Patula vs. People

4/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 669
G.R. No. 164457. April 11, 2012.*
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to be Informed; The

Bill of Rights guarantees some rights to every person accused of a
crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation.—The Bill of Rights guarantees some
rights to every person accused of a crime, among them the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Same; Same; Same; An accused cannot be convicted of an
offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information.
—The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and
cause of the accusation in the information should never be taken
for granted by the State. An accused cannot be convicted of an
offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or
information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged
in the complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime,
even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily
included in the information filed against him.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of Estafa under Article 315,
Paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.—The elements of the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000171732c1ba37615505b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/36
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Patula vs. People
offense charged were as follows: (a) That the offender received

money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (b)
That the offender misappropriated or converted such money,
goods or other personal property, or denied his part in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the
prejudice of another; and (d) That the offended party made a
demand on the offender for the delivery or return of such money,
goods or other personal property.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; The rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there
was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.—It is
apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged
to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any
difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any
obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches
herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the
burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there
was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony
may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but
if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
Same; Same; Same; If an extrajudicial utterance is offered,
not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without
reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does
not apply.—The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted,
the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-
examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not
as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference
to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness
testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a
thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the
complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the
accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in
137
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 137
Patula vs. People
character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore,

between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the
hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted
in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
Same; Same; Right to Cross-Examination; The right to cross-
examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of
testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is
essential to the administration of justice.—Section 36, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right
of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant
claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied
because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that
the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the
only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
Same; Same; Public Documents; Private Documents; Section
19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public
document and a private document for the purpose of their
presentation in evidence.—Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court distinguishes between a public document and a private
document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz.:
Section 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private. Public documents are: (a) The written official acts, or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged
before a notary public except last wills and testaments, and (c)
Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein. All other writings are
private.
Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Entries in the Course of
Business; Requisites before Entries in the Course of Business
Could be Excepted from the Hearsay Rule.—The terse yet
sweeping manner of justifying the application of Section 43 was
unacceptable due to the need to show the concurrence of the
several requisites before entries in the course of business could be
excepted from the hearsay
138
Patula vs. People
rule. The requisites are as follows: (a) The person who made the
entry must be dead or unable to testify; (b) The entries were made
at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (c) The
entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or
religious; (e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Temistocles B. Diez for petitioner.
Manolo Zerna for private respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly
test the State’s evidence of guilt in order to ensure that
such evidence adheres to the basic rules of admissibility
before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged
upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge;
otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.
The accused need not adduce anything to rebut evidence
that is discredited for failing the test. Acquittal should then
follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information

filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City
that averred:
“That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20,

1997 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain
of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the
total
139
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 139
Patula vs. People
sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company

under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the
sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from
complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period of
time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to
defraud the said company, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the
said company but instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the
proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount of
P131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.”1
Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the

information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of facts was had,
and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution’s first witness was Lamberto Go, who
testified that he was the branch manager of Footlucker’s
Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footlucker’s) in Dumaguete City
since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of
Footlucker’s, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she
became a sales representative; that as a sales
representative she was authorized to take orders from
wholesale customers coming from different towns (like
Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and
Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect
payments from them; that she could issue and sign official
receipts of Footlucker’s for the payments, which she would
then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the
payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her
volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped,
leading him to confront her; that she responded that
business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk
to verify; that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on
some collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to
an audit by com-
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 22.
140

Patula vs. People
pany auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a

customer of petitioner’s that the customer’s outstanding
balance had already been fully paid although that balance
appeared unpaid in Footlucker’s records; and that one
night later on, petitioner and her parents went to his house
to deny having misappropriated any money of Footlucker’s
and to plead for him not to push through with a case
against her, promising to settle her account on a monthly
basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped
reporting to work.2
On March 7, 2002, Go’s cross examination, re-direct
examination and re-crossexamination were completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen
Guivencan, whom Footlucker’s employed as its store
auditor since November 16, 1995 until her resignation on
March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had requested her to
audit petitioner after some customers had told him that
they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger
had still reflected outstanding balances for them; that she
first conducted her audit by going to the customers in
places from Mabinay to Zamboanguita in Negros Oriental,
and then in Siquijor; that she discovered in the course of
her audit that the amounts appearing on the original
copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers
varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of
the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon
completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written report
denominated as “List of Customers Covered by
Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records
as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997” marked as
Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had
misappropriated the total amount of P131,286.92.3
_______________
2 TSN, September 15, 2000; March 7 and 30, 2001.
3 TSN, April 4, 2002; August 13, 2002; September 11, 2002; September
12, 2002; and November 20, 2002.
141
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 141

Patula vs. People
During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the Prosecution

marked the ledgers of petitioner’s various customers
allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first
column that contained the dates of the entries, a second

that identified the invoices by the number, a third that
stated the debit, a fourth that noted the credit (or the
amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit
minus credit). Only 49 of the ledgers were formally offered
and admitted by the RTC because the 50th ledger could no
longer be found.
In the course of Guivencan’s direct-examination,
petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on
the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and
their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves
presented in court.4 With that, petitioner’s counsel did not
anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding
her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended
to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the
information.
The Prosecution then formally offered its documentary
exhibits, including Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
(like the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly
executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the
confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the
accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencan’s so-called
Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies.5
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense
decided not to file a demurrer to evidence although it had
manifested the intention to do so, and instead rested its
case.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their
respective memoranda, and submitted the case for
decision.6
_______________
4 TSN, September 11, 2002, pp. 3-7
5 Rollo, p. 23-27.
6 Id., p. 27.
142

Patula vs. People
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as

petitioner had opted “not to present evidence for her
defense” the Prosecution’s evidence remained “unrefuted
and uncontroverted,”7 rendered its decision finding
petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
“Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and

circumstances, the Court finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par
(1b) of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE PENALTY of
imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum
to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum with
all the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify
private complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with interest at
12% per annum until fully paid and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the cash bail put up by the accused shall be effective
only until the promulgation of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.”8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the

RTC denied the motion on May 7, 2004.9
Issues
Insisting that the RTC’s judgment “grossly violated [her]

Constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her because,
while the charge against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1
(b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented
against her and upon which her conviction was based, was
falsification, an offense not alleged or included in the
Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty,” and that
_______________
7 Id., p. 40.
8 Id., p. 43.
9 Id., pp. 45-46.
143
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 143

Patula vs. People
said judgment likewise “blatantly ignored and manifestly

disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in that the
documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all
private documents, the due execution and authenticity of
which were not proved in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,” petitioner has
directly appealed to the Court via petition for review on
certiorari, positing the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR

THAT MATTER, CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315,
PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE
CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION
WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS
VIOLATED WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY
EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING THAT THE
CHARGE AGAINST HER IS ESTAFA THROUGH
MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS “B” TO “YY”-“YY-2”,
ALL PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE EXECUTION AND
AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE 132 OF THE SAID
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE FACT
THAT SAID EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY
THE ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN GUIVENCAN
DESPITE THE OBJECTION THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH
TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED
EXHIBITS “B” TO “YY”-“YY-2” INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE
ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.
144

Patula vs. People

CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION “REMAINS UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED” DESPITE ACCUSED’S OBJECTION
THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT
TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE’S NOT CROSS-

EXAMINING KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT
HER TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT
TENDED TO PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN
INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF SAID
TESTIMONY AS BEING “UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED”, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENSE’S OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID
WITNESS.
RULING THAT EXHIBIT “A”, WHICH IS THE LIST OF
CUSTOMERS COVERED BY SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA
WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND
SELF-SERVING.10
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:

1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the
falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by petitioner to her
customers violated petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation;
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the
falsification of the duplicate receipts despite the information not
alleging the falsification;
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioner’s
guilt for estafaas charged despite their not being duly
authenticated; and
4. Whether or not Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers and receipts
(Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove
petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for
being hearsay.
_______________
10 Id., p. 10.
145
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 145

Patula vs. People
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioner’s right to be informed

of the nature and cause of the accusation
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her

Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation when: (a) it held that the information did
not have to allege her falsification of the duplicate receipts,
and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code by relying on the
evidence on falsification.
The contention of petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guarantees some rights to every
person accused of a crime, among them the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:
“Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a

criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in

effect when the information was filed in the RTC, contained
the following provisions on the proper manner of alleging
the nature and cause of the accusation in the information,
to wit:
146

Patula vs. People
“Section 8. Designation of the offense.—Whenever possible, a

complaint or information should state the designation given to the
offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or
omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such
designation, reference should be made to the section or subsection
of the statute punishing it. (7)
Section 9. Cause of accusation.—The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily

in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form
as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court
to pronounce proper judgment.” (8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the

nature and cause of the accusation in the information
should never be taken for granted by the State. An accused
cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged
in the complaint or information. To convict him of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be violative of the Constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.11
Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if
duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily
included in the information filed against him.
The crime of estafa charged against petitioner was
defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b),
Revised Penal Code, viz.:
“Article 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall

defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall
be punished by:
_______________
11 People v. Manalili, G.R. No. 121671, August 14, 1998, 294 SCRA 220, 252;
People v. Ortega, Jr., G.R. No. 116736, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 166, 187; People v.
Guevarra, G.R. No. 66437, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA 740, 751; Matilde, Jr. v.
Jabson, No. L-38392, December 29, 1975, 68 SCRA 456, 261; United States v.
Campo, No. 7321, 23 Phil. 368, 371-372 (1912).
147
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 147

Patula vs. People

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and

medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but
does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over
200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount
does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases
mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or
partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.
xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:

(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal property
in trust, or on commission, or for admini-
148

Patula vs. People
stration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make

delivery of, or to return, the same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money, goods
or other personal property, or denied his part in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the
prejudice of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the
delivery or return of such money, goods or other personal
property.12
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution,

petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by
her customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the
receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer to
show that the customers had paid less than the amounts
actually reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she
committed the falsification in order to conceal her
misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the
falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from

the estafa charged against her, the Prosecution could
legitimately prove her acts of falsification as its means of
establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an
essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the
information. In that manner, her right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not
infringed or denied to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the
information herein completely pleaded the estafa defined
and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised
Penal Code within the context of the substantive law and
the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information
to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because
falsification was not an element of the estafa charged.
_______________
12 Barrameda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96428, September 2, 1999,
313 SCRA 477, 484.
149
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 149

Patula vs. People

Not surprisingly, the RTC correctly dealt in its decision
with petitioner’s concern thuswise:
“In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that

[the] prosecution’s evidence utterly fails to prove the crime
charged. According to the defense, the essence of Karen
Guivencan’s testimony is that the accused falsified the receipts
issued to the customers served by her by changing or altering the
amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her
testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is
misappropriation under Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of the Revised
Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of any
falsification or alteration of amounts in the [i]nformation under
which the accused was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY.
Accused, thus, maintains that the testimony of Karen Guivencan
should therefore not be considered at all as it tended to prove an
offense not charged or included in the [i]nformation and would
violate [the] accused’s constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
The Court is not in accord with such posture of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that
because the crime charged in the [i]nformation is merely
[e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents,

the prosecution could not prove falsification. Such
argumentation is not correct. Since the information
charges accused only of misappropriation pursuant to Art.
315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds
that there is no necessity of alleging the falsification in the
Information as it is not an element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of
Estafa and Falsification will constitute as one complex
crime and when they are considered as two separate
offenses. The complex crime of Estafa Through
Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to
falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or
goods from another person. In other words, the
falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa.
However, if the falsification is committed to conceal the
misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and
falsification are committed. In the instant case, when
accused collected payments from the customers, said
collection which was in her possession was at her disposal.
The falsified
150

Patula vs. People
or erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate

copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some
amount of her collection which she did not remit to the
company xxx.13
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence, being

hearsay, did not prove petitioner’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the
Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this
burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to warrant
a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein.14 The Prosecution must
further prove the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense.15 In doing all these, the
Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence,
and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the
evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in

favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed.16 Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused
has no burden of proof,17 that he must then be acquitted
and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the
presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the
weakness of the defense put up by the accused is
inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the
Prosecution has not discharged its burden of
_______________
13 Rollo, pp. 41-42 (bold emphasis supplied).
14 Andaya v. People, G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 539,
556-557.
15 People v. Esmale, G.R. Nos. 102981-82, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA
578, 592.
16 Section 14, (2), Article III (Bill of Rights).
17 People v. Arapok, G.R. No. 134974, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA
479, 498.
151
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 151

Patula vs. People
proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged

and in identifying the accused as the malefactor
responsible for it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa
charged in the information?
To establish the elements of estafa earlier mentioned,
the Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and
Guivencan, and various documents consisting of: (a) the
receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her
customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the
accounts pertaining to each customer with the
corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of
the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished
by Guivencan herself.18 The ledgers and receipts were
marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court
the various duties of petitioner as Footlucker’s sales
representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no
personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by
petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to
Footlucker’s. This means that persons other than

Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based her
testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly
issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn
statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her
being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity
to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the
entries as evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation or
conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The
denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of
misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus
unreliable and untrust-
_______________
18 Supra, at note 1.
152

Patula vs. People
worthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence

of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was
unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative
value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of
Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from her own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal
knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of
a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of
the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose
because her testimony derives its value not from the credit
accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from
the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of
her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what
she has heard another person say about the facts in
dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and
under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight
of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the
witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the
information to the witness without oath. The information
cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in
court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-
examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay
is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any
question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple
assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden
entirely upon the dead or
153
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 153

Patula vs. People
absent author.19 Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony

rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.20 The testimony may have
been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it
is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.21
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a
human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the
fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as
evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to
the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial
utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter
asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a
slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he
heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief,
this testimony is admissible not to prove that the
complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the
accused uttered those words.22 This kind of utterance is
hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.23 The
distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not
apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.24
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is
understandably not the only rule that explains why
testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding
_______________
19 5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Edition, pp. 267-
268; citing Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johnson (N.Y.), 45, 50, 6 Am. Dec.
253.
20 Id., citing Minea v. St. Louis Corp., 179 Mo. A., 705, 716, 162 S.W.
741.
21 Id., p. 268.
22 Wigmore, Sec. 1766; Tracy’s Handbook, 62 Ed., pp. 220-221.
23 Id.
24 20 Am Jur 404.
154

Patula vs. People
hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing

party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to
have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.25
If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because
the declarant is not in court.26 It is then to be stressed that
the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of
justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible
hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a dispute
while also safeguarding a party’s right to cross-examine
her adversary’s witness, the Rules of Court offers two
solutions. The first solution is to require that all the
witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in
court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz.:
“Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.—The

examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be
done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the
witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be
given orally. (1a)”
The second solution is to require that all witnesses be

subject to the cross-examination by the adverse party.
Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this
solution thusly:
“Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.—Upon

the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be
cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in

the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient
fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)”
_______________
25 People v. Pagkaliwagan, 76 Phil. 457, 460 (1946).
26 Donnelly v. United States, 228 US 243.
155
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 155

Patula vs. People
Although the second solution traces its existence to a

Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e.,
Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which
guarantees that: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to
face xxx,” the rule requiring the cross-examination by the
adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as
evidence is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to
its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and
due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity
and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor
upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court
statement depends.27
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s
testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of
petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in

admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private
documents that were not duly authenticated as required by
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes
between a public document and a private document for the
purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz.:
_______________
27 Gulam v. Santos, G.R. No. 151458, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 463,
473.
156

Patula vs. People
“Section 19. Classes of documents.—For the purpose of

their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of

the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except
last wills and testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.”
The nature of documents as either public or private

determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its
official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will)
or a competent public official with the formalities required
by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no
further authentication in order to be presented as evidence
in court. In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person
without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is
proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign
character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules
of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The
requirement of authentication of a private document is
excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the
document is an ancient one within the context of Section

21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b)
_______________
28 Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not
necessary.—Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
157
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 157

Patula vs. People
when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable

document have not been specifically denied under oath by
the adverse party;29 (c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted;30 or (d)
when the document is not being offered as genuine.31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives were private documents because private
individuals executed or generated them for private or
business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the
exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could
not be presented and admitted as evidence against
petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their
authentication in the manner provided in Section 20 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
“Section 20. Proof of private documents.—Before any

private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
_______________
found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given. (22 a)
29 Section 8, Rule 8, Rules of Court, which states:
Section 8. How to contest such documents.—When an action or defense is
founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding
pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution
of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to
be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of
the original instrument is refused. (8a)
30 Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
31 Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court.
158

Patula vs. People

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that
which it is claimed to be.”
The Prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate the

signature of petitioner in various receipts, to wit:
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with
the original receipts, do you have copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but it’s not now in my
possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable
Court, can you assure this
(Next Page)
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in
this case, Anna Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this
case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the
receipts also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would
present this, or offer the same as soon as the original receipts can
be presented, but for purposes only of your testimony, I’m
going to point to you a certain signature over this receipt
number FLDT96 20441, a receipt from Cirila Askin, kindly go
over the
159
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 159

Patula vs. People
signature and tell the Honorable Court whether you are

familiar with the signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word
“collector”.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature
rather, of the accused in this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting
the original receipts Your Honor, because it’s quite voluminous,
so we will just forego with the testimony of the witness but we will
just present the same using the testimony of another witness,
for purposes of identifying the signature of the accused. We
will request that this signature which has been identified to by the
witness in this case be marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to
present the original copy and present the same to offer as our
exhibits but for the meantime, this is only for the purposes of
recording, Your Honor, which we request the same, the receipt
which has just been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit
“A” You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit “A”.
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit “A-1”.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature & mark it as Exh. “A-1”. What is the number
of that receipt?
160

Patula vs. People

ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that:
received from Cirila Askin.32
x x x”
As the excerpts indicate, Go’s attempt at authentication

of the signature of petitioner on the receipt with serial
number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked
as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of petitioner
thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled
out after the Prosecution admitted that the document was
a mere machine copy, not the original. Thereafter, as if to

soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly
promised to produce at a later date the originals of the
receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other
receipts. But that promise was not even true, because
almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to
authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receipts
through a different witness (though then still unnamed). As
matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go
authenticate both the machine copy of the receipt with
serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of
petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the
machine copy was inexplicably forgotten and was no longer
even included in the Prosecution’s Offer of Documentary
Evidence.
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial
number FLDT96 No. 20441 was subsequently presented as
Exhibit B through Guivencan. However, the Prosecution
did not establish that the signature appearing on Exhibit B
was the same signature that Go had earlier sought to
identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on
the machine copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact
that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking
nomenclature for the machine copy of the receipt bearing
serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and
purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to
refer instead to an en-
_______________
32 TSN, September 15, 2000, pp. 13-16.
161
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 161

Patula vs. People
tirely different document entitled “List of Customers

covered by ANA LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records
as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, 1997.”
In her case, Guivencan’s identification of petitioner’s
signature on two receipts based alone on the fact that the
signatures contained the legible family name of Patula was
ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the
documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently,
Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioner’s
signature on the receipts either because she lacked
familiarity with such signature, or because she had not
seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the

following excerpts from her testimony bear out:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet,
will you go over these Miss witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The
other receipt is the one showing her payment prior to the last
payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as
Exhibit “B-3”, receipt number 20441.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as –
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the
collector, are your familiar with that signature? (shown to
witness)
A. Yes.
162

Patula vs. People

Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit “B-
3-a”.
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit “B-4” and
the signature as Exhibit “B-4-a”.
COURT:
Mark it.33
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued
to one Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this receipt if this is
the receipt of your office?
A. Yes.
Q. There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose
signature is this?
A. Ms. Patula.
Q. How do you know that this is her signature?
A. Because we can read the Patula.34
We also have similar impressions of lack of proper

authentication as to the ledgers the Prosecution presented
to prove the discrepancies between the amounts petitioner
had allegedly received from the customers and the amounts
she had
_______________
33 TSN, August 13, 2002, pp. 15-16.
34 TSN, September 11, 2002, p. 9.
163
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 163

Patula vs. People
actually remitted to Footlucker’s. Guivencan exclusively

relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgers to
support her audit report on petitioner’s supposed
misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of
independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the
following excerpts of her testimony show:
Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed
that this Cecilia Askin has an account of P10,791.75?
ATTY. DIEZ:
The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office
record.
COURT:
Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that
and showed it to the customers for confirmation.
Q. What about the receipts?
COURT:
Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied
that amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by the
customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed by the
customers?
WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance of
P10,971.75.
Q. Do you have a- what’s the basis of saying that the balance of this
customer is still P10,971.75
(Next Page)
164

Patula vs. People

ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):
[i]n your office?
COURT:
That was already answered pañero, the office has a ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?
A. No, Ma’am.35
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and
the duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable Court
on that discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her
ledger shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in the
original
(Next page)
WITNESS (continuing):
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred
Ninety-one Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75).
COURT:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there?
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already
forwarded to the Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it
has already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original
receipt she has still a balance.
_______________
35 TSN, April 4, 2002, pp. 20-21.
165
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 165
Patula vs. People

xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
The confirmation sheet ---
COURT:
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt
in your earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to as the
receipts, the original receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that
that particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand
something?
A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in
the ledger?
A. Yes.36
In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the

Prosecution’s evidence, it should come as no surprise that
petitioner’s counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the
RTC mysteriously overruled the objections and allowed the
Prosecution to present the unauthenticated ledgers, as
follows:
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA:
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
Q – Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers.
Where is it now?
A – It is here.
Q – Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how
much is her account in your office?
_______________
36 TSN, August 13, 2002, pp. 10-14.
166

Patula vs. People

ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer
the question, let me interpose our objection on the ground
that this ledger has not been duly identified to by the
person who made the same. This witness will be testifying

on hearsay matters because the supposed ledger was not
identified to by the person who made the same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think
they were already duly identified by this witness. As a matter of
fact, it was she who brought them to court
(Next Page)
COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the
entries is not this witness, Your Honor. How do we know
that the entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts
submitted to their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let
the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A – It’s the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is
the auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where
those entries were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.
xxx
167
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 167

Patula vs. People

ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing
objection to the questions profounded(sic) on those ledgers
on the ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.
Q – (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who
prepared the entries on those ledgers, is she still connected
with Footluckers?
A – She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of
business. So, exempt from the hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.37
The mystery shrouding the RTC’s soft treatment of the

Prosecution’s flawed presentation was avoidable simply by
the RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules earlier
quoted, as well as with Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, which contains instructions on how to prove the
genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as
follows:
“Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.—The

handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is
_______________
37 TSN, September 11, 2002, pp. 3-7.
168

Patula vs. People
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the

judge.” (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not

themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents,
the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to
YY and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted
rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as
evidence. That was the only fair and just result, as the
Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine
Nails and Wires Corporation:38
“On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.,

contends that Jeanne King’s testimony was hearsay
because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of
the documents supporting respondent’s cause of action,

such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of lading, SGS
Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even
though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the
importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein
respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of
the facts which gave rise to respondent’s cause of action. Further,
petitioner asserts, even though she personally prepared the
summary of weight of steel billets received by respondent, she did
not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually
shipped and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondent’s cause of action
is founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo
consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable,
respondent has to prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric
tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00, and second, the
actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer,
namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned
to handle respondent’s importations, including their insurance
coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets
being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her
testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. However,
_______________
38 G.R. No. 138084, April 10, 2002, 380 SCRA 374, 378-379.
169
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 169

Patula vs. People
she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the

delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have
personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received.
Even though she prepared the summary of the received
steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts
prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets
received was hearsay. It has no probative value even if not
objected to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to
properly authenticate respondent’s documentary evidence. Under
Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private
document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticated either by the person who executed it, the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any
person who was present and saw it executed, or who after
its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the
person to whom the parties to the instruments had

previously confessed execution thereof. In this case,
respondent admits that King was none of the
aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary of
the weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated
bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of
steel billets actually received had no proven real basis,
and King’s testimony on this point could not be taken at
face value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public
or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any
of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 20 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any
private document is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here,
respondent’s documentary exhibits are private documents.
They are not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus,
their due execution and authenticity need to be proved
before they can be admitted in evidence. With the
exception concerning the summary of the weight of the
steel billets imported, respondent presented no supporting
evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently,
they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo
and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In
sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove
petitioner’s liability.”
170

Patula vs. People
That the Prosecution’s evidence was left uncontested

because petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to
cross-examination, and did not tender her contrary
evidence was inconsequential. Although the trial court had
overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencan’s
testimony by petitioner’s counsel due to the hearsay
character, it could not be denied that hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, had no probative value.39 Verily,
the flaws of the Prosecution’s evidence were fundamental
and substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and
were defects that the adverse party’s waiver of her cross-
examination or failure to rebut could not set right or cure.
Nor did the trial court’s overruling of petitioner’s objections
imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and
value.Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the

ledgers from the application of the hearsay rule by also
tersely stating that the ledgers “were prepared in the
regular course of business.”40 Seemingly, the RTC applied
Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
“Section 43. Entries in the course of business.—Entries made

at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.”
This was another grave error of the RTC. The terse yet
sweeping manner of justifying the application of Section 43
was unacceptable due to the need to show the concurrence
of the several requisites before entries in the course of
business could be excepted from the hearsay rule. The
requisites are as follows:
_______________
39 Id., citing Eugenio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103737, December
15, 1994, 239 SCRA 207, 220.
40 Rollo, p. 42.
171
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 171

Patula vs. People

(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or
religious;
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.41
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State

to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court
reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a judge
must rigidly test the State’s evidence of guilt in order to
ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the

crime charged upon such evidence. The failure of the judge
to do so herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of
law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove
her innocence. Her acquittal should follow.
IV
No reliable evidence on damage
Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt

unreliable, the Court declares that the disposition by the
RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify Footlucker’s in the
amount of P131,286.92 with interest of 12% per annum
until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually founded.
Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that
basis. Her acquittal has to be declared as without prejudice
to the filing of a civil
_______________
41 II Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Ninth Edition, p. 652.
172

Patula vs. People
action against her for the recovery of any amount that she
may still owe to Footlucker’s.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE AND
REVERSES the decision convicting ANNA LERIMA
PATULA of estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her for
failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action
brought against her for the recovery of any amount still
owing in favor of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del

Castillo and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment set aside, Anna Lerima Patula acquitted.
Notes.—Generally, witnesses can testify only to those

facts derived from their own perception. A recognized
exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying
person’s declaration made under the consciousness of an
impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.

(People vs. Salcedo, 645 SCRA 248 [2011])
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against an accused cannot be waived for reasons
of public policy. (People vs. Pangilinan, 660 SCRA 16
[2011])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Patula vs. People

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Patula vs. People

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

4/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 669

G.R. No. 164457. April 11, 2012.*

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to be Informed; The

136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patula vs. People

offense charged were as follows: (a) That the offender received

VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 137

Patula vs. People

character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore,

138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patula vs. People

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information

“That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20,

VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 139

Patula vs. People

sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company

Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the

140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

pany auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a

VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 141

During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the Prosecution

column that contained the dates of the entries, a second

142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as

“Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the

Insisting that the RTC’s judgment “grossly violated [her]

VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 143

said judgment likewise “blatantly ignored and manifestly

1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR

144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE’S NOT CROSS-

The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:

VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 145

did not violate petitioner’s right to be informed

Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her

“Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a

Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in

146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Section 8. Designation of the offense.—Whenever possible, a

ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily

The importance of the proper manner of alleging the

“Article 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall

VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 147

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and

The elements of the offense charged were as follows:

148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

stration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make

According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution,

falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from

VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 149

“In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that

[e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents,

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

or erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate

Testimonial and documentary evidence, being

Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in

VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 151

proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged

Footlucker’s. This means that persons other than

152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED