FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 135715. April 13, 2011.]

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST

LOANS, represented by MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, PCGG CHAIRMAN
AND ORLANDO C. SALVADOR AS CONSULTANT OF THE TECHNICAL
WORKING GROUP OF THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE , petitioners, vs .
HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN, PANFILO O.
DOMINGO, CONRADO S. REYES, ENRIQUE M. HERBOZA,
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, ABDULLAH DIMAPORO AND AMER
DIANALAN , respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ , J : p

This petition for review on certiorari 1 is one among the 17 cases led before us
by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, charging public
respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (Ombudsman) for grave abuse of
discretion, when, on the ground of prescription and insu ciency of evidence, he
dismissed all of these cases then pending before him, including this case in OMB-0-97-
1718.
The Facts
Respondents Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, Abdullah Dimaporo, and Amer Dianalan,
were stockholders and o cers of the Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills (MINCOCO), a
domestic corporation established in 1974, 2 while respondents Pan lo O. Domingo,
Conrado S. Reyes, Enrique M. Herboza, and Ricardo Sunga, were then o cers of the
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC).
On 10 May 1976, MINCOCO applied for a Guarantee Loan Accommodation with
the NIDC for the amount of approximately P30,400,000.00, which the NIDC's Board of
Directors approved on 23 June 1976.
The guarantee loan was, however, both undercapitalized and under-collateralized
because MINCOCO's paid capital then was only P7,000,000.00 and its assets worth is
P7,000,000.00.
This notwithstanding, MINCOCO further obtained additional Guarantee Loan
Accommodations from NIDC in the amount of P13,647,600.00 and P7,000,000.00, 3
respectively.
When MINCOCO's mortgage liens were about to be foreclosed by the
government banks due its outstanding obligations, Eduardo Cojuangco issued a
memorandum dated 18 July 1983, bearing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos'
(President Marcos) marginal note, disallowing the foreclosure of MINCOCO's
properties. 4 The government banks were not able to recover any amount from
MINCOCO and President Marcos' marginal note was construed by the NIDC to have
effectively released MINCOCO, including its owners, from all of its financial liabilities. 5

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 The above mentioned transactions, were, however, discovered only in 1992 after
then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), in an effort to recover the ill-gotten
wealth of the late President Marcos, his family, and cronies, issued Administrative
Order No. 13 6 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans (the Committee) , with the Chairman of the Philippine Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) as the Committee's head. The Committee was directed, inter alia,
to inventory all behest loans, and identify the lenders and borrowers, including the
principal o cers and stockholders of the borrowing rms, as well as the persons
responsible for the granting of loans or who in uenced the grant thereof. 7
Subsequently, then President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 8 outlining the
criteria which may be utilized as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan, viz.:
a. It is under-collateralized;
b. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;

c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government o cials like presence

of marginal note;

d. Stockholders, o cers or agents of the borrower corporation are identi ed

as cronies;

e.Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;

f. Use of corporate layering;

g. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought;

h. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.

The Committee found that twenty-one (21) corporations, including MINCOCO,

obtained behest loans. It claimed that the fact that MINCOCO was under-collateralized
and undercapitalized; that its o cers were identi ed as cronies; that the late President
Marcos had marginal note, effectively waiving the government's right to foreclose
MINCOCO's mortgage liens; and, that the Guarantee Loan Accommodation were
approved in an extraordinary speed of one month, bore badges of behest loans.
Subsequently, the Committee led with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint
against MINCOCO's Officers and NIDC's Board of Directors for violation of Section 3 (e)
and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, 9 as amended.
By Resolution dated 9 July 1998, the Ombudsman motu prorio dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that, rst , there was insu cient evidence to warrant the
indictment of the persons charged; and, second, the alleged offenses had prescribed.
1 0 The Ombudsman explained:

Being undercapitalized, standing alone is meaningless. The approval of

the loans/guarantees was still based on sound lending practice, otherwise,
MINCOCO would have been disquali ed from obtaining the same. If MINCOCO's
equity was more than the amount of the loans, there was no need for it to obtain
the latter.

Anent the claim that Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was a crony of the late
President Marcos, no evidence was adduced to prove the same, hence, remains a
bare allegation. . . . .
On the issue that the notation by President Marcos in the Memorandum of
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 July 18, 1983 is a behest order, suffice it to state that these marginal notes, if they
meant endorsement as de ned under Memorandum Order No. 61, endorsed the
recommendation regarding the mortgage liens of the government banks of the
Mothballed Coconut Oil Mills and not the approval/grant of the loans/guarantees
in 1976. It is in effect approved the release of the liabilities of the former
owners of coconut oil mills, one of which was MINCOCO , but not the
acquisition of the said loans/guarantees.

The take over of MINCOCO by UNICOM without the consent of NIDC is not
a characteristic of a behest loan. It is a mere violation of procedures that
does not warrant a criminal action .
xxx xxx xxx

For the perpetration of the acts being complained of, the respondents are
charged of violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. The
instant case however will no longer prosper for the offenses have already
prescribed .

Be it remembered that MINCOCO applied for and was granted

loans/guarantees way back in 1976. Thus, these acts are governed by the law in
force at the time of their commission, which is the old R.A. No. 3019 before its
amendment by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 in March 1982. Offenses perpetrated
prior to the enactment of this latter law prescribed ten (10) years later. And since
the case was led against the herein respondents only in September 1997, the
offenses have long prescribed in 1986.

Prescription commenced to run in 1976 when the assailed transaction

happened. . . . . 1 1

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 1 2
The petitioner argued that the right of the State to recover behest loans as ill-
gotten wealth is imprescriptible under Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution;
1 3 and, assuming that the period to le criminal charges herefore is subject to
prescription, the prescriptive period should be counted from the time of discovery of
behest loans or sometime in 1992 when the Committee was constituted. 1 4
The Ombudsman, in his Comment, countered that his o ce has the discretionary
power during preliminary investigation to determine the su ciency of evidence for
indictment; 1 5 that it is beyond the ambit of the Court to review this exercise of
discretion; 1 6 that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only to civil
suits and not to criminal proceedings; 1 7 and, that the crime under which the
respondents herein were charged had already prescribed. 1 8
Private respondents Pan lo O. Domingo and Enrique M. Herboza, led their
respective Comments mainly reiterating the Ombudsman's contentions. The other
respondents did not le their Comments, and, thus, considered to have waived their
chance thereto.
The Court's Ruling
The remedy from an adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; what was led with the Court, however,
was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Nevertheless, the Court will treat
this petition as one led under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents shows that the
Committee imputes grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the
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 complaint. 1 9 This was how we also treated the previous cases marred by the same
procedural lapse, the latest of which is the 2009 Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 135703). 2 0
At the core of the controversy is the Ombudsman's Resolution holding that
prescription had already set-in effectively barring the institution of charges against the
private respondents. The Ombudsman claimed that the alleged behest loans,
transpired in 1976, 2 1 and, thus, the complaint led after more than two decades from
the commission thereof or on 8 October 1997, was well beyond the 10-year
prescriptive period provided for under the old Republic Act No. 3019. 2 2
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following shall be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription
started to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. 2 3
At the outset, the provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution that "the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public o cials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall
not be barred by prescription , laches or estoppels," has already been settled in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No.
130140) n , 2 4 where the Court held that the above cited constitutional provision
"applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases."
25

The period of prescription for

the crime charged in this
petition, committed in 1976
and prior to the amendment of
Republic Act No. 3019, is ten
(10) years.
Section 11 2 6 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
195, provides that the offenses committed under Republic Act No. 3019 shall prescribe
in fteen (15) years; prior to this amendment, however, under the old Republic Act No.
3019, this prescriptive period was only ten (10) years. In People v. Paci cador, 2 7 the
Court held that the longer prescriptive period of 15-years does not apply in crimes
committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 , which was approved on
16 March 1982, because, not being favorable to the accused, it cannot be given
retroactive effect. Considering that the alleged crime was committed in 1976, and in
line with the Court's ruling in Paci cador, the prescription period should be ten (10)
years.
Prescription of crime shall
begin to run from the day of its
commission, and if the same
be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial
proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
While we sustain the Ombudsman's contention that the prescriptive period for
the crime charged herein is 10 years and not 15 years, we are not persuaded that in this
speci c case, the prescriptive period began to run in 1976, when the loans were
transacted.
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 The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes committed
under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act No. 3326, 2 8 Section 2 of
which provides that:
Section 2.Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.

Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his
right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of
the prescriptive period. 2 9 An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance"
doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of
limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute
of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action. " 3 0 It was in this accord that the Court
confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque 3 1
which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), 3 2 and the
subsequent cases 3 3 which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the
ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, 3 4 that if the violation of
the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to
run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is
the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the
Committee made an exhaustive investigation. 3 5 When the complaint was led in 1997,
only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for
this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans, 3 6 that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party,
to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of
the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public o cials and the
bene ciaries of the loans." 3 7 In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), 3 8 the
Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the
legality of these transactions.
While the Ombudsman has the
full discretion to determine
whether a criminal case is to
be filed, the Court is not
precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman's action when
there is a grave abuse of
discretion.
True, the Ombudsman is a constitutionally created body with constitutionally
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 mandated independence. Despite this, however, the Ombudsman comes within the
purview of the Court's power of judicial review 3 9 — a peculiar concept of Philippine
Ombudsman, embodied in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution 4 0 — which
serves as a safety net against its capricious and arbitrary acts. 4 1 Thus, in Garcia-Rueda
v. Pascasio , 4 2 the Court held that "while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case is to be led, the Court is not precluded from
reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is grave abuse of discretion." 4 3 This is
because, "while the Ombudsman enjoys, as it must, complete independence, it cannot
and must not lose track of the law, which it is bound to uphold and obey." 4 4
After reviewing the case's records, the Court nds that the present petition calls
for the exercise of its power of judicial review.
Private respondents are charged with violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019 which states:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public o cers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public o cers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public o cer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted bene ts, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his o cial administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to o cers and employees of o ces or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not
the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

From the 1999 landmark case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on

Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130140), 4 5 to the 2008 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra (G.R. No. 133756), 4 6 and to the
2009 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No.
135703), 4 7 the same issues confronted the Court as the one presented in the present
petition, in that the Ombudsman similarly dismissed these cases not only on the ground
of prescription but also for insufficiency of evidence. 4 8
Interestingly, the facts in Tabasondra 4 9 are squarely on all fours as the present
case. Tabasondra , 5 0 involved Coco-Complex Philippines, Inc., (CCPI), a domestic
corporation primarily incorporated for the manufacture of coconut oil. 5 1 CCPI applied
for Guarantee Loan Accommodation thru the National Investment Development
Corporation amounting to P9,277,080.00, allegedly for the purchase of an oil mill to be
supplied by Krupp Germany. The NIDC Board approved the loan in 1969, 5 2
notwithstanding the fact that CCPI was undercapitalized with only P2,111,000.00 paid-
up capital, 5 3 and under-collateralized with only P495,300.00 assets. 5 4 Thus, with the
NIDC's Guarantee Loan Accommodation, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted
the loan. Still, with NIDC's guarantee, CCPI obtained additional loans from PNB in 1972,
which, as of 1992, ballooned to P205,889,545.76.
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 When the Committee led criminal complaints against the CCPI's O cers and
PNB's Board of Directors for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019,
the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. For this, the
Committee charged the Ombudsman for grave abuse of discretion, but pending its
resolution before us, the Ombudsman, taking cue from the Court's 1999 ruling in G.R.
No. 130140, 5 5 motu proprio reinvestigated the complaint it earlier dismissed (and was
still pending before us), only to dismiss it anew, in a Resolution dated 16 October 2000,
opining that NIDC's Board of Directors, who approved the loans in favor of CCPI,
should have been the ones indicted . 5 6 Subsequently, the Court dismissed
Tabasondra for being moot and academic.
Similarly, in the present petition, MINCOCO was also granted by NIDC a
Guarantee Loan Accommodation amounting initially to P30.4 million pesos, despite its
being undercapitalized and under-collateralized. 5 7
As the Ombudsman admitted, when MINCOCO's mortgage liens were about to
be foreclosed by the government banks, the late President Marcos intervened and
through a marginal note, in connivance with the NIDC's o cers, waived the liabilities of
its owners to the detriment of the government. 5 8 It behooves the Court that while the
Ombudsman admitted this fact, it saw nothing wrong in President Marcos' intervention,
and the involvement therein of the NIDC's o cers. This intervention alone, by no less
than the highest o cial of the land, waiving a multi-million peso liability of a private
corporation, should have alarmed the Ombudsman.
It surprises us that while the Ombudsman dismissed Tabasondra for not
impleading therein the NIDC's Board of Directors, now that they (NIDC's Board of
Directors) have been impleaded, the Ombudsman still dismissed the complaint,
allegedly for insufficiency of evidence. 5 9
Applying mutatis mutandis G.R. No. 133756 6 0 in this petition, it is apparent that
there can be liability for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Violation of Section 3 (e) 6 1 of Republic Act No. 3019 requires that there be injury
caused by giving unwarranted bene ts, advantages or preferences to private parties
who conspire with public o cers. In contrast, Section 3 (g) 6 2 does not require the
giving of unwarranted bene ts, advantages or preferences to private parties, its core
element being the engagement in a transaction or contract that is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
The waiver of MINCOCO's multi-peso loan should have been enough basis in
nding that probably Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was violated and the fact
that NIDC extended a loan guarantee to MINCOCO, despite its being undercapitalized
and under-collateralized, should have also been enough ground in nding probable
cause for violation of Section 3 (g) of the above-cited law.
More importantly, the nding of the Committee that MINCOCO obtained behest
loans because of the following circumstances: MINCOCO was under-collateralized
and undercapitalized; its o cers were identi ed as cronies; President
Marcos had marginal note, effectively waiving the government's right to
foreclose MINCOCO's mortgage liens; and, NIDC approved MINCOCO's
Guarantee Loan Accommodation in an extraordinary speed of one month,
should have been accorded a proper modicum of respect by the Ombudsman.
Considering the membership of the Committee — representatives from the
Department of Finance, The Philippine National Bank, the Asset Privatization
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 Trust, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation and even the
Development Bank of the Philippines — its recommendation should be given great
weight. No doubt, the members of the Committee are experts in the eld of
banking. On account of their special knowledge and expertise, they are in a better
position to determine whether standard banking practices are followed in the
approval of the loan/guarantee or what would generally constitute as adequate
security for a given loan. 6 3

The duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to

establish whether there exists probable cause to le information in court against the
accused. 6 4 A nding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not, the accused committed the crime. 6 5 Considering the quantum of
evidence needed to support a nding of probable cause, the Court holds that the
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint against
herein respondents.
Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the parties' evidence. 6 6 It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. 6 7 The validity and merits of a party's accusation or
defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during the trial proper. 6 8
In conclusion, the offenses ascribed to respondents "involve behest loans which
bled white the economy of the country, one of the excesses of the authoritarian regime
that led to the EDSA revolution, a serious evil that the 1987 Constitution aimed to
extirpate." 6 9 It involves nothing less than the interest of the people whose
transgressed rights are supposed to be vindicated by their protector — the
Ombudsman. 7 0 As protector of the people, the Ombudsman should be pro-active in
making use of its vast arsenal of powers to "bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise
dark places even over the resistance of those who would draw the blinds." 7 1
The criminal liability of Conrado S. Reyes is hereby extinguished in accordance
with Article 89 (1) 7 2 of the Revised Penal Code as confirmed by his death certificate. 7 3
With respect to respondents Pan lo O. Domingo and Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, the
facts of their deaths have to be con rmed to determine the application to them of the
same provision.
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED
to:
1. DISMISS the complaint against deceased respondent Conrado S. Reyes;
2. REQUIRE the counsels of respondents Pan lo O. Domingo and
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to submit proof of their deaths; and
3. FILE with the Sandiganbayan the necessary Information against
respondents Abdullah Dimaporo, Amer Dianalan, Enrique M. Herboza, and Ricardo
Sunga.
SO ORDERED .
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta * and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

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 *Per Raffle dated 12 April 2011, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta is designated as
additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. inhibition.
1.Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but treated by the Court as a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65.
2.Registered with the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission on 30 July 1974. Rollo,
p. 29.
3.Petition for Review on Certiorari (hereafter, petition). Id. at 13.
4.In 1983, MINCOCO sold all its shares to the United Coconut Mills (UNICOM), which retained
control over the mothballed oil mills. Petition, id. at 14.
5.Ombudsman Resolution, Id. at 31.
6.Issued on 8 October 1992.
7.Administrative Order No. 13.

8.Issued on 9 November 1992.

9.Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted bene ts, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
o cial administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to o cers and employees of
o ces or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
xxx xxx xxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.
10.Ombudsman Resolution. Rollo, pp. 28-34.

11.Id. at 31-32.
12.Per Order dated 13 August 1998, the Ombudsman Denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the petitioner. Id. at 35-38.

13.Petition. Id. at 17-18.

14.Id. at 21-23.
15.Ombudsman's Comment. Id. at 342.
16.Id.

17.Id.
18.Id.
19.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto , G.R. No. 135703,
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 15 April 2009, 585 SCRA 18, 28.
20.Id.
21.Petition. Rollo, p. 13.
22.THE ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

23.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto , G.R. No. 130817,
22 August 2001, 363 SCRA 489, 493.

24.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto , G.R. No. 130140,
25 October 1999, 317 SCRA 272.
25.Id. at 289.

26.Section 11. Prescription of Offenses. — All offenses punishable under this Act shall
prescribe in fifteen years.

27.G.R. No. 139405, 13 March 2001, 354 SCRA 310, 318.

28.AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY
SPECIAL ACT AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION
SHALL BEGIN TO RUN.

29.Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno (Ret.) Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra note 24
at 319.
30.Id. at 318-319, citing 21 AM JUR 2d, pp. 715-716.
31.G.R. No. 100285, 13 August 1992, 212 SCRA 607.

32.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra note 24.
33.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. 130817,
supra note 23; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto ,
G.R. No. 135119, 21 October 2004, 441 SCRA 106; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman , G.R. No. 135350, 3 March 2006, 484 SCRA
16; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra , G.R.
No. 133756, 4 July 2008, 557 SCRA 31.

34.People v. Duque, supra note 31; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto, supra note 24; Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 140358, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 561.
35.415 Phil. 723 (2001).

36.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra note 19.
37.Id. at 28.
38.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra note 23.
39.M. Maulion, Power and Paradox: Deconstructing Ombudsman Independence Amidst the
Thicket of the Constitution, Law and Jurisprudence, LI U.S.T. L. REV. 140-141.
40.Id.
41.Id.
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 42.G.R. No. 118141, 5 September 1997, 278 SCRA 769 at 776 cited in M. Maulion, Power and
Paradox: Deconstructing Ombudsman Independence Amidst the Thicket of the
Constitution, Law and Jurisprudence, supra note 39.
43.Id. at 141.
44.Id.

45.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra note 24.
46.Supra note 33.
47.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra note 19.
48.Id.

49.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra, supra note 33.
50.Id.
51.Id. at 35.
52.Id.
53.As of 31 December 1969, id. at 36.

54.Id.
55.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra note 24.

56.The Committee questioned the Ombudsman's dismissal thereof before the Court which is
now pending for resolution. Supra note 33 at 40.
57.Ombudsman's Resolution. Rollo, p. 29.

58.Id. at 31.

59.Id. at 33.
60.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra, supra note 33.

61.The elements of the offense in Section 3 (e) are: (1) that the accused are public o cers or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public o cers commit the
prohibited acts during the performance of their o cial duties or in relation to their public
positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether the government or any
party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted bene ts, advantage or
preference to such parties; and (5) that the public o cers have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

62.On the other hand, the elements of the offense in Section 3 (g) are: (1) that the accused is a
public o cer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.

63.Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra note 19 at

34.
64.Id. at 33.

65.Id.
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 66.Id.

67.Id.
68.Id.

69.Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno (Ret.) Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra note 29
at 323.
70.Id.

71.Commenting on the role of Ombudsman, which was challenged in 1970 in Alberta, Canada,
Chief Justice Milvain said ". . . [h]e can bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark
places even over the resistance of those who would draw the blinds. . . . ." M. Maulion,
Power and Paradox: Deconstructing Ombudsman Independence Amidst the Thicket of
the Constitution, Law and Jurisprudence, supra note 39 at 110 citing Wafaqi Mohtasib
Annual Report [http://www/policy.hu/bokhari/OmbuIntro.htm].
72.Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
judgment.

73.Death Certificate. Rollo, p. 249.

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "(G.R. No. 130149)" in the original document.

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