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Third Division G.R. No. 48157, March 16, 1988: Supreme Court of The Philippines
Third Division G.R. No. 48157, March 16, 1988: Supreme Court of The Philippines
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THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 48157, March 16, 1988
RICARDO QUIAMBAO, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO,
JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, AND FELIPE GAZA,
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES. LAND AUTHORITY,
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT.
DECISION
FERNAN, J,:
This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one involving pure
questions of law pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and upon denial thereof, filed
his Answer to the complaint, specifically denying the material allegations therein
and averring that the Agreement upon which private respondents base their prior
possession over the questioned lot had already been cancelled by the Land
Authority in an Order signed by its Governor, Conrado Estrella. By way of
affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case, petitioner alleged the
pendency of L.A. Case No. 968, an administrative case before the Office of the
Land Authority between the same parties and involving the same piece of land. In
said administrative case, petitioner disputed private respondent’s right of
possession over the property in question by reason of the latter’s default in the
installment payments for the purchase of said lot. Petitioner asserted that this
administrative case was determinative or private respondents’ right to eject
petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a
judicial action until after its termination.
After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss contained in
petitioner’s affirmative defenses. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in
the case was the recovery of physical possession, the court had jurisdiction to try
and hear the case.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-1576 a petition
for certiorari with injunction against public respondent Judge Adriano Osorio of
the Municipal Court of Malabon and private respondents, praying for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent judge to suspend the
hearing in the ejectment case until after the resolution of said petition. As prayed
for, the then CFI of Rizal issued a restraining order enjoining further proceedings
in the ejectment case.
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in
Civil Case No. C-1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative case between
the same parties on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968 and praying that
the same parties on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968 and praying that
the petition for certiorari be granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and the
Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.
Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior possession, the
CFI dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order previously
issued. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, adopted in
toto by intervenor Land Authority was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal
filed by petitioner Quiambao and intervenor Land Authority with the Court of
Appeals, and certified to Us as aforesaid.
The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether or not the
administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of
the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar
to said ejectment case.
Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal
case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the
former.
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative
in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak
of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2]
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject
petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on .the resolution of the
pending administrative case. For while it may be true that private respondents had
prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the
ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least,
suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell
executed in their favor. Whether or not private respondents can continue to
exercise their right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the
issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the
cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed
portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have
every right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private
every right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private
respondents' right of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner
from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court
to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a
determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial
notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in
the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the
court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer
exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us: