Feminist Discourse Moral Values and The Law - A Conversation MACKINNON PDF
Feminist Discourse Moral Values and The Law - A Conversation MACKINNON PDF
1-1-1985
Mary C. Dunlap
Equal Rights Advocates
Carol J. Gilligan
Harvard University
Catharine A. MacKinnon
University of Minnesota
Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow
University of California at Los Angeles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
Recommended Citation
Ellen C. Dubois, Mary C. Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow,
Isabel Marcus & Paul J. Spiegelman, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation, 34
Buff. L. Rev. 11 (1985).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol34/iss1/4
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Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation
Authors
Ellen C. Dubois, Mary C. Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow,
Isabel Marcus, and Paul J. Spiegelman
* This Article is an edited transcript of the discussion held on October 19, 1984 at the
law school of the State University of New York in Buffalo as part of the James McCormick
Mitchell Lecture Series.
1. Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Visiting Pro-
fessor, 1984-1985, City University of New York Law School.
2. Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
3. Associate Professor of History, State University of New York at Buffalo. Visiting
Professor, 1984-1985, Department of History, University of Wisconsin.
4. Member, California Bar. Founder, Equal Rights Advocates.
5. Associate Professor of Education, Harvard University.
6. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
7. Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
say: "Please come back, please come back during the academic
year to talk in the law school. Your work demonstrates that you
have something terribly important to say about legal education."
As I began to think about a discussion concerning the law, and
feminism, and politics, and moral values, and consulted with Paul,
our horizons expanded. Paul and I began to think that rather
than simply have one lecturer in a formal mode, and in a very
traditional format, that it would be appropriate to have a series of
conversations. Feminist discourse has moved away from the sim-
ple, formal presentation of papers. There are very complicated
and sophisticated and explosive issues that need to be discussed.
There are people who feel very strongly, and are very brave and
courageous, on all sides of the issues that feminism has raised.
Rather than have a single presentation, it would be more appro-
priate at this time to have a conversation which would raise some
of the complicated issues of equality and difference and would ex-
plore the connection between theory and practice.
One of the reasons I have great hopes for this morning's con-
versation is that we have two people who have been engaged both
as theoreticians and in the world of practice. We have Mary Dun-
lap, coming in from California, who has taught in law schools, and
who, as a practitioner, is a founder of one of the first feminist
public interest law firms in the United States: Equal Rights Advo-
cates. And we have Catharine MacKinnon, whose official affilia-
tion is with the University of Minnesota Law School. Not only has
she written significant pieces of feminist jurisprudential theory,
she also has been involved in the drafting of legislation and
litigation.
Dunlap: I am delighted to go first. I am delighted to be here
at all. I am thrilled by the energy that Paul, Isabel, and others
have put into coming together today, and by the devotion of this
lecture series to feminist issues. It's exciting. It's exciting to be
able to address these issues, and to differ openly about
them-which we will be doing today-to air our disagreements,
to learn from them, to move on from them, and to work together
from them.
The title of this morning's conversation, "Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values, and the Law," raises a sundry set of definitional
problems which I am going to completely skip over. You have to
watch out for that-that's the prerogative of the self-proclaimed
1985] MITCHELL LECTURE
12. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda For Theory (pts. 1
& 2), 7 SIGNS 515 (1982), 8 SIGNS 635, 647 (1983).
13. J. Nesley, My Mother Liked to Fuck, in PowERs or DESIRE, supra note 11, at 468-70.
1985] MITCHELL LECTURE
refer to, that were getting raped, were mostly gay men. It seems
to me that the issue there is power again-force violence-and
that the basis of the inequality in that case may not be gender, but
sexual orientation. And, furthermore I suppose that there is a
small percentage of straight men that are raped, but then I think
we have to ask ourselves who is raping them. If you were to cite
statistics that say that the majority of straight men that are raped
are raped by women, then I would think we have a problem; but
if we can identify that it is straight men that are doing the raping,
then I think that the crux of the problem is still the same.
Another comment from audience: More often than not I find my-
self in a position, at least emotionally, of thinking: "What could be
so wrong with female supremacy?" If we are all interested in
equality, it seems to me to be really equal, given that men have
had power for so many hundreds of thousands of years, that it
should be our turn now-let us have our shot at the helm, and
then we can talk about equality. For a second "academic" ques-
tion, which is a little more attuned to the passion that I feel about
this issue, I would like to ask Catharine MacKinnon: What do you
espouse or what would you advocate in terms of a feminist stan-
dard for addressing these inequalities in the law? Are you advocat-
ing one standard, granting that we have different values, that we
have different measures that would obviously characterize the
problems at this point? And if you are, are we not going to run
into the same sort of problems?
MacKinnon: Some women talk about female supremacy. It is
not my position. One of the things you learn by being on the bot-
tom is something that you do not forget: what it feels like to be
kicked. So long as your alternatives are only kicking or getting
kicked, if you remember what getting kicked was like, kicking may
make you sick or it may make you turned on, or you may choose
it over the alternative.
I will answer your question, the last one, and I will also talk a
little bit about the pornography ordinance which Andrea Dworkin
and I wrote and which Mary has taken the occasion to attack. I do
urge-as a litigation strategy, as a way of doing briefs, and as a
deep implicit as well as explicit argument-that the equality prin-
ciple can mean that no group should be subordinated to another
group on the basis of sex. We-could use the term "subordination"
that way, leaving the gender neutrality glossed the way I just did.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
The second part of the definition spells out that men, chil-
dren, or transsexuals who are used in the place of women also
have a cause of action, so that what is made through their use is
pornography. This design is actually a new legal approach to the
question of inequality in general, and of sexual inequality in par-
ticular. It is both sex-specific and gender-neutral. It is sex-specific
because it defines pornography as pornography is. It defines por-
nography in terms of what it does to women, but it acknowledges
that what pornography does is make inequality sexy-it reflects
an understanding that whoever is on the bottom is the girl, regard-
less of whether that person be a woman, a man, a transsexual, or a
child. If you look at what happens in gay male rape and talk to
those male victims, they know that they have been treated like
women. It is part of the insult. If you look at what happens with
rape in prison, you know that the one who gets repeatedly raped
is the girl. You understand that what it is to be female is to be
targeted and stigmatized on the basis of your sexuality; you can
tell it is a stigma and not just your identity by the fact that when it
is transferred to somebody who does not share your biology eve-
rybody knows it is an insult. So, the law we drafted defines the
harm sex specifically and then says: "If you treat other people that
way, that is also an injury."
I think that anything that functions socially, on an on-going
basis, to make inequality sexy can not be dismissed as mere sym-
bolism. To say that this is merely a symbolic attack is to ignore the
abuse of women that is directly tied to it. There is nothing sym-
bolic about this abuse or our law's confrontation of it. People are
coerced into pornography and assaulted because of it. Pornogra-
phy is directly forced on people. If the people are children, they
develop the same symptoms in later life as if they had had the sex
forced on them. To reduce pornography to symbol ignores the
documented facts that connect pornography with rape, battery,
forced prostitution, child sexual abuse, and sexual harassment.
This is not to say that all those things would automatically go
away if pornography were eliminated. It is clear we are in a sys-
tem that needs all of those things and that they are all mutually
supportive. But few argue that we should do nothing about rape
because it is just symbolic of women's status, and besides it is too
hard to distinguish from intercourse, just as pornography is too
hard to distinguish from erotica. That is, by the way, the same
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
ford to buy a drug that will save the life of his wife. The question
is: Should he steal the drug? Amy said, "I hated these dilemmas
last time as much as I do now," and she elaborated the same rea-
soning that she had given at eleven: "It all depends. What if the
husband got caught? It would not help his wife. And anyway, from
everything I know about cancer, it cannot be cured by a single
treatment. And, where would this drug be, sitting out on the shelf
of a drugstore? The whole situation is unreal. ' 17 She then said:
"Like I had said last time [actually she had not], life comes before
property. He should steal the drug."
That, by the way, is the "right" answer. She jumps a full
stage in moral development, as measured by Kohlberg's
scale-from eleven to fifteen years. But look what she has done
now: She is learning that if she enters into a construction of real-
ity which she has identified as unreal and problematic, she will
advance in "moral development." In other words, if you equate
moral development with justice reasoning, then, in a sense you
render her more deeply uncertain, more susceptible to the tension
between what she thinks and what she really thinks, less convinced
that her voice will be heard.
I wanted to tell you about the re-interview of Jake at fifteen
because that is very interesting, too. It tells us how psychological
systems of assessment distort male as well as female thinking. Jake
is the one who said at age eleven, that moral dilemmas are like
"math problems with humans." Anyone who can do math can
solve these problems and agree on what the right answer is: that
is, that life comes before property. At fifteen, he says (beginning
the same way he did at eleven): "Money comes and goes but
human life only comes once, so therefore the wife's claim to her
life takes precedence over the druggist's claim to his property."
But then Jake is asked to comment about the fact that the drug-
gist feels strongly about his profit. Jake responds: "He's got the
wrong set of priorities." That's the approach that says there is one
logical way to answer and that if you disagree it is because you do
not understand or because you have the wrong set of priorities.
We say in psychology that it is because you are at a lower stage.
But then Jake says something else which is extremely interesting.
17. The comments of Jake and Amy are not direct quotations, but are a summary of
the argument presented using the language of the transcribed interview.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
the political context in which the case is found, or-to use the
legal realist phrase-about what the judge had for breakfast that
morning), usually behave the same way Amy did. They feel that
the problems are disembodied and disemboweled from the way in
which they occur in the world.
When I thought about Amy's response, I thought that we in
the legal system may be focusing our problems too narrowly.
Through her use of a different voice, Amy tells us that we may
need to know a great deal more about facts and about situations
before we can make decisions about them. What would those
other facts be? What else would we want to know about the Heinz
dilemma before we would be satisfied, as law students and lawyers,
that we could solve the problem? Take that a step further. Amy
not only fights the hypo, she approaches it in a different way. As
Carol has pointed out in her book and this afternoon, Jake saw
the problem as an algebraic equation with people; there is the
druggist, and there is Heinz with Heinz's wife. How do we balance
those equities? How do we decide between those two people? Jake
"gets it right." He says: "Life is more important than property, so
life wins." Amy says: "I see two people with a problem here: the
druggist, whose goal in life is to make a profit; and Heinz, who
would like to save his wife's life. Is there not some way of holding
the needs of both of those parties constant, and trying to work out
another solution?" Like the "pirate-next-door game," Amy begins
to think about other sorts of solutions to the problem. She does
not say (at least in that earlier part of the study): "I think Heinz
should or should not necessarily steal the drug." Have Heinz and
the druggist talked about some other ways to solve this problem?
How about an installment contract? How about payments over
time? Has Heinz explored other ways to raise the money? Has the
druggist thought about ways of providing a drug and perhaps get-
ting payment in some other way?
Amy doesn't see the problem as presenting, by necessity, a
bipolar choice. Amy's approach to the problem is in direct contra-
diction, I think, to the way we typically solve problems in the legal
system: in a bipolar, win-lose way. The drug is either stolen or it is
not, and it is either right or wrong to steal. Thus, if Heinz steals
the drug, and is later prosecuted for it, he will be exonerated if he
can come up with a series of legally recognized justifications for
stealing it. Amy tells us that if we learn more facts and we take the
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
needs of the parties and hold them constant, perhaps we can come
up with some other solutions-solutions, as Carol pointed out,
which might not have been thought about if we looked at the
problem from the perspective of only one party in the problem,
either Heinz or the druggist. Amy is trying to remember every-
body as she tries to solve the problem.
Amy then does another thing with the problem. She asks, as
Carol reports in her book,"' whether Heinz and the druggist ever
sit down and talk about this. She wants to know why she has to
solve the problem. She uses "I" as a third person looking at this
problem from the outside. Maybe, she muses, if they sat down and
talked to each other, they would come up with yet a whole bunch
of other solutions that I, sitting here as a third person, could not
think about. Perhaps the act of dialogue itself might produce
some other solutions. Amy thus suggests not only different kinds
of substantive solutions, she also thinks of a whole different sort of
process: dialogue between the parties. Now, I think that has obvi-
ous implications for our adversary culture and our adversary sys-
tem. Our Anglo-American culture and adversary system require,
for the most part, that two parties talk to a judge. Amy and Jake
are asked to play judge for Heinz and the druggist; they are asked
to decide whether Heinz is right to steal the drug or not. Perhaps
there are other forms that might encourage the parties to come
up with other solutions.
I want to come back to yet another dimension of how Amy
and Jake reform the way in which we might look at legal decision
making and problem solving. This is something that is evident
during both of Amy's interviews. She says: "Well, suppose Heinz
steals the drug and then he goes to jail. That is not going to do his
wife any good because in addition to the drug she also needs the
relationship with her husband to get her through this difficult
time of what may turn out to be terminal cancer." Amy is thus
concerned with preserving the relationship of the parties and
looking at the situation in which they are imbedded. She looks
both at the past and at the future, considering the effect on the
parties of a certain decision.
Maybe I have taken too much out of the Amy and Jake prob-
lem. It is, nevertheless, an interesting meditation on the legal sys-
perhaps lawyer-to-other-client.
These are some of the kinds of questions that you can think
about as you speculate-those of you who are going to be Amys
and Hilarys in our legislature someday-as to how you might
build a legal system with that voice. It is very clear to me that
certain ethics or rules of behavior or notions of what is morally
and ethically correct behavior are derived from a male image of
what is appropriate within the legal system.
It is no accident, it seems to me, that that little drawing I put
up there to illustrate the structure of legal negotiation looks like a
football field. It is no accident, I think, that our court imagery is
frequently described in battle terms. "Well, on this motion we
won the battle, but who knows how the war will go?" We have a
conception, as we frequently do in war, that one party must win
and the other party must lose. The court is very limited in the
remedies that it can award, and people begin to think in those
kinds of limited, winless ways.
What would the practice of law look like if Amy and Hilary
had a greater voice?21 On this question, I think it is important to
take note of at least one of the issues that Mary alluded to this
morning: the numbers of women in a profession. As a lot of socio-
logical research tells us, to the extent that women are tokens in a
profession, and to the extent to which Amy and Hilary live in a
world in which they are surrounded by people speaking in differ-
ent voices and looking through different lenses, they may not feel
free to express alternative ways of practicing law or looking at the
legal system. It is, therefore, important to look at the numbers of
both men and women who have this different voice and have be-
gun to develop some support for expressing it and different ways
of being able to practice law.
When I was speaking to a group of practicing lawyers about
some of these subjects a few months ago in Los Angeles, a very
experienced district attorney began to talk to the audience about
how she viewed the trial process as one of creating a relationship
with the other participants in the courtroom. She had been
trained, as most of us are, in the ethic of persuasion and argument
and intimidation of the decisionmaker (especially if the deci-
22. Stanton, Rev. Sydney Smith v. Rev. Antoinette L. Brown, 3 THE UNA 69, 69 (1855).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
23. Wollstonecraft was born in London in 1759. A pioneer of the women's rights
movement, she published her first book, Thoughts on the Education of Daughters, in 1787. In
1792 her most noted work, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, was published. In it, she
proposed opening.the professions up to women. The underlying theme of all her work was
that the male-female relationship should be a "rational fellowship" rather than a relation-
ship of "slavish obedience." Wollstonecraft died in 1797, immediately after giving birth.
1985] MITCHELL LECTURE
24. Anthony Comstock (1844-1915) was a New York postal inspector and a leading
member of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice. In these capacities he was
able to initiate the successful prosecutions of 3,670 violators of the obscenity laws and de-
stroy 160 tons of "obscene" literature and pictures. He was also the author of several
books on vice, including Frauds Exposed (1880), Gambling Outrages (1887), Morals and Art
(1888), and Traps for the Young (1890).
25. Margaret Sanger was born in Corning, New York in 1883. For her efforts to re-
move legal barriers to dissemination of information about contraception, she is credited
with founding the birth control movement in the United States. Though she never went to
jail under an obscenity statute, she was indicted in 1914 for mailing pamphlets which advo-
cated birth control (her case was dismissed in 1916), and in 1917 she served 30 days in a
workhouse for operating a birth control clinic in Brooklyn.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
which it had been won was historically exploded: the idea that
women by virtue of being women automatically had the same
politics.
I came here to talk about a similar movement from a focus on
obliteration of gender to an elaboration of gender in modern fem-
inist thought. Instead I want to say something else. I was struck by
something in both MacKinnon's and Gilligan's presentations. The
essence of what each had to say was reminiscent of the first revela-
tions of feminism a decade and a half ago. Catharine presented
this in her exposition of the rage that discovering women's abused
and degraded status initially produces. For me, that was the way
radical feminism appeared to me when I first found it in 1969.
Carol presented this in her scholarly indignation that women had
been in fact totally ignored by scholars and that the ignoring of
women distorted all subsequent intellectual discoveries. Both are
first premises of modern feminism. However, we are not now at
the beginning of feminism; we are right in the thick of it. In fact,
as this panel suggests, there are by this time many feminisms.
Women are no longer ignored in the political scene. Au contraire,
the issues that the women's movement has raised are at the very
center of this historical moment. I am talking about abortion, and
I am talking about the question of a female vice president. I could
never have imagined that these issues would have reached the
level of historical significance that they have with the rapidity that
they did.
This raises the question about where, in fact, historical
change in the condition of women is going to come from. In some
ways Carol Gilligan is too optimistic about change and Catharine
MacKinnon is too pessimistic about it.
MacKinnon: That's why I'm doing this work on pornography,
right?
DuBois: I think that I am more convinced that Catharine
MacKinnon is too pessimistic than I am that Carol Gilligan is too
optimistic. What Carol Gilligan is saying is that the introduction
of women and the recognition of them is going to change the
moral discourse. We have to face the existence of Sandra Day
O'Connor-I mean, there are women, and there are women. Do
not get me wrong: she is going to change the political discourse. I
just do not want it to change in the direction that she is going to
change it. I guess this leads to my second point: I see a tautology
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
gets her past that reality. I do not submit, by that example, that
her disability in its immutability is like gender, which I believe is
mutable in many ways, our self-definitions being part of it. What I
am trying to say is that the idea that any of us here, or any of you
there, should decide for all of us who is a good feminist, who is a
good radical, what sex is good, and who gets to talk is taking ad-
vantage of the rest of us. I am not going to take such advantage of
people.26
Questionfrom audience (to Gilligan): If instead of breaking your
subjects down into male and female, you had broken them into
rich and poor, white and black, children of employed and unem-
ployed parents, would you have found different things?
Gilligan: That is a terrific question. That is exactly my ques-
tion and that is what I am doing now. I started my work on ado-
lescents in a girls' school, of advantaged girls, and now I am work-
ing in the inner city so that I can answer your question. But let me
give you some preliminary information; let me tell you why I did
what I did and some preliminary answers that suggest it is not that
simple, that you cannot assimilate the discussion of gender into
the discussion of social inequality. There are elements and dimen-
sions to questions of gender that do not fit that model. Basically, I
am in disagreement with Kitty MacKinnon. Trying to make gen-
der fit the inequality model is the most traditional way to deal
with gender, and it will not work. Gender is not exactly like social
class. It is not simply a matter of dominance and subordination.
There is no way to envision gender disappearing as one envisions,
in utopian visions of society, class disappearing or race becoming a
difference that makes no difference. The fact that gender is a dif-
ference that one cannot envision disappearing is why it makes so
many people so angry. It does not fit their schemes of analysis. It
is always a thorn in their side.
Let me present one of my most interesting, intriguing, "find-
ings in process." I have black women in my studies. I did not ex-
plain that explicitly in my book; I realize that was a serious omis-
sion: since I said nothing, everybody assumed my subjects were all
white, which is a reasonable assumption. If you are not told the
gender of subjects of psychological research and you assume they
are male, you're probably right. If I had said to people that there
were black women in my studies, people would assume, because of
the way blacks have been portrayed in the social science literature,
that the black women exemplify the lower stages of the various
kinds of care that I wrote about in the middle chapters of my
book. (There I focused on how women are what Kitty calls "the
feminine"; I studied different ways that women conceptualize fem-
ininity-from oppressive ways to nonoppressive ways.) In fact, the
opposite is true. Without having any particular criterion, I just
picked women. I found that I was using the voices of black women
to represent the integration of justice and care. I can explain that
in my own terms by noting that black women are exactly in a posi-
tion to know most acutely about both inequality and attach-
ment-both experiences have been heightened for them in this
racist society. I was thus very intrigued that the voices I picked to
best illustrate the struggle to integrate justice and caring belong
to black women.
I then did a study of medical students. I found a group of
women within that study who seemed to be atypical of the rest of
the women in the strength of their justice focus. They were black
women. And these women were different from black women in
my other studies, so I didn't even have a uniform finding about
"black women vs. white women." I began to wonder: What was it
about the medical school context that was heightening this issue? I
then noticed that this group of black women, the medical stu-
dents, had been interviewed by a white male. I realized it would
certainly heighten all the elements of inequality, to have a white
man interviewing black female medical students-there is a whole
dominance issue right there. The strongest justice-focus women in
my study were the black female medical students. One might
think that the doubly oppressed groups should speak doubly
strongly about care. It is not so simple. Perhaps the victims of vio-
lence are the proponents of care. Still, the victims of violence,
most often male, are the perpetrators of violence.
It's a complicated set of problems. My own sense is that we
shouldn't reach for all the familiar categories of analysis which
have never been able to deal very well with these problems. I see
an opening now. The source of my optimism is that opening. I
don't think oppression will miraculously end and that things will
change, but I see at this moment an opening. I think this opening
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
made an historical analogy with which I agree. The way that the
issue of protective labor legislation versus the ERA was unresolv-
able in 1920 and splintered the women's movement, has certain
analogies to the question of pornography in feminism today. Most
feminists I know are in the position you, Carrie, are; they kind of
sit on one seat and then they have to go over and sit on the other
one because they cannot take one side or the other.
I cannot say why pornography has become the brick wall up
against which feminism has come. One thing I would point out is
that it is a sexual issue. Much of the feelings people have about it
have to do with the fact that it is sexual. I actually think that there
is a kind of pornophobia; in some ways we are more afraid of por-
nography than we need to be. I want to read an article by Lisa
Duggan. She answers this question in this way:
Pornography is made to stand for all misogyny, all discrimination, all ex-
ploitation of women, in the view of the feminist anti-pornography campaign.
It not only causes but constitutes the subordination of women. The com-
modification and objectification of women's bodies is believed to reside more
centrally in pornography than in mainstream media. This society's cultural
violence against women is said to radiate from, rather than be reflected in,
pornography. The campaign against pornography is thus a symbolic substi-
tute for more diffuse but more necessary campaign against the myriad forms
of male domination in economic life and political life and sexual life. Por-
nography serves as a condensed metaphor for female degradation.28
28. Duggan, Censorship in the Name of Feminism, Village Voice, Oct. 16, 1984, at 11
(one in a series of three articles in a symposium on feminism and the first amendment
entitled ForbiddenFantasies:A Special Issue on Pornography).
19851 MITCHELL LECTURE
29. 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affid mem. 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
30. The Briggs Initiative was a referendum to prohibit school teachers from publicly
giving their views on homosexuality. Specifically, the initiative provided for the filing of
charges against teachers, teachers' aides, school administrators, or counselors either for
advocating, promoting, encouraging, or soliciting private or public homosexual activities in
a manner likely to come to the attention of other employees or students, or for publicly
and indiscreetly engaging in such actions. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1978, at 107 (supple-
mentary material). The referendum was defeated. Herben, Tax Limits Passed in Several
States, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1978, at Al, col. 1, A19, col.3.
31. See generally Duggan, supra note 28; Hentoff, Is the First Amendment Dangerous to
Women?, Village Voice, Oct. 16, 1984, at 14; Goldstein, Pornography and Its Discontents,
Village Voice, Oct. 16, 1984, at 19.
1985] MITCHELL LECTURE
tween saying, "The only kind of sex that is good is the kind that I
say is good, and my name is Kitty MacKinnon," and "The only
sex that is good is the kind that I say is good, and my name is
Jerry Falwell." I am sorry, but there is a terribly frightening par-
allel there. With all that I have in common with her that I will
never have in common with him, that parallel frightens me.
DuBois: Let me say one other thing about why pornography
becomes so central. At this point in history feminism and the op-
pression of women have an ambivalent relationship to the ques-
tion of sexuality: that we have had too much of it not under our
own control and not enough of it under our own control. Pornog-
raphy captures that. We have both been the victims-having sexu-
ality impressed on us against our will-and we have been deprived
of our own sexual expression. The debate over pornography gets
caught in that.
Questionfrom audience: I would like to go back to the central
proposals that were made by the speakers throughout the course
of the day. We seem to be heading in a somewhat anti-feminist
direction. My reasons, briefly, for feeling this way: First of all,
Carol Gilligan did not spend a lot of time elaborating on her as-
sertion that an androgynous ideal is not out of the question as a
long range goal of feminist strategies and reforms. Mary Dunlap
seems to have suggested that she would back the ideal of equality,
which even the softest feminist might agree is flawed by what
male domination has done to the contents of that notion. We are
told by Ellen DuBois that the whole notion of moralism can be
somewhat of a co-opting trap for feminism. I guess that I am
troubled by attempts, on a theoretical level, to characterize a
largely more powerful and exciting movement, attempts that have
led to the articulation of feminist theory. The tragedy is that such
attempts really could be total dead-ends for feminism. I do not see
androgyny as being an ideal that I am particularly interested in,
but until "feminist values" (whatever those are) have been looked
at a lot more carefully, I cannot back the ideal of equality. Nor
can I do so until I see, in more detail, just what that ideal can
produce for men rather than for women.
My real problem is that while everybody is happy to dump on
Catharine MacKinnon's campaign against pornography, at the
same time they ignore her very clearly stated position that the
state is now a tool of patriarchal oppression. They seem to be
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
equality that does not co-exist with, as Kitty said, fifty-nine cents
to the dollar? What does the word "equality" mean?
Comment from audience: Getting back to the point on androg-
yny: I interpreted the resolution which the children arrived at as
more a recognition that even at the age of four years, the young
woman in the scenario knew quite well that she would not be able
to influence the pirate's game and had decided instead to settle
for as much of her own space as possible. This was to simply say:
"Well, let's be neighbors."
Gilligan: That is very interesting and very illuminating be-
cause you assume there are two choices: either she dominates or
she is subordinate. I say that her solution is transformative be-
cause it creates a game that is neither the neighbor game nor the
pirate game but a new game-the pirate-neighbor game-which
is different from the one that either imagined. How it works out
in practice is one thing. But one sees this, as a matter of fact, in
studies of small children. They do not resort to aggression as their
first means of resolving conflict. Contrary to the image psycholo-
gists have created, they in fact play out solutions that are creative
and cooperative, like the solution of a pirate-neighbor game. She
says, basically: "Instead of my losing and your winning, let's in-
vent a new game." I identify that as the creative solution.
Comment from audience: I guess I would be interested in the
cultural content in the game of the four-year-old girl.
Gilligan: That's a very good question. If you observe the pi-
rate-neighbor game, is it a concealed form of domination and sub-
ordination or is it in fact a kind of creative adventure for both
kids?
DuBois: To return to I cannot see any purpose in calling any
position in the debate between different feminist positions "anti-
feminist." We often face clear and unambiguous anti-feminist op-
position. These anti-feminists are easy to pick out. We are also at
a point at which feminists have no political unity. We are at a cru-
cial point. But I cannot understand why in the world we should
call dissenting feminisms "anti-feminist." Do you mean to obscure
the difference between feminists who disagree on that position
and Phyllis Schlafly or Ronald Reagan?
Response from audience: No, but I do want to draw out connec-
tions between some of the more disparaging aspects of the analy-
sis. I think that there are connections which could become dis-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
32. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983).
1985] MITCHELL LECTURE
cle, 33 she identifies the state with male domination, and yet the
prescription is that feminists, who are concerned about images of
sexual violence, try to use the state in order to eliminate or
supress those images."
One theme which emerges in these conversations is anger.
What else are we besides our anger? Another theme which
emerges is frustration. We have no way of knowing in advance
whether the use of the state for a particular program over time
will not lead to a reform being turned on its head. Perhaps the
best example of that may be what has happened in the abortion
debate. To hear the major presidential and vice-presidential can-
didates in 1984 talking about issues which we all thought were
resolved in 1972 leaves one with the most extraordinary sense of
anger and frustration. What we have heard in this conversation,
the pitch of which rose at times, is a reflection of how complex we
perceive the issues to be and how emotionally engaged we are.
I hope this will inspire you to continue the conversation.