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610 Phil. 615

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009
SONNY ROMERO Y DOMINGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ISABEL PADUA,
REGINA BREIS, MINERVA MONTES AND OFELIA
BELANDO BREIS,[1] RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

On April 1, 1999[2] at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner[3] driven by petitioner

Sonny Romero and the Apego Taxi[4] driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on
collision along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo,
Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City while the taxi was going in the
opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the death of Gerardo
Breis, Sr.,[5] Arnaldo Breis,[6] Gerardo Breis, Jr.,[7] Rene Montes,[8] Erwin Breis[9]
and Jimmy Padua.[10] Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived
although they sustained serious injuries.

As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence

As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage
to property in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur.

After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged in a
decision[11] dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable
and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of P3,541,900 by
way of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate
damages and loss of earning capacity.

Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur,
claiming that the MTC erred in holding him civilly liable in view of his acquittal.
On July 17, 2001, the RTC affirmed the MTC judgment in toto.[12]

Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed[13] to the Court of Appeals (CA). On

March 3, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision[14] affirming the RTC.

Left with no other recourse, petitioner now argues[15] that his acquittal should
have freed him from payment of civil liability. He also claims that he should be
totally exonerated from any liability because it was Gerardo Breis, Sr., not the
regular driver, Jimmy Padua, who was actually driving the taxi at the time of the
accident, which was clearly in violation of insurance and transportation laws.

We disagree.

The rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.[16] Criminal
liability will give rise to civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in
damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.[17]
Every crime gives rise to (1) a criminal action for the punishment of the guilty
party and (2) a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage,
and indemnification for the losses.[18]

However, the reverse is not always true. In this connection, the relevant portions
of Section 2, Rule 111 and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.--xxx

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall
be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. (emphasis supplied)
Sec. 2. Contents of the judgment.--xxx

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the

 In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
(emphasis supplied)

Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not
necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.[19] Courts can
acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in
the same case.[20] It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted.
[21]

In this case, the MTC held that it could not ascertain with moral certainty the
wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus in view of the
condition of the highway where the accident occurred and the short distance
between the bus and the taxi before the collision. However, it categorically stated
that while petitioner may be acquitted based on reasonable doubt, he may
nonetheless be held civilly liable. [22]
The RTC added that there was no finding by the MTC that the act from which
petitioner's civil liability may arise did not exist. Therefore, the MTC was correct
in holding petitioner civilly liable to the heirs of the victims of the collision for the
tragedy, mental anguish and trauma they suffered plus expenses they incurred
during the wake and interment.[23]
In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, we agree with the
conclusion of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not commit
the crime charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with
moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the
bus at the time of the accident. Put differently, petitioner was acquitted because
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, his
civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is
another matter.
While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his
negligence was established by preponderance of evidence.[24] In other words, the
failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate
(and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of
such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable.
Thus, the MTC (as affirmed by the RTC and the CA) correctly imposed civil
liability on petitioner despite his acquittal. Simple logic also dictates that petitioner
would not have been held civilly liable if his act from which the civil liability had
arisen did not in fact exist.
arisen did not in fact exist.
Anent the second issue, it would be well to remind petitioner of the time-honored
doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts.[25] The rule finds greater relevance
in this case because the MTC,[26] the RTC[27] and the CA[28] uniformly held that
it was Jimmy Padua, and not Gerardo Breis, Sr., who was driving the taxi at the
time of the accident.

There are of course instances[29] when this Court can embark on a re-examination
of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Sad to say, none of those
instances is present here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.

[1]The surnames of respondents Regina Breis and Ofelia Belando Breis were
erroneously stated as "Bries" in the caption of the petition.
[2] Erroneously indicated as April 21, 1999 by the Court of Appeals.
[3] With Plate No. EAW-533 and Body No. 1019.
[4] With Plate No. PVZ-345.
[5] 36 years old.
[6] 13 years old.
[7] 9 years old.
[8] 14 years old.
[9] 7 years old.
[10] 41 years old.
[11] Penned by Judge Manuel E. Contreras. Rollo, pp. 24-36.
[12] Decision penned by Judge Martin P. Badong, Jr. Id., pp. 37-42.
[13] Under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
[14]Penned by Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos (deceased) and concurred in by
Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired) and Arturo D. Brion (now a member of the
Supreme Court). Rollo, pp. 43-48.
[15] Petitioner appealed to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[16] Revised Penal Code, Art. 100. Underlying the principle that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its
effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because of
the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person
injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage,
contempt and others where no civil liability arises on the part of the offender
either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private
person injured by the crime. Occena v. Icamina, G.R. No. 82146, 22 January 1990,
181 SCRA 328, 333, citing H. Jarencio, Torts and Damages, 1983 ed., p. 237. In
the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of
everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused by another by reason of
his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not
punishable by law. Id., citing C. Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages,
Revised Edition, pp. 246-257.
[17] Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-78911-25, 11 December 1987, 156 SCRA 325.
[18] United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265 (1911).
[19] Bautista
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46025, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 231,
236; Calalang v. IAC, G.R. No. 74613, 27 February 1991, 194 SCRA 514.
[20] Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39999, 31 May 1984, 129 SCRA 558,
567. "There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still
be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. xxx To
require a civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean
clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its
attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned." See also
People v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-57555, 28 August 1984, 131 SCRA 454; Maximo v.
Garuchi, G.R. Nos. L-47994-97, 24 September 1986, 144 SCRA 326; Vizconde v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-74231, 10 April 1987, 149 SCRA 226; People
v. Ligon, G.R. No. L-74041, 29 July 1987, 152 SCRA 419.
[21] Id.

[22] Rollo, p. 31.

[23] Id., pp. 41-42.
[24]In that case, his civil liability remains to be ex delito. (See Manantan v. CA, 403
Phil. 298 [2001].)
[25]Vicente Delos Santos, et al. v. Fred Elizalde, G.R. Nos. 141810 & 141812, 2
February 2007, 514 SCRA 14.
[26] Rollo, p. 24.
[27] Id., p. 39.
[28] Id., p. 45.
[29]It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review,
the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial
of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to
this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; 2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Sampayan v. CA, G.R.
No. 156360, 14 January 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229.

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