Wildlife Protection Act 1972
Wildlife Protection Act 1972
(i) To provide for protection of wild animals, birds and plants and for matters connected
therewith or ancillary or incidental thereto.
(ii) To ensure the ecological and environmental security of the country.
Wildlif (Protection) Amendment Act, 1986 proposed to provide that no one will be
permitted to trade in wild animals specified in Schedule I or Part II of Schedule II of the Act
or in any derivatives there from after a period of two months from the commencement of
the amending Act or two months from the date on which a wild animal is included in
Schedule I or Part II of Schedule 11 by notification issued under the provisions of the Act.
Under the scheme of the Act, trade or commerce in wild animal’s articles and trophies
within the country is permissible and is regulated under Chapter N. Since there hardly any
market within the country for wild animals or articles and derivatives thereof, the stocks
acquired for trade within the country are smuggled out to meet the demand in foreign
markets. This clandestine trade is abetted by illegal practices of poaching which have taken
a heavy toll of our wild animals and birds. The stocks declared by the traders at the
commencement of The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 are till used as a cover for such illicit
trade. Attempts to acquire the declared stocks of skins of some wild species have also not
met with the desired success, mainly because most traders are not inclined to part with
theft stocks and thereby lose the ploy for illegal activities. It is, therefore, necessary to
suitably amend the Act to prohibit trade in certain specified wild animals or theft
derivatives. It is, therefore, proposed to provide that no one will be permitted to trade in
wild animals specified in Schedule 1 or Part II of Schedule II of the Act or in any derivatives
there from after a period of two months from the commencement of the amending Act or
two months from the date on which a wild animal is included in Schedule I or Part II of
Schedule II by notification issued under the provisions of the Act. All existing licences for
internal trade would be invalid thereafter. Further, no fresh licences would be granted for
internal trade on such wild animals or their derivatives in future. An exemption is being
given to notified Government of India undertakings who can purchase stocks from licenses
during the specified period of two months for manufacturing articles from them exclusively
for export. The exemption at present available to dealers in ivory tinder the second proviso
to section 44(1) is also being removed so as to enforce a total ban in dealing in Indian ivory
and simultaneously to provide for some regulation over the manufacture and trade of
articles made out of imported ivory.
To highlight the ecological and environmental objective in the long title of the Wild
Life Act;
To add new definitions in view of the amendments proposed in the Wild Life Act;
To give statutory status to the National Board for Wild Life and restructuring of State
Wild Life Advisory Boards giving wider representation to all concerned;
To provide certain safeguards to stop killing of animals on the pretext of being
dangerous to human life and property; to rationalize and expedite the process of
final notification of sanctuaries and national parks and safeguard the decline of bio-
diversity during the intervening period between the first and final notification;
To provide that any alteration in the boundaries of national parks and sanctuaries
shall be made only on the basis of the recommendations of the National Board for
Wild Life;
To ban commercial sale of forest produce removed from national parks and
sanctuaries for better management of Wild Life;
To provide that no construction of commercial tourist lodges, hotels, zoos and safari
parks shall be allowed inside the national parks and sanctuaries except with the prior
approval of the National Board for Wild Life;
To empower the officers to evict encroachment from the national parks and
sanctuaries;
The Wildlife (Protection) Amendment Bill 2010 prepared by the Ministry of Environment
and Forests. This is to further amend the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and strengthen the
exisfing provisioiis for penalties, traps, criminal procedure etc.
This Bill may be called the Wildlife (Protection) Amendment Act, 2010. It shall come into
force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette
appoint.
The Wild Life (Protection) Act 1972 establishes the legal framework for the protection and
conservation of various species of plants and animals and the proper management of their
habitats. The Wild Life Act includes but is not limited to, the regulation and control of trade
in parts and products derived from such species. Despite the penalties already provided for,
there seems to be no reduction in the instances of wildlife crime that continue to be
reported across the country. Many of these are perpetrated by organized, international
gangs of criminals who have sophisticated networks spread across the country and abroad.
Salient Features of the Wild Life Protection Act
"uncured trophy" means the whole or any part of any captive animal (other than
vermin) which has not undergone a process of taxidermy. This includes a freshly killed
wild animal, ambergris, musk and other animal products.
"vermin" means any wild animal specified in Schedule V.
"wildlife" includes any animal, bees, butterflies, crustacean, fish and moths; and
aquatic or land vegetation which forms part of any habitat.
Case Details
State of M.P. & others v Madhukar Rao - Date of Judgment: 9th Jan 2008
Case No.: Appeal (civil) 5196 of 2001 - Bench: H.K.Sema & Aftab Alam
Judgment: C.A.Nos.5197, 5198, 5199, 5200 of 2001, SLP) Nos.2095 and 8024 of
2002 and Criminal Appeal No.487 of 2006 Aftab Alam, J.
This judgment will dispose of the four appeals in all of which the same question arises for
consideration. The question is whether a vehicle or vessel etc. seized under Section 50(1)(c)
of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) is put beyond the
power of the Magistrate to direct its release during the pendency of trial in exercise of
powers under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to
as the Code ). On behalf of the appellant, the State of Madhya Pradesh, it is strongly
contended that the answer to the question would be only in the affirmative. The contention
appears to us to be ex facie untenable but in order to examine the stand of the State
Government it would be necessary to state the facts and circumstances in which the
question arises and to take note of the relevant provisions of law in light of which it is to be
answered.
The facts of the case are taken from Civil Appeal No.5199 of 2001, the State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. Madhukar Rao, which was the leading case before the High Court. On March 12,
1997 at about 3.30 a.m., in course of checking a Sub-Inspector of Excise found a Tata Sumo
vehicle, bearing Registration No.MH.31-H/6919, carrying 206 kgs. of antlers.
The vehicle was owned by Madhukar Rao, the respondent, but he was not in it at the time
of checking. The Excise Sub-Inspector informed the officers of the Forest Department who
registered a case being Offence No.6527/97 under Sections 39, 42, 43, 44, 49(Kha) and
51(Kha) of the Act. The four persons occupying the vehicle were arrested and the vehicle
and the antlers were seized under Section 50(1)(c) of the Act. The Judicial Magistrate,
Raipur, was duly informed about the institution of the case on March 13, 1997.
The respondent, being the owner of the vehicle, moved the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Raipur on May 12, 1997 for its release on Supurdnama. On behalf of the respondent it was
stated that he was not an accused in the case and he had no concern with the commission
of any offences. It was further stated that his neighbour Shri Lohiya, one of the accused in
the case, had borrowed the vehicle on the pretext of going to see his ailing father. The
Magistrate allowed the petition and directed for release of the vehicle on Supurdnama by
order, dated May 12, 1997.
Against the order of the Magistrate, the State Government filed a revision before the
Sessions Judge, Raipur. In the revision, it was stated that the Magistrate had erred in
allowing the release of the vehicle in disregard of Section 39(d) of the Act in terms of which
the seized vehicle became the property of the Government and hence, the court had no
power to release it on Supurdnama. It was further contended that the power of release
under Section 451 of the Code could be exercised only in respect of vehicles seized by a
police officer. The Sessions Judge by order, dated June 5, 1997 allowed the revision, relying
upon a Bench decision of the Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in L.P.A.No.152
of 1996. (Here it is stated on behalf of the State that the S.L.P. filed against the order in the
L.P.A. was dismissed by this Court in limine). After the revision was allowed and the order of
release passed by the Magistrate was set aside, the Wild Life Warden and Divisional Forest
Officer, Raipur passed an order on June
16, 1997 declaring the seized vehicle as Government property in terms of Section 39(d) of
the Act. The respondent then went to the High Court at Jabalpur, in Writ Petition No.4421 of
1997, challenging the decision of the Sessions Judge and seeking a direction for release of
the vehicle on Supurdnama as ordered by the Magistrate. The case of the present
respondent along with three other cases (giving rise to the three other appeals in this batch)
was finally heard by a full bench. Dharmadhikari,J. (as His Lordship then was) who authored
the full bench judgment held and found that the Magistrate s power to release a vehicle
during the pendency of trial was not, in any way, affected by the legislative changes in the
Act relied upon by the State and in appropriate cases it was fully open to the Magistrate to
pass an order of interim release of a seized vehicle. The three other cases were also
disposed of following the Full Bench decision in Madhukar s case. The State is in appeal
against the order passed by the High Court.
On behalf of the State, it is contended that after the amendments made in Section 50 and
Section 39(1)(d) of the Act w.e.f. October 2, 1991 by Act 44 of 1991 there was no way a
vehicle seized for violation of the Act could be released. The amendments in Section 50 took
away the power from the Assistant Director of Wild Life Preservation or Wild Life Warden
(or an officer superior to them) and the Magistrate under the Code, in any event, had no
such power. Moreover, the amendment of Section 39(1)(d) of the Act made any interim
release of the vehicle further impossible.
In order to appreciate the submissions made on behalf of the State it would be necessary to
examine the relevant provisions of law. Chapter VI of the Act contains provisions dealing
with the prevention and detection of offences.
The chapter begins with Section 50 that gives to the specificied officers the powers of entry,
search, arrest and detention. It is a long section having as many as nine sub-sections. Sub-
section (1) which is sub-divided into three clauses is as follows :50. Power of entry, search,
arrest and detention - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force, the Director or any other officer authorized by him in this behalf or the Chief
Wild Warden or the authorised officer or any Forest Officer or any Police Officer not below
the rank of a sub-inspector, may, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that any person
has committed an offence against this Act
(a) require any such person to produce for inspection any captive animal, wild animal,
animal article, meat, [trophy, uncured trophy, specified plant or part or derivative thereof]
in his control, custody or possession, or any licence, permit or other document granted to
him or required to be kept by him under the provisions of this Act;
(b) stop any vehicle or vessel in order to conduct search or inquiry or enter upon and search
any premises, land, vehicle or vessel, in the occupation of such person, and open and search
any baggage or other things in the possession;
(c) seize any captive animal, wild animal, animal article, meat, trophy or uncured trophy, or
any specified plant or part or derivative thereof, in respect of which an offence against this
Act appears to have been committed, in the possession of any person together with any
trap, tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon used for committing any such offence and, unless he is
satisfied that such person will appear and answer any charge which may be preferred
against him, arrest him without warrant, and detain him.
Provided that where a fisherman, residing within ten kilometers of a sanctuary or National
Park, inadvertently enters on a boat, not used for commercial fishing, in the territorial
waters in that sanctuary or National Park, a fishing tackle or net on such boat shall not be
seized.
Before the Act was subjected to a large number of amendments with effect from October 2,
1991, Section 50 had sub-section
(2) which was as follows :
(2) Any officer of rank not inferior to that of an Assistant Director of Wild Life preservation
or Wild Life Warden, who, or whose subordinate has seized any trap, tool, vehicle, vessel or
weapon under clause (c) of sub-section (1), may release the same on the execution by the
owner thereof of bond for the production of the property so released, if and when so
required, before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which
the seizure has been made.
The Amendment Act 44 of 1991 deleted sub-section (2) and inserted in its place sub-section
(3-A) which is as follows :
(3-A). Any officer of a rank not inferior to that of an Assistant Director of Wild Life
Preservation of [as Assistant Conservator of Forests], who, or whose subordinate, has seized
any captive animal or wild animal under clause (c) of sub-section (1) may give the same for
custody on the execution by any person of a bond for the production of such animal if and
when so required, before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of
which the seizure has been made.
At the same time, amendments were made in Section 39(1)(d) after which it reads as
follows :
39. Wild animals, etc., to be Government
property (1) Every
(a) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(d) vehicle, vessel, weapon, trap or tool that has been used for committing an offence and
has been seized under the provisions of this Act, shall be the property of the State
Government, and, where such animal is hunted in a sanctuary or National Park declared by
the Central Government, such animal or any animal article, trophy, uncured trophy or meat
[derived from such animal, or any vehicle, vessel, weapon, trap or tool used in such hunting]
shall be the property of the Central Government.
Ms.Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh
referred in detail to various sub-sections of Section 50. She also referred to Section 51 laying
down the penalties for offences committed under the Act, Section 53 dealing with the
punishment for wrongful seizure and Section 54 dealing with the power to compound
offences. Learned counsel submitted that prior to October 2, 1991, while sub-section (2) of
Section 50 was in existence, the specified officers were empowered to release any trap,
tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon seized under clause (c) of sub-section (1) in connection with
any offence under the Act. But the provision was deleted and was substituted by sub-
section (3-A) that limited the power of release only in regard to any captive animal or wild
animal. The legislative intent was thus clear that no release was permissible of any article
other than a captive animal or wild animal that could be given in the custody of any person
on execution of a bond.
Learned counsel submitted that Section 50 of the Act provided a complete and
comprehensive scheme in matters of entry, search, arrest and detention for prevention and
detection of offence under the Act and excluded the application of any other Act, including
the Code, in the matter. She maintained that at no time it was open to the Magistrate to
direct for interim release of a vehicle seized under Section 50(1)(c) of the Act. Previously
officers of certain higher ranks had the power to release the seized vehicle but after deletion
of sub-section (2) the power was taken away from the departmental officers as well and
hence, a vehicle seized for commission of an offence under the Act could no longer be
released on interim basis.
In support of the submission that Section 50 provided a complete Code she also referred to
Sections 51 and 53 of the Act. She submitted that the punishment for wrongful seizure too
was provided under the Act itself and hence, the seizure would not attract the provisions of
any other law, including the Code. In support of the submission she relied upon the decision
of this Court in State of Karnataka vs. K.A.Kunchindammed [2002 (9) SCC 90]. She
particularly relied upon paragraph 23 of the decision.
We are unable to accept the submissions. To contend that the use of a vehicle in the
commission of an offence under the Act, without anything else would bar its interim release
appears to us to be quite unreasonable. There may be a case where a vehicle was
undeniably used for commission of an offence under the Act but the vehicle s owner is in a
position to show that it was used for committing the offence only after it was stolen from his
possession. In that situation, we are unable to see why the vehicle should not be released in
the owners favour during the pendency of the trial.
We are also unable to accept the submission that Section 50 and the other provisions in
Chapter VI of the Act exclude the application of any provisions of the Code. It is indeed true
that Section 50 of the Act has several provisions especially aimed at prevention and
detection of offences under the Act. For example, it confers powers of entry, search, arrest
and detention on Wild Life and Forest Officers besides police officers who are normally
entrusted with the responsibility of investigation and detection of offences; further sub-
section (4) of Section 51 expressly excludes application of Section 360 of the Code and the
provisions of Probation of Offenders Act to persons eighteen years or above in age. But it
does not mean that Section 50 in itself or taken along with the other provisions under
Chapter VI constitutes a self-contained mechanism so as to exclude every other provision of
the Code. This position becomes further clear from sub-section (4) of Section 50 that
requires that any person detained, or things seized should forthwith be taken before a
Magistrate. Sub-section (4) of Section 50 reads as follows :
50(4). Any person detained, or things seized under the foregoing power, shall forthwith be
taken before a Magistrate to be dealt with according to law [under intimation to the Chief
Wild Life Warden or the officer authorized by him in this regard].
It has to be noted here that the expression used in the sub-section is according to law and
not according to the provisions of the Act . The expression according to law undoubtedly
widens the scope and plainly indicates the application of the provisions of the Code. We find
that the full bench of the High Court has correctly taken the view that the deletion of sub-
section (2) and its replacement by sub-section (3-A) in Section 50 of the Act had no effect on
the powers of the Magistrate to release the seized vehicle during the pendency of trial
under the provisions of the Code.
The effect of deletion of sub-section (2) and its replacement by sub-section (3-A) may be
summed up thus: as long as, sub-section (2) of Section 50 was on the Statute Book the
Magistrate would not entertain a prayer for interim release of a seized vehicle etc. until an
application for release was made before the departmental authorities as provided in that
sub-section. Further, in case the prayer for interim release was rejected by the
departmental authority the findings or observations made in his order would receive due
consideration and would carry a lot of weight before the Magistrate while considering the
prayer for interim release of the vehicle. But now that sub-section (2) of Section 50 stands
deleted, an aggrieved person has no option but to approach the Magistrate directly for
interim release of the seized vehicle. We are also of the view that the decision in
Kunchindammed is of no help to the State in the present appeals. Paragraph 23 of the
decision apparently seems to support the appellant s contention but we find it difficult to
apply it in the facts of the present case. The decision in Kunchindammed was rendered on
the provisions of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963. In that case, an order of confiscation of the
vehicle was passed by the competent authority and the confiscation order had attained
finality. The present case arises under the Wild Life Protection Act and the facts are
materially different.
The decision of this Court closer to the issue under consideration may be found in Moti Lal
vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. [2002 (4) SCC 713]. In that case an offence
committed under the Act was handed over for investigation to the Central Bureau of
Investigation and the action was assailed exactly on the plea that the Wild Life Act was a
special law and it contained comprehensive provisions for investigation, inquiry, search,
seizure, trial and imposition of punishment and, therefore, the police force establishment
under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act was not empowered to investigate the
case. This Court rejected the contention and after examining in detail the various provisions
of the Act particularly the provisions of Section 50 came to find and hold as follows :
The scheme of Section 50 of the Wild Life Act makes it abundantly clear that a police officer
is also empowered to investigate the offences and search and seize the offending articles.
For trial of offences, the Code of Criminal Procedure is required to be followed and for that
there is no other specific provision to the contrary. The special procedure prescribed is
limited for taking cognizance of the offence as well as powers are given to other officers
mentioned in Section 50 for inspection, arrest, search and seizure as well as of recording
statement. The power to compound offences is also conferred under section 54. Section 51
provides for penalties which would indicate that certain offences are cognizable offences
meaning thereby a police officer can arrest without warrant. Sub-section (5) of Section 51
provides that nothing contained in Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 shall apply to a person convicted of an offence with
respect to hunting in a sanctuary or a national park or of an offence against any provision of
Chapter 5-A unless such person is under 18 years of age. The aforesaid specific provisions
are contrary to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure and that would
prevail during the trial. However, from this, it cannot be said that operation of rest of the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are excluded.
In this view of the matter, there is no substance in the contention raised by the learned
counsel for the appellant that Section 50 of the Wild Life Act is a complete code and,
therefore, CBI would have no jurisdiction to investigate the offences under the said Act.
Hence, it cannot be said that the judgment and order passed by the High Court rejecting the
petition filed by the appellant is in any way illegal or erroneous.
We have, therefore, no doubt that the provisions of Section 50 of the Act and the
amendments made thereunder do not in any way affect the Magistrate s power to make an
order of interim release of the vehicle under Section 451 of the Code. Learned counsel
submitted that Section 39(1)(d) of the Act made the articles seized under Section 50(1)(c) of
the Act as government property and, therefore, there was no question of their release. The
submission was carefully considered by the Full Bench of the High Court and on an
examination of the various provisions of the Act it was held that the provision of Section
39(1)(d) would come into play only after a court of competent jurisdiction found the
accusation and the allegations made against the accused as true and recorded the finding
that the seized article was, as a matter of fact, used in the commission of offence. Any
attempt to operationalise Article 39(1)(d) of the Act merely on the basis of seizure and
accusations/allegations leveled by the departmental authorities would bring it into conflict
with the constitutional provisions and would render it unconstitutional and invalid. In our
opinion, the High Court has taken a perfectly correct view and the provisions of Section
39(1)(d) cannot be used against exercise of the Magisterial power to release the vehicle
during pendency of the trial.
We thus find no merit in any of the submission made on behalf of the appellants. The High
Court has taken a correct view that warrants no interference by this Court. Accordingly, all
the appeals and special leave petitions are dismissed.