Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Vaello Madero Pet
Vaello Madero Pet
JEFFREY B. WALL
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
VIVEK SURI
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
ABBY C. WRIGHT
LAURA E. MYRON
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
[email protected]
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Congress violated the equal-protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security
Income—a program that provides benefits to needy
aged, blind, and disabled individuals—in the 50 States
and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mar-
iana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not
extending it to Puerto Rico.
(I)
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (D.P.R.):
United States v. Vaello-Madero, No. 17-cv-2133
(Feb. 4, 2019)
United States Court of Appeals (1st Cir.):
United States v. Vaello-Madero, No. 19-1390 (Apr.
10, 2020)
(II)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statutory provisions involved ...................................................... 2
Statement:
A. Legal background ............................................................. 2
B. Factual background and proceedings below .................. 5
Reasons for granting the petition ............................................... 9
A. The court of appeals’ decision is incorrect ...................... 9
B. The decision below warrants this Court’s review ........ 20
Conclusion ................................................................................... 24
Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (Apr. 10, 2020) ...... 1a
Appendix B — District court opinion and order
(Feb. 4, 2019).............................................. 38a
Appendix C — District court opinion and order
(May 14, 2018) ............................................ 50a
Appendix D — Statutory provisions ..................................... 61a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
(III)
IV
Cases—Continued: Page
Department of Transportation v. Association of
American Railroads, 575 U.S. 43 (2015) ......................... 21
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) ............................. 14
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307
(1993) .................................................................................... 18
Financial Oversight & Management Board
v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020) ..... 11
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) ........ 10
Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) ...................... passim
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) ............................... 14
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1
(2010) .................................................................................... 21
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) ............................ 21
Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) .................................. 14
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) ............................... 11
Lyng v. International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace, & Agricultural Implementation
Workers of America, 485 U.S. 360 (1988)......................... 17
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) ............................ 18
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977) .............................. 14
Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela,
574 U.S. 1006 (2014)............................................................ 21
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976).............................................................. 11
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)................................... 21
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ...................... 10
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880) ................................. 10
Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) .................................. 20
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990) ....................... 11
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) ..................... 10
V
Cases—Continued: Page
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory,
431 U.S. 471 (1977).............................................................. 17
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) ............................... 20
Peña-Martinez v. Azar, No. 18-1206, 2020 WL
4437859 (D.P.R. Aug. 3, 2020) ........................................... 23
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) ......................................................... 11
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863
(2016) .............................................................................. 11, 19
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) .............................. 21
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954) ........................ 10
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) .................................................................................... 15
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) ........................ 16, 19
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) .................... 21
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010) ................. 21
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575
(2020) .................................................................................... 21
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) ............................. 16, 21
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015)................................. 21
U.S. Const.:
Art. I:
§§ 2-3 ........................................................................... 11
§ 8, Cl. 1 ...................................................................... 11
Art. II, § 2......................................................................... 11
Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2.......................................................... 5, 11
Territory Clause .......................................................... 5
Amend. V ............................................................ 7, 9, 10, 22
Due Process Clause ........................................... 7, 9, 10
VI
Miscellaneous:
Gary Burtless & Orlando Sotomayor, Labor Supply
and Public Transfers, in The Economy of Puerto
Rico: Restoring Growth (Susan M. Collins et al.
eds., 2006) ...................................................................... 13, 14
Memorandum from Michael Stephens, Supervisory
Actuary, Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social
Security Administration, to Steve Goss, Chief Actu-
ary, Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social Secu-
rity Administration, Estimated Change in Federal
SSI Program Cost for Potential Extension of SSI
Eligibility to Residents of Certain U.S. Territories
- INFORMATION (June 11, 2020),
https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/
SSIEligExt_20200611.pdf ........................................... 13, 22
Social Security Administration, SSI Monthly
Statistics, June 2020, Tbl. 1 (released July 2020),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/
ssi_monthly/2020-05/table01.html....................................... 2
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
JOSE LUIS VAELLO-MADERO
(1)
2
*
The motion to dismiss explained that the government’s com-
plaint cited two statutes as bases for the district court’s jurisdiction,
but that the reference to one of those statutes, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(4),
had been a mistake. App., infra, 51a; D. Ct. Doc. 23, at 3. Respond-
ent acknowledged, and the court held, that the court had jurisdiction
over the case under the other statute cited in the complaint,
28 U.S.C. 1345, which confers jurisdiction over “all civil actions,
suits or proceedings commenced by the United States.” App., infra,
52a-53a (citation and emphasis omitted). The motion also argued
that, to the extent respondent’s answer raised counterclaims, the
court lacked the power to hear them because respondent had failed
to exhaust administrative remedies. D. Ct. Doc. 23, at 8. But the
court read the answer as raising “affirmative defenses” rather than
counterclaims, and it held that it could properly “address the merits
of the United States’ overpayment claim, and the constitutional
challenge as an affirmative defense to [respondent’s] liability.”
App., infra, 53a.
7
No. 19-1390
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
v.
JOSÉ LUIS VAELLO-MADERO,
DEFENDANT, APPELLEE
1
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . . ” U.S. Const. amend. V. See
Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects, & Surveyors v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976).
(1a)
2a
2
For more information about SSI, see Mary Daly & Richard Burk-
hauser, The Supplemental Security Income Program, in Means-
Tested Transfer Programs in the U.S. 79 (Robert Moffitt ed., Univ.
of Chicago Press 2003).
4a
3
The district court maintained jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1345, which applies to any case “commenced by the United States.”
6a
4
“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States. . . . ” U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2.
7a
5
The Supreme Court opinion refers to the appellee in Califano as
“Torres,” but Hispanics usually use both the paternal and maternal
last names, so the correct appellation used should have been “Gau-
tier Torres,” as used by the district court.
11a
6
Footnote four reads:
12a
7
While the district court’s analysis referred to the “U.S. citizens
living in Puerto Rico,” id. at 1a, the Supreme Court assessed the ques-
tion in Harris as to Puerto Rico residents, 446 U.S. at 651-52.
14a
8
We find it persuasive that, as pointed out in Peña Martínez, the
Supreme Court’s use of the conjunctive “and” when listing the three
considerations that “suffice[d] to form a rational basis” suggests “that
no one ‘consideration’ independently sufficed to justify the exclusion
of Puerto Rico residents from eligibility for SSI.” Peña Martínez
v. Azar, 376 F. Supp. 3d 191, 207-08 (D.P.R. 2019) (citing OfficeMax,
Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 589 (6th Cir. 2005)).
15a
9
Appellant cites United States v. Ríos-Rivera, 913 F.3d 38, 44 (1st
Cir. 2019), as evidence that our Court has recently sanctioned Con-
gress’s differential treatment of Puerto Rico under Califano and
Harris. Reviewing under plain error whether the prosecution of a
defendant under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), violated his
equal protection rights, this Court in Ríos-Rivera held that the dis-
trict court did not err by not sua sponte applying heightened scru-
tiny and rejected the argument that Congress’s decision was irra-
tional because it “never explained its justification for treating traf-
ficking within Puerto Rico differently from interstate trafficking.”
Id. at 44. Nothing about that holding is inconsistent with the result
we reach today.
17a
10
In an effort to comprehend what was meant by this third factor,
we located a post-hoc explanation of the exclusion of Puerto Rico
from SSI—a statement in a 1990 congressional briefing on Puerto
Rico’s status. See Briefing on Puerto Rico Political Status by the
General Accounting Office & the Cong. Research Serv.: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. of Insular & Int’l Affairs of H. Comm. on In-
terior & Insular Affairs, 101st Cong. 34 (1990) (statement of Carolyn
Merk, Specialist in Social Legislation). The CRS staff member,
who had been a House staffer at the time SSI was passed, explained:
Some of the reasons SSI does not apply in Puerto Rico pertain
to income disparity between the mainland United States and
Puerto Rico and what could potentially happen to the income
distribution of the population there. Similar concerns were
raised at the time about extending Federal benefit levels to
low-income States such as Alabama or Mississippi. . . . [I]t
is certainly true that when you raise someone’s income by ten-
fold there can be serious effects on the labor supply and work
incentives and disincentives of the non-SSI members of the
family, who may not even earn as much as the SSI benefit.
Raising the income from $32 or whatever, tenfold a month,
where the amount may be a fair wage on the part of the fulltime
workers, or in some cases, of the primary earner’s family, has
been an issue, and continues to be a primary question.
Id. Any concerns related to “economic disruption” should be met
with suspicion considering the present circumstances of Puerto
Rico’s economic affairs and the legislation that has been enacted
by Congress since Harris and Califano were decided. See Puerto
18a
11
We note that the Court in Harris did not include any qualifier
and concluded curtly that “Puerto Rican residents do not contribute
to the federal treasury.” Harris, 446 U.S. at 652.
21a
12
It should be noted that the U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto
Rico, despite contributing to the national fisc, have no voting repre-
sentation in the federal government. See Igartúa v. Trump, 868 F.3d
24 (1st Cir. 2017) (en banc); Igartúa-de la Rosa v. United States, 417
F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
13
A not insubstantial case can be made, correlating Puerto Rico’s
current recession at least in part with the lack of equitable federal
funding of social and health benefits programs available to other
Americans. See Juan R. Torruella, Commentary, Why Puerto Rico
Does Not Need Further Experimentation with Its Future: A Re-
ply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism”, 131 Harv. L. Rev.
F. 65, 91-92 (2018) (explaining how local government has been forced
to cover the healthcare funding shortfalls under Medicare and Med-
icaid to provide even minimal health benefits).
22a
14
See Torruella, supra note 13, at 89; Laura Sullivan, How Puerto
Rico’s Debt Created a Perfect Storm Before the Storm, NPR (May
2, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/02/607032585/how-
puerto-ricos-debt-created-a-perfect-storm-before-the-storm.
15
See Puerto Rico; Major Disaster and Related Determinations,
82 Fed. Reg. 46,820 (Oct. 6, 2017).
16
See Puerto Rico; Emergency and Related Determinations, 85
Fed. Reg. 6,965 (Feb. 6, 2020).
17
I.R.S., Tax Topic No. 901, Is a Person with Income from Puerto
Rico Required to File a U.S. Federal Income Tax Return?, available
at https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc901 (“if you’re a bona fide resident
of Puerto Rico and a U.S. government employee, you must file a U.S.
23a
19
The Court did not address Maryland’s two additional arguments
for its maximum grant regulations: to provide incentives for family
planning and to allocate available public funds to meet the needs of
the largest possible number of families. Id. at 484, 486.
26a
20
Explicitly applying rationality review, the Court in Zobel invali-
dated a government scheme distributing monetary benefits which
were based on the length of residency in the state, rejecting as im-
permissible the state’s argument that the scheme was justified by
“past contributions” to the state. Id. at 60-61, 63; see also id. at 71
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he relationship between residence
and contribution to the State [is] so vague and insupportable, that it
amounts to little more than a restatement of the criterion for the
discrimination it purports to justify.”).
21
We cite Shapiro for this limited premise noting that we are
acutely aware that the Court views the situation here differently
from that in Shapiro, see Califano, 435 U.S. at 4-5, which dealt with
27a
24
Nevertheless, the incongruity of Appellant’s arguments be-
comes more patent when one considers that if a resident of Puerto
Rico moves, say to New York, he or she becomes eligible to receive
SSI benefits upon establishing residence in that state for thirty con-
secutive days, 42 U.S.C. § 1382, yet Appellee, who presumably was
required to pay federal income taxes during his quarter century res-
idency in New York, loses his SSI benefits solely because he moves
to Puerto Rico.
25
While Appellant decries any reliance on Moreno because it pre-
dates Califano and Harris, as we have explained, the Court in those
latter cases was not tasked with reviewing on equal protection
grounds the rationality of excluding otherwise eligible Puerto Rico
residents from SSI.
29a
2.
Having found the tax status argument irrational and
arbitrary, we thus come to Appellant’s remaining argu-
ment: the claim that the cost of including Puerto Rico
residents in the SSI program is a rational basis for their
exclusion.
As Appellant posits and we accept, “Congress has
wide latitude to create classifications that allocate non-
contractual benefits under a social welfare program,”
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210 (1977), and “pro-
tecting the fiscal integrity of Government programs,
and of the Government as a whole, ‘is a legitimate con-
cern of the State,’ ” Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW,
485 U.S. 360, 373 (1988) (quoting Ohio Bureau of Emp’t.
Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 493 (1977)). In Lyng,
the Court upheld an amendment to the Food Stamp Act
which barred households from becoming eligible for
food stamps if a member of the household was on strike
and prevented an increase in food stamps because the
striker’s income had decreased. Id. The government
presented three objectives served by the challenged
statute, and the Court focused primarily on Congress’s
“concern that the food stamp program was being used
to provide one-sided support for labor strikes,” which
had “damaged the program’s public integrity.” Id. at
371 (first citing then quoting S. Rep. No. 97-139, p. 62
(1981)). The Court noted “Congress’ considered ef-
forts” to achieve its stated goal of maintaining neutrality
in private labor disputes as evidenced by tailoring the
statute to not strip eligibility from those who were pre-
viously eligible for food stamps and who refused to ac-
cept employment on account of a strike. Id. at 372.
30a
Only after finding the statute rational did the Court ad-
dress the question of cost-saving for the federal govern-
ment, qualifying its analysis that “Congress can[not]
pursue the objective of saving money by discriminating
against individuals or groups.” Id. at 373; see also
Hodory, 431 U.S. at 493 (“We need not consider whether
it would be ‘rational’ for the State to protect the fund
through a random means, such as elimination from cov-
erage of all persons with an odd number of letters in
their surnames. Here, the limitation of liability tracks
the reasons found rational above, and the need for such
limitation unquestionably provides the legitimate state
interest required by the equal protection equation.”).
We respect that “[f]iscal considerations may compel
certain difficult choices in order to improve the protec-
tion afforded to the entire benefited class.” Lyng, 485
U.S. at 373 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 355
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). And that when cou-
pled with a classification rationally drawn to further
some constitutionally permissible state interest, cost-
savings are certainly allowed to play into the legisla-
ture’s calculations, and we are not in a position to sec-
ond-guess those decisions. See Bowen v. Gillard, 483
U.S. 587, 599 (1987) (finding the AFDC amendment
served Congress’s goal of decreasing federal expendi-
tures and distributing benefits fairly through “iden-
tif [ication of] a group that would suffer less than others
as a result of a reduction in benefits”). Cf. Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 633 (explaining that while fiscal integrity is a
valid state interest, a state “may not accomplish such a
31a
26
A reminder that according to the Court, just like Puerto Rico
residency, indigency does not warrant any form of heightened re-
view. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 323.
32a
27
While the categorical requirements for age, blindness, and disa-
bility are almost identical between the two programs, the income
limit to qualify for AABD is substantially lower. CRS Report, su-
pra at 11.
34a
3.
Finally, while the inclusion of the Northern Mariana
Islands in the SSI program does not standing alone ren-
der the discriminatory treatment of Appellee per se ir-
rational, see Baker, 916 F.2d at 747, the fact that Con-
gress extended SSI benefits to the residents of the
Northern Mariana Islands as part of the Islands’ cove-
nant to enter the United States undercuts the Appel-
lant’s only offered explanations for the exclusion.
Aside from where they live, the otherwise SSI-qualify-
ing residents of Puerto Rico and of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands have the legally-relevant characteristics in
common, i.e., they are (1) low-income and low-resourced,
(2) elderly, disabled, or blind, and (3) generally exempted
from paying federal income tax. 28 These shared traits
undermine Appellant’s already weakened arguments.
In addition, as to Appellant’s contention that the in-
clusion of Northern Mariana Islands residents in the
SSI program “pre-dated both Califano and Harris, and
in neither case did the Supreme Court suggest that it
undermined Congress’s rationality,” we refer to our ear-
lier point regarding the limited holding of those cases.
In neither case was the inclusion of Northern Mariana
Islands residents in the SSI program brought to the
Court’s attention; it went unmentioned and would have
been irrelevant to the district court opinions in Califano
(holding that the exclusion from SSI violated the plain-
tiff ’s right to travel) and in Harris (finding that the less
28
We note that unlike residents of Puerto Rico, who are required
to pay federal taxes on all income earned outside of Puerto Rico, the
Northern Mariana Islands government retains all taxes paid by its
bona fide residents regardless of the income source. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 931(a); Lowry, supra note 16, at 23.
35a
APPENDIX B
1
United States citizens in Puerto Rico contribute equally to Social
Security and Medicare as do United States citizens in the States and
District of Columbia.
42a
2
Notwithstanding, the United States acknowledges that Congress
made SSI program benefits available to residents of the Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands by virtue of a joint resolu-
tion in 1976. See Pub. L. No. 94-241, § 502(a)(1), 90 Stat. 263, 268
(1976) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note, and implemented by 20
C.F.R. § 416.120(c)(10)).
43a
3
Likewise, United States citizens in the other two territories that
are excluded from the SSI program, Guam and the United States
Virgin Islands, are mainly of Chamorro and afro-caribbean descent,
respectively.
4
Jones Act (Puerto Rico), Ch. 154, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
5
8 U.S.C. § 1402.
46a
6
While Rice v. Cayetano was decided by the Supreme Court on
Fifteenth Amendment grounds, racial classifications are equally im-
permissible in the Equal Protection content, i.e., Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47a
7
The United States relies on the pre Boumediene and Windsor
cases of Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) and Harris v. Rosario,
446 U.S. 651 (1980). This Court, however, cannot simply bind itself
to the legal status quo of 1980, and ignore important subsequent de-
velopments in the constitutional landscape. If so, cases like Plessy,
Baker v. Nelson and Korematsu would still be good law.
8
Although the inclusion of United States citizens residing in the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands came subsequent
to the enactment of the SSI program, this fact nonetheless evidences
that Congress, in fact, has recognized the importance of extending
the program to United States citizens in the territories.
9
The United States in its supplemental brief (Docket No. 96) notes
that unlike United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico, resident
aliens are subject to federal income tax. This misses the point. A
48a
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS
Vaello-Madero’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 57) and DENIES the government’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 59). Judgment shall be
entered accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 4th day of February,
2019.
APPENDIX C
II. Discussion
The United States moves to dismiss without preju-
dice its claims against Vaello-Madero under Rule 41(a)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule
states that “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff ’s
request only by court order, on terms that the court con-
siders proper.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). The United
States argues that it made a mistake pleading jurisdic-
tion, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case be-
cause Vaello-Madero did not exhaust administrative rem-
edies under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Vaello-Madero counters
that 28 U.S.C. § 1345 confers jurisdiction and that dis-
missal without prejudice would be unfair. The Court
agrees with Vaello-Madero.
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1345
Section 1345 grants the district courts “original juris-
diction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings com-
menced by the United States,” unless an act of Congress
provides otherwise. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (emphasis added).
It “grants broad jurisdictional power to the district
courts over suits when the United States is plaintiff,” in-
cluding actions to determine “the United States’ right to
obtain restitution of monies wrongfully paid from the
public fisc.” United States v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc.,
399 F.3d 1, 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
815 (2005). The Social Security Act’s administrative
review scheme under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)-(h) does not de-
feat jurisdiction under section 1345 when the United
States appears as plaintiff. The First Circuit has held
that “these statutes do not purport to limit the govern-
ment’s ability to bring a claim . . . under a different
grant of jurisdiction,” like section 1345. Id. at 14.
53a
APPENDIX D
* * * * *
(e) For purposes of this subchapter, the term
“United States”, when used in a geographical sense,
means the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
* * * * *
63a
* * * * *
“SECTION 502. (a) The following laws of the
United States in existence on the effective date of this
Section and subsequent amendments to such laws will
apply to the Northern Mariana Islands, except as other-
wise provided in this Covenant:
“(1) those laws which provide federal services
and financial assistance programs and the federal
banking laws as they apply to Guam; Section 228 of
Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act as it
applies to the several States; the Public Health Ser-
vice Act as it applies to the Virgin Islands; and the
Micronesian Claims Act as it applies to the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands;
“(2) those laws not described in paragraph (1)
which are applicable to Guam and which are of gen-
eral application to the several States as they are ap-
plicable to the several States; and
“(3) those laws not described in paragraph (1) or
(2) which are applicable to the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, but not their subsequent amendments
64a
* * * * *