree with the ruling. Court considering that only pure questions of law were raised.
Petitioners' claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of The case was assigned to the Third Division of the Court, which
their failure to specifically deny respondent's affirmative defenses then transferred it to the Court en banc on August 21, 1989
that "they were given all the chances to air their grievances on considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional. On September
February 9, 10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also on February 22, 1988 14, 1989, the Court en banc accepted the case and required
during which they were represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak" and respondents to comment.
that on February 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Respondents filed their comment on November 13, 1989.
Mabini College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even Petitioners were required to reply. As reply, they filed a pleading
though without any renewal permit, physically coercing students entitled "Counter-Comment," to which respondents filed a
not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled rejoinder entitled "Reply to Counter-Comment To this petitioners
classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right to filed a "Rejoinder to Reply."
be present in their classes. The issues having been joined, the case was deemed submitted.
Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners waived At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine encapsuled in the
their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent following excerpt from Alcuaz:
college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is
for the first semester of school year 1988-89. Said form considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph
specifically states that: 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a
The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the
to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers
institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere are for "one semester." It is thus evident that after the close of the
with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract
required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such
conduct and discipline. being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It
is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law
between the contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate expelled or barred from enrollment for the exercise of their right
Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: to free speech and peaceable assembly and/or subjected to
Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of disciplinary action without abiding with the requirements of due
Appeals, 100 SCRA 197). The contract having been terminated, process. Also, it is understandable for student leaders to let loose
there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be extremely critical and, at times, vitriolic language against school
compelled to enter into another contract with said students and authorities during a student rally.
teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the But the right of students is no license and not without limit . . .
appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties.' [Order of February 24, 1989; Rollo, p. 13.]
(Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra). [At 161 1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected
SCRA 17-18; Emphasis supplied.] Rights at the Schoolgate.
In Alcuaz, the Second Division of the Court dismissed the petition Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the
filed by the students, who were barred from re-enrolling after they recognition and protection of the rights of free speech and
led mass assemblies and put up barricades, but it added that "in assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides:
the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
during the school year when this petition was filed, should be assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time." [At 161 SCRA [Art. III.]
22.] Mr. Justice Sarmiento dissented from the majority opinion. This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers provision was found in the 1973 Constitution, as amended [Art.
in Alcuaz. The students did not move for reconsideration. The VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended [Art. III, sec. 81,
Court en banc, to which the case had been transferred, denied the the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, para. 13], and
motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated September 29, the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15, para. 13]. Thus, as early as
1989, but added as an obiter dictum: 1907, the Court in People v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, upheld the
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right right to speech and assembly to overturn a conviction for sedition.
of students to complete their education in the school or university It said:
of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort to Section 5 of the Act No. 292 is as follows:
rallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain
as part of their freedom of speech and their right to assemble, still by force or outside of legal methods any of the following objects
such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be are guilty of sedition:
conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, xxx xxx xxx
coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, 2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or
demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would municipal government or any public official, from freely
be to subvert freedom into degenerate license. exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any judicial or
The majority's failure to expressly repudiate the "termination of administrative order.
contract" doctrine enunciated in the decision provoked several But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge "the freedom
dissents on that issue. Although seven (7) members of the of speech" or "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
Court * disagreed with the Second Division's dismissal of the petition the Government for redress of grievances" guaranteed by
students petition, a definitive ruling on the issue could not have the express provisions of section 5 of "the Philippine Bill."
been made because no timely motion for reconsideration was filed xxx xxx xxx
by the students. (As stated above, the motion for reconsideration It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
was filed by the dismissed teachers.) public assembly of the people to protest against grievances
Be that as it may, the reassessment of the doctrine laid down whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is
in Alcuaz, insofar as it allowed schools to bar the readmission or always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract, grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a
shall be made in this case where the issue is squarely raised by rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
petitioners [Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 5]. irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to
Initially, the case at bar must be put in the proper perspective. seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
This is not a simple case of a school refusing readmission or re- individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the
enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the fact that the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the
refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of
implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt
actions directed against the school. Petitioners are students of to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most
respondent school who, after leading and participating in student peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to
protests, were denied readmission or re-enrollment for the next the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes
semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the
assembly as exercised by students vis-a-vis the right of school prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur
officials to discipline them. on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and
Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by the punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercise in
ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated August 8, 1988; Rollo, pp. 1212-A], drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and
he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between students' rights between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous
and the school's power to discipline them, to wit: uprising. [At pp. 424, 426.]
Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly
right to education, and there is such denial when students are guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is
well-settled in our jurisdiction. In the leading case of Malabanan students who clearly incurred marked academic deficiency, with
v. Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359, the the following caveat:
Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fernando in an en xxx xxx xxx
banc decision, declared: 4. The academic freedom enjoyed by ''institutions of higher
xxx xxx xxx learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion
speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be
citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate
thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to
in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a
Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, "shed legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the equal protection clause being disregarded. [At p. 711.]
the schoolhouse gate." While therefore, the authority of In Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No.
educational institutions over the conduct of students must be 62297, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 94, a case arising from almost
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional the same facts as those in Malabanan, the Court rejected "the
safeguards. [At pp. 367-368.] infliction of the highly- disproportionate penalty of denial of
The facts in Malabanan are only too familiar in the genre of cases enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to
involving student mass actions: graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and
. . . Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to
respondent [Gregorio Araneta] University. They sought and were them. [At p. 98].
granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11,
8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent school was directed to allow the
permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their
the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) the place respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary
indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their
stated but at the respond floor lobby. At such gathering they participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to 2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Rights Within the School.
Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the
marched toward the Life Science building and continued their rights to free speech and assembly, this should not be taken to
rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline
continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language students. This was made clear by the Court in Malabanan, when it
severely critical of the University authorities and using echoed Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 393 US
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of 503, 514: "But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of
hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. behavior — materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."
9, 1982, they were informed through a memorandum that they Thus, in Malabanan, the Court said:
were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the xxx xxx xxx
holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science 8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally
Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place
for mandamus with damages against private respondents and other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the
before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On October basketball court, of the (VMAS) building of the University.
20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed.
Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the "concerted
par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically activity [referring to such assembly went on until 5:30 p.m."
their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. . . . [ At
the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of pp. 370-371].
classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
academic year. . . . [At pp. 363-364.] requires observance of procedural due process. Thus:
The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too severe . . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to
and reduced it to a one-week suspension. satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
The rule laid down in Malabanan was applied with equal force in (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
three other en banc decisions of the Court. cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, G.R. No. to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 706, the Court reiterated that if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
barring students from enrolling. It enjoined the school and its behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
officials from acts of surveillance, blacklisting, suspension and investigating committee or official designated by the school
refusal to re-enroll. But the Court allowed the non-enrollment of authorities to hear and decide the case. [At pp. 706-707].
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that
offense committed. As stated in Malabanan, "[i]f the concept of the student shall be enrolled for only one semester, and that after
proportionality between the offense committed and sanction that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the
imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes." [At sound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual
p. 371]. recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for
3. Circumventing Established Doctrine. the entire period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph
Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then, student 107 states:
mass actions have escalated not only because of political events Every student has the right to enrol in any school, college or
that unfurled but also because of the constantly raging controversy university upon meeting its specific requirement and reasonable
over increases in tuition fees. But the over-eager hands of some regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic
school authorities were not effectively tied down by the ruling delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is
in Malabanan. Instead of suspending or expelling student leaders presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire period he is
who fell into disfavor with school authorities, a new variation of expected to complete his course without prejudice to his right to
the same stratagem was adopted by the latter: refusing the transfer.
students readmission or re-enrollment on grounds not related to, This "presumption" has been translated into a right in Batas
their alleged misconduct of "illegal assembly" in leading or Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education Act of 1982." Section 9 of
participating in student mass actions directed against the school. this act provides:
Thus, the spate of expulsions or exclusions due to "academic Sec. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other rights,
deficiency." and subject to the limitations prescribed by law and regulations,
4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student. students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination of x x x           x x x          x x x
contract" theory. But it must be repeatedly emphasized that the 2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing
contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of
priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the disciplinary regulations.
State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational x x x           x x x          x x x
institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)]. 5. Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students' Rights.
Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated
Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that "respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the
which provides that "[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom
understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire semester for enjoyed by the school" [Rollo, p. 16]. To support this conclusion,
collegiate courses," which the Court in Alcuaz construed as he cited the cases of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee,
authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the Loyola School of Theology, G.R. No. L-40779, November 28,
ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has 1975, 68 SCRA 277, and Tangonan v. Pano, G.R. No. L-45157,
already expired. June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, where the Court emphasized the
The "termination of contract" theory does not even find support in institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of
the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a college student students as a major component of the academic freedom
enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.
tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. These cases involve different facts and issues. In Garcia, the issue
collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and was whether a female lay student has a clear legal right to compel
the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for theological studies
complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed leading to a degree. In Tangonan, the issue was whether a nursing
on for more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition student, who was admitted on probation and who has failed in her
fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials for nursing subjects, may compel her school to readmit her for
transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under enrollment.
Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court's unequivocal
provides: statement in Villar that the right of an institution of higher
137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to
is enrolling for the entire school year for elementary and discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional
secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there win be a
courses. A student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in violation of their right to equal protection [At p. 711]
writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who 6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup.
has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private
or for any length of time longer than one month may be charged respondents cite the recent cases of Capitol Medical Center,
ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he withdraws Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499, October 13, 1989,
within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the and Licup v. University of San Carlos, G.R. No. 85839, October
second week of classes, regardless of whether or not he has 19, 1989, both decided by the First Division of the Court.
actually attended classes. The student may be charged all the We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions
school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week dissimilar from the issues in the present case.
of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a In Capitol Medical Center, the Court upheld the decision of the
justifiable reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees school authorities to close down the school because of problems
only up to and including the last month of attendance. emanating from a labor dispute between the school and its faculty.
The Court ruled that the students had no clear legal right to assembly, particularly a February 1988 student rally. (The crux of
demand the reopening of the school. the matter, as shown even in the Answer.)
On the other hand, in Licup the issue resolved was whether or not e) There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for
the students were afforded procedural due process before disciplinary action. (In effect, admitted in the Answer;
disciplinary action was taken against them. Thus, the Court stated: even Alcuaz required due process.)
The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of petitioners f) Respondents admit students with worse deficiencies — a clear
that they were deprived of due process of law and that the case of discrimination against petitioners for their role in the
investigation conducted was far from impartial and fair. On the student rally. (An equal protection question.)
contrary, what appear from the record is that the charges against g) Respondent school is their choice institution near their places
petitioners were adequately established in an appropriate of residence which they can afford to pay for tertiary education, of
investigation. The imputation of bias and partiality is not which they have already lost one-and-a-half school-years — in
supported by the record. . . . itself punishment enough. [Rollo, p. 86].
Moreover, Licup, far from adopting the "termination of contract" Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks,
theory in Alcuaz, impliedly rejected it, to wit: namely, Normandy Occiano, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco,
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused re-enrollment
their education, the USC as an educational institution is also without just cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-enroll.
entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were
concommitant right to see to it that this freedom is not afforded due process, in the manner expressed in Guzman, before
jeopardized. they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the
True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because
afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied that
seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student
breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led
standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students
review the discretion of university authorities. (Emphasis because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken
supplied.) against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline
7. The Instant Case. not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation
To justify the school's action, respondents, in their Comment of the basic tenets of fair play.
dated November 12, 1989, quoting from their answer filed in the Moreover, of the eight (8) students with failing grades, some have
trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight (8) have only one or two failures, namely, Rex Magana, Elvin Agura,
incurred failing grades, to wit: Emmanuel Barba, and Luis Santos. Certainly, their failures cannot
a) Ariel Non has not only failed in four (4) subjects but also failed be considered marked academic deficiency within the context of
to cause the submission of Form 137 which is a pre-requisite to the Court's decision in Villar.
his re- enrollment and to his continuing as a student of Mabini; Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades,
b) Rex Magana not only has failed in one (1) subject but also has namely, Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon, and
incomplete grades in four (4) subjects as well as no grades in two Daniel Torres, it is not clear from respondents' enumeration
(2) subjects; whether the failures were incurred in only one semester or
c) Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three (3) through the course of several semesters of study in the school.
incomplete grades; Neither are the academic standards of respondent school, from
d) Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and has to still which we can gauge whether or not these students are
take CMT 1 1 to 22. He is already enrolled at Ago Foundation; academically deficient, alleged by respondents. Thus, while the
e) Joselito Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9) subjects; prerogative of schools to set academic standards is recognized, we
f) Luis Santos has failed in one (1) subject; cannot affirm respondent school's action as to petitioners Non,
g) George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and has to Villalon, Dayaon and Torres because of insufficient information.
remove the incomplete grade in one (1) subject; With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim
h) Daniel Torres has failed in five (5) subjects, has to remove has enrolled in Ago Foundation, such fact alone, if true, will not
incomplete grades in five (5) more objects and has no grade in bar him from seeking readmission in respondent school.
one (1) subject. [Rollo, p. 79.] However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary
Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this allegation action could have been taken against petitioners for breach of
as follows: discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court's
xxx xxx xxx ruling in Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to
(11) Petitioners were and are prepared to show, among others, disciplinary proceedings in connection with the February 1988
that: mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed must
be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth
a) Three of the 13 of them were graduating. (Admitted in the
in Guzman, it must be imposed only after the requirements of
Answer.)
procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit
b) Their academic deficiencies, if any, do not warrant non-
from the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which
readmission. (The Answer indicates only 8 of the 13 as with
provides in Paragraph 145 that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed
deficiencies.)
upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual
c) Their breach of discipline, if any, was not serious.
and/or in the school's rules and regulations duly promulgated and
d) The improper conduct attributed to them was during the
only after due investigation shall have been conducted."
exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
administrative sanctions have become moot and academic.
Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment when his father was notified of this development sometime in
and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school August, 1982, the latter had demanded that his son "reform or else
for four (4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently we will recall him to the province"; that Guzman was one of the
penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed petitioners in G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs.
when they led and participated in the mass actions that, according National University, et al.," at the hearing of which on November
to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still 23, 1983 this Court had admonished "the students involved (to)
subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful take advantage and make the most of the opportunity given to
purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations them to study;" that Guzman "however continued to lead or
between petitioners and the officials of respondent school which actively participate in activities within the university premises,
necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that
of Appeals and before the trial court. disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the
respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and February 24, 1989 are Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. 066446) in
hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED connection with the destruction of properties of respondent
to readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they University on September 12, 1983 ", and "is also one of the
are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the appropriate defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of the Regional Trial Court
action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George of Manila entitled 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan
(Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records et al.' for damages arising from destruction of university
(Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the school's prescribed properties
academic standards. 4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued
SO ORDERED. to lead or actively participate, contrary to the spirit of the
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Paras, Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ... Court (in G.R. No.
Gancayco, Bidin, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. 65443 in which he was also one of the petitioners) and to
Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave. university rules and regulations, within university premises but
without permit from university officials in activities that disturbed
2. DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, or disrupted classes;" and
and ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners, 5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of
vs. good scholastic standing. "
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to
JHOCSON in his capacity as President of National wit:
University, respondents. 1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have
NARVASA, J.: forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek enrollment in respondent
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution of
Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come higher learning, must also be respected. It is also beyond
to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their comprehension why petitioners, who continually despise and
school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." villify respondent university and its officials and faculty members,
In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies should persist in seeking enrollment in an institution that they
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August hate.
7, 1984, they allege: 2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal
1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re- technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all concerned that
enroll them in their respective courses is "the latter's participation petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.
in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University. 3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral
2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of basis, respondents cannot be compelled to enroll them after the
its cavalier if not hostile attitude to the student's exercise of their end of the semester.
basic constitutional and human rights already recorded in Rockie On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as
C. San Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) follows:
and its utter contempt for the principle of due process of law to ... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court
the prejudice of petitioners;" and Resolved to NOTE the same and to require a REPLY to such
3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a
of expulsion without cause or if there be any, without being MANDATORY INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow the
informed of such cause and without being afforded the enrolment of petitioners for the coming semester without
opportunity to defend themselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of
Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]). them may be subjected with their right to lawful defense
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent recognized and respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado
University and its President pursuant to this Court's requirement Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a pending criminal
therefor1 , respondents make the claim: charge against him for malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless
1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the is of the opinion that, as above-noted, without prejudice to the
school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because continuation of any disciplinary proceeding against him, that he
of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and human rights;" be allowed to resume his studies in the meanwhile. As shown in
2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of said
1986 "when the enrollment period was already closed;" petitioner, is extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure
3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was that whatever protest or grievance petitioner Guzman may have
"poor", "due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes"; that would be ventilated in a lawful and peaceful manner.
Petitioners' REPLY inter alia— discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of "good school discipline" is
1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 a duty specifically enjoined on "every private school" by the
(when enrollment was already closed), it being alleged that "while Manual of Regulations for Private Schools; 11 and in this
he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to do so several connection, the Manual further provides that-
times before that date, all to no avail, because respondents ... ... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding
persistently refused to allow him to do so" respondents' ostensible sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing
reason being that Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians.
within the school premises," although there were no existing Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate
disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo" at the time; such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time
2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless
resolution 2 justifies the conclusion that "petitioners' right to otherwise specified. 12
exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been restricted But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
or limited; and observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that
3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not
school premises without the permission of the school ... can be entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
explained by the fact that the respondents persistently refused to actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
issue such permit repeatedly sought by the students. " student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof.
resolution, this time reading as follows: There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy
... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the
deliberating on the issues raised in the petition for extraordinary students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to
mandatory injunction as well as the respondents' comment on the answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
petition and the reply of counsel for petitioners to the respondents' desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b) (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
consider the respondents' comment as ANSWER to the petition; behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
and (c) require the parties to file their respective MEMORANDA investigating committee or official designated by the school
within twenty (20) days from notice. ... . authorities to hear and decide the case.
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are
and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted directed to allow the petitioners to re-enroll or otherwise continue
proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners- with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary
students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the proceedings to which any or all of them may be subjected in
university premises, conducted without prior permit from school accordance with the standards herein set forth.
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or SO ORDERED.
perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, Teehankee, CJ., Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-
noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil
case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief
Termination Proceedings
against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish 1. ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re- vs.
enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight
may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the
standing. weight standards of the airline company.
Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, He is now before this Court via a petition for review on
have the right among others "to freely choose their field of study certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To buttress his
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e)
up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight
violation of disciplinary regulations." 6 Petitioners were being standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational
denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other
violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for overweight employees were promoted instead of being
Private Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any disciplined.
student except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con,
the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only We uphold the legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however,
after due investigation shall have been conducted." 8 This Court is should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social
therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not
Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of respondents of imposing for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
sanctions on students without due investigation. character.
Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and The Facts
enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for ... (its) Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international
government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of feet and eight inches (5’8") with a large body frame. The proper
the college." 10 The rules may include those governing student weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to
166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed
the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL. up his case requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on
PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave from November 5, 1992.
December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the company’s Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on
weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of
March 5, 1985 to November 1985. the charge within which to file his answer and submit
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to controverting evidence.8
return to work. But petitioner’s weight problem recurred. He On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. 9 Notably,
again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to he did not deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is
February 1989. that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds "no action has been taken by the company" regarding his case
over his ideal weight. In line with company policy, he was "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him
removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. because "the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew
He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and members who are similarly situated."
report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where
may avail of the services of the company physician should he petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a weight reduction
wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain
July 3, 1989.2 his ideal weight.10
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that
discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the
overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period
Consequently, his off-duty status was retained. covering a total of almost five (5) years," his services were
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon considered terminated "effective immediately."11
personally visited petitioner at his residence to check on the His motion for reconsideration having been denied, 12 petitioner
progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.
pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to reduce weight in a letter On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes
addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The ruled13 that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The dispositive part
letter, in full, reads: of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
Dear Sir: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss rendered, declaring the complainant’s dismissal illegal, and
from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989. ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:
percentage until such time that my ideal weight is achieved. a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for purposes of appeal is
designated time schedule you will set for my weight check. hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998 at
Respectfully Yours, ₱651,000.00;
F/S Armando Yrasuegui4 b. Attorney’s fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his SO ORDERED.14
ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are
he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not be complied
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
weight checks. performance of his duties. 16 Assuming that it did, petitioner could
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was be transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a
given one more month to comply with the weight requirement. As negative factor.17 Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr.
usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of
He was reminded that his grounding would continue pending being disciplined.18
satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.5 Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he Commission (NLRC).19
was seen submitting his passport for processing at the PAL Staff On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution
Service Division. directing the reinstatement of petitioner without loss of seniority
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated rights and other benefits.20
refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the Motion to
accordingly. He was given another set of weight check Quash Writ of Execution22 of PAL.
dates.6 Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to
for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to quash to the NLRC.23
explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.7 On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed following tenor:
at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the
166 pounds. Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by our findings
herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed
portion of said decision concerning complainant’s entitlement to for resolution:
backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainant’s entitlement I.
to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S OBESITY CAN
backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual reinstatement BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e)
or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE
choice of the form of the reinstatement of complainant, whether PHILIPPINES;
physical or through payroll within ten (10) days from notice II.
failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainant’s WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non- ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S DISMISSAL
payment shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE
of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.25 OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight III.
uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food intake, is a WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
disease in itself."26 As a consequence, there can be no intentional ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT
defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS
PAL for him to lose weight.27 DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR
PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the PROMOTED;
Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the IV.
performance of his duties as flight steward despite being WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONER’S
have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES
petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND
the weight standards of PAL.28 ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring supplied)
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail. 29 Thus, PAL elevated Our Ruling
the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Article 282(e) 44 of the Labor Code.
Procedure.30 A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed 31 the NLRC: conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee
petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL and may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his
VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondent’s ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal
complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor
SO ORDERED.32 Code. As explained by the CA:
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders"
part of the NLRC because it "looked at wrong and irrelevant of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin
considerations"33 in evaluating the evidence of the parties. crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her
Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of PAL are position in the company. In other words, they were standards that
meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee’s establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s position. In
position.34 The failure to adhere to the weight standards is this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall
an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of
282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to
willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest. 35 Said the meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact a ground that
CA, "the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one
irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the that falls under Article 282(e) – the "other causes analogous to the
dismissal is legally proper." 36 In other words, "the relevant foregoing."
question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that
of the standard and whether or not the employee qualifies or apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They apply prior to
continues to qualify under this standard."37 employment because these are the standards a job applicant must
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after
weight standards of PAL are reasonable. 38 Thus, petitioner was hiring because an employee must continue to meet these
legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this
prescribed weight standards.39 It is obvious that the issue of perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article
escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.40 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for "qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to
reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held qualify was willful or intentional. x x x45
that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He
qualification which, in case of violation, "justifies an employee’s claims that obesity is a "physical abnormality and/or
separation from the service."42 illness."46 Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,47 he
Issues says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Nadura’s case cannot be made to fall 1973,53 which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of
squarely within the specific causes enumerated in subparagraphs the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that
1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within the
and says that Nadura’s illness – occasional attacks of asthma – is purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a
a cause analogous to them. mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration herself of concomitant disability.
is sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial court said, The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a
"illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that respondent
of imagination." discriminated against Cook based on "perceived" disability. The
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph evidence included expert testimony that morbid obesity is a
1(a), all the others expressly enumerated in the law are due to the physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the
voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Nadura’s metabolic system and the neurological appetite – suppressing
illness could be considered as "analogous" to any of them is signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within
beyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems.
the same was contracted through his own voluntary act.48 Notably, the Court stated that "mutability is relevant only in
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing from a
in Nadura is substantially different from the case at given impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those
bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse by
applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the behavioral alteration."
issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the
cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a words of the District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook
miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. was sometime before 1978 "at least one hundred pounds more
Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight than what is considered appropriate of her height." According to
standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in 1988.
issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was
entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the
the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous
not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended,
the weight standards of PAL. but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely
petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to attributable to the employee without any external force
reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through
possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of
determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks
"[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."54
which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now."49 II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot occupational qualification defense.
of expenses."50 However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a
could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can
per the advice of PAL.51 He chose to ignore the suggestion. In show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification
fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide
weight checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his occupational qualification (BFOQ).55 In the United States, there
fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that
illness. contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the
of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals,52 decided by the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a
United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook business or enterprise.56
worked from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not
institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center exist if there is no statute providing for it. 57 Further, there is no
that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.58
voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent Both arguments must fail.
admitted that her performance met the Center’s legitimate First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No. 727761 or
expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons62 contain provisions similar
that time, "she stood 5’2" tall and weighed over 320 pounds." to BFOQ.
Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee
compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government
and it also put her at greater risk of serious diseases. and Service Employee’s Union (BCGSEU),63 the Supreme Court
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining
discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This was in direct whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the
violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose
rationally connected to the performance of the job; 64 (2) the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and
employer must establish that the standard is reasonably the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant
and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is are important factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts
reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work- have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors.
related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Thus, the arguments of respondent that "[w]hether the airline’s
Simbol,66 this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its
employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is mission of transporting passengers to their destination"; and that
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; the weight standards "has nothing to do with airworthiness of
and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or respondent’s airlines," must fail.
substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by
unable to properly perform the duties of the job.67 petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was involved there were
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight
because it is parallel to BFOQ.68 BFOQ is valid "provided it engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline company,
job performance."69 alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated the
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based
Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,70 the Court did not hesitate to pass BFOQ and being overweight are not the same. The case of
upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped
employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It was cabin space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the
held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would certainly have
purpose is the protection of the interests of the company against difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures. In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be perform their task. That an obese cabin attendant occupies more
applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can
Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in holding that the weight judicially recognize without introduction of evidence. 77 It would
standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to
observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner.
transports.74 It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft,
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during
circumstances.75 emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in
common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are
standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into
obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-
carrier. bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has possibilities are not remote.
committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight
achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most standards of PAL were made known to him prior to his
particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he
aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as must maintain at all times.78 In fact, never did he question the
imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees. authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith
the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay
gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight
the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to limitations based on height and body frame for both male and
say that airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to
due to public confidence on their safety records. People, allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to
especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any
companies transport their passengers to their respective possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the
destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is part of PAL.
unacceptable. III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to discriminated against by PAL.
serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices of the Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a
passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to convenient excuse to discriminate against him. 79 We are
care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA
when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of that "[t]he element of discrimination came into play in this case as
the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape
who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is
a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the
cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable The law is very clear. Although an award or order of
standard and the private respondent’s failure to comply."80 It is a reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a writ of
basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative execution,93 the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll
allegation.81 reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not belong to the
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts.
affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything
particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support under the sun" to frustrate his "immediate return to his previous
the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish position,"94 there is evidence that PAL opted to physically
discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in accordance
who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof with the order of the Labor Arbiter. 95 In fact, petitioner duly
must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and received the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown
the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the by his signature.96
similarity of his situation with other employees. Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed in a case97 that "[t]he unjustified refusal of the employer to
overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his
indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate
weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their being him despite the issuance of a writ of execution" 98 and ""even if the
overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal,
discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
data that could have adequately established a case of wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal
discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, "PAL by the higher court." 99 He failed to prove that he complied with
really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet."82 the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative that he actually rendered services for PAL from the moment he
agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded was dismissed, in order to insist on the payment of his full
respect, even finality.83 The reason is simple: administrative backwages.
agencies are experts in matters within their specific and In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite
specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast being overweight, petitioner in effect wants to render the issues in
rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the
substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the law does not
grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a exact compliance with the impossible.100
conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
be reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to
arbitrariness.85 separation pay. This may be deduced from the language of Article
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly
misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings. dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
protection clause guaranty86 of the Constitution. However, in the backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
the Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.
individuals.88 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,89 which is the source of employee as an act "social justice," 101 or based on "equity."102 In
our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for
equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral
discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private actions, no matter how character of the employee.103
egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee. 91 Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service. 104 It should include
moot. regular allowances which he might have been receiving.105 We are
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious
reinstatement and wages have not been mooted. He is entitled to misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral
reinstatement and his full backwages, "from the time he was character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL
illegally dismissed" up to the time that the NLRC was reversed by lasted for more or less a decade.
the CA.92 WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance: is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G.
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service, which should
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even include his regular allowances.
pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to SO ORDERED.
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his RUBEN T. REYES
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely Associate Justice
reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer
shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
 respondent’s dismissal the other offenses he allegedly committed
since 1999.
2. KING OF KINGS TRANSPORT INC., CLAIRE On December 11, 2001, respondent filed a Complaint for illegal
DELA FUENTE and MELISSA LIM, petitioners, dismissal, illegal deductions, nonpayment of 13th-month pay,
vs. service incentive leave, and separation pay. He denied committing
SANTIAGO O. MAMAC, respondent. any infraction and alleged that his dismissal was intended to bust
Is a verbal appraisal of the charges against the employee a breach union activities. Moreover, he claimed that his dismissal was
of the procedural due process? This is the main issue to be effected without due process.
resolved in this plea for review under Rule 45 of the September In its April 3, 2002 Position Paper, 5 KKTI contended that
16, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP respondent was legally dismissed after his commission of a series
No. 81961. Said judgment affirmed the dismissal of bus conductor of misconducts and misdeeds. It claimed that respondent had
Santiago O. Mamac from petitioner King of Kings Transport, Inc. violated the trust and confidence reposed upon him by KKTI.
(KKTI), but ordered the bus company to pay full backwages for Also, it averred that it had observed due process in dismissing
violation of the twin-notice requirement and 13th-month pay. respondent and maintained that respondent was not entitled to his
Likewise assailed is the December 2, 2004 CA money claims such as service incentive leave and 13th-month pay
Resolution2 rejecting KKTI’s Motion for Reconsideration. because he was paid on commission or percentage basis.
The Facts On September 16, 2002, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes
Petitioner KKTI is a corporation engaged in public transportation rendered judgment dismissing respondent’s Complaint for lack of
and managed by Claire Dela Fuente and Melissa Lim. merit.6
Respondent Mamac was hired as bus conductor of Don Mariano Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations
Transit Corporation (DMTC) on April 29, 1999. The DMTC Commission (NLRC). On August 29, 2003, the NLRC rendered a
employees including respondent formed the Damayan ng mga Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Manggagawa, Tsuper at Conductor-Transport Workers Union and WHEREFORE, the decision dated 16 September 2002 is
registered it with the Department of Labor and Employment. MODIFIED in that respondent King of Kings Transport Inc. is
Pending the holding of a certification election in DMTC, hereby ordered to indemnify complainant in the amount of ten
petitioner KKTI was incorporated with the Securities and thousand pesos (P10,000) for failure to comply with due process
Exchange Commission which acquired new buses. Many DMTC prior to termination.
employees were subsequently transferred to KKTI and excluded The other findings are AFFIRMED.
from the election. SO ORDERED.7
The KKTI employees later organized the Kaisahan ng mga Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied through
Kawani sa King of Kings (KKKK) which was registered with the November 14, 2003 Resolution8 of the NLRC.
DOLE. Respondent was elected KKKK president. Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Respondent was required to accomplish a "Conductor’s Trip CA urging the nullification of the NLRC Decision and
Report" and submit it to the company after each trip. As a Resolution.
background, this report indicates the ticket opening and closing The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
for the particular day of duty. After submission, the company Affirming the NLRC, the CA held that there was just cause for
audits the reports. Once an irregularity is discovered, the company respondent’s dismissal. It ruled that respondent’s act in "declaring
issues an "Irregularity Report" against the employee, indicating sold tickets as returned tickets x x x constituted fraud or acts of
the nature and details of the irregularity. Thereafter, the concerned dishonesty justifying his dismissal."9
employee is asked to explain the incident by making a written Also, the appellate court sustained the finding that petitioners
statement or counter-affidavit at the back of the same Irregularity failed to comply with the required procedural due process prior to
Report. After considering the explanation of the employee, the respondent’s termination. However, following the doctrine in
company then makes a determination of whether to accept the Serrano v. NLRC,10 it modified the award of PhP 10,000 as
explanation or impose upon the employee a penalty for indemnification by awarding full backwages from the time
committing an infraction. That decision shall be stated on said respondent’s employment was terminated until finality of the
Irregularity Report and will be furnished to the employee. decision.
Upon audit of the October 28, 2001 Conductor’s Report of Moreover, the CA held that respondent is entitled to the 13th-
respondent, KKTI noted an irregularity. It discovered that month pay benefit.
respondent declared several sold tickets as returned tickets Hence, we have this petition.
causing KKTI to lose an income of eight hundred and ninety The Issues
pesos. While no irregularity report was prepared on the October Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors for our
28, 2001 incident, KKTI nevertheless asked respondent to explain consideration:
the discrepancy. In his letter,3 respondent said that the erroneous Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding in
declaration in his October 28, 2001 Trip Report was unintentional. favor of the complainant/private respondent, full back wages,
He explained that during that day’s trip, the windshield of the bus despite the denial of his petition for certiorari.
assigned to them was smashed; and they had to cut short the trip Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
in order to immediately report the matter to the police. As a result KKTI did not comply with the requirements of procedural due
of the incident, he got confused in making the trip report. process before dismissing the services of the complainant/private
On November 26, 2001, respondent received a letter4 terminating respondent.
his employment effective November 29, 2001. The dismissal Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals rendered an incorrect
letter alleged that the October 28, 2001 irregularity was an act of decision in that [sic] it awarded in favor of the complaint/private
fraud against the company. KKTI also cited as basis for respondent, 13th month pay benefits contrary to PD 851.11
The Court’s Ruling from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to
The petition is partly meritorious. study the accusation against them, consult a union official or
The disposition of the first assigned error depends on whether lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they
petitioner KKTI complied with the due process requirements in will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the
terminating respondent’s employment; thus, it shall be discussed employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses,
secondly. the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and
Non-compliance with the Due Process Requirements circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the
Due process under the Labor Code involves two aspects: first, employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice.
substantive––the valid and authorized causes of termination of Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company
employment under the Labor Code; and second, procedural––the rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under
manner of dismissal.12 In the present case, the CA affirmed the Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC that the termination of (2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule
employment of respondent was based on a "just cause." This and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will
ruling is not at issue in this case. The question to be determined is be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses
whether the procedural requirements were complied with. to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their
Art. 277 of the Labor Code provides the manner of termination of defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the
employment, thus: management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are
Art. 277. Miscellaneous Provisions.––x x x given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice.
tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties
just and authorized cause without prejudice to the requirement of as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish (3) After determining that termination of employment is justified,
the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of
written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the
and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to charge against the employees have been considered; and (2)
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so grounds have been established to justify the severance of their
desires in accordance with company rules and regulations employment.
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of In the instant case, KKTI admits that it had failed to provide
Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall respondent with a "charge sheet."16 However, it maintains that it
be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the had substantially complied with the rules, claiming that
validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the "respondent would not have issued a written explanation had he
regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The not been informed of the charges against him."17
burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or We are not convinced.
authorized cause shall rest on the employer. First, respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of
Accordingly, the implementing rule of the aforesaid provision committing an infraction. The law is clear on the matter. A verbal
states: appraisal of the charges against an employee does not comply
SEC. 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice.––In all with the first notice requirement. In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v.
cases of termination of employment, the following standards of NLRC,18 the Court held that consultations or conferences are not a
due process shall be substantially observed: substitute for the actual observance of notice and hearing. Also,
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Mesano,19 the Court, sanctioning
in Article 282 of the Code: the employer for disregarding the due process requirements, held
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground that the employee’s written explanation did not excuse the fact
or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable that there was a complete absence of the first notice.
opportunity within which to explain his side. Second, even assuming that petitioner KKTI was able to furnish
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee respondent an Irregularity Report notifying him of his offense,
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given such would not comply with the requirements of the law. We
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or observe from the irregularity reports against respondent for his
rebut the evidence presented against him. other offenses that such contained merely a general description of
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee, the charges against him. The reports did not even state a company
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, rule or policy that the employee had allegedly violated. Likewise,
grounds have been established to justify his termination. 13 there is no mention of any of the grounds for termination of
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employment under Art. 282 of the Labor Code. Thus, KKTI’s
employee’s last known address.14 "standard" charge sheet is not sufficient notice to the employee.
To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the Third, no hearing was conducted. Regardless of respondent’s
services of employees: written explanation, a hearing was still necessary in order for him
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should to clarify and present evidence in support of his defense.
contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against Moreover, respondent made the letter merely to explain the
them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity circumstances relating to the irregularity in his October 28, 2001
to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. Conductor’s Trip Report. He was unaware that a dismissal
"Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every proceeding was already being effected. Thus, he was surprised to
kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees receive the November 26, 2001 termination letter indicating as
to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. 15 This grounds, not only his October 28, 2001 infraction, but also his
should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days previous infractions.
Sanction for Non-compliance with Due Process Requirements vs.
As stated earlier, after a finding that petitioners failed to comply ALEX P. MONTANEZ, doing business under the
with the due process requirements, the CA awarded full name and style APM or AD AND PROMO
backwages in favor of respondent in accordance with the doctrine MANAGEMENT, Respondents
in Serrano v. NLRC.20 However, the doctrine in Serrano had DECISION
already been abandoned in Agabon v. NLRC by ruling that if the LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
dismissal is done without due process, the employer should Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
indemnify the employee with nominal damages.21 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to reverse and set
Thus, for non-compliance with the due process requirements in aside the Decision1 dated June 14, 2011 and Amended
the termination of respondent’s employment, petitioner KKTI is Decision2 dated October 13, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
sanctioned to pay respondent the amount of thirty thousand pesos G.R. CV No. 02281-MIN, where it declared null and void
(PhP 30,000) as damages. Sections 7, 8, 37 and 45 of the Davao City Ordinance No. 092,
Thirteenth (13th)-Month Pay Series of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as "Ordinance No. 092-
Section 3 of the Rules Implementing Presidential Decree No. 2000" or "the Ordinance").3
85122 provides the exceptions in the coverage of the payment of The facts are as follows:
the 13th-month benefit. The provision states: On August 8, 2000, the city government of Davao (City
SEC. 3. Employers covered.––The Decree shall apply to all Government), through its Sangguniang Panlungsod, approved
employers except to: Ordinance No. 092-2000 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the
xxxx Construction, Repair, Renovation, Erection, Installation and
e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, Maintenance of Outdoor Advertising Materials and For Related
boundary, or task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount for Purposes." Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45 of the ordinance provided as
performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in follows:
the performance thereof, except where the workers are paid on CHAPTERS
piece-rate basis in which case the employer shall be covered by SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
this issuance insofar as such workers are concerned. Article 1
Petitioner KKTI maintains that respondent was paid on purely Advertising Sign
commission basis; thus, the latter is not entitled to receive the SECTION 7 - BILLBOARD - Outdoor advertising signs shall not
13th-month pay benefit. However, applying the ruling in be allowed in a residential zone as designated in the Official
Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Zoning Map. Adjacent billboards shall be erected in such a way as
Union v. NLRC,23 the CA held that respondent is entitled to the to maintain 150.00 meters unobstructed line of sight.
said benefit. Billboards and other self-supporting outdoor signs along
It was erroneous for the CA to apply the case of Philippine highways shall be located within a minimum of 10.00 meters
Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Union. Notably away from the property lines abutting the road right-of-way.
in the said case, it was established that the drivers and conductors SECTION 8 - REGULATED AREAS - Bridge approach areas
praying for 13th- month pay were not paid purely on commission. within 200 meters of the following bridges shall be designated as
Instead, they were receiving a commission in addition to a fixed "regulated areas" in order to preserve, among others, the natural
or guaranteed wage or salary. Thus, the Court held that bus view and beauty of the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the Davao City
drivers and conductors who are paid a fixed or guaranteed Skyline and the view of Samal Island, to wit:
minimum wage in case their commission be less than the statutory 1. Generoso Bridge I and II;
minimum, and commissions only in case where they are over and 2. Bolton Bridge I and II;
above the statutory minimum, are entitled to a 13th-month pay 3. Lasang Bridge
equivalent to one-twelfth of their total earnings during the xx xx
calendar year. CHAPTER 10
On the other hand, in his Complaint, 24 respondent admitted that he FEES
was paid on commission only. Moreover, this fact is supported by SECTION 37 - FEES - Fees for the application of Sign Permits to
his pay slips25 which indicated the varying amount of be paid at the Office of the City Treasurer shall be as follows:
commissions he was receiving each trip. Thus, he was excluded I. DISPLAY SURFACE
from receiving the 13th-month pay benefit.
a) Sign fee shall be collected per square meter of the display
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the surface of billboards, business signs, electrical signs, ground
September 16, 2004 Decision of the CA is MODIFIED by signs, projecting signs, roof signs, signboards and wall signs for
deleting the award of backwages and 13th-month pay. Instead, such amount as follows:
petitioner KKTI is ordered to indemnify respondent the amount of
a.1 outdoor video screen................... ₱150.00
thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000) as nominal damages for
a.2 tri-wind billboard........................ ₱100.00
failure to comply with the due process requirements in
a.3 neon............................................. ₱75.00
terminating the employment of respondent.
a.4 illuminated .................................. ₱50.00
Substantive Due Process a.5 painted-on .................................... ₱30.00
G.R. No. 199172 a.6 others ............................................ ₱15.00
1. HON. LEONCIO EVASCO, JR., in his capacity as b) Posters (per piece) ....................................... ₱5.00
OIC CITY ENGINEER OF DAVAO CITY and c) Temporary signs (per square meter) ........... ₱5.00
HON. WENDEL A VISADO, in his capacity as THE d) Other advertising and/or propaganda Materials (per square
CITY ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO meter) ........................ ₱10.00
CITY, Petitioners
e) Building lines/staking line and Grade (fixed With the impending demolition of APM's billboard structures,
amount) ............................................. ₱200.00 respondent Montanez sought recourse before the Regional Trial
II. STRUCTURE Court (RTC), Branch 14, Davao City on March 28, 2006 and filed
Erection of support for any signboard, billboard and the like shall a petition for injunction and declaration of nullity of Ordinance
be charged a fee as follows: No. 092-2000 and order of demolition dated March 17, 2006 with
1) up to 4 square meter of signboard................ ₱100.00 application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
2) in every square meter or fraction thereof...... ₱50.00 restraining order docketed as Sp. Civil Case No. 31,346-06.
III. RENEWAL FEE In his petition,6 respondent Montanez claimed that Ordinance No.
Renewal of sign permit shall include among others the 092-2000 is unconstitutional for being overbreadth in its
corresponding payment for the display surface and support application, vague, and inconsistent with Presidential Decree No.
structure of the sign as determined in accordance with this Section 1096 or the National Building Code of the Philippines (National
and Section 35 of this Ordinance. Building Code).
IV. OTHER FEES In an Order7 dated April 17, 2006, the RTC granted respondent
Sign fees paid under this Ordinance shall be without prejudice to Montañez's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
an additional payment of electrical permit fee for signs with injunction, to wit:
electrical devices as required in accordance with the provisions of WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, the instant
the National Building Code. prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is
xx xx hereby GRANTED. The respondents, namely, OIC Leoncio
CHAPTER 14 Evasco, Jr. of the Davao City Engineer's Office and Davao City
REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL MATERIALS Administrator Wendel A visado are hereby restrained from
SECTION 45 - REMOVAL. The City Engineer or his duly implementing the Order of demolition dated March 17, 2006 and
authorized representative shall remove, upon recommendation of from actually demolishing the advertising structures of petitioner
the Building Official, the following at the expense of the Alex P. Montanez along Bolton Bridge and Bankerohan Bridge
displaying party: until the main case is decided and tried on the merits or until
further orders from this Court.
l. Those displayed without permit from the Local Building
Official, provided that the displaying party shall be given a Meanwhile, in response to the damage caused by typhoon
reasonable period of sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice to Milenyo in September 2006 especially to various billboard
comply with the sign permit requirement provided hereof; structures within Metro Manila, former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) issued Administrative
2. Those displayed with a permit but without bearing the
Order (AO) No. 1608 directing the Department of Public Works
necessary permit marking requirement as provided in Section 39
and Highways (DPWH) to conduct nationwide field inspections,
hereof, provided that the displaying party shall be given a
evaluations, and assessments of billboards and to abate and
reasonable period of sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice to
dismantle those: (a) posing imminent danger or threat to the life,
comply with the marking permit requirement provided hereof;
health, safety and property of the public; (b) violating applicable
3. Those displayed beyond the expiry date as provided in Section
laws, rules and regulations; (c) constructed within the easement of
34 hereof, however, if the displaying party intends to renew such
road right-of-way; and/or, (d) constructed without the necessary
permit even beyond the period sought to be extended, the same
permits. President Arroyo also issued AO No. 160-A 9 specifying
shall be given a reasonable period of sixty (60) days from receipt
the legal grounds and procedures in the abatement of billboards
of the notice to comply with the renewal requirement provided
and signboards constituting public nuisance or other violations of
hereof without prejudice to the payment of surcharge of 25% of
law.
the total fees for such delay.
Assuming the role given by AO No. 160, Acting DPWH
4. Those displayed in public places and/or structures as stated in
Secretary Hennogenes E. Ebdane, Jr. issued National Building
section 41;
Code Development Office (NBCDO) Memorandum Circular No.
5. Those billboards, business signs, electrical signs, ground signs,
310 directing all local government Building Officials to cease and
projecting signs, roof signs or wall signs which are installed or
desist from processing application for and issuing and renewing
constructed in violation of this Ordinance or other applicable
billboard permits.
statues and ordinances.
Pursuant to this directive, the city government suspended all
As early as 2003, the City Engineer of Davao City (City
pending applications for billboard permits.
Engineer) started sending notices of illegal construction to various
While petitioner Montañez's case was still pending before the
outdoor advertising businesses, including Ad & Promo
RTC, the city government issued another order of demolition
Management (APM), owned by herein respondent Alex P.
dated September 25, 2008, this time directed against Prime
Montanez, that constructed the billboards in different areas within
Advertisements & Signs (Prime), on the ground that the latter's
the city. The City Engineer reminded the entities to secure a sign
billboards had no sign permits and encroached a portion of the
permit or apply for a renewal for each billboard structure as
road right of way. The city government gave Prime until October
required by Ordinance No. 092-2000.
8, 2008 to voluntarily trim its structures. Otherwise, the same
In February4 and March 2006, the City Engineer issued orders 5 of
shall be removed by the city demolition team.
demolition directing erring outdoor advertising businesses,
The directive against Prime prompted herein respondent Davao
including APM, to "voluntarily dismantle" their billboards that
Billboards and Signmakers Association, Inc. (DABASA) to
violate Ordinance No. 092- 2000 within three days from receipt of
intervene11 in Sp. Civil Case No. 31,346-06 in behalf of its
the order. Otherwise, the city government shall summarily remove
members consisting of outdoor advertising and signmaker
these structures without further notice. In the orders of demolition
businesses in Davao City such as APM and Prime.
dated March 17, 2006, the summary removal was scheduled on
The RTC Decision
March 30, 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.
In its Decision12 dated January 19, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of On the basis of City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,17 the appellate court
herein respondents Montanez and DABASA, to wit: held that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is not consistent with the
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is National Building Code and, thus, invalid. It cited the following
rendered declaring as void and unconstitutional the following inconsistencies: First, Section 7 of Ordinance No. 092-2000
provisions of City Ordinance No. 092-2000 as follows: requires that signs and signboards must be constructed at least 10
(a) Sections 7, 8 and 41 meters away from the property line while the National Building
for being contrary to P.D. 1096 or the National Building Code of Code allows projection of not more than 300 millimeters over
the Philippines. alleys and roads. The Ordinance unduly interferes with
The injunction previously issued base (sic) on the aforesaid proprietary rights inasmuch as it requires a larger setback
provisions of the ordinance is hereby made permanent.13 distance. Second, Section 8 of the Ordinance regulates building
Both parties moved for reconsideration. Thus, in its Joint Order and constn1ction of signs and signboards within certain areas to
dated April 1, 2009, the RTC modified its original decision, to preserve the natural beauty of the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the
wit: Davao City Skyline, and the view of Samal Island.
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the .instant Upholding People v. Fajardo,18 the local government cannot rely
motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner is GRANTED solely on aesthetics in justifying its exercise of police
modifying the court's decision dated JANUARY 19, 2009 as power. Third, Section 45 of the Ordinance authorizes the City
follows: Engineer, upon the Building Official's recommendation, to
~ demolish advertising materials that have been found to be illegally
(a) declaring as void and unconstitutional the following provisions constructed. In effect, the Ordinance expanded the Building
of City Ordinance No. 092-2000, as follows: Official's authority, which, under the National Building Code, was
aa) Sections 7, 8 and 37, for being contrary to P.D. 1096 or the limited to determining ruinous and dangerous buildings or
National Building Code of the Philippines; structures and to recommending its repair or demolition. Further,
the National Building Code does not allow the demolition of signs
[bb] declaring herein Section 41 of City Ordinance No. 092- 2000
based on a supposed lack of permit. Instead, it allows these
as deleted; and
structures to continue to operate so long as a duly accredited
[cc] declaring the injunction previously issued by the Court based
engineer certifies the structures' structural integrity.19
on the aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance, permanent.
The Issues
Respondents'. (sic) motion for reconsideration is DENIED.14
The petitioner City Engineer now comes before this Court raising
Aggrieved, the petitioner City Engineer sought recourse before
the following issues:
the Court of Appeals.
I
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF SIGNAGE ORDINANCE,
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the City
WIDCH IS LIFTED/COPIED FROM UNCHALLENGED
Engineer's appeal, to wit:
PROVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby
REGULATION (SIC) OF NATIONAL BUILDING CODE OF
DENIED and the January 19, 2009 Decision and April 1, 2009
THE PHILIPPINES, RUNS CONTRA[R]Y TO THE
Joint Order of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
NATIONAL BUILDING CODE ITSELF?
City in Civil Case No. 31,346-06 the Regional Trial Court (sic)
II
AFFIRMED with modification.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
The appealed Decision and Joint Order are affirmed insofar as it
DECLARING SECTION 8 OF SIGNAGE ORDINANCE NULL
declares Section 7 and 8 of City Ordinance of Davao No. 092
AND VOID
series of 2002 (sic) null and void. Section 45 of the challenged
III
Order (sic) is likewise declared null and void. We, however,
reinstate Section 41 of the challenged Ordinance.15 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING SECTION 37 OF SIGNAGE ORDINANCE
Again, both parties moved for reconsideration. Subsequently, the
NULL AND VOID
Court of Appeals promulgated its Amended Decision, to wit:
IV
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, respondent-appellant City of
Davao's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
Petitioner-appellee's prayer for the categorical declaration of the DECLARING SECTION 45 OF SIGNAGE ORDINANCE
nullity of Section 37 of the challenged Ordinance and rectification NULL AND VOID20
of the dispositive portion of our June 14, 2011 Decision are The petitioner City Engineer argues that Ordinance No. 092-2000
GRANTED. The fallo of said decision should now read: is not inconsistent with the National Building Code as follows: as
"WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby to Section 7, it cannot be held to be inconsistent with Section
DENIED and the January 19, 2009 Decision and April 1, 2009 1002,21 which is under Chapter 10, of the National Building Code
Joint Order of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao because said provision applies to all building projections, in
City in Civil Case No. 31,346-06 are AFFIRMED with general. Signs and billboards are specifically governed by Chapter
modification. 20 thereof. As to Section 8, Section 458(a)(3)(iv)22 of Republic
Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of the Philippines
The appealed Decision and Joint Order are affirmed insofar as it
(LGC), the city government has the power to regulate the display
declares Section 7, 8 and 37 of City Ordinance of Davao No. 092
of signs for the purpose of preserving the natural view and beauty
series of 2002 (sic) null and void. Section 45 of the
of the surroundings. Aesthetic considerations do not constitute
challenged Ordinance is likewise declared null and void. We
undue interference on property rights because it merely sets a
however, reinstate Section 41 of the challenged Ordinance."16
limitation and, in fact, still allows construction of property
Hence, the present petition.
provided it is done beyond the setback. As to Section 37, when it
nullified the same, the Court of Appeals did not state the specific
legal findings and bases supporting its nullity. Thus, the assailed police power to regulate billboard structures within its territorial
decision violated Section 14, Article VIII 23 of the Constitution. As jurisdiction.29
to Section 45, the Court of Appeals went beyond its authority Petitioners failed to allege the specific
when it invalidated the said Section because the parties, both constitutional provision violated
petitioners and respondents, did not raise any issue as to the The records reveal that while petitioners claim that Ordinance No.
validity of said section. Moreover, the city engineer is mandated 092-2000 is unconstitutional, they have not pointed to any
to act as the local building official. In turn, under the LGC, the specific constitutional provision it allegedly violated. The settled
city engineer is empowered to perform duties and functions rule is that an ordinance is presumed constitutional and
prescribed by ordinances, such as Ordinance No. 092-2000. Thus, valid.30 This presumption may only be overcome by a showing of
the city engineer has the authority to cause the removal of the ordinance's clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.31
structures found to have violated the ordinance. To invalidate an ordinance based on a bare and unilateral
On the other hand, herein respondents maintain that Ordinance declaration that it is unconstitutional is an affront to the wisdom
No. 092-2000 is invalid for the following reasons: .first, Section 7 not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
thereof contradicts the National Building Code because while the which approved it.32
latter does not impose a minimum setback from the property lines Consistency between Ordinance No.
abutting the road right-of- way, the said provision requires a 10- 092-2000 and the National Building
meter setback. Second, Section 8's establishment of "regulated Code is irrelevant
areas" in keeping with aesthetic purposes of the surroundings is The Court of Appeals ruled that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is
not a valid exercise of police power. Third, the fees required by invalid because it contradicts the provisions of the National
Section 37 of the ordinance are excessive, confiscatory, and Building Code, i.e., the. Ordinance imposes additional
oppressive. Fourth, Section 45, insofar as it empowers the requirements not provided in the National Building Code and
building official to cause the removal of erring billboards, is an even expanded the authority of the city building official in the
undue delegation of derivative power. Under the National removal of erring billboard structures.
Building Code, the building official's authority is limited to the We disagree.
determination of ruinous and dangerous buildings and structures.24 As stated earlier, the power to regulate billboards within its
The Ruling of the Court territorial jurisdiction has been delegated by Congress to the city
The petition is meritorious. government via the Davao City Charter. This direct and specific
We disagree with the Court of Appeals when it declared Sections grant takes precedence over requirements set forth in another law
7, 8, 37, and 45 of Ordinance No. 092-2000 as unconstitutional, of general application,33 in this case the National Building Code.
thus, null and void for being inconsistent with the National Stated differently, the city government does not need to refer to
Building Code. However, the validity of Ordinance No. 092-2000 the procedures laid down in the National Building Code to
is being upheld for reasons different from those espoused by the exercise this power.
petitioners. Thus, the consistency between Ordinance No. 092-2000 with
It is settled that an ordinance's validity shall be upheld if the the National Building Code is irrelevant to the validity of the
following requisites are present: First, the local government unit former.1âшphi1
must possess the power to enact an ordinance covering a To be clear, even if the National Building Code imposes
particular subject matter and according to the procedure minimum requirements as to the construction and regulation of
prescribed by law. Second, the ordinance must not contravene the billboards, the city government may impose stricter limitations
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or must because its police power to do so originates from its charter
not be against public policy or must not be unreasonable, and not from the National Building Code. The ordinance
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common specifically governs billboards and other similar structures
right.25 situated within Davao City, independent of the provisions of the
The power to regulate billboards was National Building Code.
validly delegated to the local city Ordinance No. 092-2000 is a valid
council via Davao's charter exercise of police power
Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if: (a) it
installation of building and other structures such as billboards has a lawful subject such that the interests of the public
within Davao City, is an exercise of police power. 26 It has been generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
stressed in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel- its exercise; and (b) it uses a lawful method such that its
Air Village Association27 that while police power is lodged implementing measures must be reasonably necessary for the
primarily in the National Legislature, Congress may delegate this accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
power to local government units. Once delegated, the agents can individuals.34
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by First, Ordinance No. 092-2000 seeks to regulate all signs and sign
the national lawmaking body. structures based on prescribed· standards as to its location, design,
Republic Act No. 4354 otherwise known as the Revised Charter size, quality of materials, construction and maintenance35 to: (a)
of the City of Davao (Davao City Charter),28 enacted on June 19, safeguard the life and property of Davao City's inhabitants; (b)
1965, vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the keep the surroundings clean and orderly; (c) ensure public
legislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for decency and good taste; and (d) preserve a harmonious aesthetic
the display, construction, and maintenance of billboards and relationship of these structures as against the general
similar structures. surroundings.36
With the aforementioned law, Congress expressly granted the Second, the ordinance employs the following rules in
Davao City government, through the Sangguniang Panlungsod, implementing its policy, viz.: (a) Minimum distances must be
observed in installing and constructing outdoor
billboards (i.e., 150 meters unobstructed line of sight, 10 meters CARPIO, J.:
away from the property lines abutting the right-of-way); 37 (b) Bury me in the ground, place a stone and a cross over it.
Additional requirements shall be observed (i.e., billboards shall My name, the date of my birth, and of my death. Nothing more.
have a maximum total height of 17 meters, the top and bottom If you later wish to surround my grave with a fence, you may do
lines of billboards shall follow a common base) 38 in locations so.
designated as "regulated areas" to preserve the natural view and No anniversaries. I prefer Paang Bundok.
beauty of the Davao River, Mt. Apo, the Davao City Skyline, and - Jose Rizal
the view of Samal Island;39 ( c) Sign permits must be secured from  
and proper fees paid to the city government; 40 and (d) Billboards The Case
without permits, without the required marking signs, or otherwise  
violative of any provision thereof shall be removed, allowing the Before this Court is a Petition for Injunction, with Applications
owner 60 days from receipt of notice to correct and address its for Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
violation.41 and Others 1 filed by the Knights of Rizal (KOR) seeking, among
The Court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as others, for an order to stop the construction of respondent DMCI
unreasonable unless the rules imposed are so excessive as to be Homes, Inc. 's condominium development project known as the
prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or Torre de Manila. In its Resolution dated 25 November 2014, the
42
confiscatory.  It must be remembered that the local legislative Court resolved to treat the petition as one for mandamus. 2
authority has a wide discretion to determine not only what the The Facts
interests of the public require but also what measures are  
necessary for the protection of such interests.43 We accord high On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-
respect to the Sanggunian's issuance because the local council is PDI) 3 acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot in the City of Manila,
in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.44 located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-
In the same vein, Ordinance No. 092-2000 reflects the wisdom Alai Building and Adamson University.4 The lot was earmarked
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as elected representatives of for the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila
the people of Davao City. In local affairs, acts of local officials condominium project.
must be upheld when it is clear that these were performed On 2 April 2012, DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to
squarely within the statutory authority granted to them and in start the construction of its project. It then obtained a Zoning
the exercise of their sound discretion.45 Permit from the City of Manila's City Planning and Development
For the foregoing reasons, the validity of Ordinance No. 092- Office (CPDO) on 19 June 2012.5
2000, including the provisions at issue in the present petition, viz.: Then, on 5 July 2012, the City of Manila's Office of the Building
Sections 7, 8, 3 7, and 45 must be upheld. Official granted DMCI-PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to
By way of an observation, We note that petitioner City Engineer build a "Forty Nine (49) Storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level
issued orders of demolition that required erring outdoor Res'l./Condominium" on the property. 6
advertising businesses to correct the defects of their structures On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution
within three days from receipt of notice. Otherwise, the No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to
billboard will be summarily removed. In said orders dated March temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing
17, 200646 and September 25, 2008,47 the summary removal among others, that "the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on
operations were March 30, 2006 and October 8, 2008, their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above
respectively. These orders of demolition, however, violate Section the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of
45 of the ordinance inasmuch as the orders do not observe the our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the
reglementary periods granted to erring billboard owners. Section line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard
45 clearly gives the owners at least 60 days to correct any defect vantage point[.]"7
suffered by their structures and altogether comply with the Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of
ordinance requirements. the City of Manila's City Legal Officer on whether he is bound to
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition comply with Resolution No. 121.8 In his letter dated 12 September
is GRANTED. The Decision and Amended Decision of the Court 2012, City Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is
of Appeals dated June 14, 2011 and October 13, 2011, "no legal justification for the temporary suspension of the
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 02281-MIN are Building Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-PDI]" since the
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. construction "lies outside the Luneta Park" and is "simply too far
SO ORDERED. to I be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO the artistic and historical significance" of the Rizal
Associate Justice Monument. 9 He also pointed out that "there is no showing that
WE CONCUR: the [area of subject property has been officially declared as an
anthropological or archeological area. Neither has it ' been
2.
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner. categorically designated by the National Historical Institute as a
vs. heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a
DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT national treasure."
DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF MANILA, Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND opinion or the National Historical Commission of the Philippines
THE ARTS, NATIONAL HISTORICAL (NHCP) on the matter. In the letter10 dated 6 November 2012 from
COMMISSION OF THE NHCP I Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno addressed to
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DMCI-PDI and the letter 11 dated 7 November 2012 from NHCP
DECISION Executive Director III Ludovico D. Bado)f addressed to then
Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim, the NHCP maintained that the Next, the KOR contends that the project is a nuisance per
Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal se23 because "[t]he despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal
f.ark and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot Monument is a situation that annoy's or offends the senses' of
possibly obstruct the frontal view of the National Monument. every Filipino who honors the memory of the National Hero Jose
On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Rizal. It is a present, continuing, worsening and aggravating status
Torre de Manila project that garnered about 7,800 signatures, the or condition. Hence, the PROJECT is a nuisance per se. It
City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its deserves I to be abated summarily, even without need of judicial
directive in Resolution No. 121 1 enjoining the City of Manila's proceeding. "24
building officials to temporarily suspend ~MCI-PDI's Building The KOR also claims that the Torre de Manila project violates the
Permit. 12 NHCP's Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes,
In a letter to Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada dated 18 December Illustrious Filipinos and Other Personages, which state that
2013, DMCI-PIDI President Alfredo R. Austria sought historic monuments should assert a visual "dominance" over its
clarification on the controversy surrounding its Zoning Permit. He surroundings,25 as well as the country's commitment under
stated that since the CPDO granted its Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of
continued with the application for the Building Permit, which was Monuments and Sites, otherwise known as the Venice Charter. 26
granted, and did not deem it necessary to go through the process Lastly, the KOR claims that the DMCI-PDI's construction was
of appealing to the local zoning board. He then expressed DMCI- commenced and continues in bad faith, and is in violation of the
PDI's willingness to comply with the process if the City of Manila City of Manila's zoning ordinance. 27
deemed it necessary. 13 Arguments of DMCI-PDI
On 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments In its Comment, DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR's petition should
and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06, be dismissed on the following grounds:
Series of 2013, 14 recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's I.
application for variance. ;The MZBAA noted that the Torre de THXS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
Manila project "exceeds the prescribed maximum Percentage of THIS ACTION.
Land Occupancy (PLO) and exceeds the prescribeµ Floor Area II.
Ratio (FAR) as stipulated in Article V, Section 17 of City KOR HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT OR INTEREST TO FILE OR
Ordinance No. 8119[.]" However, the MZBAA still recommended PR0SECUTE THIS ACTION.
the approval of the variance subject to the five conditions set III.
under the same resolution. TORRE DE MANILA IS NOT A NUISANCE PER SE.
After some clarification sought by DMCI-PDI, the MZBAA IV.
issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06-A, Series of 2013, 15 on 8 DMCI-PDI ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN CONSTRUCTING
January 2014, amending condition (c) in the earlier resolution. 16 TORRE DE MANILA; AND
On 16 January 2014, the City Council of Manila issued V.
Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, 17 adopting Zoning Board KOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
Resolution Nos. 06 and 06- A. The City Council resolution states ORPER AND/OR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
that "the City Council of Manila find[ s] no cogent reason to deny INJUNCTION. 28
and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the [MZBAA] First, DMCI-PDI asserts that the Court has no original
and hereby ratif[ies] and confirm[s] all previously issued permits, jurisdiction over actions for injunction.29 Even assuming that the
licenses and approvals issued by the City [Council] of Manila for Court has concurrent jurisdiction, DMCI-PDI maintains that the
Torre de Manila[.]" petition should still have been filed with the Regional Trial Court
Arguments of the KOR under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and because the petition
On 12 September 2014, the KOR, a "civic, patriotic, cultural, involves questions of fact. 30
nonpartisan, non-sectarian and non-profit organization" 18 created DMCI-PDI also contends that the KOR's petition is in actuality an
under Republic Act No. 646, 19 filed a Petition for Injunction opposition' or appeal from the exemption granted by the City of
seeking a temporary restraining I order, and later a permanent Manila's MZBAA, a matter which is also not within the
injunction, against the construction of DMCIPDI's Torre de jurisdiction of the Court. 31 DMCI-PDI claims that the proper
Manila condominium project. The KOR argues that the subject forum should be the MZBAA, and should the KOR fail there, it
matter of the present suit is one of "transcendental importance, should appeal the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society, Board (HLURB). 32
or with far-reaching implication" involving the desecration of the DMCI-PDI further argues that since the Rizal Monument has been
Rizal Monument. declared a National Treasure, the power to issue a cease and desist
The KOR asserts that the completed Torre de Manila structure order is lodged with the "appropriate cultural agency" under
will "[stick] out like a sore thumb, [dwarf] all surrounding Section 25 of Republic Act No. li0066 or the National Cultural
buildings within a radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the Heritage Act of 2009. 33 Moreover, DMCI-PDI asserts that the
sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park: Torre de Manila KOR availed of the wrong remedy since an action for injunction
building would loom at the back I and overshadow the entire is not the proper remedy for abatement of a nuisance. 34
monument, whether up close or viewed from a distance. ''20 Second, DMCI-PDI maintains that the KOR has no standing to
Further, the KOR argues that the Rizal Monument, as a National institute this proceeding because it is not a real party in interest in
Treasure, is entitled to "full protection of the law" 21 and the this case. The purposes of the KOR as a public corporation do not
national government must abate the act or activity that endangers include the preservation of the Rizal Monument as a cultural or
the nation's cultural heritage "even against the wishes of the local historical heritage site.35 The KOR has also not shown that it
government hosting it." 22 suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged
illegal conduct of the City of Manila. If there is any injury to the
KOR at all, the same was caused by the private conduct of a breach of certain provisions of City Ordinance No. 8119."50 It
private entity and not the City of Manila. 36 maintained, however, 1 that the deficiency is "procedural in
Third, DMCI-PDI argues that the Torre de Manila is not a nature and pertains mostly td the failure of [DMCI-PDI] to
nuisance per se. DMCI-PDI reiterates that it obtained all the comply with the stipulations that allow an excess in the [FAR]
necessary permits, licenses, clearances, and certificates for its provisions." 51 Further, the City of Manila argued that the
construction. 37 It also refutes the KOR's claim that the Torre de MZBAA, when it recommended the allowance of the project's
Manila would dwarf all other structures around it; considering that variance, imposed certain conditions upon the Torre de Manila
there are other tall buildings even closer to the Rizal Monument project in order to mitigate the possible adverse effects of an
itself, namely, the Eton Baypark Tower at the corner of Roxas excess FAR. 52
Boulevard and T.M. Kalaw Street (29 storeys; 235 meters from The Issue
the Rizal Monument) and Sunview Palace at the corner of M.H. The issues raised by the parties can be summed up into one main
Del Pilar and T.M. Kalaw Streets (42 storeys; 250 meters from the point: Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the
Rizal Monument). 38 officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-
Fourth, DMCI-PDI next argues that it did not act in bad faith PDI's Torre de Manila project?
when it started construction of its Torre de Manila project. Bad The Court's Ruling
faith cannot be attributed to it since it was within the "lawful The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed.
exercise of [its] rights." 39 The KOR failed to present any proof There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de
that DMCI-PDI did not follow the proper procedure and zoning Manila.
restrictions of the City of Manila. Aside from obtaining all the In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission,53 the
necessary permits from the appropriate government Court held that "what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited
agencies,40 DMCI-PDI also sought clarification on its right to by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to
build on its site from the Office of the City Legal Officer of morals, customs and I public order." This principle is
Manila, the Manila CPDO, and the NHCP.41 Moreover, even if the fundamental in a democratic society, to protect the weak against
KOR proffered such proof, the Court would be 1 in no position to the strong, the minority against the majority, and the individual
declare DMCI-PDI's acts as illegal since the Court is not a trier of citizen against the government. In essence, this principle, which is
facts. 42 the foundation of a civilized society under the rule of law,
Finally, DMCI-PDI opposes the KOR's application for a prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only through
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and writ of preliminary law. Without this principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties
injunction. DMCI-PDI asserts that the KOR has failed to establish of citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by
"a clear and unmistakable right to enjoin I the construction of the shifting passions of those who can spout the loudest, or those
Torre de Manila, much less request its demolitior." 43 DMCI-PDI who can gather the biggest crowd or the most number of Internet
further argues that it "has complied with all the legal requirements trolls. In other instances,54 the Court has allowed or upheld actions
for the construction of Torre de Manila x x x [and] has violated o that were not expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined
right of KOR that must be protected. Further, KOR stands to that these acts were not contrary to morals, customs, and public
suffer o damage because of its lack of direct pecuniary interest in order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable
this petiti1 on. To grant the KOR's application for injunctive relief solution to the controversy. However, it is the law itself - Articles
would constitute an unjust taking of property without due process 130655 and 1409(1)56 of the Civil Code - which prescribes that acts
of law. "44 not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public
Arguments of the City of Manila policy are allowed if also not contrary to law.
In its Comment, the City of Manila argues that the writ of In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de
mandamus cannot issue "considering that no property or Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs, and public order"
substantive rights whatsoever in favor of [the KOR] is being or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the
affected or x x x entitled to judicial protection[.]"45 contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI
The City of Manila also asserts that the "issuance and revocation complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local
of a Building Permit undoubtedly fall under the category of a ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.
discretionary act or duty performed by the proper officer in light There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law
of his meticulous appraisal and evaluation of the pertinent prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its
supporting documents of the application in accordance with the effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the
rules laid out under the National Building Code [and] Presidential Rizal Monument.
Decree No. 1096,"46 while the remedy of mandamus is available Specifically, Section 47 reads:
only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. 47 SEC. 47. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards. -
Further, the City of Manila maintains that the construction of the Historic site and facilities shall be conserved and preserved. These
Torre de Manila did not violate any existing law, since the shall, to the extent possible, be made accessible for the
"edifice [is] well behind (some 789 meters away) the line of sight educational and cultural enrichment of the general public.
of the Rizal Monument."48 It adds that the City of Manila's The following shall guide the development of historic sites and
"prevailing Land Use and Zoning Ordinance [Ordinance No. facilities:
8119] x xx allows an adjustment in Floor Area Ratios thru the 1. Sites with historic buildings or places shall be developed to
[MZBAA] subject to further final approval of the City conserve and enhance their heritage values.
Council."49 The City Council adopted the MZBAA's favorable: 2. Historic sites and facilities shall be adaptively re-used.
recommendation in its Resolution No. 5, ratifying all the licenses 3. Any person who proposes to add, to alter, or partially demolish
and permits issued to DMCI-PDI for its Torre de Manila project. a designated heritage property will require the approval of the
In its Position Paper dated 15 July 2015, the City of Manila City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) and shall be
admitted that the Zoning Permit issued to DMCI-PDI was "in required to prepare a heritage impact statement that will
demonstrate to the satisfaction of CPDO that the proposal will not The natural environmental character of the site and its adjacent
adversely impact the heritage significance of the property and properties shall be considered in the site development of each
shall submit plans for review by the CPDO in coordination with building and facility.
the National Historical Institute (NHI). 2. The height and bulk of buildings and structures shall be so
4. Any proposed alteration and/or re-use of designated heritage designed that it does not impair the entry of light and ventilation,
properties shall be evaluated based on criteria established by the cause the loss I of privacy and/or create nuisances, hazards or
heritage significance of the particular property or site. inconveniences to adjacent developments.
5. Where an owner of a heritage property applies for approval to 3. Abutments to adjacent properties shall not be allowed without
demolish a designated heritage property or properties, the owner the neighbor's prior written consent which shall be required by the
shall be required to provide evidence to satisfaction that City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) prior to the
demonstrates that rehabilitation and re-use of the property is not granting of a Zoning Permit (Locational Clearance).
viable. 4. The capacity of parking areas/lots shall be per the minimum
6. Any designated heritage property which is to be demolished or requirements of the National Building Code. These shall be
significantly altered shall be thoroughly documented for archival located, developed and landscaped in order to enhance the
purposes with! a history, photographic records, and measured aesthetic quality of the facility. In no case, shall parking areas/lots
drawings, in accordance with accepted heritage recording encroach into street rights-of-way and shall follow the Traffic
guidelines, prior to demolition or alteration. Code as set by the City.
7. Residential and commercial infill in heritage areas will be 5. Developments that attract a significant volume of public modes
sensitive to the existing scale and pattern of those areas, which of transportation, such as tricycles, jeepneys, buses, etc., shall
maintains the existing landscape and streetscape qualities of those provide on-site parking for the same. These shall also provide
areas, and which does not result in the loss of any heritage vehicular loading and unloading bays so as street traffic flow will
resources. not be impeded.
8. Development plans shall ensure that parking facilities (surface 6. Buffers, silencers, mufflers, enclosures and other noise-
lots residential garages, stand-alone parking garages and parking absorbing I materials shall be provided to all noise and vibration-
components as parts of larger developments) are compatibly producing machinery. Noise levels shall be maintained according
integrated into heritage areas, and/or are compatible with adjacent to levels specified in DENR DA9 No. 30 - Abatement of Noise
heritage resources. and Other Forms of Nuisance as Defined by Law.
9. Local utility companies (hydro, gas, telephone, cable) shall be 7. Glare and heat from any operation or activity shall not be
required to place metering equipment, transformer boxes, power radiated, seen or felt from any point beyond the limits of the
lines, conduit, equipment boxes, piping, wireless property.
telecommunication towers and other utility equipment and devices 8. No large commercial signage and/or pylon, which will be
in locations which do not detract from the visual character of detrimental to the skyline, shall be allowed.
heritage resources, and which do not have a negative impact on its 9. Design guidelines, deeds of restriction, property management
architectural integrity. plans and other regulatory tools that will ensure high quality
10. Design review approval shall be secured from the CPDO for developments shall be required from developers of commercial
any alteration of the heritage property to ensure that design subdivisions and condominiums. These shall be submitted to the
guidelines and standards are met and shall promote preservation City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) for review and
and conservation of the heritage property. (Emphasis supplied) approval. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance Se9tion 4 7 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates
No. 8119 only serve as guides, as it expressly states that "the the "development of historic sites and facilities." Section 48
following shall guide the :development of historic sites and regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is
facilities." A guide simply sets a direction 'or gives an instruction nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that
to be followed by prope1iy owners and developers in order to disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries
conserve and enhance a property's heritage values. of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the1
On the other hand, Section 48 states: background of a historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila
SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards. - The City considers it in stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument
the public interest that all projects are designed and developed in a and "cannot possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal]
safe, efficient and aesthetically pleasing manner. Site Monument." 57 Likewise, ;the Torre de Manila is not in an area
development shall consider the environmental character and that has been declared as an "anthropological or archeological
limitations of the site and its adjacent properties. All project area" or in an area designated as a heritage zone, cultural
elements shall be in complete harmony according to good design property, historical landmark, or a national treasure by the
principles and the subsequent development must be visually NHCP. 58
pleasing as well as efficiently functioning especially in relation to Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the
the adjacent properties and bordering streets. subject of arts and culture, provides that "[t]he State shall
The design, construction, operation and maintenance of every conserve, promote and popularize the nation's historical and
facility shall be in harmony with the existing and intended cultural heritage and resources x x x." Since this provision is not
character of its neighborhood. It shall not change the essential self-executory, Congress passed laws dealing with the
character of the said area but will be a substantial improvement to preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage.
the value of the properties in the neighborhood in particular and One such law is Republic Act No. 10066, 59 or the National
the community in general. Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the National
Furthermore, designs should consider the following: Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies
1. Sites, buildings and facilities shall be designed and developed to issue a cease and desist order "when the physical integrity of
with1 regard to safety, efficiency and high standards of design. the national cultural treasures or important cultural properties [is]
found to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration The KOR also invokes this Court's exercise of its
from its original state."60 This law declares that the State should extraordinary certiorari power of review under Section 1, Article
protect the "physical integrity" of the heritage property or building VIII65 of the Constitution. However, this Court can only exercise
if there is "danger of destruction or significant alteration from its its extraordinary certiorari power if the City of Manila, in issuing
original state." Physical integrity refers to the structure itself - the required permits and licenses, gravely abused its discretion
how strong and sound the structure is. The same law does not amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Tellingly, neither
mention that another project, building, or property, not itself a the majority nor minority opinion in this case has found that the
heritage property or building, may be the subject of a cease and City of Manila committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista, permits and licenses to DMCI-PDI. Thus, there is no justification
or sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act at all for this Court to exercise its extraordinary certiorari power.
No. 10066 cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium Moreover, the exercise of this Court's
project. extraordinary certiorari power is limited to actual cases and
Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila. controversies that necessarily involve a violation of the
The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, Constitution or the determination of the constitutionality or
liberty or 1property without due process of law x x x." 61 It is a validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a
fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from statute that does not raise the issue of constitutionality or validity
an individual without due process, whether substantive or of the statute cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the Court's direct
procedural. The dispossession of property, or in this case the exercise of its expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR's
stoppage of the construction of a building in one's own property recourse lies with other judicial remedies or proceedings allowed
would violate substantive due process. under the Rules of Court.
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v.
when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 66 we held that
officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the in cases where the question of constitutionality of a governmental
party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance action is raised, the judicial power that the courts exercise is
of such act. likewise identified as the power of judicial review - the power to
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or review the constitutionality of the actions of other branches of
in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction government. As a rule, as required by the hierarchy of courts
of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is principle, these cases are filed with the lowest court with
within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. jurisdiction over the 1subject matter. The judicial review that the
Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila "to courts undertake requires:
consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, "the 1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
standards set under Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to the judicial power;
applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under 2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has been case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de result of its enforcement;
Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is "not 3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
pap: of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National possible opportunity; and
Heritage Site in 1095," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact 4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the
"well-beyond" the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson case.
Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno. 62 Neither has the area of the Torre de The lower court's decision under the constitutional scheme
Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural property, a reaches the Supreme Court through the appeal process, through a
historical landmark or even a national treasure."63 petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the Court.
standards under Ordinance No. 8119 would involve making a In the present case, the KOR elevated this case immediately to
finding of fact. A finding lot fact requires notice, hearing, and the this Court in an original petition for injunction which we later on
submission of evidence to ascertain compliance with the law or treated as one for mandamus under Rule 65. There is, however, no
regulation. In such a case, it is the Regional Trial Court which has clear legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the provisions
the jurisdiction to hear the case, receive evidence, make a proper of Ordinance No. 8119 for applications for permits to
finding of fact, and determine whether the Torre de Manila project build outside the protected areas of the Rizal Park. Even if there
properly complied with the standards set by the ordinance. were such legal duty, the determination of whether the City of
In Meralco v. Public Service Commission, 64 we held that it is the .Manila failed to abide by this legal duty would involve factual
cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to matters which have not been admitted or established in this case.
be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or Establishing factual matters is not within the realm of this Court.
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.
thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or
proper court or tribunal. determining the background sightline that is supposed to be
To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under protected or that is part of the "physical integrity" of the Rizal
Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre de Manila project will be an Monument. How far should a building like the Torre de Manila be
empty exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the from the Rizal Monument - one, two, three, four, or five
Rizal Park - and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. kilometers? Even the Solicitor General, during the Oral
Mandamus will lie only if the officials Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does not prescribe how
sightline is determined, neither is there any way to measure by
metes and bounds whether al construction that is not part of the In De Castro v. Salas,71 we held that no rule of law is better
historic monument itself or is outside the protected area can established than the one that provides that mandamus will not
be said to violate the Rizal Monument's physicalintegrity, except issue to control the discretion of an officer or a court when
only to say "when you stand in front of the Rizal Monument, there honestly exercised and when such power and authority is not
can be no doubt that your view is marred and impaired." This kind abused.
of a standard has no parameters and can include a sightline or a In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus
construction as far as the human eyes can see when standing in to compel action in matters involving judgment and discretion,
front of the Rizal Monument. Obviously, this Court cannot apply only "to act, but not to act lone way or the other," 72 and only in
such a subjective and non-uniform standard that adversely affects cases where there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of
property rights several kilometers away from a historical sight or discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.73
facility. In this case, there can be no determination by this Court that the
The Dissenting Opinion claims that "the City, by reason of a City of Manila had been negligent or remiss in its duty under
mistaken or erroneous construction of its own Ordinance, had Ordinance No. 8119 considering that this determination will
failed to consider its duties under [Ordinance No. 8119] when it involve questions of fact. DMCI- PDI had been issued the proper
issued permits in DMCI-PDI's favor." However, MZBAA Zoning permits and had secured all approvals and licenses months before
Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A67 easily dispel this claim. the actual construction began. Even the KOR could not point to
According to the resolutions, the City of Manila, through the any law that respondent City of Manila had violated and could
MZBAA, acted on DMCI-PDI's application for variance under the only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice
powers and standards set forth in Ordinance No. 8119. Charter which do not constitute clear legal bases for the issuance
Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, of a writ of mandam1s.
capriciously, or arbitrarily in issuing said resolution, the Court The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles
should respect MZBAA's exercise of discretion. The Court cannot for the preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites,
"substitute its I judgment :for that of said officials who are in a and buildings. It brings I together principles in the field of
better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the historical conservation and restoration that have been developed,
authority specifically vested in them by law." 68 Since the Court agreed upon, and and laid down by experts over the years. Each
has "no supervisory power over the proceedings I and actions of country, however, remains "responsible for applying the plan
the administrative departments of the government," it "should not within the framework of its own culture and traditions."74
generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become
functions.; 69 The power of the Court in mandamus petitions does enforceable as law. The Philippines is not legally bound to follow
not extend "to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but mere guidelines
a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action - a set of the best practices and techniques that have been proven
already taken in the exercise of either."70 over the years to be the most effective in preserving and restoring
Still, the Dissenting Opinion insists on directing the re-evaluation historical monuments, sites and buildings.
by the City of Manila, through the CPDO, of the permits The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI's Zoning Permit was
previously issued in favor of the Torre de Manila project to granted without going through the process under Ordinance No.
determine compliance with the standards ]under Ordinance No. 8119. However, the same was properly rectified when, faced with
8119. It also declares that the circumstances in this case warrant mounting opposition, DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from
the prohacvice conversion of the proceedings in the issuance of the City of Manila and immediately began complying with the
the permits into a "contested case" necessitating notice and procedure for applying for a variance. The MZBAA did
hearing with all the parties involved. subsequently recommend the approval of the variance and the
Prohac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a City Council of Manila approved the same, ratifying the licenses
precedent because the decision is for the specific case only, not to and permits already given to DMCI-PDI. Such ratification was
be followed in other cases. A prohac vice decision violates well within the right of the City Council of Manila. The City
statutory law - Article 8 of the Civil Code - which states that Council of Manila could have denied the application had it seen
"judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the any reason to do so. Again, the ratification is a function of the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the City Council of Manila, an exercise of its discretion1 and well
Philippines." The decision of the Court in this case cannot within the authority granted it by law and the City's own
be prohac vice because by mandate bf the law everydecision of Ordinance No. 8119.
the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety,
another case comes up with the same facts as the present case, that health, convenience, and welfare. There is no indication that the
case must be decided in the same way as this case to comply with Torre de Manila project brings any harm, danger, or hazard to the
the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the law. Thus, people in the surrounding areas except that the building allegedly
a prohac vice decision also violates the equal protection clause of poses an unsightly view on the taking of photos or the visual
the Constitution. appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists. In fact,
It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the discretionary the Court must take the approval of the MZBAA, and its
executive acts of the executive branch unless there is a clear subsequent ratification by the City Council of Manila, as the duly
showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials. Great care
of jurisdiction. Mandamus does not lie against the legislative and must be taken that the Court does not unduly tread upon the local
executive branches or their members acting in the exercise of their government's performance of its duties. It is not for this Court to
official discretionary functions. This emanates from the respect dictate upon the other branches bf the government how their
accorded by the judiciary to said branches as co-equal entities discretion must be exercised so long as these branches do not
under the principle of separation of powers. commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Likewise, any violation of Ordinance No. 8119 must be JUSTICE CARPIO: And the buildable area is to the edge of the
determined in the proper case and before the proper forum. It is property ...it's not 60 percent, correct?
not within the power of this Court in this case to make such ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
determination. Without such determination, this Court cannot JUSTICE CARPIO: So, if you look at all the ... residential
simply declare that the City of Manila had failed to consider its buildings in the last ten years, they [have] all variances. They
duties under Ordinance No. 8119 when it issued the permits in did not follow the original FAR 4 or the 60 percent (of land
DMCI-PDI's favor without making a finding of fact how the City occupancy). Every residential building that stand alone was a
of Manila failed "to consider" its duties with respect to areas variance. ATTY. FLAMINIANO: That's correct, Your
outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park. In the first place, this Honor.
Court has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact in an original JUSTICE CARPIO: So the rule really in the City of Manila is
action like this before this Court. Moreover the City of Manila variance, and the exception which is never followed is FAR 4.
could not legally apply standards to sites outside the area covered ATTY. FLAMINIANO: FAR 4, it appears to be that way,
by the ordinance that prescribed the standards. With this, I taken Your Honor.
in light of the lack of finding that there was grave abuse of xxxx
discretion I on the part of the City of Manila, there is no basis to JUSTICE CARPIO: Every developer will have to get a
issue the writ of mandamus against the City of Manila. variance because it doesn't make sense to follow FAR 4
During the Oral Arguments, it was established that the granting of because the land is so expensive and if you can build only two
a variance neither uncommon nor irregular. On the contrary, storeys on a 1,000-square meter lot, you will surely lose
current practice has made granting of a variance the rule rather money, correct? ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Exactly, Your
than the exception: Honor. 75 (Emphasis supplied)
JUSTICE CARPIO: Let's go to Ordinance 8119. For residential This, the MZBAA's grant of the variance cannot be used as a
condominium that stand alone, in other words not part of a basis to grant the mandamus petition absent any clear finding
commercial complex or an industrial complex ... that said act amo'1nted to "grave abuse of discretion,
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor. manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority."
JUSTICE CARPIO: The [Floor Area Ratio (FAR)] is uniform for The KOR is Estopped from Questioning the
the entire City of Manila, the FAR 4, correct? ATTY. Torre de Manila Construction.
FLAMINIANO: I believe so, Your Honor, it's FAR 4. The KOR is now estopped from questioning the construction of
JUSTICE CARPIO: So it's FAR 4 for all residential condominium the Torre de Manila project. The KOR itself came up with the
complex or industrial projects. idea to build a structure right behind the Rizal Monument that
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There might be, the FAR might be would dwarf the Rizal Monument.
different when it comes to condominiums in commercial areas, In the mid-1950s, the Jose Rizal National Centennial Commission
Your Honor. (JRNCC) l formulated a plan to build an Educational Center
JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, I'm talking of stand-alone ... within the Rizal Park. In July 1955, the KOR proposed the
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor. inclusion of a national theater on the site of the Educational
JUITICE CARPIO: ... residential condominiums... Center. The JRNCC adopted the proposal. The following[ year, a
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Uniform at FAR 4, Your Honor. law - Republic Act No. 142776 - authorized the establishment of
JUSTICE CARPIO: And the percentage of land occupancy is the Jose Rizal National Cultural Shrine consisting of a national
always 60 percent. theater, a national museum, and a national library on a single
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: 60 percent correct, Your Honor. site. 77
JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay ... how many square meters is this To be built on the open space right behind the 12.7 meter high
Torre de Manila? Rizal Monument were: the KOR's proposed nationaltheater,
xxx standing 29.25 meters high and 286 meters in distance from the
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: The land area, Your Honor, it's almost Rizal Monument; the nationallibrary, standing 25 .6 meters high
5,000 ... 5,556. and 180 meters in distance from the Rizal ;Monument, with its
JUSTICE CARPIO: So, it's almost half a hectare. rear along San Luis Street (now T.M. Kalaw Street); and facing it,
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor. the nationalmuseum, at 19.5 meters high and 190 meters in I
JUSTICE CARPIO: And at FAR 4, it can only build up to 18 distance from the Rizal Monument, with its back along P. Burgos
storeys, I mean at FAR 4, is that correct? Street. 78
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: If the 60 percent of the lot... However, several sectors voiced their objections to the
JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, but that is a rule. construction for various reasons. Among them, the need to
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: That is a rule, that's the rule, Your preserve the open space of the park, the high cost of construction,
Honor. the desecration of the park's hallowed grounds, and the fact that
the proposed cultural center including the 129.25 meter high
JUSTICE CARPIO: 60 percent of...
national theater proposed by the KOR would dwarf the 12.7
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Of the land area.
meter high Rizal Monument. 79 The JRNCC revised the plan and
JUSTICE CARPIO: ... buildable, the rest not buildable.
only the National Library - which still stands today - was built. 80
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
According to the NHCP, the KOR even proposed to build a Rizal
JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay, so if you look around here in the City
Center on the park as recently as 2013.81 The proposal was
of Manila anywhere you go, you look at stand alone residential
disapproved by the NHCR and the Department of Tourism.
condominium buildings...
Surely, as noble as the KOR's intentions were, its proposed center
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There's a lot of them, Your Honor.
would have dwarfed the Rizal Monument with its size and
JUSTICE CARPIO: It's always not FAR 4, it's more than FAR 4.
proximity.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
In contrast, the Torre de Manila is located well outside the Rizal By definition, a nuisance peraccidens is determined based on its
Park, and to the rear of the Rizal Monument - approximately 870 surrounding conditions and circumstances. These conditions and
meters from the Rizal Monument and 3 0 meters from the edge of circumstances must be well established, not merely alleged. The
Rizal Park. 82 Court cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as
It is a basic principle that "one who seeks equity and justice must established facts as the KOR would have us do in this case. 99 The
come to court with clean hands. "83 In Jenosa v. Delariarte, 84 the KOR itself concedes that the question of whether the Torre de
Court reiterated ,that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he Manila is a nuisance peraccidens is a question of fact. 100
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. This The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to
"signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity find facts, to estimate their force, and to apply rules of law to the
on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and case thus made. 101 1lhis Court is no such authority. It is not a trier
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. of facts. It cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and
" 85 Thus, the KOR, having earlier proposed a national theater a accept these as facts, more so in this case where these allegations
mere 286meters in distance from the back of the Rizal Monument are contested by the respondents.
that would have dwarfed the Rizal Monument, comes to this I The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial
Court with unclean hands. It is now precluded from "seeking any courts. The question, then, of whether the Torre de Manila project
equitable refuge" 86 from the Court. The KOR's petition should be is a nuisance peraccidens must be settled after due proceedings
dismissed on this ground alone. brought before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot
Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se. circumvent the process in the guise be protecting national culture
In its petition, the KOR claims that the Torre de Manila is a and heritage.
nuisance perse that deserves to be summarily abated even without The TRO must be lifted.
judicial proceedings. 87 However, during the Oral Arguments, Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and
counsel for the KOR argued that the KOR now believes that the prevent further injury102 until final adjudication on the merits of
Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens and not a the case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the KOR are
nuisance perse. 88 not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, must be dismissed and the TRO lifted.
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of I
anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety administrative agencies when they are supported by substantial
of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired vested rights
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the in the various permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied
free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of for in order to build a 49-storey building which is, and had been,
water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. allowed by the City of Manila's zoning ordinance.
Thy Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first, As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to
nuisance perse, is on "recognized as a nuisance under any and all review discretionary decisions or actions of administrative
circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public agencies in the absence of proof that such decisions or actions
health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
under the undefined law of necessity." 89 The second, or excess of jurisdiction.
nuisance peraccidens, is that which "depends upon certain In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa, 103 we held that mandamus is
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on
of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act which the law
tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing in law specifically enjoins as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion
constitutes a nuisance. "90 of a party from the use and enjoyment be a right to which he is
It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance clearly entitled. Only specific legal rights may be enforced by
per se. The Torre de Manila project cannot be considered as a mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights of th6
"direct menace to I public health or safety." Not only is a petitioner are not well-defined, definite, clear, and certain, 104 the
condominium project commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI- petition must be dismissed. Stated otherwise, the writ never issues
PDI has, according to the proper government agencies, complied in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It
with health and safety standards set by law. DMCI-PDI has been is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
granted the following permits and clearances prior to starting the perform a duty already imposed. 105
project: (1) Height Clearance Permit from the Civil Aviation In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in
Authority of the Philippines;91 (2) Development Permit from the discretionary acts of the executive department in the absence of
HLURB;92 (3) Zoning Certification from the HLURB; 93 (4) grave abuse of discretion, 106 and considering that mandamus may
Certificate of Environmental Compliance Commitment from the only be issued to enforce a clear and certain legal right, 107 the
Environment Management Bureau of the Department of present special civil action for mandamus must be dismissed and
Environment and Natural Resources;94 (5) Barangay the TRO issued earlier must be lifted.
Clearance  (6) Zoning Permit;  (7) Building Permit;97 (8) and
95 96
A FINAL WORD
Electrical and Mechanical Permit.98 It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi
Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance Ultimo Adios, the poem he left for his family the night before he
recommended by the MZBAA and granted by the City Council of was executed, Rizal wrote:
Manila. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Torre de Manila Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora
project is not a nuisance perse. Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz 108
On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila [Ako’y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas
is a nuisance peraccidens. na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag
yaong maligayang araw na sisikat A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE
109
sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.]  ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED
[I die just when I see the dawn break, BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING
Through the gloom of night, to herald the day]  110
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE
West towards Manila Bay, with his back to the firing squad, like TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS
the traitor the colonial government wished to portray him. He EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex
asked to face his executioners, facing the East where the sun "A" p. 39)
would be rising since it was early morning, but the Spanish Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are
captain did not allow it. As he was shot and a single bullet struck bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not
his frail body, Rizal forced himself, with his last remaining exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The
strength, to turn around to face the East and thus he fell on his beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would
back with] his face to the sky and the rising sun. Then, the receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief
Spanish captain approached Rizal and finished him off with one from the Municipality of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41)
pistol shot to his head. Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60.
Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired
simple tomb, marked with a cross and a stone with only his name of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the
and the date of his birth and death; no anniversary celebrations; implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo, Annex
and interment at Paang Bundok (now, the Manila North "C", p. 43).
Cemetery). Rizal never wanted his grave to be a burden to future Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on
generations. Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its
The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution
carried out. The letter was discovered many years later, in 1953. No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the
By then, his remains had been entombed at the Rizal Monument, implementation thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", P. 44)
countless anniversaries had been . celebrated, with memorials and Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp.
monuments built throughout the world. 45 and 48, respectively) filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay,
Rizal's wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or were denied by respondent in its Decision No. 1159, in the
pageantry; to the point of reaching oblivion or obscurity in the following manner:
future. 111 For Rizal's life was never about fame or vainglory, but Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following
for the country he loved dearly and for which he gave up his life. grounds, to wit:
The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal' s own wishes. 1. Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of
That Rizal's statue now stands facing West towards Manila Bay, Makati and the intended disbursements fall within the twin
with Rizal's back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we principles of 'police power and parens patriae and
continue the present orientation of Rizal's statue, with Rizal facing 2. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a
West, we would be like the Spanish captain who refused Rizal's Certification, dated June 5, 1989, has already appropriated the
request to die facing the rising sun in the East. On the other hand, amount of P400,000.00 to implement the Id resolution, and the
if Rizal' s statue is made to face East, as Rizal had desired when only function of COA on the matter is to allow the financial
he was about to be shot, the background - the blue sky above assistance in question.
Manila Bay - would forever be clear of obstruction, and we would The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state that:
be faithful to Rizal's dying wish. a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or rational
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for relation to the public safety, health, morals, or general welfare to
lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power. The
Court on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately. mere assertion by the legislature that a statute relates to the
SO ORDERED. public health, safety, or welfare does not in itself bring the statute
ANTONIO T. CARPIO within the police power of a state for there must always be an
Associate Justice obvious and real connection between the actual provisions of a
police regulations and its avowed purpose, and the regulation
adopted must be reasonably adapted to accomplish the end
Equal Protection of Laws sought to be attained. 16 Am. Jur 2d, pp. 542-543; emphasis
1. HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the supplied).
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between the
vs. objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. the inhabitants of Makati.
PARAS, J.: Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution No.
The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered
60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of thereby should be for a public purpose, i.e., that the disbursement
Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general of the amount of P500.00 as burial assistance to a bereaved family
welfare clause. of the Municipality of Makati, or a total of P400,000.00
The pertinent facts are: appropriated under the Resolution, should be for the benefit of the
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality
Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads: and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present
case. On this point government funds or property shall be spent or
used solely for public purposes. (Cf. Section 4[2], P.D. 1445). (pp. responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC,
50-51, Rollo) 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the
Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a
of Makati, through its Council, passed Resolution No. 243, re- thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social
affirming Resolution No. 60 (Rollo, Annex "H", p. 52). life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be
However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA the very foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S.,
Decision No. 1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained P. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances
to file this special civil action of certiorari praying that COA of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal
Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void. progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute IAC, supra).
of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no
founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to
laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the
is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of
people. Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by
corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc.
182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, of the inhabitants of Makati."
there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police
which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid power is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public greatest benefits.
corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has
things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to
safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,
police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private
as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad
delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the
corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and,
fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it
municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions
such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of
only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is
the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102). absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general COA's additional objection is based on its contention that
welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the
"enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ...
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a
provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain few individuals as in the present case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is
and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office
91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare
"every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of
necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10,
and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights.
peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p. 12)
comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general power in the promotion of the common good.
welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying
illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably
powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days
councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been before the elections: - Provided, That, any elective official,
passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the whether national or local, running for any office other than the
tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
poor, etc. president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned only upon
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or
our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for
a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of
painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President President, Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to
in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, participate in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998
or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for
on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
political or otherwise. The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price
caveat, this petition is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on comparable with that of private printers under proper security
Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE. measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission
may contract the services of private printers upon certification by
2. ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it
TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties
vs. and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission may assign
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official
DECISION ballots.
NACHURA, J.: To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub
courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by
realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a
compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we photocopying machine and that identification marks, magnetic
exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are
irrelevant to our day.1 It is in this light that we should address the provided on the ballot.
instant case. The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.2
of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January
8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In view of 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled "AN ACT
pressing contemporary events, the petition begs for immediate AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN
resolution. ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
The Antecedents TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES). SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY,
No. 8436, entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS
ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO.
LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS,
AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section PURPOSES." Section 13 of the amendatory law modified Section
11 thereof reads: 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus:
SEC. 11. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended
size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the titles of to read as follows:
the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon Section 15. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the
in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the format of the electronic display and/or the size and form of the
names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be
and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative,
where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic displays
his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be must be constructed to present the names of all candidates for the
provided. same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary. electronic displays must be constructed to present the entire ballot
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in voter sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing
his or her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall
ballot choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. be until midnight.
Under each position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their
arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P.
the same type size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari,
indicated using the same font and size. seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official The Petitioners' Contention
ballot shall be provided. Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that
filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of the moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him a candidate
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable only at the start of the campaign period. Petitioners then assert
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because
public appointive office or position, including active members of at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They
the armed forces, and officers and employees in government- should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the considered as candidates.6
start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the
Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two
official candidates within thirty (30) days before the start of the conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to
period for filing a certificate of candidacy. give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not
With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their
shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko CoCs.7
Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as
printers under proper security measures which the Commission ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is
shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the
printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Constitution.8
Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. The Respondent's Arguments
Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor
Commission shall assign watchers in the printing, storage and General (OSG), representing respondent COMELEC, argues that
distribution of official ballots. petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit." Petitioners
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the have not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by
Committee shall ensure that the necessary safeguards, such as, but the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. The OSG
not limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink, further claims that the petition is premature or unripe for judicial
microprinting, are provided on the ballot. determination." Petitioners have admitted that they are merely
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each planning to file their CoCs for the coming 2010 elections. Their
city/municipality at the rate of one ballot for every registered interest in the present controversy is thus merely speculative and
voter with a provision of additional three ballots per precinct.3 contingent upon the filing of the same. The OSG likewise
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer contends that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. They are
election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, 4 the questioning an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of
Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and the latter's rule-making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties improper remedy.9
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC
Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any Resolution No. 8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. The
person holding a public appointive office or position including OSG, however, agrees with petitioners that there is a conflict in
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should be resolved. According
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to consider appointive
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his officials as ipso facto resigned and to require them to vacate their
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. positions on the same day that they file their CoCs, because they
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further, this -
considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy deemed resigned- provision existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang
for the same or any other elective office or position. (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no longer finds a place in our present election
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate laws with the innovations brought about by the automated
of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from November 20 to system.10
Our Ruling
I. corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
defect. What petitioners assail in their petition is a resolution It may be recalled-in inverse chronology-that earlier, Presidential
issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative Decree No. 1296, or the 1978 Election Code, contained a similar
power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, cannot be provision, thus'
availed of, because it is a remedy to question decisions, SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. -
resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or Every person holding a public appointive office or position,
quasi-judicial function.11 Prohibition is also an inappropriate including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
remedy, because what petitioners actually seek from the Court is a and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
determination of the proper construction of a statute and a corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the
declaration of their rights thereunder. Obviously, their petition is date he files his certificate of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet
one for declaratory relief,12 over which this Court does not shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding
exercise original jurisdiction.13 the filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of President of the Philippines.
the questioned provisions of both the COMELEC resolution and Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971,
the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the likewise stated in its Section 23 the following:
instant petition. SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position.
The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues - Every person holding a public appointive office or position,
raised and the compelling state interest involved in their early including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections and every officer or employee in government-owned or controlled
has already started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the
for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing date he files his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That the filing
imminent and irreparable damage to their means of livelihood of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
and, at the same time, crippling the government's criminal or administrative liabilities which he may have incurred.
manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised
from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite Election Code approved on June 21, 1947, also provided that
the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues. SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and
In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of employees who are candidates. - Every person holding a public
practice or technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a appointive office or position shall ipso facto cease in his office or
case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy.
that the Rules were promulgated to provide guidelines for the During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that 725, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT
dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF
mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE
discretion.14 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING
II. THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on January
To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we 5, 1946, contained, in the last paragraph of its Section 2, the
trace the brief history of the assailed provision. Section 4(a) of following:
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies or
which for ready reference is quoted as follows: government-owned or controlled corporations, whether such
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the office by appointive or elective, shall be considered to have
filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for resigned from such office from the moment of the filing of such
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any certificate of candidacy.
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS,
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMENDMENTS
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a THEREOF," enacted without executive approval on June 22,
public appointive office or position, including active members of 1941, the precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic
the armed forces, and officers and employees in government- resignation of elective, but not appointive, officials.
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the August 22, 1938, had, in its Section 22, the same verbatim
start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.15 provision as Section 26 of R.A. No. 180.
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No.
8436, the law amended by R.A. No. 9369. The proviso was lifted 1582, or the Election Law enacted by the Philippine Commission
from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code in 1907, the last paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:
(OEC) of the Philippines, which reads: Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers.- x x x.
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election,
person holding a public appointive office or position, including nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and office to election, at any municipal, provincial or Assembly
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled election, except for reelection to the position which he may be
holding, and no judge of the Court of First Instance, justice of the appointive sector of the civil service, why should it not apply to
peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Bureau of the elective sector for, after all, even senators and congressmen
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any are members of the civil service as well
candidate or influence in any manner or take any part in any Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in
municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of general, to give an exception to itself which is not available to
being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any other similarly situated officials of government. Of course, the
public office whatever for a term of five years: Provided, answer is, the reason why we are special is that we are elected.
however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to Since we are imposing a disqualification on all other government
deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any officials except ourselves, I think, it is the better part of delicadeza
election. to inhibit ourselves as well, so that if we want to stay as senators,
From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the we wait until our term expires. But if we want to run for some
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. other elective office during our term, then we have to be
9369- that any person holding a public appointive office or considered resigned just like everybody else. That is my proposed
position, including active members of the armed forces, and amendment. But if it is unacceptable to the distinguished Sponsor,
officers, and employees in government-owned or controlled because of sensitivity to the convictions of the rest of our
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her colleagues, I will understand.
office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-
of his/her certificate of candidacy- traces its roots to the period of thought of.- It is a good policy.- However, this is something that is
the American occupation. already in the old law which was upheld by the Supreme court in
In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill a recent case that the rider was not upheld and that it was valid.17
later to be consolidated with House Bill No. 5352 and enacted as The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on
R.A. No. 9369, Senator Richard Gordon, the principal author of automatic resignation of appointive civil servants must have been
the bill, acknowledged that the said proviso in the proposed the reason why Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the
legislative measure is an old provision which was merely copied following during the period of amendments: "ANY PERSON
from earlier existing legislation, thus' WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN
Senator Osmeña.- May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A
opinion of the good Sponsor.- This reads like, "ANY PERSON CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD
HOLDING [means currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC." 18 The said proviso seems to
POSITION" SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive
RESIGNED- [which means that the prohibition extends only to officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as
appointive officials] "INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby,
THE ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES"- This conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive
is a prohibition, Mr. President.- This means if one is chairman of positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the
SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso facto resigned when he files his campaign period when they are already treated by law as
certificate of candidacy.- Is that the intention candidates.
Senator Gordon.- This is really an old provision, Mr. President. Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC
Senator Osmeña.- It is in bold letters, so I think it was a and Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436 contained a similar provision on
Committee amendment. automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their
Senator Gordon.- No, it has always been there. CoCs for any office other than that which they hold in a
Senator Osmeña.- I see. permanent capacity or for President or Vice-President. However,
Senator Gordon.- I guess the intention is not to give them undue with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act, 19 in
advantage, especially certain people. 2001, this provision was repealed by Section 14 20 of the said act.
Senator Osmeña.- All right.16 There was, thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor- against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned
Santiago expressed her concern over the inclusion of the said from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective
provision in the new law, given that the same would be officials were not.
disadvantageous and unfair to potential candidates holding ᳠This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Farv. ᳠
21
appointive positions, while it grants a consequent preferential The Executive Secretary  when it ruled that
treatment to elective officials, thus' Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Senator Santiago.- On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing Is Not Violative of the Equal
cause, so I make this point more as a matter of record than of any Protection Clause of the Constitution
feasible hope that it can possibly be either accepted or if we come The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
to a division of the House, it will be upheld by the majority. Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives
I am referring to page 15, line 21.- The proviso begins: undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and
"PROVIDED FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON HOLDING A violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
PUBLIC APPOINTIVE OFFICE - SHALL BE CONSIDERED The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER OFFICE." absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.- If the
The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
this Hall is that there is, for me, no valid reason for exempting real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
elective officials from this inhibition or disqualification imposed from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal
by the law.- If we are going to consider appointive officers of the protection guarantee in this manner:
government, including AFP members and officers of government- The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
owned and controlled corporations, or any other member of the individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality.- It is not intended to prohibit provisions dating back to the American occupation, is violative of
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is the equal protection clause.
directed or by territory within which it is to operate.- It does not But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that address the issues on legal standing and on the existence of an
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and actual controversy.
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.- Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
within such class and those who do not. questions.23 In this case, petitioners allege that they will be
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in the 2010
the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence,
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the
office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing COMELEC resolution.
authority.- Some appointive officials hold their office in a The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while candidates, they have the standing to raise the constitutional
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the
that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of
Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some
employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from theoretical, correlative effect on voters.24 The Court believes that
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any both candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal
election except to vote.- Under the same provision, elective protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting
officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are rights.25
obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent
activities. direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their laws, regulations and rulings.26
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by
any position other than those occupied by them.- Again, it is not this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the resolution of actual cases and controversies. 27 The Court, in this
wisdom of this classification. case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists between the
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the
9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is enforcement and administration of all election laws. Petitioners
anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the
persons belonging under the same classification are similarly very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey
treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the
infringed.22 assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the
However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fari᳼/i>, was filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a
intently focused on the main issue of whether the repealing clause speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy. 28
in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider, in IV.
that it unwittingly failed to ascertain with stricter scrutiny the Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial
impact of the retention of the provision on automatic resignation review, the Court now delves into the constitutional challenge.
of persons holding appointive positions (Section 66) in the OEC, It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office
vis-୶ is the equal protection clause.- Moreover, the Court's vision touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of
᳠in Fari/i>
᳠ was shrouded by the fact that petitioners therein, Fari᳠ et association. This premise is best explained in Mancuso v.
al., never posed a direct challenge to the constitutionality of Taft,29 viz.:
᳠Section 66 of the OEC. Faret ᳠ al. rather merely questioned, on Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the
constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14 of the opportunity to write a letter to the local newspaper, speak out in a
Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted declaration in public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or
Fari᳼/i> may then very well be considered as an obiter dictum. picket an official building to seek redress of grievances. All of
III. these activities are protected by the First Amendment if done in a
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view manner consistent with a narrowly defined concept of public order
of the constitutional challenge advanced by petitioners, once and and safety. The choice of means will likely depend on the amount
for all, to settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the of time and energy the individual wishes to expend and on his
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of perception as to the most effective method of projecting his
Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown above, was based on message to the public. But interest and commitment are evolving
phenomena. What is an effective means for protest at one point in
time may not seem so effective at a later date. The dilettante who Amendment right and a fundamental interest. Hence any
participates in a picket line may decide to devote additional time legislative classification that significantly burdens that interest
and resources to his expressive activity. As his commitment must be subjected to strict equal protection review. 30
increases, the means of effective expression changes, but the Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest
expressive quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is
picket line, or to publish the newspaper. At one point in time he breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now
may decide that the most effective way to give expression to his the opportune time for the Court to strike down the said proviso
views and to get the attention of an appropriate audience is to for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being
become a candidate for public office-means generally considered overbroad.
among the most appropriate for those desiring to effect change in In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto
our governmental systems. He may seek to become a candidate by resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not
filing in a general election as an independent or by seeking the considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
nomination of a political party. And in the latter instance, the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class.
individual's expressive activity has two dimensions: besides The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those
urging that his views be the views of the elected public official, he who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts,
is also attempting to become a spokesman for a political party does not justify such differential treatment.
whose substantive program extends beyond the particular office in In order that there can be valid classification so that a
question. But Cranston has said that a certain type of its citizenry, discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm
the public employee, may not become a candidate and may not of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of
engage in any campaign activity that promotes himself as a valid classification be complied with, namely:
candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled what may be (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
the most important expression an individual can summon, namely (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
that which he would be willing to effectuate, by means of (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
concrete public action, were he to be selected by the voters. (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run The first requirement means that there must be real and
for office also affects the freedom to associate. In Williams v. substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As
Rhodes, supra, the Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public
election system that made it virtually impossible for third parties Works and Highways,31 a real and substantial distinction exists
to secure a place on the ballot. The Court found that the First between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to
Amendment protected the freedom to associate by forming and justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the
promoting a political party and that that freedom was infringed toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal a two-
when the state effectively denied a party access to its electoral wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a
machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects four-wheel vehicle.
associational rights, albeit in a slightly different way. An Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not
individual may decide to join or participate in an organization or comply with the second requirement if it is not germane to the
political party that shares his beliefs. He may even form a new purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise
group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture his supporters on constitutional law, explains,
and fellow party members may decide that he is the ideal person The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will
to carry the group's standard into the electoral fray. To thus still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. To
restrict the options available to political organization as the illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between
Cranston charter provision has done is to limit the effectiveness of men and women will justify the prohibition of the latter from
association; and the freedom to associate is intimately related with employment as miners or stevedores or in other heavy and
the concept of making expression effective. Party access to the strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification, however,
ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party the law cannot provide for a lower passing average for women in
machinery to carry the party's programs to the people are the bar examinations because physical strength is not the test for
precluded from doing so because those nominees are civil admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a
servants. higher rate than locally assembled automobiles for the protection
Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no
view of individual expression or associational effectiveness, wide justification for treating them differently when it comes to
opportunities exist for the individual who seeks public office. The punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of the
fact of candidacy alone may open previously closed doors of the vehicle has no relation to the observance of these rules.32
media. The candidate may be invited to discuss his views on radio The third requirement means that the classification must be
talk shows; he may be able to secure equal time on television to enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem
elaborate his campaign program; the newspapers may cover his sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last
candidacy; he may be invited to debate before various groups that requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all
had theretofore never heard of him or his views. In short, the fact the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights
of candidacy opens up a variety of communicative possibilities conferred and obligations imposed.33
that are not available to even the most diligent of picketers or the Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds
most loyal of party followers. A view today, that running for that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
public office is not an interest protected by the First Amendment, offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane
seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public to the purposes of the law.
office was the preserve of the professional and the wealthy.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the
Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First
use of a governmental position to promote one's candidacy, or
even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. erode the public's confidence in its public employees. For the
The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial as the impartiality
integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the itself; the knowledge that a clerk in the assessor's office who is
danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files
political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. 34 The which could provide pressure points for furthering his campaign is
restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil destructive regardless of whether the clerk actually takes
servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in advantage of his opportunities. For all of these reasons we find
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they that the state indeed has a compelling interest in maintaining the
would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office honesty and impartiality of its public work force.
work. We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the Cranston-a flat prohibition on office-seeking of all kinds by all
assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the kinds of public employees-as even reasonably necessary to
ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice Marshall pointed out
that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. in Dunn v. Blumstein, [s]tatutes affecting constitutional rights
Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, must be drawn with precision. For three sets of reasons we
the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For conclude that the Cranston charter provision pursues its objective
example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet in a far too heavy-handed manner and hence must fall under the
for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice- equal protection clause. First, we think the nature of the
President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in regulation-a broad prophylactic rule-may be unnecessary to
the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take fulfillment of the city's objective. Second, even granting some sort
charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior of prophylactic rule may be required, the provision here prohibits
and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they candidacies for all types of public office, including many which
both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat would pose none of the problems at which the law is aimed.
them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Third, the provision excludes the candidacies of all types of public
Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the employees, without any attempt to limit exclusion to those
example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his employees whose positions make them vulnerable to corruption
position during the entire election period and can still use the and conflicts of interest.
resources of his office to support his campaign. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails
discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the
could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the
for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position OEC violates the equal protection clause.
aspired for. V.
Mancuso v. Taft,35 cited above, explains that the measure on The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being
automatic resignation, which restricts the rights of civil servants overbroad.
to run for officea right inextricably linked to their freedom of First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive
expression and association, is not reasonably necessary to the posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions
satisfaction of the state interest. Thus, in striking down a similar in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the
measure in the United States, Mancuso succinctly declares' government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he
In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for,
review, however, we do see some contemporary relevance of indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the
the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In government to wield influence in the political world.
order for the Cranston charter provision to withstand strict While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek
scrutiny, the city must show that the exclusion of all government public elective office are those who occupy relatively high
employees from candidacy is necessary to achieve a compelling positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone,
state interest. And, as stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective
with similar statutes, see Wisconsin State Employees, supra; office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the
Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a substantial qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the
interest in protecting the integrity of its civil service. It is laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic
obviously conceivable that the impartial character of the civil so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give
service would be seriously jeopardized if people in positions of free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public
authority used their discretion to forward their electoral ambitions office. Such is the essence of democracy.
rather than the public welfare. Similarly if a public employee Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and
pressured other fellow employees to engage in corrupt practices in all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in
return for promises of post-election reward, or if an employee character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay
invoked the power of the office he was seeking to extract special level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to
favors from his superiors, the civil service would be done restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.36
irreparable injury. Conversely, members of the public, fellow- Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly
employees, or supervisors might themselves request favors from broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the
the candidate or might improperly adjust their own official citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all
behavior towards him. Even if none of these abuses actually governmental power emanates from them.
materialize, the possibility of their occurrence might seriously Mancuso v. Taft,37 on this point, instructs
As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there the type of employee seeking the office. As Justice Douglas
exists the device of the leave of absence. Some system of leaves pointed out in his dissent in Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 120-126, 67
of absence would permit the public employee to take time off to S.Ct. 556, restrictions on administrative employees who either
pursue his candidacy while assuring him his old job should his participate in decision-making or at least have some access to
candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover, a leave of absence policy information concerning policy matters are much more justifiable
would eliminate many of the opportunities for engaging in the than restrictions on industrial employees, who, but for the fact that
questionable practices that the statute is designed to prevent. the government owns the plant they work in, are, for purposes of
While campaigning, the candidate would feel no conflict between access to official information, identically situated to all other
his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion, nor industrial workers. Thus, a worker in the Philadelphia mint could
any conflict between his efforts to persuade the public and his be distinguished from a secretary in an office of the Department
access to confidential documents. But instead of adopting a of Agriculture; so also could a janitor in the public schools of
reasonable leave of absence policy, Cranston has chosen a Cranston be distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the
provision that makes the public employee cast off the security of same city. A second line of distinction that focuses on the type of
hard-won public employment should he desire to compete for employee is illustrated by the cases of Kinnear and Minielly,
elected office. supra. In both of these cases a civil service deputy decided to run
The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil for the elected office of sheriff. The courts in both cases felt that
service by enforcing, through dismissal, discipline, or criminal the no-candidacy laws in question were much too broad and
prosecution, rules or statutes that treat conflict of interests, indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive enough to
bribery, or other forms of official corruption. By thus attacking justify a flat rule was one in which an inferior in a public office
the problem directly, instead of using a broad prophylactic rule, electorally challenged his immediate superior. Given all these
the city could pursue its objective without unduly burdening the considerations, we think Cranston has not given adequate
First Amendment rights of its employees and the voting rights of attention to the problem of narrowing the terms of its charter to
its citizens. Last term in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court deal with the specific kinds of conflict-of-interest problems it
faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee asserted seeks to avoid.
that the interest of ballot box purity justified its imposition of one We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours
year and three month residency requirements before a citizen campaigning will drain the energy of the public employee to the
could vote. Justice Marshall stated, inter alia, that Tennessee had extent that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and
available a number of criminal statutes that could be used to that inevitable on-the-job campaigning and discussion of his
punish voter fraud without unnecessary infringement on the candidacy will disrupt the work of others. Although it is
newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it appears from the record in indisputable that the city has a compelling interest in the
this case that the Cranston charter contains some provisions that performance of official work, the exclusion is not well-tailored to
might be used against opportunistic public employees. effectuate that interest. Presumably the city could fire the
Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or
that Cranston has put much effort into tailoring a narrow disrupts the work of others. Also, the efficiency rationale common
provision that attempts to match the prohibition with the problem. to both arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies
The charter forbids a Cranston public employee from running for equally well to a number of non-political, extracurricular activities
any office, anywhere. The prohibition is not limited to the local that are not prohibited by the Cranston charter. Finally, the
offices of Cranston, but rather extends to statewide offices and connection between after-hours campaigning and the state interest
even to national offices. It is difficult for us to see that a public seems tenuous; in many cases a public employee would be able to
employee running for the United States Congress poses quite the campaign aggressively and still continue to do his job well.38
same threat to the civil service as would the same employee if he Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing39 sustained as constitutional a
were running for a local office where the contacts and information provision on the automatic resignation of District Clerks, County
provided by his job related directly to the position he was seeking, Clerks, County Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District
and hence where the potential for various abuses was greater. Nor Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and Animals,
does the Cranston charter except the public employee who works County Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors
in Cranston but aspires to office in another local jurisdiction, most and Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys, County Attorneys,
probably his town of residence. Here again the charter precludes Public Weighers, and Constables if they announce their candidacy
candidacies which can pose only a remote threat to the civil or if they become candidates in any general, special or primary
service. Finally, the charter does not limit its prohibition to election.
partisan office-seeking, but sterilizes also those public employees In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating
who would seek nonpartisan elective office. The statute reviewed differently particular officials, as distinguished from all others,
in Mitchell was limited to partisan political activity, and since that under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law,
time other courts have found the partisan-nonpartisan distinction a merits the stamp of approval from American courts. Not,
material one. See Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin State Employees, however, a general and sweeping provision, and more so one
supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line between nonpartisan violative of the second requisite for a valid classification, which is
and partisan can often be blurred by systems whose true on its face unconstitutional.
characters are disguised by the names given them by their On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans,
architects, it seems clear that the concerns of a truly partisan from whom we copied the provision in question, had already
office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional. It is
those involved in an office removed from regular party politics to high-time that we, too, should follow suit and, thus, uphold
warrant distinctive treatment in a charter of this sort. fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren, restrictions to such
The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of freedoms.
the Cranston charter relates not to the type of office sought, but to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. WHEREAS, the expropriation of said land would certainly benefit
The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of public interest, let alone, a step towards the implementation of
Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code social justice and urban land reform in this City;
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared WHEREAS, under the present situation, the City Council deems it
as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. necessary to authorize Hon. Mayor BENJAMIN S. ABALOS to
SO ORDERED. institute expropriation proceedings to achieve the noble purpose
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA of the City Government of Mandaluyong.
Associate Justice NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion duly seconded, the City
Council of Mandaluyong, in session assembled, RESOLVED, as
it hereby RESOLVES, to authorize, as it is hereby authorizing,
Expropriation Hon. Mayor BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, to institute expropriation
1. SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners, proceedings against the above-named registered owner of that
vs. parcel of land situated along Dr. Jose Fernandez Street, Barangay
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY Mauway, City of Mandaluyong, (f)or the purpose of developing it
COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG to a low-cost housing project for the less privileged but deserving
CITY, Respondents. constituents of this City.
RESOLUTION ADOPTED on this 2nd day of October 1997 at the City of
BERSAMIN, J.: Mandaluyong.
The petitioners appeal the adverse decision promulgated on Sgd. Adventor R. Delos Santos
October 18, 20021 and resolution promulgated on January 17, Acting Sanggunian Secretary
2003,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside
the order issued in their favor on February 19, 2002 by the Attested: Approved:
Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, in Mandaluyong City
(RTC).3 Thereby, the CA upheld Resolution No. 552, Series of
1997, adopted by the City of Mandaluyong (City) authorizing its Sgd. Roberto J. Francisco Sgd. Benjamin S.
then City Mayor to take the necessary legal steps for the City Councilor & Acting Abalos
expropriation of the parcel of land registered in the names of the City Mayor Presiding Officer
petitioners.
Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was
We affirm the CA.
but the initial step in the City’s exercise of its power of eminent
Antecedents
domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044
of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for
square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and
certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment
Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half
of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional,
of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented
confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.
out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere
property and only source of income.
authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the legal steps
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to
Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to
purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the
authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the
petitioners was premature.
necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the
On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and
petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing
dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining that certiorari did
for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The
not lie against a legislative act of the City Government, because
resolution reads as follows:
the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail
RESOLUTION NO. 552, S-19974
judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING HON. BENJAMIN S.
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
ABALOS TO TAKE THE NECESSARY LEGAL STEPS FOR
or excess of jurisdiction; that the special civil action of prohibition
THE EXPROPRIATION OF A PARCEL OF LAND SITUATED
did not also lie under the circumstances considering that the act of
ALONG DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ STREET, BARANGAY
passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasi-judicial, or
MAUWAY, CITY OF MANDALUYONG, OWNED BY MR.
ministerial act; and that notwithstanding the issuance of
ANTONIO YUSAY
Resolution No. 552, the City had yet to commit acts of
WHEREAS, there is a parcel of land situated along Dr. Jose
encroachment, excess, or usurpation, or had yet to act without or
Fernandez Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong,
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
owned and registered in the name of MR. ANTONIO YUSAY;
amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREAS, this piece of land have been occupied for about ten
However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the
(10) years by many financially hard-up families which the City
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision and
Government of Mandaluyong desires, among other things, to
declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The RTC
provide modest and decent dwelling;
held that the petition was not premature because the passage of
WHEREAS, the said families have already negotiated to acquire
Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the City to
this land but was refused by the above-named owner in total
deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only property; that
disregard to the City Government’s effort of providing land for
there was no due process in the passage of Resolution No. 552
the landless;
because the petitioners had not been invited to the subsequent
hearings on the resolution to enable them to ventilate their
opposition; and that the purpose for the expropriation was not for
public use and the expropriation would not benefit the greater (b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess
number of inhabitants. of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA. lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the CA (c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
concluded that the reversal of the January 31, 2001 decision by in the ordinary course of law.6
the RTC was not justified because Resolution No. 552 deserved to It is further emphasized that a petition for certiorari seeks solely to
be accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and correct defects in jurisdiction,7 and does not correct just any error
validity absent any sufficient showing to the contrary; that notice or mistake committed by a court, board, or officer exercising
to the petitioners (Spouses Yusay) of the succeeding hearings judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board, or
conducted by the City was not a part of due process, for it was officer thereby acts without jurisdiction or in excess of
enough that their views had been consulted and that they had been jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to
given the full opportunity to voice their protest; that to rule lack of jurisdiction.8
otherwise would be to give every affected resident effective veto The first requisite is that the respondent tribunal, board, or officer
powers in law-making by a local government unit; and that a must be exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial
public hearing, although necessary at times, was not indispensable function, according to Bouvier, 9 is the exercise of the judicial
and merely aided in law-making. faculty or office; it also means the capacity to act in a specific
The CA disposed as follows: way which appertains to the judicial power, as one of the powers
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned order of the of government. "The term," Bouvier continues, 10 "is used to
Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City dated describe generally those modes of action which appertain to the
February 19, 2002 in SCA Case No. 15-MD, which declared judiciary as a department of organized government, and through
Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997 of the City of Mandaluyong and by means of which it accomplishes its purpose and exercises
null and void, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. its peculiar powers."
SO ORDERED.5 Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against the
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary
their motion. Thus, they appeal to the Court, posing the following settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and
issues, namely: enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a
1. Can the validity of Resolution No. 552 be assailed even before legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or
its implementation? opinion.
2. Must a citizen await the takeover and possession of his property Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its discretion in
by the local government before he can go to court to nullify an adopting Resolution No. 552. To demonstrate the absence of
unjust expropriation? abuse of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a resolution
Before resolving these issues, however, the Court considers it and an ordinance. The first is upon a specific matter of a
necessary to first determine whether or not the action for certiorari temporary nature while the latter is a law that is permanent in
and prohibition commenced by the petitioners in the RTC was a character.11 No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a
proper recourse of the petitioners. resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the
Ruling lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant circumstances.
We deny the petition for review, and find that certiorari and In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the
prohibition were not available to the petitioners under the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way
circumstances. Thus, we sustain, albeit upon different grounds, abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for its expression of
the result announced by the CA, and declare that the RTC gravely sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.
erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and Moreover, Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code)
prohibition. required the City to pass an ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for
1. the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. In this
Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of regard, Section 19 of The Local Government Code clearly
a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod provides, viz:
The special civil action for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of Section 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may,
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, whose Section 1 provides: through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose,
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or government unit may immediately take possession of the property
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of
xxx the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner must allege and
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
establish the concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at
(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
the time of the taking of the property.
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses
sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary
the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. Indeed, in in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third
Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 12 a case in reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
which the Municipality of Parañaque based its complaint for unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
expropriation on a resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled members.
so: If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the
of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress
other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires
authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed,
restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of
other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms,
the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows: and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, to an injustice." In the instant case, there is no reason to depart
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon impossible, absurd, or unjust.
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language –
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such from "resolution" under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 –
offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by
government unit may immediately take possession of the property individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the
a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that
the fair market value of the property based on the current tax right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation."
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at xxx
the time of the taking of the property." (Emphasis supplied) In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an its Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11, 1994
LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council ratified all the acts of its mayor regarding the subject
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to expropriation.
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner
proceedings over a particular private property. merely alleged the existence of such an ordinance, but it did not
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, present any certified true copy thereof. In the second place,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. In fact, it was
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. In any
Section 9 Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws. event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the petitioner’s Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23,
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that:
was not accepted. " x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted
power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically
Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be
resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
by an LGU. This case, however, is not in point because the prayer of the complaint?"
applicable law at that time was BP 337, the previous Local The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of
Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere
would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is
RA 7160, the present Local Government Code which was already equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of
in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial
explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose. court’s Decision which dismissed the expropriation
We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms suit.13 (Emphasis supplied)
"resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance
ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, authorizing and providing for the expropriation, the petition for
but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for,
action. considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the
2. Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’ property
Prohibition does not lie against expropriation was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to
The special civil action for prohibition is governed also by mount any judicial challenge, for the
Section 2 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only
states: through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of court.22 Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.23
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618.
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a Costs to be paid by the petitioners.
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with SO ORDERED.
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or Associate Justice
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. 2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
xxx the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and (NIA), Petitioner,
oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and vs.
orderly administration of justice.14 The writ of prohibition is RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, INC., LITTIE
directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of SARAH A. AGDEPPA, LEOSA NANETTE
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no AGDEPPA and MARCELINO VIERNES,
appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary MARGARITA TABOADA, PORTIA CHARISMA
course of law.15 For grave abuse of discretion to be a ground for RUTH ORTIZ, represented by LINA ERLINDA A.
prohibition, the petitioner must first demonstrate that the tribunal, ORTIZ and MARIO ORTIZ, JUAN MAMAC and
corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, GLORIA MATAS, Respondents.
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has exercised its or his DECISION
power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or SERENO, J.:
personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as would Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the 12 August
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. 16 On the other hand, 2008 Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and 22 October 2008
the term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board, or Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196.
officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such The assailed issuances affirmed with modification the 31 August
jurisdiction or acted without any authority.17 1999 "Judgment" promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish (RTC), Branch 22, Judicial Region, Kabacan, Cotabato. The RTC
facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or had fixed the just compensation for the value of the land and
adequate.18 A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will improvements thereon that were expropriated by petitioner, but
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that excluded the value of the excavated soil. Petitioner Republic of
judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.191avvphi1 the Philippines is represented in this case by the National
The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was Irrigation Authority (NIA).
not available to the petitioners as a remedy against the adoption of The Facts
Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such NIA is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created
adoption, was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3601 on 22 June 1963. It is
functions, but only expressing its collective sentiment or opinion. primarily responsible for irrigation development and management
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby in the country. Its charter was amended by Presidential Decree
the immediate possession of the land under expropriation (P.D.) 552 on 11 September 1974 and P.D. 1702 on 17 July 1980.
proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is To carry out its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under
made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just P.D. 552 to exercise the power of eminent domain.1
compensation to the owner. 20 This bar against prohibition comes NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing
from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. On 08 September
the taking of private land intended for public use, 21 and the 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for
interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the the expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering
power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of a total of 14,497.91 square meters. 2 The case was docketed as
eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in Special Civil Case No. 61 and was assigned to RTC-Branch 22.
scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate The affected parcels of land were the following:
amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected 1) Lot No. 3080 – covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just No. T-61963 and registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan
compensation for the taking of their property or when there has 2) Lot No. 455 – covered by TCT No. T-74516 and registered
been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the under the names of RG May, Ronald and Rolando, all surnamed
remedy of prohibition become available. Lao
3) Lot No. 3039 – registered under the name of Littie Sarah 6) That the number of banana clumps (is) two hundred twenty
Agdeppa3 (220);
On 11 July 1995, NIA filed an Amended Complaint to include 7) That the number of coco trees found (is) fifteen (15).13
Leosa Nanette A. Agdeppa and Marcelino Viernes as registered The report, however, stated that the committee members could not
owners of Lot No. 3039.4 agree on the market value of the subject properties and
On 25 September 1995, NIA filed a Second Amended Complaint recommended the appointment of new independent
to allege properly the area sought to be expropriated, the exact commissioners to replace the ones coming from the parties
address of the expropriated properties and the owners thereof. only.14 On 22 October 1996, the RTC issued an Order 15 revoking
NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate the appointments of Atty. Agdeppa and Engr. Mabang as
possession of the properties after depositing with the Philippine members of the committee and, in their stead, appointed Renato
National Bank the amount of ₱ 19,246.58 representing the Sambrano, Assistant Provincial Assessor of the Province of
provisional value thereof.5 Cotabato; and Jack Tumacmol, Division Chief of the Land Bank
On 31 October 1995, respondents filed their Answer with of the Philippines–Kidapawan Branch.16
Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim. 6 They On 25 November 1996, the new committee submitted its
alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to expropriate Commissioners’ Report to the lower court. The committee had
portions of their land, because it was not a sovereign political agreed that the fair market value of the land to be expropriated
entity; that it was not necessary to expropriate their properties, should be ₱ 65 per square meter based on the zonal valuation of
because there was an abandoned government property adjacent to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). As regards the
theirs, where the project could pass through; that Lot No. 3080 improvement on the properties, the report recommended the
was no longer owned by the Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIA’s following compensation:
valuation of their expropriated properties was inaccurate because a. ₱ 200 for each gmelina tree that are more than four (4) years
of the improvements on the land that should have placed its value old
at ₱ 5 million; and that NIA never negotiated with the landowners b. ₱ 150 for each gmelina tree that are more than one (1) year old
before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent c. ₱ 164 for each coco tree
and irreparable damages to their properties valued at ₱ 250,000.7 d. ₱ 270 for each banana clump17
On 11 September 1996, the RTC issued an Order forming a On 03 December 1997, the committee submitted to the RTC
committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the another report, which had adopted the first Committee Report, as
expropriated properties to establish the just compensation to be well as the former’s 25 November 1996 report. However, the
paid to the owners. The committee was composed of the Clerk of committee added to its computation the value of the earthfill
Court of RTC Branch 22 as chairperson and two (2) members of excavated from portions of Lot Nos. 3039 and 3080. 18 Petitioner
the parties to the case.8 objected to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the
On 20 September 1996, in response to the expropriation computation of the value of the land.19
Complaint, respondents-intervenors Margarita Tabaoda, Portia The Ruling of the Trial Court
Charisma Ruth Ortiz, Lina Erlinda Ortiz, Mario Ortiz, Juan On 31 August 1999, the RTC promulgated its "Judgment," 20 the
Mamac and Gloria Matas filed their Answer-in-Intervention with dispositive portion of which reads:
Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counter-Claim. They WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of all the foregoing considerations, the
essentially adopted the allegations in the Answer of the other court finds and so holds that the commissioners have arrived at
respondents and pointed out that Margarita Tabaoda and Portia and were able to determine the fair market value of the properties.
Charisma Ruth Ortiz were the new owners of Lot No. 3080, The court adopts their findings, and orders:
which the two acquired from the Rural Bank of Kabacan. They 1. That 18,930 square meters of the lands owned by the
further alleged that the four other respondents-intervenors were defendants is hereby expropriated in favor of the Republic of the
joint tenants-cultivators of Lot Nos. 3080 and 3039.9 Philippines through the National Irrigation Administration;
On 10 October 1996, the lower court issued an Order stating it 2. That the NIA shall pay to the defendants the amount of ₱
would issue a writ of possession in favor of NIA upon the 1,230,450 for the 18,930 square meters expropriated in proportion
determination of the fair market value of the properties, subject of to the areas so expropriated;
the expropriation proceedings.10 The lower court later amended its 3. That the NIA shall pay to the defendant-intervenors, owners of
ruling and, on 21 October 1996, issued a Writ of Possession in Lot No. 3080, the sum of ₱ 5,128,375.50, representing removed
favor of NIA.11 earthfill;
On 15 October 1996, the committee submitted a Commissioners’ 4. That the NIA shall pay to the defendants, owners of Lot No.
Report12 to the RTC stating the following observations: 3039, the sum of P1,929,611.30 representing earthfill;
In the process of ocular inspection, the following were jointly 5. To pay to the defendants the sum of ₱ 60,000 for the destroyed
observed: G-melina trees (1 year old);
1) The area that was already occupied is 6x200 meters which is 6. To pay to the defendants the sum of ₱ 3,786,000.00 for the 4-
equivalent to 1,200 square meters; year old G-melina trees;
2) The area which is to be occupied is 18,930 square meters, more 7. That NIA shall pay to the defendants the sum of ₱ 2,460.00 for
or less; the coconut trees;
3) That the area to be occupied is fully planted by gmelina trees 8. That all payments intended for the defendant Rural Bank of
with a spacing of 1x1 meters; Kabacan shall be given to the defendants and intervenors who
4) That the gmelina tress found in the area already occupied and have already acquired ownership over the land titled in the name
used for [the] road is planted with gmelina with spacing of 2x2 of the Bank.21
and more or less one (1) year old; NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed
5) That the gmelina trees found in the area to be occupied are the Decision of the RTC to the CA, which docketed the case as
already four (4) years old;
CA-G.R. CV No. 65196. NIA assailed the trial court’s adoption of loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
the Commissioners’ Report, which had determined the just "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent
compensation to be awarded to the owners of the lands to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
expropriated. NIA also impugned as error the RTC’s inclusion for substantial, full and ample.32 The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation of the excavated soil from the expropriated compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market
properties. Finally, it disputed the trial court’s Order to deliver the value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the
payment intended for the Rural Bank of Kabacan to defendants- seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
intervenors, who allegedly acquired ownership of the land still action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as
titled in the name of the said rural bank.22 between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals the time of the actual taking by the government.33
On 12 August 2008, the CA through its Twenty-First (21st) In the instant case, we affirm the appellate court’s ruling that the
Division, promulgated a Decision23 affirming with modification commissioners properly determined the just compensation to be
the RTC Decision. It ruled that the committee tasked to determine awarded to the landowners whose properties were expropriated by
the fair market value of the properties and improvements for the petitioner.
purpose of arriving at the just compensation, properly performed The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the
its function. The appellate court noted that the committee procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
members had conducted ocular inspections of the area when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just
surrounding the expropriated properties and made their compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of
recommendations based on official documents from the BIR with committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties,
regard to the zonal valuations of the affected properties. 24 The CA subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact areas
observed that, as far as the valuation of the improvements on the affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on
properties was concerned, the committee members took into the properties.34 When the members were unable to agree on the
consideration the provincial assessor’s appraisal of the age of the valuation of the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court
trees, their productivity and the inputs made. 25 The appellate court selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the
further noted that despite the Manifestation of NIA that it be task of determining the value of the land and the improvements.
allowed to present evidence to rebut the recommendation of the The new committee members even made a second ocular
committee on the valuations of the expropriated properties, NIA inspection of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from
failed to do so.26 the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated
The assailed CA Decision, however, deleted the inclusion of the properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and
value of the soil excavated from the properties in the just considered other factors such as distance from the highway and
compensation. It ruled that the property owner was entitled to the nearby town center.35 Further, the committee members also
compensation only for the value of the property at the time of the considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated
taking.27 In the construction of irrigation projects, excavations are by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provide
necessary to build the canals, and the excavated soil cannot be for the value of the properties and the improvements for taxation
valued separately from the land expropriated. Thus, it concluded purposes.36
that NIA, as the new owner of the affected properties, had the We can readily deduce from these established facts that the
right to enjoy and make use of the property, including the committee members endeavored a rigorous process to determine
excavated soil, pursuant to the latter’s objectives.28 the just compensation to be awarded to the owners of the
Finally, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that recognized expropriated properties. We cannot, as petitioner would want us
defendants-intervenors Margarita Tabaoda and Portia Charisma to, oversimplify the process undertaken by the committee in
Ruth Ortiz as the new owners of Lot No. 3080 and held that they arriving at its recommendations, because these were not based on
were thus entitled to just compensation. The appellate court based mere conjectures and unreliable data.
its conclusion on the non-participation by the Rural Bank of In National Power Corporation v. Diato-Bernal, 37 this Court
Kabacan in the expropriation proceedings and the latter’s emphasized that the "just"-ness of the compensation could only be
Manifestation that it no longer owned Lot No. 3080.29 attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the
On 11 September 2008, the NIA through the OSG filed a Motion value of the condemned property. The reliable and actual data we
for Reconsideration of the 12 August 2008 Decision, but that referred to in that case were the sworn declarations of realtors in
motion was denied.30 the area, as well as tax declarations and zonal valuation from the
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s Decision, NIA now comes to BIR. In disregarding the Committee Report assailed by the
this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. National Power Corporation in the said case, we ruled thus:
The Issues It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and
The following are the issues proffered by petitioner: devoid of any actual and reliable basis. First, the market values of
The Court of appeals seriously erred in affirming the trial court’s the subject property’s neighboring lots were mere estimates and
finding of just compensation of the land and the improvements unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as sworn
thereon based on the report of the commissioners. declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or
The court of appeals erred in ruling that the payment of just zonal valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the
compensation for lot no. 3080 should be made to respondents contiguous residential dwellings and commercial establishments.
margarita taboada and Portia charisma ruth Ortiz.31 The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the
The Court’s Ruling community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value
On the first issue, the Petition is not meritorious. of respondent’s property. Finally, the market sales data and price
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's
As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners’ report of contradictory, or when the findings are not supported by the
land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is evidence on record.42 These exceptions, however, are not present
manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. in the instant case.
The trial court adopted the flawed findings of the commissioners Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, we affirm the findings
hook, line, and sinker. It did not even bother to require the of the CA, which sustained the trial court’s Decision adopting the
submission of the alleged "market sales data" and "price listings." committee’s recommendations on the just compensation to be
Further, the RTC overlooked the fact that the recommended just awarded to herein respondents.
compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or more than We also uphold the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the
two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is value of the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation.
settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil
the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of from that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial
the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. Clearly, compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to
the recommended just compensation in the commissioners’ report compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such value could
is unacceptable.38 only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.
In the instant case, the committee members based their In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al., 43 we held that
recommendations on reliable data and, as aptly noted by the rights over lands are indivisible, viz:
appellate court, considered various factors that affected the value [C]onsequently, the CA’s findings which upheld those of the trial
of the land and the improvements.39 court that respondents owned and possessed the property and that
Petitioner, however, strongly objects to the CA’s affirmation of its substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the
the trial court’s adoption of Provincial Ordinance No. 173. The underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court
OSG, on behalf of petitioner, strongly argues that the sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion
recommendations of the committee formed by the trial court were of the property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion
inaccurate. The OSG contends that the ordinance reflects the 1999 is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides:
market values of real properties in the Province of Cotabato, while ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its
the actual taking was made in 1996.40 surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon
We are not persuaded. any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may
We note that petitioner had ample opportunity to rebut the deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to
testimonial, as well as documentary evidence presented by special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
respondents when the case was still on trial. It failed to do so, reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
however. The issue raised by petitioner was adequately addresses Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to
by the CA’s assailed Decision in this wise: the subsoil under it.
A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the second set of x x x           x x x          x x x
Commissioners, with Atty. Marasigan still being the Chairperson Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and
and Mr. Zambrano and Mr. Tomacmol as members, was not possession of their properties in the event the latter are
arbitrary and capricious in performing the task assigned to them. reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are
We note that these Commissioners were competent and characteristically indivisible. For the loss sustained by such
disinterested persons who were handpicked by the court a quo due owners, they are entitled to just compensation under the Mining
to their expertise in appraising the value of the land and the Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
improvements thereon in the province of Cotabato. They made a Moreover, petitioner’s argument that the landowners’ right
careful study of the area affected by the expropriation, mindful of extends to the sub-soil insofar as necessary for their practical
the fact that the value of the land and its may be affected by many interests serves only to further weaken its case. The theory would
factors. The duly appointed Commissioners made a second ocular limit the right to the sub-soil upon the economic utility which
inspection of the subject area on 4 September 1997; went to the such area offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the
BIR office in order to get the BIR zonal valuation of the landowners’ right extends to such height or depth where it is
properties located in Carmen, Cotabato; interviewed adjacent possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is
property owners; and took into consideration various factors such extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest
as the location of the land which is just less than a kilometer away protected by law.
from the Poblacion and half a kilometer away from the highway Hence, the CA correctly modified the trial court’s Decision when
and the fact that it is near a military reservation. With regard to it ruled thus:
the improvements, the Commissioners took into consideration the We agree with the OSG that NIA, in the construction of irrigation
valuation of the Provincial Assessor, the age of the trees, and the projects, must necessarily make excavations in order to build the
inputs and their productivity. canals. Indeed it is preposterous that NIA will be made to pay not
Thus, it could not be said that the schedule of market values in only for the value of the land but also for the soil excavated from
Ordinance No. 173 was the sole basis of the Commissioners in such land when such excavation is a necessary phase in the
arriving at their valuation. Said ordinance merely gave credence building of irrigation projects. That NIA will make use of the
to their valuation which is comparable to the current price at that excavated soil is of no moment and is of no concern to the
time. Besides, Mr. Zambrano testified that the date used as bases landowner who has been paid the fair market value of his land. As
for Ordinance No. 173 were taken from 1995 to 1996.41 pointed out by the OSG, the law does not limit the use of the
Moreover, factual findings of the CA are generally binding on this expropriated land to the surface area only. Further, NIA, now
Court. The rule admits of exceptions, though, such as when the being the owner of the expropriated property, has the right to
factual findings of the appellate court and the trial court are enjoy and make use of the property in accordance with its
mandate and objectives as provided by law. To sanction the remand this case to the trial court for the reception of evidence to
payment of the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be entitled
recover more than the value of the land at the time when it was to receive the payment of just compensation.
taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The 12
compensation, and would discourage the construction of August 2008 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196, awarding
important public improvements.44 just compensation to the defendants as owners of the expropriated
On the second issue, the Petition is meritorious. properties and deleting the inclusion of the value of the excavated
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which had awarded soil, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is
the payment of just compensation – intended for Lot No. 3080 hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of
registered in the name of the Rural Bank of Kabacan – to the evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080. No
defendants-intervenors on the basis of the non-participation of the pronouncements as to cost.
rural bank in the proceedings and the latter’s subsequent SO ORDERED.
Manifestation that it was no longer the owner of that lot. The MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
appellate court erred on this matter. Associate Justice
It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the
expenditure of public funds.45 In this kind of proceeding, we
require trial courts to be more circumspect in their evaluation of
the just compensation to be awarded to the owner of the
expropriated property.46 Thus, it was imprudent for the appellate
court to rely on the Rural Bank of Kabacan’s mere declaration of
non-ownership and non-participation in the expropriation
proceeding to validate defendants-intervenors’ claim of
entitlement to that payment. Taxation
The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a 1. CITY OF PASIG and CRISPINA V. SALUMBRE, in
conveyance of real property to be valid.1âwphi1 It should be her capacity as OIC-City Treasurer of Pasig
noted that Lot No. 3080 is a registered parcel of land covered by City, Petitioners
TCT No. T-61963. In order for the reconveyance of real property vs.
to be valid, the conveyance must be embodied in a public MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent
document47 and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds DECISION
where the property is situated.48 MARTIRES, J.:
We have scrupulously examined the records of the case and found Under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, a municipality
no proof of conveyance or evidence of transfer of ownership of is bereft of authority to levy and impose franchise tax on franchise
Lot No. 3080 from its registered owner, the Rural Bank of holders within its territorial jurisdiction. That authority belongs to
Kabacan, to defendants-intervenors. As it is, the TCT is still provinces and cities only.1 A franchise tax levied by a
registered in the name of the said rural bank. It is not disputed that municipality is, thus, null and void. The nullity is not cured by the
the bank did not participate in the expropriation proceedings, and subsequent conversion of the municipality into a city.
that it manifested that it no longer owned Lot No. 3080. The trial At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
court should have nevertheless required the rural bank and the which seeks a reversal of the Decision 2 dated 28 August 2007, and
defendants-intervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining to Resolution3 dated 8 February 2008 of the Court of
the conveyance of the subject lot. The court cannot rely on mere Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81255 entitled "The Manila
inference, considering that the payment of just compensation is Electric Company v. The City of Pasig, et al."
intended to be awarded solely owner based on the latter’s proof of THE FACTS
ownership. On 26 December 1992, the Sangguniang Bayan of the
The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67, Section 9 of Municipality of Pasig enacted Ordinance No. 25 which, under its
the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides thus: Article 3, Section 32, imposed a franchise tax on all business
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If the venture operations carried out through a franchise within the
ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are municipality, as follows:
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any ARTICLE 3 -FRANCHISE TAX
sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid Section 32. Imposition of Tax. - Any provision of laws or grant of
to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same exemption to the contrary notwithstanding, any person,
proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require corporation, partnership or association enjoying a franchise and
the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant doing business in the Municipality of Pasig, shall pay a franchise
or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or tax at the rate of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of its
retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been gross receipts derived from the operation of the business in Pasig
made. during the preceding calendar year.
Hence, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s By virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7829, which took effect on
Order to award payment of just compensation to the defendants- 25 January 1995, the Municipality of Pasig was converted into a
intervenors. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080. highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Pasig.
Despite the fact that the lot was covered by TCT No. T-61963 and On 24 August 2001, the Treasurer’s Office of the City
was registered under its name, the Rural Bank of Kabacan Government of Pasig informed the Manila Electric
manifested that the owner of the lot was no longer the bank, but Company (MERALCO), a grantee of a legislative franchise, 4 that
the defendants-intervenors; however, it presented no proof as to it is liable to pay taxes for the period 1996 to 1999, pursuant to
the conveyance thereof. In this regard, we deem it proper to Municipal Ordinance No. 25. The city, thereafter, on two separate
occasions, demanded payment of the said tax in the amount of CONVERSION OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF P ASIG INTO A
₱435,332, 196.00, exclusive of penalties. CITY DID NOT VEST THE LATTER WITH AUTHORITY TO
On 8 February 2002, MERALCO protested 5 the validity of the LEVY FRANCHISE TAXES AS THE ORDINANCE
demand "claiming that the same be withdrawn and cancelled for GRANTING SUCH POWER WAS NULL AND VOID.
the following reasons: (1) Ordinance No. 25 was declared void ab II.
initio by the Department of Justice (DOJ) for being in THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
contravention of law, which resolution was reiterated in another REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION
case that questioned the validity of the franchise tax, etc.; (2) The OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING THAT THERE IS
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC) ordered the NOTHING IN REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7892 WHICH INVESTS A
Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, to refund MERALCO CURATIVE EFFECT UPON ORDINANCE NO. 32.
the amount the latter paid as franchise tax because the former III.
lacked legal foundation in collecting the same, as municipalities THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
are not empowered by law to impose and collect franchise tax REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION
pursuant to Section 142 of the LGC; (3) The CA affirmed the OF THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO THE RULE THAT
RTC decision; and (4) The petition for certiorari filed by the then IN CASE OF DOUBT IN THE APPLICATION OF A
Municipality of Pasig before the Supreme Court, assailing the STATUTE, AN APPLICATION GIVING EFFECT TO THE
decision of the CA that sustained the RTC, was likewise LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LOCAL
dismissed and the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality AUTONOMY ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION
of Pasig was denied with finality. SHOULD BE FOLLOWED.
In view of the inaction by the Treasurer's Office, MERALCO For the Court’s consideration is the following:
instituted an action before the RTC for the annulment of the said ISSUE
demand with prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ Whether the CA was correct in ruling that the City of Pasig had
of preliminary injunction.6 The RTC ruled in favor of the City of no valid basis for its imposition of franchise tax for the period
Pasig, disposing as follows: 1996 to 1999.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby OUR RULING
rendered in favor of the defendant City of Pasig, declaring as We answer in the affirmative.
valid its demand for payment of franchise tax upon [MERALCO] I. Unlike a city, a municipality is bereft of authority to levy
for the years 1996 to 1999, inclusive, subject to revision of the franchise tax, thus, the ordinance enacted for that purpose is
computation of the amount of such tax pursuant to the guidelines void.
above-mentioned.7 The conversion of the municipality into a city does not lend
MERALCO appealed before the CA. validity to the void ordinance.
The Ruling of the CA Neither does it authorize the collection of the tax under said
On whether the City of Pasig can legally assess and collect ordinance.
franchise tax from MERALCO for the period 1996 to 1999, the The power to impose franchise tax belongs to the province by
court ruled in the negative. virtue of Section 137 of the LGC which states:
The CA ratiocinated that the LGC authorizes cities to levy a CHAPTER II
franchise tax. However, the basis of the City of Pasig’s demand Specific Provisions on the Taxing and Other Revenue-Raising
for payment of franchise tax was Section 32, Article 3 of Powers of Local Government Units
Ordinance No. 25 which was enacted at a time when Pasig was ARTICLE I
still a municipality and had no authority to levy a franchise tax. Provinces
From the time of its conversion into a city, Pasig has not enacted a Section 137. Franchise Tax. - Notwithstanding any exemption
new ordinance for the imposition of a franchise tax. The granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose
conversion of Pasig into a city, the CA explained, did not rectify a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at the rate not exceeding
the defect of the said ordinance. Citing San Miguel Corporation fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual
v. Municipal Council (SMC)8 and Arabay, Inc. v. Court of First receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Arabay), 9 the CA ruled that receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction.
the conversion of a municipality into a city does not remove the
xxxx
original infirmity of the ordinance. The dispositive portion of the
On the other hand, the municipalities are prohibited from levying
decision reads:
the taxes specifically allocated to provinces, viz:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, we resolve
ARTICLE II
to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision appealed
Municipalities
from.1âwphi1 In its stead, a new judgment is hereby entered
Section 142. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as otherwise
declaring the demand for payment of franchise tax from
provided in this Code, municipalities may levy taxes, fees, and
[MERALCO] as invalid for being devoid of legal basis.10
charges not otherwise levied by provinces.
The City of Pasig moved, but failed to obtain a reconsideration of
Section 151 empowers the cities to levy taxes, fees and charges
the said decision. Thus, the instant appeal.
allowed to both provinces and municipalities, thus -
The Present Petition for Review
ARTICLE III
The City of Pasig relied on the following reasons to support its
Cities
petition:
Section 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as otherwise
I.
provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
charges which the province or municipality may impose:
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION
Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and
OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN DECLARING THAT THE
collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities initio. It is even of little consequence that Pasig sought to collect
shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the only those taxes after its conversion into a city. A void ordinance,
provisions of this Code. or provision thereof, is what it is - a nullity that produces no legal
xxxx effect. It cannot be enforced; and no right could spring forth from
The LGC further provides that the power to impose a tax, fee, or it. The cityhood of Pasig notwithstanding, it has no right to collect
charge or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the franchise tax under the assailed ordinance.
Sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through an Besides, the City of Pasig had apparently
appropriate ordinance.11 This simply means that the local misunderstood Arabay. In that case, the taxes subject of the
government unit cannot solely rely on the statutory provision refund claim included those paid after the conversion of Dipolog
(LGC) granting specific taxing powers, such as the authority to into a city. Thus, while the creation of the City of Dipolog was
levy franchise tax. The enactment of an ordinance is indispensable effective on 1 January 1970, the petitioner, Arabay, Inc., applied
for it is the legal basis of the imposition and collection of taxes for the refund of taxes paid under the questioned ordinance for the
upon covered taxpayers. Without the ordinance, there is nothing period from December 1969 to July 1972.16 As previously noted,
to enforce by way of assessment and collection. the Court granted the refund.
However, an ordinance must pass muster the test of II. The cityhood law of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing Pasig did not cure the defect of
laws.12 Otherwise, it shall be void. the questioned ordinance.
It is not disputed that at the time the ordinance in question was The petitioner cites -
enacted in 1992, the local government of Pasig, then a Section 45. Municipal Ordinances Existing at the Time of the
municipality, had no authority to levy franchise tax. Article 5 of Approval of this Act. - All municipal ordinances of the
the Civil Code explicitly provides, "acts executed against the municipality of Pasig existing at the time of the approval of this
provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except Act shall continue to be in force within the City of Pasig until the
when the law itself authorizes their validity." Section 32 of Sangguniang Panlungsod shall, by ordinance, provide otherwise.
Municipal Ordinance No. 25 is, thus, void for being in direct of R.A. No. 7829 as legal basis that gave curative effect upon
contravention with Section 142 of the LGC. Being void, it cannot Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25.
be given any legal effect. An assessment and collection pursuant As we see it, the cited law does not lend any help to the City of
to the said ordinance is, perforce, legally infirm. Pasig's cause. It is crystal clear from the said law that what
Consequently, the CA was correct when it declared that the shall continue to be in force after the conversion of Pasig into a
demand of the City of Pasig upon MERALCO for the payment of city are the municipal ordinances existing as of the time of the
the disputed tax was devoid of legal basis. It bears emphasizing approval of R.A. No. 7829. The provision contemplates
that the DOJ and the RTC of Pasig City 13 had previously declared ordinances that are valid and legal from their inception; that upon
Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 as void ab the approval of R.A. No. 7829, their effectivity and enforcement
initio. 14 Even the City of Pasig, it seems, does not contest the shall continue. To 'continue' means (1) to be steadfast or constant
invalidity of said ordinance.15 in a course or activity; (2) to keep going: maintain a course,
It is submitted, however, that when Pasig was converted into a direction, or progress; or (3) to remain in a place or condition. 17 It
city in 1995 by virtue of R.A. No. 7829 (the cityhood law) it was presupposes something already existing.
authorized to collect and impose a franchise tax. Demurring from A void ordinance cannot legally exist, it cannot have binding
the rulings in Arabay and SMC cited in the assailed CA decision, force and effect. Such is Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No.
the City of Pasig insists that the demand for payment of franchise 25 and, being so, is outside the comprehension of Section 45 of
tax was justified for the period 1996 up to 1999, or when Pasig R.A. No. 7829
was already a city. Unlike the present case, the City of Pasig We are not in full accord with the explanation given by the City of
continues, Ara bay and SMC involved taxes paid prior to the Pasig - that Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829 intended to prevent the
respective municipalities' conversion into cities. City of Pasig from becoming paralyzed in delivering basic
We are not persuaded. services. We can concede that Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829
The doctrinal rule on the matter still rings true to this day - that assures the City of Pasig continued collection of taxes under
the conversion of the municipality into a city does not remove the ordinances passed prior to its conversion. What the petitioner fails
original infirmity of the subject ordinance. Such doctrine, evoked to realize is that Section 32, Municipal Ordinance No. 25 is not
in Arabay and SMC, is squarely relevant in the case at bar. In the singular source of its income or funds necessary for the
these two separate cases, the sales taxes were paid by the performance of its essential functions. The argument of the City
petitioners pursuant to ordinances enacted prior to the conversion of Pasig is at best flimsy and insubstantial. The records, it should
of the respondents into cities, or at which time the latter were be noted, bear no evidence to demonstrate the resulting paralysis
without authority to levy the said taxes. Finding the municipal claimed by the City of Pasig. An unsupported allegation it is, no
ordinances to be void, the Court minced no words in declaring the better than a mere conjecture and speculation.
payments of taxes under the ordinances to be without basis even if III. There is no ambiguity in
subsequently the respondents became cities. Fittingly, the Court Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829.
ordered the refund of the said taxes to the petitioners. As a last-ditch effort to persuade this Court, the City of Pasig calls
We find the instant case no different from Arabay and SMC. As in out a latent ambiguity in Section 42 of R.A. No. 7829 in order to
those cases, the cityhood law (R.A. No. 7829) of Pasig cannot pave the way for the operation of the cardinal rule in statutory
breathe life into Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25, construction requiring courts to give effect to the legislative
ostensibly by bringing it within the ambit of Section 151 of the intent. It pounces on the same ambiguity so that it may be
LGC that authorizes cities to levy the franchise tax under Section resolved in favor of promoting local autonomy.
137 of the same law. It is beyond cavil that Section 32 of We disagree. We have already established that the provision is
Municipal Ordinance No. 25 is an act that is null and void ab clear enough to dislodge any notion that it gives curative effect to
the legal infirmity of Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25. represented by Director Pedro Borgonia located at Bangued,
The legislative intent behind Section 42 of R.A. No. 7829, as Abra, is valid;
previously discussed, did not comprehend the affirmance of void That since the school is not exempt from paying taxes, it should
or inexistent ordinances. therefore pay all back taxes in the amount of P5,140.31 and back
Neither can the bare invocation of the principle of local autonomy taxes and penalties from the promulgation of this decision;
provide succor to settle any ambiguity in Section 42 of R.A. No. That the amount deposited by the plaintaff him the sum of
7829, if doubt as to its meaning may even be supposed. While we P60,000.00 before the trial, be confiscated to apply for the
can agree that an ambiguity in the law concerning local taxing payment of the back taxes and for the redemption of the property
powers must be resolved in favor of fiscal autonomy, 18 we are in question, if the amount is less than P6,000.00, the remainder
hampered by the nullity of Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance must be returned to the Director of Pedro Borgonia, who
No. 25. At the risk of being repetitive, the said ordinance cannot represents the plaintiff herein;
be given legal effect. It must be borne in mind that the That the deposit of the Municipal Treasurer in the amount of
constitutionally ordained policy of local fiscal autonomy was not P6,000.00 also before the trial must be returned to said Municipal
intended by the framers to be absolute. It does not provide Treasurer of Bangued, Abra;
unfettered authority to tax objects of any kind. The very source of And finally the case is hereby ordered dismissed with costs
local governments' authority to tax19 also empowered Congress to against the plaintiff.
provide limitations on the exercise of such taxing powers. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 22-23)
Precisely, Congress' act of withdrawing from municipalities the Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher
power to levy franchise tax by virtue of Section 142 of the LGC is learning duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
a valid exercise of its constitutional authority Commission in 1948, filed a complaint (Annex "1" of Answer by
In this case, the validity of the municipal ordinance imposing a the respondents Heirs of Paterno Millare; Rollo, pp. 95-97) on
franchise tax cannot be made to rest upon the ambiguity of a July 10, 1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare void the
provision of law (Section 42, R.A. No. 7829) operating "Notice of Seizure' and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building
supposedly, albeit mistakenly, under the context of promoting located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes
local autonomy. Regard, too, must be made for the equally and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said "Notice of Seizure" of
important doctrine that a doubt or ambiguity arising out of the the college lot and building covered by Original Certificate of
term used in granting the power of taxation must be resolved Title No. Q-83 duly registered in the name of petitioner, plaintiff
against the local government unit.20 below, on July 6, 1972, by respondents Municipal Treasurer and
In fine, the City of Pasig cannot legally make a demand for the Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the
payment of taxes under the challenged ordinance, which is void, satisfaction of the said taxes thereon. The "Notice of Sale" was
even after its conversion into a city. The CA, thus, committed no caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent
reversible error. treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The college lot and building, which sale was held on the same date.
28 August 2007 Decision and the 8 February 2008 Resolution of Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra,
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81255 are offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted.
hereby AFFIRMED. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
SO ORDERED. On August 10, 1972, the respondent Paterno Millare (now
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES deceased) filed through counstel a motion to dismiss the
Associate Justice complaint.
On August 23, 1972, the respondent Provincial Treasurer and
2. ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC., represented by Municipal Treasurer, through then Provincial Fiscal Loreto C.
PEDRO V. BORGONIA, petitioner, Roldan, filed their answer (Annex "2" of Answer by the
vs. respondents Heirs of Patemo Millare; Rollo, pp. 98-100) to the
HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First complaint. This was followed by an amended answer (Annex
Instance, Abra; ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial "3," ibid, Rollo, pp. 101-103) on August 31, 1972.
Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal On September 1, 1972 the respondent Paterno Millare filed his
Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS OF PATERNO answer (Annex "5," ibid; Rollo, pp. 106-108).
MILLARE, respondents. On October 12, 1972, with the aforesaid sale of the school
premises at public auction, the respondent Judge, Hon. Juan P.
PARAS, J.: Aquino of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, ordered
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the (Annex "6," ibid; Rollo, pp. 109-110) the respondents provincial
defunct Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, dated June 14, and municipal treasurers to deliver to the Clerk of Court the
1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656, entitled "Abra Valley proceeds of the auction sale. Hence, on December 14, 1972,
Junior College, Inc., represented by Pedro V. Borgonia, plaintiff petitioner, through Director Borgonia, deposited with the trial
vs. Armin M. Cariaga as Provincial Treasurer of Abra, Gaspar V. court the sum of P6,000.00 evidenced by PNB Check No. 904369.
Bosque as Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra and Paterno On April 12, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts
Millare, defendants," the decretal portion of which reads: adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby Said Stipulations reads:
declares: STIPULATION OF FACTS
That the distraint seizure and sale by the Municipal Treasurer of COME NOW the parties, assisted by counsels, and to this
Bangued, Abra, the Provincial Treasurer of said province against Honorable Court respectfully enter into the following agreed
the lot and building of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc., stipulation of facts:
1. That the personal circumstances of the parties as stated in jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for
paragraph 1 of the complaint is admitted; but the particular person educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are
of Mr. Armin M. Cariaga is to be substituted, however, by anyone exempted from the payment of taxes." (Annexes "B," "B-1" of
who is actually holding the position of Provincial Treasurer of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-49; 44 and 49).
Province of Abra; Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the
2. That the plaintiff Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. is the owner second floor by the Director of petitioner school for residential
of the lot and buildings thereon located in Bangued, Abra under purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83; assailed decision.
3. That the defendant Gaspar V. Bosque, as Municipal treasurer of After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from
Bangued, Abra caused to be served upon the Abra Valley Junior August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal (Per Order
College, Inc. a Notice of Seizure on the property of said school dated August 6, 1974; Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, p. 57)
under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83 for the satisfaction of petitioner instead availed of the instant petition for review
real property taxes thereon, amounting to P5,140.31; the Notice of on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before this
Seizure being the one attached to the complaint as Exhibit A; Court, which petition was filed on August 17, 1974 (Rollo, p.2).
4. That on June 8, 1972 the above properties of the Abra Valley In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to
Junior College, Inc. was sold at public auction for the satisfaction give DUE COURSE to the petition (Rollo, p. 58). Respondents
of the unpaid real property taxes thereon and the same was sold to were required to answer said petition (Rollo, p. 74).
defendant Paterno Millare who offered the highest bid of Petitioner raised the following assignments of error:
P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued by the I
defendant Municipal Treasurer. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SUSTAINING AS VALID
5. That all other matters not particularly and specially covered by THE SEIZURE AND SALE OF THE COLLEGE LOT AND
this stipulation of facts will be the subject of evidence by the BUILDING USED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES OF THE
parties. PETITIONER.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to II
consider and admit this stipulation of facts on the point agreed THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
upon by the parties. COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE PETITIONER ARE
Bangued, Abra, April 12, 1973. NOT USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR EDUCATIONAL
Sgd. Agripino Brillantes PURPOSES MERELY BECAUSE THE COLLEGE
Typ AGRIPINO BRILLANTES PRESIDENT RESIDES IN ONE ROOM OF THE COLLEGE
Attorney for Plaintiff BUILDING.
Sgd. Loreto Roldan III
Typ LORETO ROLDAN THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
Provincial Fiscal COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE PETITIONER ARE
Counsel for Defendants NOT EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAXES AND IN
Provincial Treasurer of ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY P5,140.31 AS REALTY
Abra and the Municipal TAXES.
Treasurer of Bangued, Abra IV
Sgd. Demetrio V. Pre THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE
Typ. DEMETRIO V. PRE CONFISCATION OF THE P6,000.00 DEPOSIT MADE IN THE
Attorney for Defendant COURT BY PETITIONER AS PAYMENT OF THE P5,140.31
Paterno Millare (Rollo, pp. 17-18) REALTY TAXES. (See Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-2)
Aside from the Stipulation of Facts, the trial court among others, The main issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the
found the following: (a) that the school is recognized by the phrase "used exclusively for educational purposes."
government and is offering Primary, High School and College Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for
Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof,
students all in all; (b) that it is located right in the heart of the determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22
town of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and
meters from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary thereto
elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the as well as to the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 470,
street; (d) that the high school and college students are housed in otherwise known as the Assessment Law, are without legal basis
the main building; (e) that the Director with his family is in the and therefore void.
second floor of the main building; and (f) that the annual gross On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college
income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand lot and building in question which were subjected to seizure and
pesos. sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for the educational
From all the foregoing, the only issue left for the Court to purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent residence of the
determine and as agreed by the parties, is whether or not the lot President and Director thereof, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his
and building in question are used exclusively for educational family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for
purposes. (Rollo, p. 20) commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college
The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his building is being used and rented by a commercial establishment,
Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a Memorandum for the Northern Marketing Corporation (See photograph attached as
the Government on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental Annex "8" (Comment; Rollo, p. 90]).
Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that based Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds
on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and application in the case at bar is Section 22, paragraph 3, Article
VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main
charitable or educational purposes ... building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director
Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. and his family, may find justification under the concept of
470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary
Assessment Law, provides: purpose—educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the
The following are exempted from real property tax under the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
Assessment Law: imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
xxx xxx xxx It will be noted however that the aforementioned lease appears to
(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and have been raised for the first time in this Court. That the matter
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for was not taken up in the to court is really apparent in the decision
religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes. of respondent Judge. No mention thereof was made in the
xxx xxx xxx stipulation of facts, not even in the description of the school
In this regard petitioner argues that the primary use of the school building by the trial judge, both embodied in the decision nor as
lot and building is the basic and controlling guide, norm and one of the issues to resolve in order to determine whether or not
standard to determine tax exemption, and not the mere incidental said properly may be exempted from payment of real estate taxes
use thereof. (Rollo, pp. 17-23). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that such
As early as 1916 in YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of lnternal fact was not disputed even after it was raised in this Court.
Revenue, 33 Phil. 217 [1916], this Court ruled that while it may be Indeed, it is axiomatic that facts not raised in the lower court
true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house and cannot be taken up for the first time on appeal. Nonetheless, as an
maintains a restaurant for its members, still these do not constitute exception to the rule, this Court has held that although a factual
business in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but an institution issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of
used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a
purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation. pivotal factual matter. "The Supreme Court is clothed with ample
In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds
Ilocos Norte, 51 Phil. 352 [1972], this Court included in the that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision."
exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and another lot (Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 645 [1984]).
formerly used as a cemetery. It was clarified that the term "used Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the
exclusively" considers incidental use also. Thus, the exemption conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is
from payment of land tax in favor of the convent includes, not built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is
only the land actually occupied by the building but also the being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes,
adjacent garden devoted to the incidental use of the parish priest. but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial
The lot which is not used for commercial purposes but serves purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of
solely as a sort of lodging place, also qualifies for exemption commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned
because this constitutes incidental use in religious functions. to the school involved.
The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First
further clarified by this Court in the cases of Herrera vs. Quezon Instance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
City Board of assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961] modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bishop of the petitioner.
Missionary District, 14 SCRA 991 [1965], thus — SO ORDERED.
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property
actually indispensable' therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p.
1430), but extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes,
such as in the case of hospitals, "a school for training nurses, a
nurses' home, property use to provide housing facilities for
interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and other members of
the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student nurses,
interns, and residents' (84 CJS 6621), such as "Athletic fields"
including "a firm used for the inmates of the institution. (Cooley
Searches and Seizures
on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430). 1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for vs.
purposes mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD,
Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]). Respondents
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more DECISION
liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively MARTIRES, J.:
used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid
Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The
reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said City, as shown in the application for search warrant the following
right shall thus be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. documents, articles and items, to wit:
Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients abroad;
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the list of brokers and their personal files; incorporation papers of all
law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of these companies[,] local and abroad; sales agreements with
the citizens; for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient clients; copies of official receipts purposely for clients; fax
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of messages from the clients; copies of credit advise from the banks;
government.1 clients['] message slips; company brochures; letterheads;
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and envelopes; copies of listings of personal assets of Amador
set aside the Decision,2 dated 22 September 2010, and Pastrana; list of clients and other showing that these companies
Resolution,3 dated 11 March 2011, of the Court of acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703. The CA affirmed the which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
Omnibus Order,4 dated 10 May 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search
Makati City, Branch 58 (RTC), which nullified Search Warrant anytime of the day of the premises above-described and forewith
No. 01-118. seize and take possession thereof and bring said documents,
THE FACTS articles and items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of directs.
Investigation (NBJ) Special Investigator Albert Froilan The officer(s) making the search shall make a return of their
Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search search within the validity of the warrant.
Warrant5 before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose This search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from this
of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents Date.11
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the
Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proceeded to
received confidential information that respondents were engaged respondents' office to search the same. The search was witnessed
in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their employees by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo Denna, Chief Security Officer
would call prospective clients abroad whom they would convince and Building Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate Center.
to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of Pursuant to the Return,12 dated 2 April 2001, and the Inventory
stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a Sheet13 attached thereto, the NBI and the SEC were able to seize
transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of stock, however, the following:
were actually purchased. Instead, the money collected was 1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:
allocated as follows: 42% to respondent Pastrana's personal a. Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;
account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to investors-clients, who b. List of brokers and 201 files;
threatened respondents with lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales; c. Sales agreements;
and 8% to marketing. Special Investigator Gaerlan averred that d. Official receipts;
the scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the e. Credit advise;
Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic f. Fax messages;
Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).6
g. Clients message slips;
In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan
h. Company brochures;
attached the affidavit of Rashed H. Alghurairi, one of the
i. Letterheads; and
complainants from Saudi Arabia;7 the affidavits of respondents'
j. Envelopes.
former employees who actually called clients abroad; 8 the articles
2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;
of incorporation of domestic corporations used by respondents in
3. Offshore incorporation papers;
their scheme;9 and the sketch of the place sought to be searched .10
4. Lease contracts; and
On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador,
5. Vouchers/ledgers.
Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati City, issued Search Warrant
No. 01-118, viz: On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search
Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in connection with two
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Search Warrant No.(2)
01-118 For: Violation
offenses, one for of R.A. of the SRC and the other
violation
8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and Estafa
for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contravened the
-versus-
(Art. 315, RPC) basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search warrants
AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD of are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in
1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati City connection with one specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No.
SEARCH WARRANT 01-118 failed to describe with specificity the objects to be
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: seized.14
GREETINGS: On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining quash the search warrant, respondent Abad moved for the
under oath the applicant NBI [Special Investigator] ALBERT inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She contended that the lapse of
FROILAN G. GAERLAN and his witnesses RONNIE three (3) months without action on the motion to quash clearly
AROJADO and MELANIE O. BATO, that there is probable showed Judge Salvador, Jr. 's aversion to passing judgment on his
cause to believe that AMADOR PASTRANA and RUFINA own search warrant.15
ABAD have in their possession/control located in [an] office In an Order,16 dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr.
premises located at 1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. Hence, the case was
re-raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58.
The Regional Trial Court Ruling SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 PARTICULARLY
In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the DESCRIBED THE ITEMS LISTED THEREIN WHICH SHOW
search warrant was null and void because it violated the A REASONABLE NEXUS TO THE OFFENSE OF ACTING AS
requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection STOCKBROKER WITHOUT THE REQUIRED LICENSE
with one specific offense only. It added that the SRC alone FROM THE SEC. THE IMPUGNED STATEMENT FOUND AT
punishes various acts such that one would be left in limbo THE END OF THE ENUMERATION OF ITEMS DID NOT
divining what specific provision was violated by respondents; and INTEND TO SUBJECT ALL DOCUMENTS OF
that even estafa under the RPC contemplates multifarious settings. RESPONDENTS TO SEIZURE BUT ONLY THOSE
The RTC further opined that the search warrant and the "SHOWING THAT THESE COMPANIES ACTED IN
application thereto as well as the inventory submitted thereafter VIOLATION OF THEIR ACTUAL REGISTRATION WITH
were all wanting in particularization. The fallo reads: THE SEC."19
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 01-118 issued on March 26, Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC
2001 is hereby QUASHED and NULLIFIED. All documents, and estafa are so intertwined that the punishable acts defined in
articles and items seized are hereby ordered to be RETURNED to one of them can be considered as including or are necessarily
petitioner/accused. Any and all items seized, products of the included in the other; that operating and acting as stockbrokers
illegal search are INADMISSIBLE in evidence and cannot be without the requisite license infringe Section 28.1 of the SRC; that
used in any proceeding for whatever purpose. The petition to cite these specific acts of defrauding another by falsely pretending to
respondent SEC and NBI officers for contempt of court is possess power or qualification of being a stockbroker similarly
DENIED for lack of merit. constitute estafa under Article 315 of the RPC; and that both
SO ORDERED.17 Section 28.1 of the SRC and Article 315 of the RPC penalize the
Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General act of misrepresentation, an element common to both offenses;
elevated an appeal before the CA. thus, the issuance of a single search warrant did not violate the
The Court of Appeals Ruling "one specific offense rule."20
In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the Petitioner further contends that the subject search warrant is not a
ruling of the RTC. It declared that Search "Warrant No. 01-118 general warrant because the items listed therein show a reasonable
clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which nexus to the offense of acting as stockbrokers without the required
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one license from the SEC; that the statement "and other showing that
specific offense, because the application failed to specify what these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with
provision of the SRC was violated or even what type the SEC" did not render the warrant void; and that the words "and
of estafa was committed by respondents. The appellate court other" only intend to emphasize that no technical description
observed that the application for search warrant never alleged that could be given to the items subject of the search warrant because
respondents or their corporations were not SEC-registered brokers of the very nature of the offense.21
or dealers, contrary to petitioner's allegation that respondents In their comment,22 respondents counter that the lower court was
violated Section 28.1 of the SRC which makes unlawful the act of correct in ruling that the subject warrant was issued in connection
buying or selling of stocks in a dealer or broker capacity without with more than one specific offense; that estafa and violation of
the requisite SEC registration. the SRC could not be considered as one crime because the former
The CA further pronounced that the subject search warrant failed is punished under the RPC while the latter is punished under a
to pass the test of particularity. It reasoned that the inclusion of special law; that there are many violations cited in the SRC that
the phrase "other showing that these companies acted in violation there can be no offense which is simply called "violation of R.A.
of their actual registration with the SEC" rendered the warrant all- No. 8799;" and that, similarly, there are three classes
embracing as it subjected any and all records of respondents of estafa which could be committed through at least 10 modes,
inside the office premises to seizure and the implementing officers each one of them having elements distinct from those of the other
effectively had unlimited discretion as to what property should be modes.
seized. The CA disposed the case in this wise: Respondents assert that Search Warrant No. 01-118 does not
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby expressly indicate that the documents, articles, and items sought
DENIED. The Omnibus Order dated May 10, 2002 of the to be seized thereunder are subjects of the offense, stolen or
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City is AFFIRMED. embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or
SO ORDERED.18 intended to be used as the means of committing an offense; that it
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied is a general warrant because it enumerates every conceivable
by the CA in its resolution, dated 11 March 2011. Hence, this document that may be found in an office setting; that, as a result,
petition. it is entirely possible that in the course of the search for the
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS articles and documents generally listed in the search warrant,
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN those used and intended for legitimate purposes may be included
SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WHICH in the seizure; that the concluding sentence in the subject warrant
QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 CONSIDERING "and other showing that these companies acted in violation of
THAT: their actual registration with the SEC" is a characteristic of a
I. general warrant; and that it allows the raiding team unbridled
latitude in determining by themselves what items or documents
READ TOGETHER, THE ALLEGATIONS IN NBI AGENT
are evidence of the imputation that respondents and the
GAERLAN'S APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT
corporations they represent are violating their registration with the
AND SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 SHOW THAT SAID
SEC.23
WARRANT WAS ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 28.1 OF R.A. NO. 8799. In its reply,24 petitioner avers that the validity of a search warrant
may be properly evaluated by examining both the warrant itself
II.
and the application on which it was based; that the acts alleged in In Stonehill, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search
the application clearly constitute a transgression of Section 28.1 warrants which were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws,
of the SRC; and that the nature of the offense for which a search Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
warrant is issued is determined based on the factual recital of the Penal Code," stated:
elements of the subject crime therein and not the formal In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
designation of the crime itself in its caption. applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
THE COURT'S RULING committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
individual the right to personal liberty and security of homes probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz: competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to (Code) and Revised Penal Code," - as alleged in the
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. aforementioned applications - without reference to any
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful determinate provision of said laws; or
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to
person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of
sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when the domicile and the privacy of communication and
attempted.25 correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
Criminal Procedure provide for the requisites for the issuance of a the constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the socalled
search warrant, to wit: general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen,
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.30
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez, 31 the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the Court further ruled:
witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily
be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in determine whether an offense exists to justify the issuance or
the Philippines. quashal of the search warrant because the personal properties that
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, may be subject of the search warrant are very much intertwined
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of with the "one specific offense" requirement of probable cause.
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the The only way to determine whether a warrant should issue in
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally connection with one specific offense is to juxtapose the facts and
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, circumstances presented by the applicant with the elements of the
together with the affidavits submitted. offense that are alleged to support the search warrant.
Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno xx xx
(Stonehill),26 the Court stressed two points which must be The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional
considered in the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no requirement that a search warrant should issue only on the basis of
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined probable cause. Since the primary objective of applying for a
personally by the judge; and (2) that the warrant search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent
shall particularly describe the things to be seized. 27 Moreover, prosecution for an offense for which the search warrant was
in Stonehill, on account of the seriousness of the irregularities applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself
committed in connection with the search warrants involved in that that the evidence presented by the applicant establishes the facts
case, the Court deemed it fit to amend the former Rules of Court and circumstances relating to this specific offense for which the
by providing that "a search warrant shall not issue except upon warrant is sought and issued. x x x32
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation
The search warrant must be of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and
issued for one specific offense. for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."33 First, violation of the SRC is not an
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the
warrant is that it must be issued based on probable cause which, said law such as manipulation of security prices, 34 insider
under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense trading,35 acting as dealer or broker without being registered with
to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant. 28 In search the SEC,36 use of unregistered exchange,37 use of unregistered
warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and clearing agency,38 and violation of the restrictions on borrowings
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent by members, brokers, and dealers39 among others. Even the charge
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place three ways of committing the said crime: (1) with unfaithfulness
sought to be searched.29 or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three ways
of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of 118 also covered estafa under the RPC. Even the application for
abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these reasons the search warrant merely stated:
alone, it can be easily discerned that Search Warrant No. 01-118 Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad through their employees
suffers a fatal defect. scattered throughout their numerous companies call prospective
Indeed, there are instances where the Court sustained the validity clients abroad and convince them to buy shares of stocks in a
of search warrants issued for violation of R.A. No. 6425 or the certain company likewise based abroad. Once the client is
then Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In Olaes v. People,40 even convinced to buy said shares of stocks, he or she is advised to
though the search warrant merely stated that it was issued in make a telegraphic transfer of the money supposedly intended for
connection with a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Court did not the purchase of the stocks. The transfer is made to the account of
nullify the same for it was clear in the body that it was issued for the company which contacted the client. Once the money is
the specific offense of possession of illegal narcotics, viz: received, the same is immediately withdrawn and brought to the
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it treasury department of the particular company. The money is then
is in connection with Violation of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise counted and eventually allocated to the following: 42% to
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in Pastrana, 32% for the Sales Office, 7% for the redeeming clients
the text thereof that [t]here is probable cause to believe that (those with small accounts and who already threatened the
Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Comia St., company with lawsuits), 10% for the cost of sales and 8% goes to
Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, [have] in their possession and marketing. No allocation is ever made to buy the shares of
control and custody of marijuana dried stocks.46
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first
exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense and foremost a codification of various rules and regulations
stated above. Although the specific section of the Dangerous governing securities. Thus, unlike, the drugs law wherein there is
Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the a clear delineation between use and possession of illegal drugs,
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the the offenses punishable under the SRC could not be lumped
finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the together in categories. Hence, it is imperative to specify what
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the particular provision of the SRC was violated.
description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-
or things to be seized.41 (emphasis supplied) 118, petitioner insists that the warrant was issued for violation of
In People v. Dichoso,42 the search warrant was also for violation Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, "No person shall engage in
of R.A. No. 6425, without specifying what provisions of the law the business of buying or selling securities in the Philippines as a
were violated. The Court upheld the validity of the warrant: broker or dealer, or act as a salesman, or an associated person of
Appellants' contention that the search warrant in question was any broker or dealer unless registered as such with the
issued for more than one (1) offense, hence, in violation of Commission." However, despite this belated attempt to pinpoint a
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He provision of the SRC which respondents allegedly violated,
engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal Search Warrant No. 01-118 still remains null and void. The
possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal allegations in the application for search warrant do not indicate
possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and that respondents acted as brokers or dealers without prior
sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant registration from the SEC which is an essential element to be held
is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, liable for violation of Section 28.l of the SRC. It is even worthy to
following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate note that Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC's Comment
search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second on the Motion to Quash,47 dated 5 April 2002.
for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal In addition, even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the
possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The SRC was specified in the application for search warrant, there
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals could have been no finding of probable cause in connection with
specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into that offense. In People v. Hon. Estrada,48 the Court pronounced:
prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong be the best evidence that could be obtained under the
to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary
may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative
Dangerous Drugs Act.43 (emphases supplied) ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a
Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit,44 the search warrant was license required by law, as in the present case - and such evidence
captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could
Firearms, etc.), the Court held that while "illegal possession of easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be
firearms is penalized under Section I of P .D. No. 1866 and illegal secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a
possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.
cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before
various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the
explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life and constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and
property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to personalities.49 (emphasis supplied)
be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof
etc. under P.D. No. 1866."45 that respondents lacked the license to operate as brokers or
The aforecited cases, however, are not applicable in this case. dealers.1âшphi1 Such circumstance only reinforces the view that
Aside from its failure to specify what particular provision of the at the time of the application, the NBI and the SEC were in a
SRC did respondents allegedly violate, Search Warrant No. 01- quandary as to what offense to charge respondents with.
Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,56 it was pointed out
of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined with each other that the that one of the tests to determine the particularity in the
issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the one- description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when
specific-offense rule, the two offenses are entirely different from the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation
each other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.57
included in the other. An offense may be said to necessarily In addition, under the Rules of Court, the following personal
include another when some of the essential elements or property may be the subject of a search warrant: (i) the subject of
ingredients of the former constitute the latter. And vice versa, an the offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or intended
offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when to be used as the means of committing an offense. 58
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed
those constituting the latter.50 to state the specific offense alleged committed by respondents.
The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an Consequently, it could not have been possible for the issuing
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of judge as well as the applicant for the search warrant to determine
deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary that the items sought to be seized are connected to any crime.
estimation is caused the offended party or third person. 51 On the Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for
other hand, Section 28.1 of the SRC penalizes the act of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the
performing dealer or broker functions without registration with documents, articles and items enumerated in the search warrant
the SEC. For such offense, defrauding another and causing failed the test of particularity. The terms used in this warrant were
damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation are not too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the
essential elements. Thus, a person who is found liable of violation transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and
of Section 28.1 of the SRC may, in addition, be convicted seizure. Even the phrase "and other showing that these companies
of estafa under the RPC. In the same manner, a person acquitted acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC" does
of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may be held liable not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No. 01-
for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because violation of 118 was indeed issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC;
Section 28.1 of the SRC is ma/um prohibitum, in which there is the same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations' certificate of
no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is ma/um in registration with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of
se, in the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is registration to act as brokers or dealers.
necessary. In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having
Finally, the Court's rulings in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA been issued for more than one offense and for lack of particularity
(Columbia)52 and Laud v. People (Laud)53 even militate against in the description of the things sought for seizure.
petitioner. In Columbia, the Court ruled that a search warrant WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 September
which covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not 2010 Decision and 11 March 2011 Resolution of the Court of
violate the one-specific-offense rule, viz: Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703 are AFFIRMED.
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright SO ORDERED.
infringement and the search warrant uncovered several contraband SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
items in the form of pirated videotapes is not to be confused with Associate Justice
the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued
does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.54
In Laud, Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid as it
was issued only for one specific offense - that is, for Murder,
albeit for six (6) counts.
In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did
not state one specific offense. It included violation of the SRC
which, as previously discussed, covers several penal provisions
and estafa, which could be committed in a number of ways.
Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having
been issued for more than one specific offense.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
Reasonable particularity of the vs
description of the things to be RENANTE COMPRADO Y BRONOLA, Accused-
seized Appellant
It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must DECISION
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
MARTIRES, J.:
seized. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 19 May 2014, of the
of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 which
enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily
affirmed the Decision2 dated 18 April 2013, of the Regional Trial
identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from
Court, Branch 25, Misamis Oriental (RTC), in Criminal Case No.
seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no
2011-671 finding Renante Comprado y Bronola (accused-
discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
appellant) guilty of illegal possession of marijuan.
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however, required
THE FACTS
that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of
minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
Section 11, Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise
searching authorities.55
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The When they reached Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, their vehicle was
Information reads: stopped by three (3) police officers. All of the passengers were
That on July 15, 2011, at more or less eleven o'clock in the ordered to alight from the vehicle for baggage inspection. The bag
evening, along the national highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro was opened and they saw a transparent cellophane bag containing
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable marijuana leaves. At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-
Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law appellant, his girlfriend, and the police officers who arrested them
to possess or use any dangerous drugs, did then and there, boarded a bus bound for Cagayan de Oro City.
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, control When the bus approached Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, the police
and custody 3,200 grams of dried fruiting tops of suspected officers told the bus driver to stop at the checkpoint.1âwphi1 The
marijuana, which substance, after qualitative examination arresting officers took photos of accused-appellant and his
conducted by the Regional Crime Laboratory, Office No. 10, girlfriend inside the bus. They were then brought to the police
Cagayan de Oro City, tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous station where they were subjected to custodial investigation
drug, with the said accused, knowing the substance to be a without the assistance of counsel. 10
dangerous drug. 3 The RTC Ruling
Upon his arraignment on 8 August 2011, accused-appellant In its decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of illegal
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the possession of marijuana. It held that accused-appellant's
merits ensued. uncorroborated claim that he was merely requested to bring the
Version of the Prosecution bag to Cagayan de Oro City, did not prove his innocence; mere
On 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential possession of the illegal substance already consummated the
informant (CJ) sent a text message to Police Inspector Dominador crime and good faith was not even a defense. The RTC did not
Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station Commander of lend credence to accused-appellant's claim that he was arrested in
Police Station 6, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, because it was unbelievable that the
courier of marijuana together with a female companion, was police officers would go out of their jurisdiction in Puerto,
sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his Cagayan de Oro City, just to apprehend accused-appellant in
possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be Bukidnon. The fallo reads:
traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. At 9:30 in the WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the
evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the alleged accused RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA GUILTY
drug courier had boarded a bus with body number 2646 and plate BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime defined and
number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added penalized under Section 11, [7], Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as
that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him to
colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the
evening, the police officers stationed at Police Station 6 put up a Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [₱500,000.00], without
checkpoint in front of the station.4 subsidiary penalty in case of nonpayment of fine.
At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the policemen stopped the bus Let the penalty imposed on the accused be a lesson and an
bearing the said body and plate numbers. P/Insp. Orate, Police example to all who have criminal propensity, inclination and
Officer 3 Teodoro de Oro (PO3 De Oro), Senior Police Officer 1 proclivity to commit the same forbidden acts, that crime does not
Benjamin Jay Reycitez (SPOJ Reycitez), and PO1 Rexie pay, and that the pecuniary gain and benefit which one can derive
Tenio (PO1 Tenio) boarded the bus and saw a man matching the from possessing drugs, or other illegal substance, or from
description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the committing any other acts penalized under Republic Act 9165,
back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap. After P/Insp. cannot compensate for the penalty which one will suffer if ever he
Orate asked the man to open the bag, the police officers saw a is prosecuted and penalized to the full extent of the law. 11
transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.5 Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA.
SPO1 Reycitez took photos of accused-appellant and the The CA Ruling
cellophane bag containing the dried marijuana leaves. 6 PO3 De In its decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-
Oro, in the presence of accused-appellant, marked the bag "RCB- appellant. It opined that accused-appellant submitted to the
2" and the contents of the bag "RCB-1." 7 Thereafter, PO1 Tenio jurisdiction of the court because he raised no objection as to the
and PO3 De Oro brought accused-appellant and the seized bag to irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. The CA reasoned
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 8 On 16 July 2011, at that the seized items are admissible in evidence because the
around 1:40 in the morning, Police Senior Inspector Charity search and seizure of the illegal narcotics were made pursuant to a
Caceres (PSI Caceres) of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office 10, search of a moving vehicle. It added that while it was admitted by
Cagayan de Oro City, received the requests for examination and the arresting police officers that no representatives from the media
the specimen. PSI Caceres, after conducting qualitative and other personalities required by law were present during the
examination of the specimen, issued Chemistry Report No. D- operation and during the taking of the inventory, noncompliance
253-20119 stating that the dried leaves seized from accused- with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal and
appellant were marijuana and which weighed 3,200 grams. would not render inadmissible accused-appellant’s arrest or the
Version of the Defense items seized from him because the prosecution was able to show
Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had
marijuana. He maintains that on 15 July 2011, at around 6:30 in been preserved. The CA disposed the case in this wise:
the evening, he and his girlfriend went to the house of a certain WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment dated
Freddie Nacorda in Aglayan, Bukidnon, to collect the latter's debt. 18 April 2013 of the Regiorial Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
When they were about to leave, Nacorda requested him to carry a 10th Judicial Region, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2011-671
bag to Cagayan de Oro City is hereby affirmed in toto. 12
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
I. Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid; that the person detained has weapons concealed about
II. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence; and him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
III. Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
OUR RULING underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
The Court finds for accused-appellant. appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach
I. a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after be used against the police officer. 17 (emphases supplied and
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the citations omitted)
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to III.
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.13 A valid stop-and-frisk was illustrated in the cases of Posadas v.
The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be CA (Posadas),  18 Manalili v. CA (Manalili),  19 and People v.
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, any evidence Solayao (Solayao).
obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any In Posadas, two policemen were conducting a surveillance within
purpose in any proceeding. 14 This proscription, however, admits the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges when they spotted
of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a the accused carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They
lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a approached the accused and identified themselves as police
moving vehicle; 4) Consented warrantless search; 5) Customs officers. The accused attempted to flee but his attempt to get away
search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency was thwarted by the policemen who then checked the buri bag
circumstances. 15 wherein they found guns, ammunition, and a grenade.21
II. In Manalili, police officers were patrolling the Caloocan City
A stop-and-frisk search is often confused with a warrantless cemetery when they chanced upon a man who had reddish eyes
search incidental to a lawful arrest. However, the distinctions and was walking in a swaying manner. When this person tried to
between the two have already been settled by the Court avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced
in Malacat v. CA: 16 themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked what he
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest was holding in his hands, but he turned to resist. 22
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the In Solayao, police operatives were carrying out an intelligence
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a around the barangays of Caibiran, Biliran. Later on, they met the
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a group of accused-appellant. The police officers became suspicious
lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot when they observed that the men were drunk and that accused-
be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within suit. Upon seeing the government agents, accused-appellant's
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to companions fled. Thus, the police officers found justifiable reason
destroy, and seize any money or prope1iy found which was used to stop and frisk the accused.23
in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that IV.
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. the stop and frisk committed by the police in People v. Cogaed
xxxx (Cogaed).  24 In that case, the police officers received a message
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a from an informant that one Marvin Buya would be transporting
"stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union, to the
for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. A checkpoint was set up and
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes when a passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in checkpoint, the jeepney driver disembarked and signaled to the
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and police officers that the two male passengers were carrying
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and marijuana.
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes later identified as Victor Cogaed and Santiago Dayao. SPO1
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao what their bags contained.
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know
others' safety, he is entitled [to] the protection of himself and since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barrio
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the mate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. The
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a Court, in that case, invalidated the search and seizure ruling that
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. there were no suspicious circumstances that preceded the arrest.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not Also, in Cogaed, there was a discussion of various jurisprudence
required to conduct a "stop and frisk" it nevertheless holds that wherein the Court adjudged that there was no valid stop-and-frisk:
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v.
A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's Aruta. In that case, an informant told the police that a certain
"Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by Q: And then, after you received the information through your
bus. At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. cellphone, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street and· A: So, I prepared a team to conduct an entrapment operation in
identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling order to intercept these two persons, Sir.
Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her Q: You said that the Informant informed you that the subject was
bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves. still in Cabanglasan?
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted A: Yes, Sir.
was illegal. There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Q: How did you entrap the subject when he was still in
Aruta's arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. It was only Cabanglasan?
the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. The A: I am planning to conduct a check point because according to
evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal my Confidential Informant the subject person is from Gingoog
search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted. City, Sir.
Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the Q: According to the information, how will he go here?
jeepney driver, not the police's informant, who informed the A: He will be travelling by bus, Sir.
police that Cogaed was "suspicious." Q: What bus?
The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. A: Bachelor, Sir.
Aminnudin. Here, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Q: And then, what happened next Mr. Witness?
acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing A: At about 9:30 in the evening my Confidential Informant again
drugs. The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted called and informed me that the subject person is now boarding a
Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. Like in the bus going to Cagayan de Oro City, Sir.
case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin's bag and found Q: What did he say about the bus, if he said anything, Mr.
bundles of what turned out to be marijuana leaves. The court Witness?
declared that the search and seizure was illegal. Aminnudin was A: My agent was able to identify the body number of the bus, Bus
acquitted. No. 2646.
xxxx Q: Bearing Plate No.?
People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In A: Bearing Plate No. KVP 988, Sir.
this case, the police had been receiving information that the
Q: What was he bringing at that time, according to the
accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in
information?
Angeles City." One night, the police received information that this
A: According to my agent, these two persons were bringing along
drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so
with them a back pack color black violet with markings LOWE
they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and parked" at the hotel.
ALPINE.
The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was
Q: Then, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
dealing drugs. The man alighted from his car. He was carrying a
A: We set up a check point in front of our police station and we
juice box. The police immediately apprehended him and
waited for the bus to come over, Sir.
discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the
xxxx
juice box he was holding.
Q: About 11 o'clock in the evening, what happened, Mr. Witness?
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or
A: When we sighted the bus we flagged down the bus.
suspicious about Chua's situation when the police apprehended
him and ruled that "[t]here was no. valid 'stop-and- Q: After you flagged down the bus, what happened next?
frisk'."25 (citations omitted) A: We went on board the said bus, Sir.
  xxxx
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case Q: What happened next?
is not sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a A: We went to the back of the bus and I saw a man carrying a
stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the back pack, a black violet which was described by the Confidential
records reveals that no overt physical act could be properly Informant, the back pack which was placed on his lap.
attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds xxxx
of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was Q: What happened next?
committing, or was about to commit a crime. P/Insp. Orate A: When he opened the back pack, we found marijuana leaves,
testified as follows: the back pack containing cellophane which the cellophane
[Prosecutor Vicente]: containing marijuana leaves.26 ·
Q: On that date Mr. Witness, at about 6:30 in the evening, what In his dissent from Esquillo v. People,27 Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
happened, if any? emphasizes that there should be "presence of more than one
A: At about 6:30 in the evening, I received an information from seemingly innocent activity from which, taken together, warranted
our Confidential Informant reporting that an alleged courier of a reasonable inference of criminal activity." This principle was
marijuana were sighted in their place, Sir. subsequently recognized in the recent cases
xxxx of Cogaed28and Sanchez v. People.  29 In the case at bar, accused-
[Court]: appellant was just a passenger carrying his bag. There is nothing
Q: Aside from the sighting of this alleged courier of marijuana, suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such
what else was relayed to you if there were anything else? circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to
believe that accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana.
A: Our Confidential Informant told me that two persons, a male
and a female were having in their possession a black pack V.
containing marijuana, Sir. As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth
xxxx emphasizing that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed. 30 Thus, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and
it becomes imperative to determine whether accused-appellant's destruction.33
warrantless arrest was valid. The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the
enumerates the instances wherein a peace officer or a private vehicle is the target and not a· specific person. Further, in search
person may lawfully arrest a person even without a warrant: of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person
offense; matching the description given by their informant and not the
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus passenger. To
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle
another. when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante person.
delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in VII.
flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (l) the Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to purpose in any proceeding.34 This exclusionary rule instructs that
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
within the view of the arresting officer. 31 On the other hand, the unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should
elements of an arrest effected in hot pursuit under paragraph (b) of be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In
Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or proceeding. 35
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.32 Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict
Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused-appellant. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite
accused-appellant could not be said to have executed any overt act accused-appellant's failure to object to the regularity of his arrest
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officers 'Which before arraignment. The legality of an arrest affects only the
would indicate that he was committing the crime of illegal jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver
possession of marijuana. Neither did the arresting officers have of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of
personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
just committed an offense. Again, without the tipped information, warrantless arrest. 36
accused-appellant would just have been any other bus passenger WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014
who was minding his own business and eager to reach his Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156
destination. It must be remembered that warrantless arrests are is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Renante
mere exceptions to the constitutional right of a person against Comprado y Bronola is ACQUITTED and
unreasonable searches and seizures, thus, they must be strictly ordered RELEASED from detention unless he is detained for any
construed against the government and its agents. While the other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
campaign against proliferation of illegal drugs is indeed a noble is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to
objective, the same must be conducted in a manner which does this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from
not trample upon well-established constitutional rights. Truly, the receipt.
end does not justify the means. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
VI. Associate Justice
The appellate court, in convicting accused-appellant, reasoned 3. RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD, Petitioner,
that the search and seizure is valid because it could be considered vs.
as search of a moving vehicle: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in DECISION
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under PER CURIAM:
said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace Decision2 dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution 3 dated October
officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No.
where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual 113017 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.4
inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an The Facts
extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through
if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch50 (Manila-RTC)
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud
Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an exception to the
alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so- compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
called "Davao Death Squad" may be found. 5 In support of the Rules of Court as explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-
application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to SC25 and reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,26 provided that the
the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the application is filed by the PNP, the National Bureau of
killing of six (6) persons in December 2005, and was, in fact, part Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
of the group that buried the victims.6 Force (PAOC-TF) or the Reaction Against Crime Task Force
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice (REACT-TF),27 with the endorsement of its head, before the RTC
Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the of Manila or Quezon City, and the warrant be consequently issued
issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant No. by the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of either of the
09-144077 which was later enforced by the elements ofthe PNP- said courts, as in this case.28
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination Also, the CA found that probable cause was established since,
withthe members of the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July among others, witness Avasola deposed and testified that he
15, 2009.The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded personally witnessed the murder of six (6) persons in December
positive results for the presence of human remains.8 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims –
On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido two bodies in each of the three (3) caves. 29 Further, it observed
Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress that the Manila-RTC failed to consider the fear of reprisal and
Illegally Seized Evidence9 premised on the following grounds: (a) natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case,
Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a stating that these are sufficient reasons to justify the delay
search warrant since he had been automatically divested of his attending the application of a search warrant. 30 Accordingly, it
position asVice Executive Judge when several administrative deemed that the physical evidence of a protruding human bone in
penalties were imposed against him by the Court; 10 (b) the plain view in one of the caves, and Avasola’s first-hand eye
Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 09- witness account both concur and point to the only reasonable
14407 which was to be enforced in Davao City;11 (c) the human conclusion that the crime ofMurder had been committed and that
remains sought to be seized are not a proper subject of a search the human remains of the victims were located in the Laud
warrant;12 (d) the police officers are mandated to follow the Compound.31
prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains; 13 (e) the Finally, the CA debunked the claim of forum shopping, finding
search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause; 14 (f) the that the prior application for a search warrant filed before the
rule against forum shopping was violated;15 and (g) there was a Davao-RTC was based on facts and circumstances different from
violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper those in the application filed before the Manila-RTC.32
specification of the place to be searched and the articles to be Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was,
seized.16 however, denied in a Resolution33 dated October 17, 2011,hence,
The Manila-RTC Ruling this petition.
In an Order17 dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted the The Issues Before the Court
motion of Laud "after a careful consideration [of] the grounds The issues for the Court’s resolution are as follows: (a) whether
alleged [therein]." Aside from this general statement, the said the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated
Order contained no discussion on the particular reasons from Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b) whether the Manila-RTC had
which the Manila-RTC derived its conclusion. jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite non-compliance with
Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed a the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule126 of
Motion for Reconsideration18 which was, however, denied in an the Rules of Court; (c) whether the requirements of probable
Order19 dated December 8, 2009, wherein the Manila-RTC, this cause and particular description were complied with and the one-
time, articulated its reasons for the warrant’s quashal, namely: (a) specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
the People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the Court was violated; and (d) whether the applicant for the search
issuanceof a search warrant by the Manila RTC which was to be warrant,i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum
implemented in Davao City where the offense was allegedly shopping.1âwphi1
committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of The Court's Ruling
Court;20 (b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost four The petition has no merit.
(4) years before the search warrant application was filed rendered A. Effect of Judge Peralta’s Administrative Penalties.
doubtful the existence of probable cause;21 and (c) the applicant,
i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which
subject matter of the present search warrant application is exactly provides that "[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-
the sameas the one contained in a previous application 22 before the Executive Judge of an administrative penalty of at least a
RTC of Davao City, Branch 15 (Davao-RTC) which had been reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his position
denied.23 as such,"Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as
Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for certioraribefore the Vice-Executive Judge and accordingly issue Search Warrant No.
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017. 09-14407 in view of the Court’s Resolution in Dee C. Chuan &
The CA Ruling Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta 34 wherein he was administratively
In a Decision24 dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the People’s penalized with fines of ₱15,000.00 and ₱5,000.00.35
petition and thereby annulled and set aside the Orders of the While the Court does agree that the imposition of said
Manila-RTC for having been tainted with grave abuse of administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s
discretion. authority to act as ViceExecutive Judge, it must be qualified
It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant thatthe abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself,
were satisfied, pointing out that an application therefor involving result in the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407
considering that Judge Peralta may be considered to have made Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as
the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted
remain valid. by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court." Search
Funa v. Agra36 defines who a de factoofficer is and explains that warrant applications for such cases may befiled by "the National
his acts are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National
jureofficer, in so far as the public or third persons who are Police(PNP) and the AntiCrime Task Force (ACTAF)," and
interested therein are concerned, viz.: "personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies." As in
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall particularly
having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or
office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The
one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging [his] Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and,whenever they are on
duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority official leave of absence or are not physically present in the
derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such
that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts applications and "shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may
of the de factoofficer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said
de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are courts."
interested therein are concerned.37 The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were
The treatment of a de factoofficer’s acts is premised on the reality complied with in this case.
that third persons cannot always investigate the right of one As the records would show, the search warrant application was
assuming to hold an important office and, as such, have a right to filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its
assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, 44 particularly describing the
such.38 Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under place to be searched and the things to be seized (as will be
color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous crime of
deemed valid insofar as the public – as distinguished from the Murder.45 Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his
officer in question – is concerned. 39 Indeed, it is far more cogently capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant No.
acknowledged that the de factodoctrine has been formulated, not 09-14407 which, as the rules state, may be served in places
for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a
the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office "special criminal case" excludes it from the compelling reason
without being lawful officers.40 requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following which provides:
elements must concur: (a) there must be a de jureoffice; (b) there SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed.
must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
(c) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good following:
faith.41 a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this committed.
case. Undoubtedly, there is a de jureoffice of a 2nd Vice- b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only place of the commission of the crime isknown, or any court within
divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
– that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8- However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
02-SC as above-explained; also, it may be said that there was application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
general acquiescence by the public since the search warrant action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
application was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC under his 8- 02-SC, the rule on search warrant applications before the
apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge. 42 Finally, Judge Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above-mentioned special
Peralta’s actual physical possession of the said office is presumed criminal cases "shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of
to bein good faith, as the contrary was not the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is
established.43 Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to being applied for in connection with a special criminal case as
have acted as a de factoofficer when he issued Search Warrant above-classified already presumes the existence of a compelling
No. 09-14407, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de reason; hence, any statement to this effect would be super fluous
jureofficer suffering no administrative impediment. and therefore should be dispensed with. By all indications,
B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search Warrant No. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila
09- 14407; Exception to the Compelling Reasons Requirement and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be servedin places
Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters
under the said section have been complied with, as in this case.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC states the Thus, on these grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the
requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special preliminary issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407. Perforce,
criminal cases by the RTCs of Manilaand Quezon City. These the RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.
special criminal cases pertain to those "involving heinous crimes, C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements for the
illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, Issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 and the One-
as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act SpecificOffense Rule Under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Court.
 sufficiently show that more likely than not the crime of Murder of
In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that the human remains
searches and seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine in connection with the same are in the place sought to be
Constitution (Constitution) provides that no search warrant shall searched. In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., 48 the Court explained the
issue except upon probable causeto be determined personally by quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause for a
the judgeafter examination under oath or affirmation of the search warrant, as follows:
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and
seized: prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be only torest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of
describing the place to besearched and the persons or things to be the judge conducting the examination. However, the findings of
seized. the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states counter to the clear dictates of reason.49
that a search warrant shall not be issued except upon probable In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof
cause in connection with one specific offense: to establish the existence of probable cause had been met. That a
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant "considerable length of time" attended the search warrant’s
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one application from the crime’s commission does not, by and of
specific offenseto be determined personally by the judge after itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims or the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly observed,
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and
be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case. 50 Ultimately,
the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) in determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of circumstances must be personally examined by the judge in their
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable
account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the
personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant’s
and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims: application does not dilute the probable cause finding made
Q9-Who are these six (6) male victims who were killed and herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been
buried in the caves in December 2005 at around 9:00 p.m.? sufficiently met.
A9-I heard Tatay Laud calling the names of the two victims when The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the
they were still alive as Pedro and Mario. I don’t know the names constitutional requirement that there be a particular description of
of the other four victims. "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
Q10-What happened after Pedro, Mario and the other four victims "[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
were killed? officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
A10-Tatay Laud ordered me and the six (6) killers to bring and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in
bury equally the bodies inthe three caves. We buried Pedro and the community. Any designation or description known to the
Mario altogether in the first cave, located more or less 13 meters locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and
from the makeshift house of Tatay Laud, the other two victims in on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the
the second cave and the remaining two in the third cave. constitutional requirement."51
Q11-How did you get there at Laud Compound in the evening of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the
December 2005? foregoing standard since it particularly describes the place to be
searched, namely, the three (3) caves located inside the Laud
A11-I was ordered by Tatay Laud to go [to] the place. I ran
Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City:
errands [for] him.46
You are hereby commanded to makean immediate search at any
Avasola’s statements in his deposition were confirmed during the
time [of] the day of the premises above describe[d] particularly
hearing on July 10, 2009, where Judge Peralta conducted the
the three (3) caves (as sketched) inside the said Laud Compound,
following examination:
Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a, Davao Cityand forthwith seize and take
Court: x x x Anong panandaan mo? Nandoon ka ba noong
possession of the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and
naghukay, nakatago o kasama ka?
buried in the just said premises.
Mr. Avasola: Kasama po ako sa pagbuhat ng mga tao, sir.
x x x x52 (Emphases supplied)
Court: Mga ilang katao?
For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant even
Mr. Avasola: Anim (6) po.
made explicit reference to the sketch 53 contained in the
Court: May mass grave ba na nahukay?
application. These, in the Court’s view, are sufficient enough for
Mr. Avasola: May tatlong kweba po na maliliit yung isa malaki. x
the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
x x.47
place to be searched, which they in fact did.
Verily, the facts and circumstancesestablished from the testimony
The things to be seized were also particularly described, namely,
of Avasola, who was personally examined by Judge Peralta,
the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the
aforesaid premises. Laud’s posturing that human remains are not be searched and the things to be seized. Significantly, the
"personal property" and, hence, could not be the subject of a petitioner has not denied this defect in the search warrant and has
search warrant deserves scant consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 merely said that there was probable cause, omitting to continue
of the Rules of Court states: that it was in connection withone specific offense. He could not,
SEC. 3.Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be of course, for the warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that could
issued for the search and seizure of personal property: refer, in Judge Dayrit’s own words, "to robbery, theft, qualified
(a) Subject of the offense; theft or estafa." On this score alone, the search warrantwas totally
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the null and void and was correctly declared to be so by the very
offense; or judge who had issued it.60
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, 61 the Court, however, settled
offense. (Emphases supplied) "Personal property" in the foregoing that a search warrant that covers several counts of a certain
context actually refers to the thing’s mobility, and not to its specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense rule,
capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular person. viz.:
Article416 of the Civil Code,54 which Laud himself cites,55 states That there were several counts of the offenseof copyright
that in general, all things which can be transported from place to infringement and the search warrant uncovered several contraband
place are deemed to be personal property. Considering that human items in the form of pirated video tapes is not to be confused with
remains can generally be transported from place toplace, and the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued
considering further that they qualify under the phrase "subject of does not violate the one-specific-offense rule. (Emphasis
the offense" given that they prove the crime’s corpus delicti,56 it supplied)62
follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant under Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only
the above-cited criminal procedure provision. Neither does the for one specific offense – that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6)
Court agree with Laud’s contention that the term "human counts – it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
remains" is too all-embracing so as to subvert the particular Court had been violated.
description requirement. Asthe Court sees it, the description That being said, the Court now resolves the last issue on forum
points to no other than the things that bear a direct relation to the shopping.
offense committed, i.e., of Murder. It is also perceived that the D. Forum Shopping.
description is already specific as the circumstances would
ordinarily allow given that the buried bodies would have naturally There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively avails of
decomposed over time. These observations on the description’s several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
sufficient particularity square with the Court’s pronouncement in successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,57 wherein it was held: and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
be seized when the description therein is as specific as the adversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining
circumstances will ordinarily allow(People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.63
[1932]); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this
not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in case considering the various points of divergence attending the
making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.); search warrant application before the Manila-RTC and that before
or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in each
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued(Sec. application were different. Likewise, the application filed in
2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court) x x x If the articles desired Manila was in connection with Murder, while the one in Davao
to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the did not specify any crime. Finally, and more importantly, the
applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those places to be searched were different – that inManila sought the
articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for
search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen a particular area in the Laud Gold Cup Firing Range. There being
such evidence. (Emphases supplied)58 no identity of facts and circumstances between the two
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description applications, the ruleagainst forum shopping was therefore not
requirement – both as to the place to be searched and the things to violated.
be seized – had been complied with. Thus, for all the above-discussed reasons, the Court affirms the
Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense CA Ruling which upheld the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-
rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above- 14407.
cited which, to note, was intended to prevent the issuance of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
scattershot warrants, or those which are issued for more than one April 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the
specific offense. The defective nature of scatter-shot warrants was Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 are hereby
discussed in the case of People v. CA59 as follows: There is no AFFIRMED.
question that the search warrant did not relate to a specific SO ORDERED.
offense, in violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Diokno and of Section 3 [now, Section 4] of Rule 126 providing Chief Justice
as follows: Chairperson
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.— A search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to