EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-13139. May 24, 1961.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TAN CHU KENG TO BE

ADMITTED AS A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. TAN CHU KENG ,
petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , oppositor-
appellant.

Jesus P. Narvios and Cesar A. Kintanar for petitioner-appellee.

Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; DECLARATION OF INTENTION; EFFECT

OF FAILURE TO FILE. — The failure to le a declaration of intention within the prescribed
time, in accordance with the requirements of Section 5 of the Naturalization Law, is
fatal to the application (Ng Peng Sia vs. Republic, G. R. No. 7780 Sept. 27, 1955).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN MAY APPLICANT BE EXEMPT FROM FILING. — In order
that an applicant for naturalization may be exempt from ling a declaration of intention,
he must have been born in the Philippines and have received primary and secondary
education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to
any race or nationality and those who have resided in the Philippines continuously for
30 years or more and must have also given primary and secondary education to all his
children.
3. ID.; ID.; DOUBTS CONCERNING GRANT OF CITIZENSHIP RESOLVED
AGAINST APPLICANT. — Doubts concerning grant of citizenship should be resolved in
favor of the Government and against the applicant (U.S. vs. MacIntosh, N.Y., 1931, 51 S.
Ct. 570, 283 U. S. 605, 75 L. Ed. 1302, cited in Velayo's Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization, p. 115).
4. ID.; ID.; APPLICANT MUST COMPLY WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS; ALL
CHILDREN OF APPLICANT MUST BE INCLUDED IN PETITION. — Applicant's failure to
state in his petition the name, age, birthplace and residence of all his children as
required by law, is a ground for denying his petition, because an applicant must comply
with all the requirements and conditions speci ed by law (Hao Lian Chiu vs. Republic,
87 Phil., 668; 48 Off. Gaz., p. 1780).

DECISION

PAREDES , J : p

This is an appeal by the Republic of the Philippines from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, granting Tan Chu Keng Philippine citizenship.
On September 15, 1955, Tan Chu Keng led a petition for naturalization, with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, alleging that he emigrated to the Philippines from
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 Amoy, China, in or about July 1912, arriving in the islands on board the boat Susana;
that he is married to Lu Lay Tee, also a Chinese, born in Amoy, China, who came to the
Philippines in 1932; that he has three (3) children with his wife Lu Lay Tee, namely
Domingo Tan, Esperanza Tan and Bienvenido Tan, all born in Cebu, on January 28, 1940,
September 30, 1942 and April 22, 1945, respectively; that his children are now studying
in the Cebu Institute, a school duly recognized by the government where Philippine
history, civics and Philippine government are taught and which school is open to
children of all races; that he is a merchant, having a sari-sari store and deals in lumber,
copra and corn meal business: that he has no tax liabilities: knows the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution; can speak and write English, Spanish and the
Cebu-Visayan dialect. Petitioner claimed that he is entitled to the bene ts of
Commonwealth Act No. 535, which exempts any person who has resided in the
Philippines for a period of thirty (30) years from ling a declaration of intention — to
become a citizen. The a davits of two character witnesses, Dr. Hospicio B. Iballe, City
School Dentist of Cebu City, who claimed to have known petitioner since childhood, and
Atty. Antonio T. Paulin, who lived a stone throw from petitioner's house, vouching for his
good moral character and irreproachable conduct, were also presented. Both
witnesses are compadres of petitioner.
In the course of the proceedings, the provincial scal, on cross-examination was
able to elicit facts which were not contained in the petition, such as: that petitioner
before he married his present wife, was married in China sometime in 1923; that his
rst wife died in 1925, leaving a son Espiritu Tan, who was living at C. Padilla street,
Cebu City, at the time; that Espiritu studied at the Silliman University and reached the
2nd year high school; that he (Espiritu) was already 35 years old at the time of the
hearing; that he did not include Espiritu in the enumeration of his children in the petition
because he was already of age. On redirect, petitioner explained that Espiritu did not
finish his studies because of the outbreak of the last war and of his marriage after.
After the hearing, the provincial fiscal requested for fifteen (15) days within which
to le a memorandum. Before the expiration of the period, however, counsel for the
petitioner led a motion for the re-opening of the case to present additional evidence,
since he (petitioner) failed to introduce "important material and relevant facts, through
excusable negligence and mistake". At the reopening, petitioner testi ed that aside
from the three (3) children he mentioned in his petition, he had two (2) others, namely
Espiritu Tan and Alfonso Tan, who were born in Amoy, China, on February 17, 1924 and
January 8, 1933, respectively; that when Espiritu was under the custody of petitioner, he
attended the Cebu Little Flower School, the Silliman University and the Balamban
Institute; that in 1937 to 1938, Espiritu was classi ed as a third grader and a fth
grader in 1939 to 1940; that Alfonso studied in the Balamban Public School from Grade
I to IV. Atty. Narvios, counsel for the petitioner, testi ed that at the preparation of the
petition, he discovered that Espiritu and Alfonso were already 31 and 21 years old and
both married in 1953 and 1955, respectively; that he believed there was no necessity to
include their names in the petition, considering that under section 15 of Act 473, only
minor children are affected by the naturalization of the father.
It was also brought out at the said hearing that on February 25, 1942, petitioner
led a petition for naturalization in the CFI of Cebu, in which petition he included the
names of the two children (Espiritu and Alfonso), who were then minors; but that said
petition was dismissed for his failure to appear during the hearing, due to illness.
The lower court on June 8, 1957, rendered the following judgment:

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 "WHEREFORE, the petition to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines of
petitioner TAN CHU KENG is granted and the Court hereby decrees the
naturalization of the said petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines."

The Solicitor General alleged in his appeal brief that the lower court erred in
holding that: (1) the omission in the petition of the names of two of petitioner's children
who were 31 and 22 years old, respectively, at the time of the ling of the petition is not
a su cient ground for dismissing the petition: (2) the omission of the names of
Espiritu Tan and Alfonso Tan in the petition was not made in bad faith or due to some
ulterior motive; (3) petitioner is exempt from ling his declaration of intention to
become a Filipino citizen; and (4) petitioner has all the quali cations to become a
Filipino citizen.
1. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law (Comm. Act No. 473) speci cally
provides that the petitioner will set forth, among others, whether he is single or married
and the father of children, "the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and each
of the children". Petitioner gave the imsy explanation and his counsel tried to
corroborate it that the failure to state the names of the two (2) children (Espiritu and
Alfonso) was due to the belief that there was no necessity for it. It will be recalled that it
was only during the cross-examination that the existence of these children was elicited;
that petitioner did not voluntarily tell the court, during the hearings, that he had another
son besides Espiritu and that it was only when the Fiscal asked for time to le a
memorandum that petitioner moved for a re-opening of the case, alleging that he had to
introduce material and relevant facts, which turned out to be the existence of another
son.
The law requires the petitioner, if he is the father of children, to state the name,
age, birthplace and residence of each of the children, without making a distinction
whether the petitioner's children are minors or of age. Where the law does not
distinguish we should not distinguish. If it were the intention of the law to require only
minor children of the petitioner to be mentioned in the petition, it would have so stated.
An applicant for naturalization must comply with all the requirements and conditions
speci ed by law (Halo Lian Chu vs. Republic, 48 O.G. 1780). To dispense with some
requirements of the law on the shallow excuse that petitioner's counsel was
responsible for the omission, would blaze the trial for dangerous precedents.
2 & 3. It would seem that the omission was tinged with the color of bad faith and
done for ulterior motives, considering the fact that petitioner claims exemption to le
his declaration of intention. Commonwealth Act No. 535, amending section 6 of the
Naturalization Law, provides that, "Persons born in the Philippines and have received
their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided
continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before ling their
application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon
complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be
added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary
education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality . . ." While petitioner might have
satis ed the condition of the thirty years continuous residence, he has, however, failed
to comply with the further requisite of having given all his children of school age,
primary and secondary education. Awareness of this requisite has undoubtedly
motivated the petitioner to exclude the names of Espiritu and Alfonso in the petition,
contrariwise, he would have been compelled to show that he had given said children
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 primary and secondary education in the proper schools, which he had admittedly failed
to do. Under these facts, petitioner is not entitled to the exemption of making a
declaration of intention. The failure to le a declaration of intention within the
prescribed time, in accordance with the requirements of Section 5 of the Naturalization
Law, is fatal to his application (Ng Peng Sia vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-8378, March 23,
1956).
The requirements of the law regarding the quali cations of a petitioner for
citizenship are stringent. In view of the above ndings, it is seriously doubted whether
the petitioner herein possesses the quali cations to become a Filipino citizen. Doubts
concerning grant of citizenship should be resolved in favor of the government and
against the claimant (U.S. vs. Macintosh, N.Y., 1931, 51 S. Ct. 570, 283 U.S. 605, 75 L.
Ed. 1302, cited in Velayo's Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization, p. 1153).
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another entered denying the
petition for citizenship of petitioner-appellee Tan Chu Keng. Costs against the
petitioner-appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.

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