DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G.

LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga

FACTS:

Petitioner Dominador B. Bustos was an accused in a criminal case filed before the the justice of
the peace court of Masantol. He filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, after he
had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the court
of origin or the court of Masantol. This was due to the fact that after entering a plea of not guilty, his
counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law. However, the fiscal and
private prosecutor objected, invoking Section 11 or Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which was
sustained by the court. In view thereof, petitioner's counsel announced his intention to renounce his
right to present evidence, and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Justice of the Court of Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record.

HELD:

No.

Evidence-which is “the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on
which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings"-is identified with and forms
part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enf orced and redress obtained, and, in criminal
law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidencea nd practice.

The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. It cannot be teared
down on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these
Rules. while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant’s right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth.
MANUEL ALDEGUER, ET AL. vs.HENRY HOSKY
G.R. No. L-1164 (2 Phil. 500) September 17, 1903 J. Willard

FACTS:

Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in question in 1855 from Don Pablo Garcia. Doña Petrona
lived on the land until her death, in 1876, when Don Manuel Aldeguer, their grandfather, was appointed
guardian of Doña Petrona's four children, the present plaintiffs. In 1884 Don Manuel sold the land to
one Martinez, who sold it to the defendant, Henry Hoskyn, in 1887. In the deed to Martinez, Don
Manuel stated that he acquired the property by purchase from Don Pablo Garcia twenty-four years
before.

The court finds that this declaration was the only evidence in the case that Don Manuel had any
title to the land. The appellant has moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
This evidence is to the effect that one Bonifacio Garcia was never the owner of the land in question and
never sold it to the mother of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:

Whether the motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must be granted.

HELD:

No.

Under the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, after proof of the loss or
destruction of a written instrument, its contents may be shown by parol evidence, even if such
testimony would have been incompetent when the right of action accrued, there being, as a general
rule, no vested light of property in the rules of evidence.

To warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence
offered must be of such a character that its introduction would probably change the result. The
appellant says that the plaintiffs in their complaint alleged that the mother bought the property of Don
Bonifacio. What took place during the trial is not know, but it is certain that evidence was introduced
showing that the purchase was made from Don Pablo, because the court has so found. It must be
presumed that this was done without objection on the part of the defendant, for no exceptions relating
to the matter appear in the record. If such objections had been made, the court had power to allow the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint by striking out the name of Bonifacio and inserting that of Pablo.
PEDRO C. HERNAEZ and ASUNCION DE LA RAMA VDA. DE ALUNAN, in her own behalf and
as administratix of the estate of her deceased husband, RAFEL R. ALUNAN, versus HON. J.
HOWARD McGRATH, Attorney General of the United States, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and DR. NICANOR JACINTO
G.R. No. L-4044 (91 Phil 565) July 9, 1952 J. Tuason

FACTS:

Pedro C. Hernaez and Asuncion de la Rama Vda. de Alunan, in her own behalf and as an
administratix of the estate of her deceased husband, Rafael R. Alunan, filed an action for ejectment and
damages against the Philippine Alien Property Administration before the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
AIR FRANCE vs.. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL
GRNo. L-21438 (18 SCRA 155) September 28, 1966 J. Sanchez

FACTS:
Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of forty-eight (48) Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. On March 28, 1958, Air France, through its
authorized agent, Philippine AirLines, Inc., issued to Carascoso a "first class" round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of Air France forced him to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because
there was a "white man”, who the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to
vacate his "first class" seat, a commotion ensued, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the
tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man,
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the whiteman"
Respondent reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
Because of the incident, respondent filed an action for damages for breach of contract.
Respondent contended that he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner
asserts the following: 1. That the said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties;2. That said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; and 3. That the issuance of a
first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats. Petitioner tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis
Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff (respondent) paid for, and was issued a 'first
class' airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong.

ISSUE:
Whether the testimonies of the petitioner is admissible.

HELD:
No.

Section 5, Rule 10, Rules of Court, in part reads: ''SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or
authorize presentation of evidence.—When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.

Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence. and plaintiffs Exhibits 'A', 'A-1', 'B', 'B-1'
'C' and 'C-1' belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and
paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. If the court did not recite in the decision
the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not
mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA vs. HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of First Instance
of Pampanga, and ANDRES GUEVARRA
G.R. No. L-35366 (55 Phil 905) August 5, 1931 J. Villamor

FACTS:

NICASIO BORJE vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Br. XIII, PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES, ANGELITA CENTENO, JULIA
CARPIO, CALIXTO HERMOSA, and CRISPULA R. PAGARAN alias PULA
GR. No. L-14257 (105 Phil. 1242 ) July 31, 1959 J. Labrador

Facts:
Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and her co-accused were charged with the crime o f falsification of
publicdocuments, in their capacities as public officials and employees, for having made it appear that
certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Gonzales for distribution to calamity
indigents, in such quantities and at such prices, and from such business establishments or persons as
written in said public documents. The truth was, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as
valued and as supposedly purchased had ever been made.
The prosecution presented as evidence a booklet of receipts from the Metro Drug Corporation
in Magallanes, Cebu City. Said booklet contained triplicate copies, the original invoices of which were
sent to the company's Manila office, the dupicates given to customers, and the triplicates left attached
to the booklet. One of the Metro Drugs salesmen who issued a receipt further explained that, in
preparing receipts for sales, two carbon copies were used between the three sheets, so that the
duplicates and the triplicates were filed out of the use of the carbons in the course of the prepar ation
and signing of the originals.
The trial court judge, Hon. Bienvenido Tan, interrupted the proceeding, holding that the
triplicates were not admissible unless it was proven that the originals were lost and cannot be roduced.
Another witness was presented, and he alleged that the former practice of keeping the original white
copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicates are
submitted to the Manila office.

Issue:
Whether the triplicates of the receipts admissible as evidence?

Held:
Yes. Under the law on evidence, the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest
grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates
under this rule has long been settled. When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of
writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature o f the
party to be charged thereby, produced 2 facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signatures being thu s
reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the
sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in
evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.

The best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade o f evidence obtainable to
prove a disputed fact. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine
as the original, are duplicate originals, and have been held to be as much primary evidence as the
originals.
EDEN TAN vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-56866 (137 SCRA 278) June 27, 1985 J. Cuevas

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and ADRIANO CARPIO, MARTIN AGUILAR and PEDRO
AGUILAR vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIANO RAYMUNDO
G.R. No. L-29575 (38 SCRA 634) April 30, 1971 J. J.B.L. Reyes
BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-
PAPA represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., vs. SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR
and LEONA V. AGUILAR
G.R. No. 83377 (218 SCRA 602) February 9, 1993 J. Campos, Jr.

FACTS:
Marcosa Bernabe's children mortgaged Bernabes land. Upon maturity of the mortgage, the
Spouses Mariano and Leona Aguilar redeemed the property, and were able to acquire a title to said
property. The title in the name of Bernabe, meanwhile, was cancelled. Three years later, however,
Bernabe's heirs wrote to the Spouses Aguilar, claiming that, as Bernabe's children, they were co-owners
of the property and, hence, entitled to the partition thereof. They also claimed that the Sps. Aguilar had
resold the property to Bernabe. They filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot and presented a Xerox
copy of an alleged deed of sale executed by the Sps. Aguilar, selling, transferring and conveying back
to Bernabe the disputed lot.
The trial court ruled in petitioners' favor. The Sps. Aguilar assailed the admissibility of the
Xerox copy of the deed of sale on the ground that it was not the best evidence of the alleged sale and,
hence, should be excluded.

Issue:
Whether the photocopy of the deed of sale can be properly admitted as evidence.

Held:
No. Under the Rules of Court, when the original writing has been lost or de stroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents
may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses. Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, therefore, the proponent must
first establish the former existence of the instrument..
In this case, the trial court merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed
of sale. Existence was sufficiently proved by the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of abs olute sale.
Execution, meanwhile, may be established by the person or persons who executed it, by the p erson
before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed
or who, after its execution saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parti es to
the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. However, the loss or destruction of the
originals were not proved. This may be done through the testimony of any person who knew the fact of
its loss or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place(s) where papers of similar character are usu ally kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is in deed lost.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. JULIO G. OLILA
G.R. No. L-8189 (98 Phil. 1002) March 23, 1956 J. Bautista

Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon ordering the defendant to
pay the amount of P5,174.76, value of two U.S. treasury warrants which were forged but were paid
upon the guarantee of defendant, plus the legal interest and costs of suit.

E. MICHAEL & Co., INC. vs. ADRIANO ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:
A sale with a right to repurchase was made by Adriano Enriquez in favor of E. Michael and E.
Michael & Co., sociedad en comandita, of which appellant claims to be the successor, by reason of an
instrument, duly executed and delivered by said companies to appellant, transferring property, business
and assets of every kind, including the land which is the subject of this litigation. It is alleged in the
complaint that the time to repurchase having expired, the title to the property became absolute in
appellant and that it is accordingly the owner of the land described in said instruments.
On the trial appellant sought to prove the execution and delivery of the conveyance transferring
to it the land described in the sale with right to repurchase. The trial court prevented appellant from the
proving the fact.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in not allowing the appellant to present its evidence.

HELD:
YES. The mere fact that counsel for appellant, in putting his question to the witness,
characterized or described the instrument as one of transfer, while objectionable, was not sufficient to
cut him off altogether from proving the execution and delivery of the document if other requisites were
present. While it is always best to avoid characterizations of that kind, its harm is minimized where the
case is tried before a court instead of a jury, the court well knowing that it cannot accept the
characterization as evidence but must go to the document itself or the evidence of its contents to
determine its nature and legal effect. Trial courts should not be so strict with reference to matters of the
character under discussion as to cause a miscarriage of justice; but on the other hand, they should see to
it that they are not impose on by the introduction of fabricated testimony and that injustice shall not
result from an evasion of the rules of evidence by designing persons.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA,
deceased, MARCELA RODELASvs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET. AL.
GR. No. L-58509 (119 SCRA 16) December 7, 1982 J. Relova

FACTS:
Marcela Rodelas filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla in
1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza on the ground, among others, that the
deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.

The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was lost,
a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy

RULING:
Yes. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of
the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be
resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic
will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the
best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a
photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be
made with the standard writings of the testator.
A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity
of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the standard writings of
the testator.