Halili vs.

COMELEC; and

Morales vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Morales was elected and served as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga from
2007-2010. He was elected again as mayor during the 2010 elections. On May 15, 2012, or during
Morales’ 2nd term, Congress passed RA 10164, converting the Municipality of Mabalacat into a
component city. In the 2013 elections, Morales ran again and was elected mayor of the new Mabalacat
City. On December 8, 2015, Morales filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2016 elections for the
position of mayor of Mabalacat City.

On January 4, 2016, respondent Lucas, also a candidate for the position of mayor, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Morales for the Mayoral position
of Mabalacat City before the COMELEC. Lucas alleged that Morales was disqualified to run for mayor,
since he was elected and had served three consecutive terms prior to the 2016 elections. Lucas also
alleged that the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City did not interrupt
Morales’ service for the full term for which he was elected.

On May 10, 2016, Morales was proclaimed mayor-elect and petitioner Halili as elected vice mayor.

On May 20, 2016, respondent Garbo, another candidate for the position of mayor filed a Motion for
Leave to Intervene, alleging that he was interested in the outcome of the case since he obtained the 2 nd
highest number of votes and he should be proclaimed as mayor should Morales’ COC be cancelled.

On June 20, 2016, Halili also filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, alleging that, as incumbent vice
mayor, he should be proclaimed as mayor should Morales’ COC be cancelled pursuant to the rule on
succession under Sec. 44 of RA 7160.

COMELEC 1st Division granted the petition, cancelled Morales’ COC and ordered the proclamation of the
qualified mayoralty candidate with the next higher number of votes. COMELEC likewise held that
Morales committed a material misrepresentation in his COC in stating that he is eligible to run as mayor,
when in fact he is not, because he violated the three-term limit rule after having served for the same
local government post for three consecutive terms prior to the 2016 elections.

COMELEC en banc denied Morales’ Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the resolution of the
COMELEC 1st Division.

Hence, these consolidated petitions of Morales and Halili.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in finding that Morales
committed a false material representation in his COC; and in proclaiming Garbo as the duly
elected mayor of Mabalacat City for being the qualified candidate with the highest number
of votes

RULING:

The Court finds no merit in both petitions.

Sec. 8 The term of office of elective local officials xxx shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.

It is restated in Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code.

xxxx

The intention behind the three-term limit rule is not only to abrogate the “monopolization of political
power” and prevent elected officials from breeding “proprietary interest in their position” but also to
“enhance people’s freedom of choice”.

There are two conditions which must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate
based on violation of the three-term limit rule: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.

In the present case, Morales admits that he has been elected and has served as mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga for three consecutive terms: (1) 2007-2010; (2) 2010-2013; and (3) 2013-2016. However,
Morales insists that his second term as mayor was interrupted by the conversion of the municipality into
a component city. Morales claims that Mabalacat City is an entirely different political unit from the
Municipality of Mabalacat, having an increased territory, income and population.

The Court is not convinced.

The Court has already ruled upon the same issue in the case of Latasa v. COMELEC where the Court held
that the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent
official’s continuity of service. The Court held that to be considered as interruption of service, the “law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit.

Morales never ceased from acting and discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of
Mabalacat, despite the conversion of the Municipality into Mabalacat City.

Still, Morales insists that his declarations in his COC are material representations of his honest to
goodness belief that he was eligible to run.

In Aratea v. COMELEC, the Court found that Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew
fully well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than
three consecutive terms, yet, he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next
succeeding term.

In the present case, Morales’ alleged lack of knowledge or notice of ineligibility is negated by the
previous cases involving the three-term limit rule and his eligibility to run, specifically Rivera III v.
COMELEC and Dizon v. COMELEC. In Rivera, Morales was already elected mayor of the Municipality of
Mabalacat for three consecutive terms. He ran again as Mayor in the 2004 elections and was later on
proclaimed elective mayor. However, a quo warranto petition was filed against him alleging that he was
ineligible to run for a “fourth term”. Morales answered that his supposed 1998-2001 term could not be
considered against him because although he was proclaimed and thereafter discharged the duties as
mayor, his proclamation was later on nullified by the RTC of Angeles City. The Court ruled that although
he was belatedly ousted, which was after the expiry of his term, could not constitute an interruption in
Morales’ service of full term, and Morales could not be considered a mere “care taker of the office”.
Hence, Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution was violated. In Dizon, Morales was a respondent in a
disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections. This
time the Court ruled in his favor and held that for the purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term
limit rule was no longer a disqualifying factor against Morales because the ruling in Rivera already
served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to
interruption of continuity of service.

Accordingly, we find that Morales misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that he had
been elected, and had served, as mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for three consecutive terms; yet, he
still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term.

Morales’ representation in his COC that he was eligible to run as mayor constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office, which is a ground for a petition to deny
due course or to cancel a COC. Accordingly, we find that Morales’ COC is void ab initio, and he was never
a candidate at all, and all votes for him were considered stray votes.

A person whose COC had been denied due course and/or cancelled under section 78 is deemed to have
not been a candidate at all, because his COC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a
valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes.

In Jalosjos Jr. v. COMELEC, the Court explained that:

If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void
certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such
non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never
be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the
day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that
candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more
after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate
of candidacy is void from the very beginning.

The rule on succession under Sec. 44 of RA 7160, as espoused by Halili, would not apply if the
permanent vacancy was caused by one whose COC was void ab initio. In case of vacancies caused by
those with void ab initio COCs, the person legally entitled to the vacant position would be the candidate
who garnered the next highest number of votes among those eligible. In this case, it is Garbo who is
legally entitled to the position of mayor, having garnered the highest number of votes among the
eligible candidates. Thus, the COMELEC correctly proclaimed Garbo as mayor of Mabalacat City.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.