Marbert D.

Nuñeza EH303

Agrarian Reform Law and Social Legislation

CASE DIGEST

Assoc. of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)

FACTS:

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No.
6657. They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No.
228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure
to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section
25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be
made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases
of EPZA v. Dulay 5 and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation
contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other
things of value.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also
violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of
the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process.
Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived
of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Also, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do
not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules
were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have
not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera.

Issue:  Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

Ruling:

The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power

and eminent domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was
authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid
exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.

The court enunciated that it is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The expropriation before us affects
all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as theyare in excess of the
maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit
not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino
nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its
purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the
foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present
generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today,
although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them
tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than
the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution"
among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become
the key at least to their deliverance. Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will
be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we
estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50
billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is
in fact not even fully available at this time.

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

RELIA GUA-AN AND SONIA GUA-AN MAMON, Petitioners, v. GERTRUDES QUIRINO, represented by

ELMER QUIRINO, Respondent.

Facts:

Subject of the instant case is a 2.8800 hectare agricultural land situated in Batangan, Valencia, Bukidnon
known as Lot 0899, covered by Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-025227 in the name of Prisco
Quirino, Sr.+ (Prisco+) issued by the Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian

Reform on October 16, 1979 pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. On February 27, 1985,
Prisco+ executed a Deed of Conditional Sale (deed) covering the subject landholding to Ernesto Bayagna
(Ernesto) under the following conditions:

that the condition of this sale is that I, Prisco Quirino, Sr. and my heirs hereby [reserve our] right to
redeem or repurchase the herein subject parcel of land by returning to Ernesto Bayagna or his heirs the
same amount of Forty thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), Philippine currency, after the lapse of eight (8)
years from the date of execution of this instrument and if the subject land is not redeemed or
repurchased after the said eight years, there shall be an automatic extension of four (4) years from the
date the [eighth] year expires, and if after the 4 term expires, and I, Prisco Quirino, Sr., or my heirs still
[fail] to redeem or repurchase the herein subject land, Ernesto Bayagna or his heirs shall continue to
possess and enjoy the subject land until it is finally redeemed or repurchased. After the P40,000.00 is
returned to Ernesto Bayagna or his heirs, the latter shall be obligated to return peacefully the subject
land without any tenant or lessee. Ernesto thereupon possessed and cultivated the subject land for
more than 10 years before Prisco+ offered to redeem the same in 1996, which was refused. Instead,
Ernesto allowed the former owner of the land, petitioner Aurelia Gua-An (Aurelia), through her
daughter, petitioner Sonia Gua-An Mamon (Sonia), to redeem the lot. Subsequently, Prisco+ passed
away.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid.

Ruling:

It bears to stress that upon the promulgation of P.D. 27, farmer-tenants were deemed owners of the
land they were tilling and given the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for
themselves.8Ï‚rνll Thus, P.D. 27 specifically prohibited any transfer of such landholding except to the
government or by hereditary succession. Section 279Ï‚rνll of R.A. 6657 further allowed transfers to the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and to other qualified beneficiaries. Consequently, any other transfer
constitutes a violation of the above proscription and is null and void for being contrary to
law.10Ï‚rνll Relevant on this point is Ministry of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of
1979 which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"Despite the x x x prohibition, x x x many farmer-beneficiaries of P.D. 27 have transferred their

ownership, rights and/or possession of their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the
same to their former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of P.D. 27 and
therefore null and void."

The subject transaction is covered by the prohibition under P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657 which include
transfer of possession of the landholding to the vendee a retro, Ernesto, who, not being a qualified
beneficiary, remained in possession thereof for a period of eleven (11) years. Hence, notwithstanding
such possession, the latter did not acquire any valid right or title thereto, especially since he failed to
take any positive measure to cause the cancellation of Prisco's+ CLT No. 0-025227 despite the long lapse
of time. However, while CLT No. 0-025227 remains in Prisco's+ name, the Court cannot turn a blind eye
to the fact that Prisco+ surrendered possession and cultivation of the subject land to Ernesto, not for a
mere temporary period, but for a period of 11 years without any justifiable reason. Such act constituted
abandonment despite his avowed intent to resume possession of the land upon payment of the loan. As
defined in DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, abandonment is a willful failure of the
agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, "to cultivate, till, or develop his land to
produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two
calendar years." It is a ground for cancellation by the DARAB of an award to the agrarian reform
beneficiary. Consequently, respondent and/or Prisco's+ heirs had lost any right to redeem the subject
landholding.

The court decided that Prisco+ to have violated agrarian laws, canceling his CLT and ordering the
reallocation of the subject land to be more in accord with the law and jurisprudence.
RAYMUNDO CODERIAS, as represented by his Attorney-In-Fact, MARLON M. CODERIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTATE OF JUAN CIDOCO, represented by its Administrator, DR. RAUL R. CARAG, Respondent.

FACTS:

The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-hectare farm in Lupao, Nueva Ecija (the farm). As tiller
of the farm,5 petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) on April 26,
1974.6

In 1980, individuals connected with Chioco – who was a former Governor of Nueva Ecija – threatened to
kill petitioner if he did not leave the farm. His standing crops (corn and vegetables) and house were
bulldozed. For fear of his life, petitioner, together with his family, left the farm.7

In 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death, petitioner and his family re-established themselves on the
farm.8 On March 9, 19959 petitioner filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija a Petition10 against respondent Chioco’s estate praying that his
possession and cultivation of the farm be respected; that the corresponding agricultural leasehold
contract between them be executed; that he be awarded actual damages for the destruction of his
house, his standing crops, unrealized harvest from 1980 up to 1993, attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation.11 The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 1572-NNE-95.

Respondent moved to dismiss12 the Petition, contending that petitioner’s cause of action has
prescribed under Section 3813 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844,14 as amended, since the alleged
dispossession took place in 1980 but the Petition was filed only in 1995, or beyond the statutory three-
year period for filing such claims. Petitioner filed an opposition15 arguing that his tenure/tillage should
be deemed uninterrupted since his departure was due to threats made by Chioco’s henchmen; thus, the
three-year prescriptive period should not be applied to his case.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners action had prescribed.

Ruling:

It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been placed under the coverage of RA 3844. It is
also undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between Chioco and petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been
issued in favor of the petitioner; thus, petitioner already had an expectant right to the farm.[31] A CLT
serves as "a provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full
payment of just compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an amortizing owner. This
certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn
production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was tilling."[32] Since the
farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law,[33] Chioco had
no right to evict petitioner and enter the property. More significantly, Chioco had no right to claim that
petitioner's cause of action had prescribed. The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris, this
juridical tie, that exists between the petitioner and Chioco, which the latter is bound to respect.
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that "[a]n action to enforce any cause of action under
this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued." In
this case, we deem it proper to reckon petitioner's cause of action to have accrued only upon his
knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not at the time he was forcibly ejected from the
landholding in 1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to petitioner's life and limb existed,
petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this juridical tie. Since the
threats and intimidation ended with Chioco's death, petitioner's obligation to file a case to assert his
rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the prescriptive period commenced. These
rights, as enumerated above, include the right to security of tenure, to continue in possession of the
land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons,
the pre-emptive right to buy the land, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person
without his knowledge.

DAVAO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES GLORIA ESPINO SALIGA

AND CESAR SALIGA, AND SPOUSES DEMETRIO EHARA AND ROBERTA SUGUE EHARA,

Facts:

At the root of the present controversy are two parcels of land – 4.9964 hectares6 and 2.5574
hectares7 (subject property) - situated in Catalunan Pequeño, Davao City and originally registered in the
name of Atty. Eugenio Mendiola (deceased). The respondents claimed that they and their parents, from
whom they took over the cultivation of the landholding, had been tenants of the property as early as
1965. On August 12, 1981, the respondents and Eugenio executed a five-year lease contract.9 While
they made stipulations regarding their respective rights and obligations over the landholding, the
respondents claimed that the instrument was actually a device Eugenio used to evade the land reform
law.

The respondents also argued that pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, they,
as tenants, were deemed owners of the property beginning October 21, 1972 (the Act’s effectivity date);
thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to DNTDC was not valid. The respondents added that
DNTDC could not have been a buyer in good faith as it did not verify the status of the property –
whether tenanted or not tenanted - prior to its purchase. The respondents submitted, among others,
the pertinent tax declarations showing that the property was agricultural as of 1985.

In its answer, DNTDC alleged in defense that it purchased the property in good faith from the previous
owners (Paz M. Flores and Elizabeth M. Nepumuceno)10 in 1995. At that time, the alleged tenancy
relationship between the respondents and Eugenio had already expired following the expiration of their
lease contracts in 1986. DNTDC also claimed that prior to the sale, the Davao City Office of the Zoning
Administrator confirmed that the property was not classified as agricultural; it pointed out that the
affidavit of non-tenancy executed by the vendors affirmed the absence of any recognized agricultural
lessees on the property. DNTDC added that the property had already been classified to be within an
“urban/urbanizing zone” in the “1979-2000 Comprehensive Land Use Plan for Davao City” that was duly
adopted by the City Council of Davao City and approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) (now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]).

Issue: whether the property had been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural uses prior to
June 15, 1988 so as to remove it from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657
Ruling:

The subject property had been reclassified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988; hence, they are no
longer covered by R.A. No. 6657

We hold that the property had been reclassified to non-agricultural uses and was, therefore, already
outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) after it took effect on July 15,
1988.

1. Power of the local government units to reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural uses; the
DAR approval is not required    

Indubitably, the City Council of Davao City has the authority to adopt zoning resolutions and ordinances.
Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 226430 (the then governing Local Government Code), municipal and/or city
officials are specifically empowered to “adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in
consultation with the National Planning Commission.”31

In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court held that this power of the local
government units to reclassify or convert lands to non-agricultural uses is not subject to the approval of
the DAR.33 There, the Court affirmed the authority of the Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a
zoning classification and to reclassify the property in dispute from agricultural to residential through the
Council’s Kapasiyahang Bilang 30, as approved by the HSRC.

Based on these considerations, we hold that the property had been validly reclassified as non-
agricultural land prior to June 15, 1988. We note the following facts established in the records that
support this conclusion: (1) the Davao City Planning and Development Board prepared the
Comprehensive Development Plan for the year 1979-2000 in order to provide for a comprehensive
zoning plan for Davao City; (2) the HSRC approved this Comprehensive Development Plan through Board
Resolution R-39-4 dated July 31, 1980; (3) the HLURB confirmed the approval per the certification issued
on April 26, 2006;37 (4) the City Council of Davao City adopted the Comprehensive Development Plan
through its Resolution No. 894 and City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982;38 (5) the Office of the City
Planning and Development Coordinator, Office of the Zoning Administrator expressly certified on June
15, 1995 that per City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 as amended by S.P. Resolution No. 2843,
Ordinance No. 561, series of 1992, the property (located in barangay Catalunan Pequeño) is within an
“urban/urbanizing” zone;39 (6) the Office of the City Agriculturist confirmed the above classification and
further stated that the property is not classified as prime agricultural land and is not irrigated nor
covered by an irrigation project as certified by the National Irrigation Administration, per the
certification issued on December 4, 1998;40 and (7) the HLURB, per certification dated May 2,
1996,41 quoted the April 8, 1996 certification issued by the Office of the City Planning and Development
Coordinator stating that “the Mintal District which includes barangay Catalunan Pequeño, is identified as
one of the ‘urbaning [sic] district centers and priority areas and for development and investments’ in
Davao City.”