22. People vs. Tanjutco, G.R. No.

L-23924, April 29, 1968

SYLLABUS

1. EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE MAY BE

SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONVICTION. — Although not a
single witness testified to having personally seen the accused
in the act of falsifying the duplicate deposit slips or bank
statements, direct evidence on this point is not imperative as it
was established that the accused himself prepared the original
and deposit slips; that there were discrepancies between the
original deposit slips and the duplicates thereof; that the
amounts indicated in the originals were accordingly credited;
that there were supposed duplicate deposit slips duly signed by
the accused which contained forged initials of the bank-teller or
else not covered by any original slip at all; and that the accused
admitted not only having manipulated the records of his
employer but also of having been able by that means to
abstract amounts from the funds of his employer. Assuming all
these evidences to be circumstantials, they nonetheless
constitute legal evidence that may support a conviction,
affording as they do basis for a reasonable inference of the
existence of the fact thereby sought to be proved.
2. ID.; WHEN LACK OF FORMAL PRESENTATION OF
EXHIBITS DOES NOT RENDER THEIR CONSIDERATION
REVERSIBLE ERROR. — There is no necessity for all the
duplicates slips to be identified one by one before they may be
properly considered against the accused. The absence of the
formal presentation of certain exhibits does not render their
consideration reversible error if repeated references thereto in
the course of the trial by counsel for the accused and of the
court convincingly show that the documents were part of the
prosecution's evidence.
3. ID,; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; RELEVANCY OF
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NOT AFFECTED BY ABSENCE
OF ACCUSED'S SIGNATURE THEREON. — The relevancy of
certain documents to establish the fact that the accused had
received money for deposit for the account of his employer is
not affected by the absence of the accused's signature thereon.
Having been passed upon and favorably considered by the trial
court, the matter of relevancy of these documents cannot be
reviewed on appeal as this lies within the sound discretion of
said court which deserves the respect of the appellate tribunal.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY;
ACCEPTANCE BY COMPLAINANT OF PROPERTIES
BELONGING TO THE ACCUSED AND HIS RELATIVES IN
SETTLEMENT OF OBLIGATIONS, NOT A NOVATION
RESULTING IN EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY; NERY
CASE, DISTINGUISHED FROM PRESENT CASE. — In
support of the claim that acceptance by complainant of
payment converted the liability of the accused into a civil
obligation or else estopped the complainant with the
prosecution of the case, reliance is placed on the case
of Peoplev. Nery, L-19567, February 5, 1964. Such reliance is
misplaced. In the Nery case, an action for estafa, it was held
that contractual relationship between the parties can be validly
novated by the settlement of the obligation of the offender. In
the present case there was no contractual relationship or
bilateral agreement which can be modified or altered by the
parties. There is here merely a taking of the complainant's
property by one who never acquired juridical possession
thereof, qualified by grave abuse of confidence. Moreover, it is
inaccurate to say unqualifiedly that the theory that payment can
obliterate criminal liability was upheld in the Nery case, for it
was precisely held there that acceptance of partial satisfaction
does not affect the nullification of a criminal liability that is fully
matured and already in the process of enforcement.
5. ID.; ID.; PARTIAL PAYMENT BY ACCUSED OF
AMOUNT MISAPPROPRIATED DOES NOT BAR FILING AND
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASE FOR QUALIFIED
THEFT. — Assuming that there was partial payment in the
amount of P134,136.09 by the accused and his relatives of the
amount misappropriated in the sum of P400,086.19, the same
would not suffice to bar the filing and prosecution of the criminal
case for qualified theft against him considering that he
concedes having actually used the money belonging to his
employer although in an amount less than P400,086.19.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.  : p

In an information filed in the Court of First Instance of

Manila (Crim. Case No. 34595) on March 5, 1956, Felipe
S. Tanjutco was accused of the crime of qualified theft,
allegedly committed as follows:
"That in, about and during the period comprised
between January 7, 1953 and January, 1955, inclusive,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then the private secretary of Roman R. Santos, and as
such is entrusted with the duty of depositing large sums
of money in the bank for and in behalf of the said Roman
R. Santos, with grave abuse of confidence did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, take, steal and carry away various sums
of money amounting to P400,086.19, belonging to the
said Roman R. Santos, to the damage and prejudice of
the said owner in the aforesaid sum of P400,086.19,
Philippine currency."
After a protracted trial, decision was rendered on October
14, 1964, the court finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentencing him to
life imprisonment and to the accessory penalties of the law, to
indemnify the estate of the deceased Roman R. Santos in the
sum of P400,086.19, and to pay the costs.
 From this decision, the accused appealed to this Court
assigning 15 errors allegedly committed by the court below, all
boiling down to the question of sufficiency of evidence to
support the lower court's conclusion that he had
misappropriated the total sum of P400,086.19, and in
sentencing him to life imprisonment. In short, the main issue
here is not whether the accused had committed acts of
misappropriation, but how much he had misappropriated,
according to the evidence on record.
The abovementioned judgment of the court below was
based on the findings that during the period specified in the
complaint, the accused was the private secretary of the
complainant Roman R. Santos, businessman, financier and, at
the time, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Prudential
Bank and Trust Company (PBTC) which he had founded. As
such secretary to the Board-Chairman, the accused held office
in the bank premises, had free access to all offices of the bank
and free use of its equipment. The relationship between the
accused and his employer was so intimate and confidential that
the latter used to send to the former sums of money to be
deposited in his (Don Roman's) current accounts with the
Prudential Bank. It was in the discharge of this duty that the
accused betrayed the confidence reposed on him by his
employer by retaining for his personal use part of the money
entrusted to him, resulting in shortage in the accounts of the
employer, which was discovered only in January, 1957.
The intricate operation said to have been resorted to by
the accused and enabled him to cover up his defalcations for
some time, was succinctly described in the decision now on
appeal, thus:
"Mr. Santos (Roman) maintained four accounts, all
current, with the bank. They were identified as accounts
Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. Every time Mr. Santos sent money to
the accused to be deposited, the former indicated the
current account number to which said amount should be
deposited. The accused would then deposit the amount
with the bank and obtain a duplicate of the deposit slip
duly stamped by the bank. This duplicate deposit slip
would later on be shown to Mr. Santos to satisfy the
latter that the money entrusted to the accused was
already deposited according to his instructions. After the
latter shall have checked the correctness of the amount
appearing in the duplicate deposit slip, he would return
said duplicate to the accused for safekeeping.
"For its part, the bank kept the original of the
deposit slips and a separate ledger for each account of
every depositor. In this ledger were entered the deposits
and withdrawal during the month, arranged according to
the dates of the transactions. Said entries were taken
from the original deposit slips in its possession.
"In the case of Mr. Santos, the deposit slips
prepared by the accused indicated the account number
to be credited with the amount of each deposit and the
check used in withdrawing from the deposits likewise
carried the account number to be debited with the
 amount of the check. These ledgers were prepared in
duplicate, and the bank sent the duplicate to the
depositor after the end of each month. In this manner,
the depositor could check the duplicate deposit slips in
his possession with the entries in the duplicate ledger
received by him monthly to determine whether or not
correct entries of the deposits and withdrawals were
made.
"The accused, at first, proved to be loyal, faithful
and trustworthy a secretary and confidant as his
employer wished and thought him to be. Later on,
however, he was tempted to use part of the money
entrusted to him. Probably, he expected to replace it
before his dishonesty was discovered. However, the
temptation to use more of the money entrusted to him
was stronger than his will to replace the amounts he
abstracted. Hence, the amount he stole grew bigger and
bigger until he realized that it was only a question of time
when his crime would be discovered.
"Sometimes, he deposited a smaller amount than
that he received from his employer. At times, he did not
deposit anything at all, although he received money for
deposit.
"To hide his crime, the accused used to falsify
duplicate deposit slips which he showed to Mr. Santos.
And when he received the monthly customer's ledger, he
likewise falsified a duplicate monthly customer's ledger,
entering in the falsified ledger the correct amount he
received from Mr. Santos for deposit in place of the
amount he actually deposited. It was this falsified ledger
which the accused showed to Mr. Santos monthly. It is
obvious that Mr. Santos could not detect any defalcation
if he relied solely on the falsified duplicate deposit slips
and falsified duplicate customer's monthly ledgers."
Appellant does not dispute that a number of duplicate
deposit slips and monthly bank statements, supposed to have
been submitted by him to complainant Roman Santos, were
found to be falsified. What he is contesting here is the lower
court's finding that he, appellant, authored such falsifications,
which conclusion, he claims, is not supported by the evidence.
This allegation is without merit. We found established,
through the testimony of prosecution witnesses, that when he
deposited money for the accounts of complainant Roman
Santos, accused-appellant used to prepare two deposit slips —
one, the original, to be submitted to the bank, and the other to
be shown to Don Roman and later to be kept in his file; 1 that
the accused himself picked up the monthly bank statements of
Roman R. Santos, 2 which he would either withhold or destroy;
that he would thereafter prepare in the bank machine after
office hours, other statements indicating amounts he
purportedly deposited, 3 although actually the deposits must
have been for lesser amounts or no deposits were made at all
(as later revealed by the original deposit slips and bank
ledgers).
 It is true that not a single witness testified to having
personally seen the accused in the act of falsifying the duplicate
deposit slips or bank statements. But direct evidence on this
point is not imperative. Considering that it was the accused-
appellant who prepared the original and deposit slips; that there
appeared discrepancies between the original deposit slips
retained by the Prudential Bank and the duplicates thereof
which were found by the auditors; that the amounts indicated in
the originals were accordingly credited by the bank for the
account of the depositor Roman R. Santos; that there were
supposed duplicate deposit slips, duly signed by accused-
appellant which contained forged initials of the bank-teller, or
else not covered by any original slip at all; 4 that accused-
appellant admitted, not only of having manipulated the records
of his employer, but also of having been able, by that means, to
abstract an undetermined amount from the funds of the
latter 5 no other conclusion could be drawn from the foregoing
facts than that the falsified documents were the ones prepared
by appellant to hide his misdeeds. Even assuming these
evidences to be circumstantial, they nevertheless constitute
legal evidence 6 that may support a conviction, affording as
they are basis for a reasonable inference of the existence of the
fact thereby sought to be proved. 7
Contrary to appellant's contention, there is even no
necessity for all these duplicate deposit slips to be identified
one by one, before they may properly be considered against
the accused. These slips were not only bundled into a bunch
and formally presented as Exhibit Q; they had also been
consistently referred to as one of the bases of the prosecution's
claim that the misappropriated amount totaled P400,086.19. As
ruled by this Court in another criminal case, the absence of any
record of the formal presentation of certain exhibits does not
render their consideration reversible error, if repeated
references thereto in the course of the trial by counsel for the
accused and of the court convincingly show that the documents
were part of the prosecution's evidence. 8 No error, therefore,
was committed by the trial court in giving due credence and
weight to the deposit slips (Exh. Q).
Appellant also challenges the competence of 10
duplicate deposit slips which do not bear his signature, and
urges that the amount covered thereof — P233,744.63 —
should be deducted from the total amount covered by the
duplicate deposit slips coming from the files of Don Roman
Santos.
We have gone over these 40 documents, and found the
following:
One (1) deposit slip, dated July 21, 1953 for P13,283.07,
Account No. 2; although unsigned by accused-appellant, this
tallies with an original deposit slip retained by the Prudential
Bank. The amount it covered was duly credited for the account
of Roman R. Santos as per the bank ledger, Exhibit Y-8.
Two (2) duplicates dated November 19, 1953, for
P2,562.00 and P2,689.00, respectively (Account No. 4), are
evidently genuine; they tally with the originals. The amount they
covered were credited in favor of complainant Roman Santos
(Exh. R-2b).
One (1) duplicate dated September 8, 1953, for
P8,762.07, for Account No. 2, tallies with the original (Exh, 6),
and the amount covered thereby is duly credited for the account
of complainant Santos.
One (1) slip dated September 10, 1953, for P12,274.65
(Account No, 2), is supposed to be the duplicate of the original
(Exh. Q-29). It is noted, however, that while in the original, the
cash deposit was P1,535.20 which amount was accordingly
entered in the bank ledger for the account of complainant
Santos, in the purported duplicate, the cash deposit was placed
only at P1,319.65. The total amount covered by this particular
duplicate deposit slip (P12,274.48), is not deductible from the
sum covered by all the duplicate deposit slips found in the
possession of complainant Roman Santos, because it is clear
that the said amount of P12,274.48 was actually received by
the accused and in fact deposited by him in the bank.
Nine (9) duplicates (Account No. 2), all dated June 17,
1954, for P5,523.78, P500.00, P1,000.00, P733.51, P564.25,
P1,000.00, P974.57, P3,000.00, P3,058.84, respectively, tally
with the originals left with the bank (Exh. 7), and the amounts
thereby covered were duly credited in favor of complainant
Santos (Exh. Z-10). It was noted that no signature also appears
over the appellant's typewritten name even in the originals
submitted to the bank.
Six (6) duplicate slips (Account No. 2) for P1,724.40,
P1,509.20, P1,510.30, P1,485.75, P1,487.85 and P3,851.14, all
dated October 13, 1954, are genuine duplicates of the originals
in the possession of the Prudential Bank. It may be mentioned
that where the duplicates are duly covered with original deposit
slips, the number and denomination of the cash deposits made
were noted in said original slips. Both original and duplicate
slips of these deposits are not signed; the amount thus covered
were duly credited to the complainant Santos (Exh. Z-14).
One (1) duplicate slip dated November 9, 1954, for a
deposit of P1,782.00; one of the several deposits made by the
accused for the account of complainant Santos on the same
day. Both the original and duplicate slips have no signature
over the typewritten name of appellant. Amount covered
thereby duly credited in favor of complainant (Exh. Z-16).
Thirteen (13) unsigned duplicate deposit slips (Account
No. 2), for P1,281.00, P1,374.45, P1,323.00, P1,416.96,
P1,256.64, P1,346.40, P1,330.17, P1,438.00, P1,490.00,
P1,201.00, P1,122.70, P1,747.27 and P1,235.52; respectively,
formed part of a group of 25 deposit slips, all dated December
23, 1954. These 13 unsigned duplicates, however, have their
corresponding originals in the custody of the bank, and the
amounts they covered were duly credited to the account of
complainant Santos. They are apparently genuine copies of the
originals (Exh. Z- 16).
One (1) duplicate deposit slip dated March 12, 1954
(Account No. 3) This slip was accomplished in handwriting, on
the face of which was written diagonally: "Non-negotiable PBTC
Teller No. 2 (True Copy)"; the covered amount of P7,809.40
was duly credited in favor of the complainant. This is apparently
a reconstructed duplicate of the original.
One slip dated January 5, 1953, bearing the rubber
stampmark on PBTC Teller No. 4, but without said teller's
initials. No signature also appears over the typewritten name of
the depositor "F. S. Tanjutco." This slip purportedly showed that
a cash deposit of P2,034.15 and checks for P8,917.33 were
made on that day. A checking of the bank entry for that day
established that seven out of the eight checks specified in this
duplicate deposit slip (PBTC Checks Nos. 12955, for
P1,081.10; 12959 for P941.31; 12960 for P545.88; 12961 for
P871.66; 12963 for P440.00; 12978 for P2,887.38, and 12979
for P150.00) were debited as withdrawals from the same
Account No. 2 on January 5, 1954. Clearly, this supposed
duplicate slip is falsified. Considering that by appellant's own
admission, he was able to cover up the shortages in the funds
of his employer by manipulation of records and documents (see
the testimonies of witnesses Amado S. Carlos, Felix Costa and
Nazario L. Cruz), 9 the inclusion of the amount covered by this
slip in the computation of the sum for which appellant is
accountable, is justified. The very existence of this simulated
deposit slip is sufficient proof that it was intended to be shown
to complainant Roman Santos and thus escape detection by
the latter of appellant's defalcation of his (complainant's) funds.
Two (2) deposit slips purporting to be duplicates, but
without the corresponding originals, dated December 16, 1954
and December 27, 1954 for P2,780.27 and P126,692.89,
respectively, did not have appellant's signature; said amounts
were not also reflected in the bank ledger as actual deposits
made by appellant. Nevertheless, we have to sustain the
inclusion of these amounts in the computation of the money
under appellant's accountability for the same reason as that
given in the discussion of the preceding item.
These 40 duplicate deposit slips were admitted by the
Court below, not to prove falsification, but only to establish the
fact that accused-appellant has received money to be
deposited for the account of his employer, and determine the
exact amount thus received. The relevancy of these documents
to prove the fact is not affected by the absence of appellant's
signature thereon.
In the first place, having been passed upon and favorably
considered by the trial court, the matter of relevancy of these
documents ordinarily cannot be reviewed on appeal. This lies
within the sound discretion of said court and deserves the
respect of the appellate tribunal. 10Secondly, most of the
amounts covered by these 40 deposit slips are sufficiently
backed by the original deposit slips and the bank ledgers. And,
there is no showing that the figures indicated in both the original
and duplicate slips are separately treated or that the amount
thus covered is included twice in the summing up of the missing
amounts. As regards those without corresponding originals, we
have given the reason for their inclusion in the total sum for
which appellant is accountable, in our discussion of those
individual items. Furthermore, it appearing that even some of
the original deposit slips delivered to the bank do not bear
appellant's signature, the absence alone of such signature is no
indication that the 40 duplicate slips in question were not in fact
prepared by him.
Appellant likewise assails the admissibility of entries
appearing in the ledgers of the Prudential Bank (Exh. W, W-1 to
W-4, X, X-1 to X-6, Y, Y-1 to Y-13, Z, Z-1 to Z-18, TT, TT-1 to
TT-5), of the bank statements from its file (Exh. R, R-1 to R-5),
and the monthly bank statements taken from the files of
complainant Roman Santos (Exh. S, S-1 to S-3), claiming that
under the prosecution's theory, 11 the best evidence to prove
his guilt would be the original slips and their duplicates.
There is no merit to the contention. It must be
remembered that the prosecution had to prove the amount
allegedly embezzled by the accused. This, the prosecution tried
to do by establishing the amounts received by the accused-
appellant and company it with those deposited in the bank; the
resulting difference being treated as the amount abstracted
from the funds of the complainant. Under this theory, the
ledgers and bank statements naturally are not just secondary,
but the primary evidence of the deposits made, while the
monthly bank statements found in the files of complainant
Roman Santos which were supposed to confirm the amounts
he had ordered the accused- appellant to be deposited, are the
best evidence of the amounts actually entrusted to the latter.
Consequently, the trial court committed no error in ruling in
favor of the admissibility of the above-mentioned exhibits.
We also find as untenable appellant's allegation that
there was no "positive, direct evidence" to show that the
monthly bank statements found in the file of the complainant
were the same documents delivered by him to the latter. By
urging in his Fifth Assignment of Error the deduction from the
total sum covered by all the duplicate deposit slips coming from
the files of complainant, of the amounts covered by the 40
unsigned deposit slips, claiming that the resulting difference is
the "correct total amounts covered by duplicate deposit slips for
which accused can be held liable" (p. 27, appellant's brief), said
accused-appellant in fact acknowledged that these duplicate
deposit slips were the ones delivered by him to complainant
Santos.
Neither would it be accurate to say that the decision of
the lower court was based solely on the alleged hearsay report
of the auditing firm of Costa & Cruz (Exh, P). Said court, in its
decision, stated:
"The auditors Costa and Cruz found that the
accused manipulated only accounts Nos. 2, 3, and 4. As
stated above, he at various times deposited less than
what he received for deposit and at times he did not
deposit anything at all but simply used the entire amount
he received for deposit. To cover up for his criminal act
and in order to avoid detection especially when he feared
that Don Roman Santos might make a big withdrawal,
the accused also resorted to transferring of funds of Don
Roman from his fixed deposits to his current account.
The report of the auditors (Exh. P) is clear and the
evidence introduced in Court in support of their report
 and the testimony of Mr. Costa convinced the Court of
the correctness of the figures arrived at by
them."(Decision, pp. 8-9)
In other words, the lower court gave due weight to the report of
the auditors because it was found to be clear and duly
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence (monthly
bank accounts, bank statements, deposit slips — the materiality
and relevancy of which were already here sustained) presented
during the trial, to which conclusion we fully agree.
After going with the evidence on record, the court below
concluded that the accused had defalcated out of the money
delivered to him for deposit in the bank, the following amounts:
I. Deficiency from:      
  a. Account No. 2      
    (Exhibit No. I)      
    1954   P134,105.89  
    1955   15,760.58  
        —————  
          P149,866.47
  b. Account No. 3      
    (Exhibit No. II)      
    1953   P14,405.05  
    1954   13,114.01  
        —————  
          P27,519.06
  c. Account No. 4      
    (Exhibit No. III)    
    1953     P 23,733.87
    1954   198,725.83 P222,459.70
        ————— —————
    Total shortage of Accounts   P399,845.23
      Nos. 2, 3 & 4    
II. Interest from FIXED DEPOSIT:    
  a. F/d No. 182 12/27/54    
    Schedule I Notation   P20.96
  b. F/d No. 208 1/20/54    
        220.00 240.96
        ———— —————
      TOTAL SHORTAGES    P400,086.19
          =========

Appellant maintains that the amount he misappropriated

could not have exceeded P50,000.00. But this allegation is not
only unsupported by any corroborative evidence, but is in itself
uncertain, appellant having admitted in court that he never kept
any record of the sums he abstracted from the funds of the
complainant, and that the amount of P50,000.00 was only his
estimate (t.s.n., p. 2114, hearing of Feb. 24, 1964). Such bare
testimony indeed cannot overcome the prosecution's proof that
the unaccounted amount, for which appellant is answerable,
totalled P400,086.19.
Finally, making capital of the acceptance by complainant
of properties belonging to the accused and his relatives
allegedly assigned to the former for the settlement of his
obligations, accused- appellant claims that there had been
novation of the relationship between him and the said
complainant, resulting in the obliteration or extinction of his
criminal liability. This argument is anchored on the alleged
recognition by this Court of the novation theory (to extinguish
criminal liability) in the case of People vs. Nery, G.R. No. L-
19567, February 5, 1964.
Reliance on the aforecited Nery case, in support of the
contention that the acceptance by complainant of payment
converted the liability of the accused-appellant into a civil
obligation or else that it estopped said complainant from
proceeding with the prosecution of the case, is misplaced and
unwarranted.
Firstly, in the Nerycase, which is an action for estafa,
there was contractual relationship between the parties that can
be validly novated by the settlement of the obligation of the
offender. Whatever was said in that case, therefore, cannot be
invoked in the present case where no contractual relationship
or bilateral agreement, which can be modified or altered by the
parties, is involved. There is here merely a taking of the
complainant's property by one who never acquired juridical
possession thereof, qualified by grave abuse of confidence.
Secondly, it is inaccurate to say unqualifiedly that the
theory that payment can obliterate or extinguish criminal liability
was upheld in the Nery case. On the contrary, it was there
explicitly said:
"It may be observed in this regard that novation is
not one of the means recognized by the Penal Code
whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the
role of novation may only be to either prevent the rise of
criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that
its breach would not give rise to penal responsibility, as
when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or
other similar disguise is resorted to (cf. Abeto vs. People,
90 Phil. 58; U. S. vs. Villareal, 27 Phil. 481).
"Even in Civil Law the acceptance of partial
payments, without further change in the original relation
between the complainant and the accused, cannot
produce novation. For the latter to exist, there must be
proof of intent to extinguish the original relationship, and
such intent cannot be inferred from the mere acceptance
of payments on account of what is totally due. Much less
can it be said that the acceptance of partial satisfaction
can effect the nullification of a criminal liability that is fully
matured, and already in the process of enforcement.
 Thus, this Court has ruled that the offended party's
acceptance of a promissory note for all or part of the
amount misapplied does not obliterate the criminal
offense. (Camus vs. Court of Appeals, 48 O. G. 3898)."
Assuming, therefore, that there was partial payment 12 by
the accused- appellant of the amount he misappropriated, that
would not have sufficed to bar the filing and prosecution of the
criminal case for qualified theft against him, considering that he
concedes having actually used money belonging to his
employer although in an amount less than P400,086.19.
Furthermore, it may be mentioned that the mother and sister of
accused-appellant, before the criminal case here was filed,
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action
for annulment of the deeds of assignment of their properties
(Civil Case No. 875) on the ground that they were induced to
execute the same through fraud and deceit. In view of our ruling
on the foregoing issue, the outcome of this annulment-case will
certainly not affect the accused-appellant's liability for the crime
he had committed.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs
against the appellant.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
 

Footnotes

1.t.s.n., pp. 257-259, 269-270, hearing of Dec. 2, 1957; pp. 790, 818,
hearing of July 20, 1959.
2.t.s.n., pp. 269-270, hearing of Dec. 2, 1957; pp. 657, hearing of June 29,
1959.
3.t.s.n., pp. 260-261, hearing of Dec. 2, 1957; pp. 818, hearing of July 20,
1959.
4.Exhs. Q-1 to Q-28, 30a; t.s.n., pp. 1049-1092, 1111, hearing of July 20,
1960.
5.t.s.n., p. 818, hearing of July 20, 1959.
6.De Reeder vs. Travelers Ins. Co., 198 A. 45, 329 Pa. 328.
7.See Vol. 4, Martin, Rules of Court of the Philippines, 1966 ed., p. 22.
8.People vs. Roxas, L-16947, Nov. 29, 1962.
9.t.s.n., pp. 51-52, hearing of Oct. 4,1957; pp. 257-261, hearing of Dec. 2,
1957; pp. 790, 818, hearing of July 20, 1959.
10.20 Am. Jur. 241; Vol. 4, Martin, op. cit., on p. 23.
11.That the accused was entrusted to deposit money in the name of Don
Roman Santos with the Prudential Bank; that he deposited with the
bank only part of the money thus entrusted to him, or none at all; that
in depositing various amounts, he prepared two deposits slips — one
original and one supposed duplicate; that the original which was
delivered to the bank together with the money represents the actual
amount deposited in the accounts of Roman Santos, but the duplicate
which he submitted to the latter as proof that money he received were
 actually deposited, contains an amount more than what was in reality
deposited by him.
12.The real and personal properties assigned to complainant, by means of
deeds of assignment executed by the accused, his wife, parents and
sisters on February 12, 15 and 16, 1955, are said to be worth
P134,136.09, whereas the misappropriated amount was placed at
P400,086.19.

|||  (People v. Tanjutco, G.R. No. L-23924, [April 29, 1968], 131 PHIL 884-899)