G.R. No.

L-28790             April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration vs.CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, et. al.
Facts:
Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified
Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. Under
the said Act, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as
those of a Judge of CFI. The Secretary of Justice,Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas,
requiring him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Noblejas answered that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge,he could only
be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the
Judiciary Act and claimed that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed a
petition claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge.
Held:
No. Applying the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be
given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the
Constitution, the Supreme Court constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151
to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of
the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right
to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only
upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be
a violation of the Constitution specifically, on the doctrine of separation of powers
wherein it would charge the Supreme Court with
an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously 
reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief executive over such officials. Consequently,
the investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner are neither abuses
of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, et. al. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term limits
of elective officials, through People’s Initiative based on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago and others
opposed the petition on the ground that the constitutional provision on people’s
initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law
has been passed. They also argued that RA No. 6735, which was relied upon by Delfin,
contained no provision regarding amendments to the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover
initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.

HELD:
No, with respect to initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. FIRST: Section 2
of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The
inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not
relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution. SECOND:
the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in
the case of initiative on the Constitution. Third. While the Act provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national
and local laws.
G.R. No. 154182             December 17, 2004

EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS
Accused Edgar Y. Teves, Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental took
advantage of his official functions while in the performance of his official futies by
causing the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of  Daniel Teves. For this reason, he was held
liable for having a proscribed pecuniary interest in the cockpit b a s e d   o n t h e
s e c o n d   s u b - e l e m e n t   o f t h e t h i r d e l e m e n t   o f S e c .   3 ( h ) of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, w h e r e i n
a   p u b l i c o f f i c e r i s prohibited from having suc h interest by the
constitution or by any law.

Issue:
As regards the penalty, whether or not the Local
Government Code Prevails over the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices
Act.
Held.
Under the rule of statutory construction, where one statute deals with a subject in
general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed
way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter
shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. Or where
two statutes are of contrary tenor or of different dates but are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail over
the other. Conformably with these rules, the LGC of 1991, which specifically prohibits
local officials from possessing pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local
government unit and which, in itself, prescribes the punishment for violation thereof, is
paramount to the Anti-Graft Law, which penalizes possession of prohibited interest in a
general manner. Moreover, the latter took effect on 17 August 1960, while the former
became effective on 1 January 1991. Being the earlier statute, the Anti-Graft Law has to
yield to the LGC of 1991, which is the later expression of legislative will.
G.R. No. L-28392           January 29, 1968

JOSE C. AQUINO, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

FACTS:

The petitioners question in their petition the legality of the appointment by the Comelec
of the seven persons, as substitute members of the City Board of Canvassers to take
the place of seven City Councilors, upon the ground that those seven substitutes are
not persons or officials who are referred to in Section 159 of the Revised Election Code
as the ones who may be appointed as substitute members of the city board of
canvassers in the event of the absence or incapacity of any member of a city board of
canvassers. In their petition the petitioners contend that the seven substitutes should
be persons appointed by the President of the Philippines, not by the Comelec, pursuant
to the provisions of Section 28 of the Revised Election Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioners is correct.
HELD:
The contention of the petitioners has no merit. The appointment of substitutes in the
municipal or city council, or provincial board, by the governor or the President, as the
case may be, under Section 28 of the Revised Election Code could not have been
intended to refer to substitutes in the board of canvassers. Furthermore the supreme
court considered view that Section 28 of the Revised Election Code is now obsolete. It is
in Sections 159 and 167 of the Code where it is specifically provided how substitution in
the provincial, city, or municipal, board of canvassers, should be made - that is, that the
appointment of the substitutes must be made by the Comelec. Section 28 of the
Revised Election Code may be considered as a proviso of general character in the
Revised Election Code, while Section 159 and 167 are provisos of specific character. It
is the accepted rule of statutory construction that a specific proviso of the statute
prevails over a general proviso. It is also the rule that when there is a conflict between
two clauses or sections of the same statute, effect must be given to the last in the
order of position, the latter overriding the earlier. 
G.R. No. L-108208 March 11, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION

FACTS:

An information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor with RTC of Quezon City
against private respondent Alexander Dionisio, a member of the PNP, charging him with
the crime of homicide when he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang
during an operation. In 1992, the respondent Judge dismissed case "for re-filing with
the Sandiganbayan". Petitioner maintains that the term "regular courts" does
not include the Sandiganbayan. Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 1 provides that
"criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular courts." He further claimes that Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, as regards the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan over members of the PNP.
ISSUE
Whether or the term "regular courts" includes the Sandiganbayan.
RULING
Yes. The term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. There
could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to
remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of
the PNP and to vest it in the courts within the judicial system, the civil courts which, as
contradistinguished from courts-martial, are the regular courts. Under the amendments
introduced by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the “offenses or
felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office.” Hence,
the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term regular courts in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975. There is, as well, no merit in the theory of petitioner that
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by P.D. No. 1861, because: First, the argument is based on the faulty assumption that
the Sandiganbayan, being a special court, is not a regular court within the
contemplation of Section 46. Second, both provisions are not irreconcilable and the
presumption against an implied repeal has not been overcome. Implied repeal may be
indulged in only if the two laws are inconsistent, or the former law must be repugnant
as to be irreconcilable with the latter law. Necessarily then, an attempt must be made
to harmonize the two laws as provided under the law of statutory construction.
G.R. No. 147066 26 March 2001
AKBAYAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION
 FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May 2001 General Elections for new
voters ages 18 to 21. According to them,, around four million youth failed to register on
or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under
Republic Act No. 8189. A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new
voters on February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by
the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that no
registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)
days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
extension of the voters registration.

HELD:

No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of
Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within
120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is
regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact
laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent
and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances
of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to
the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
G.R. No. 162155               August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE et. al.vs PRIMETOWN PROPERTY

GROUP, INC.

FACTS:

Primetown Property Group, Inc., through its vice chair, applied for the refund or credit
of income tax respondent paid in 1997 due to the slowdown of the real estate industry
where respondent suffered losses. However, despite the losses, they still paid their
quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to
BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer required
respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim.  Respondent complied
but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition
as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax
refund or tax credit as it found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April
14, 1998.

Issue:
whether or not Art. 13 of the Civil Code should be applicable in computing the legal
periods or Sec. 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
HELD:
Under the principle of Lex posteriori derogat priori, a later statute takes away the effect
of a prior one. Moreover, An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably
intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses
entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably
reconciled. Applying the said principle in the present case, Both Article 13 of the Civil
Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with
the same subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year
is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
irrelevant. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing
legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason,
the Supreme Court ruled that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. By
these, the petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th
calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
filed within the reglementary period.
G.R. No. L-18536             March 31, 1965
JOSE B. AZNAR vs. RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO

FACTS:
Theodoro Santos advertised in the newspapers the sale of his car. L. De Dios, claiming
to be the nephew of Marella, went to the residence of Santos and expressing his uncle’s
intent to purchase the car. Since Santos wasn't around, it was Irineo who talked with de
Dios. On being informed, Santos advised his son to see Marella, which the son did.
Marella expressed his intention to purchase the car. A deed of sale was prepared and
Irineo was instructed by his father not to part with the deed and the car without
receiving the purchase price from Marella. When Irineo and de Dios arrived at the
residence of Marella, the latter averred that his money was short and had to borrow
from his sister. He then instructed de Dios and Irineo to go the supposed house of the
sister to obtain the money with an unidentified person. He also asked Irineo to leave
the deed to have his lawyer see it. Relying on the good faith of Marella, Irineo did as
requested. Upon arriving at the house of Marella’s supposed to be sister, de Dios and
the unidentified person then disappeared together with the car. Marella was able to sell
the car to Aznar and while attending to registration, the car was seized by Phil.
Constabulary due to the report of the incident.
ISSUE:
Between Teodoro Santos Jose B. Aznar, who has a better right to the possession of the
isputed automobile?

HELD:
Teodoro Santos has the better right. Marella never had title to the car as the car wasn't
ever delivered to him. While there was a deed of sale in his favor, he was only able to
obtain possession of the car since he stole it from Santos. Article 559 is the applicable
law. The rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from its finder, thief or
robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such
finder, thief orrobber. The said article provied 2 exceptions to the general rule which
are the owner has lost the thing or has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these
cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner who may recover it
without paying any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale.
Furthermore, the common law principle that where one of two innocent persons
must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the
party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed,
cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the
new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and a
statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this Jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 147066 26 March 2001
AKBAYAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION
 FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May 2001 General Elections for new
voters ages 18 to 21. According to them,, around four million youth failed to register on
or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under
Republic Act No. 8189. A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new
voters on February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by
the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that no
registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)
days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
extension of the voters registration.

HELD:

No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of
Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within
120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is
regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact
laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent
and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances
of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to
the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
G.R. No. L-2873             February 28, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL

Defendant Garcia was found guilty of the crime of robbery. He was 17 years of age at
the time of the commission of the crime. The lower court, ignoring defendant's
minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1
day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor. He was also sentenced to pay
the offended party, jointly and severally with the other accused, the sum of P85 as
indemnity. Republic Act No. 47 (Oct 3, 1946), which amended article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to "be
committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable
institution," instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the
controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also
amended paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that
when the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, "the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the Solicitor General is correct.
HELD:
No. The contention of Solicitor general is conflict to the rule that All parts of a statute
are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part
thereof, and conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so
regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. In other words,
Implied repeal may be indulged in only if the two laws are inconsistent, or the former
law must be repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter law. Necessarily then, an
attempt must be made to harmonize the two laws as provided under the law of
statutory construction. In the present case, there is no irreconcilable conflict between
article 68, paragraph 2, as it now stands and article 80 as amended. There is no
incompatibility between granting accused of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating
circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a
reformatory institution. In other words, there is no inconsistency between sending
defendants of certain ages to prison and giving them a penalty lower than the
imposable one on adults under the same or similar circumstances. Let it be
remembered that the privilege of article 68 is not by its nature inherent in age but
purely statutory and conventional, and that this privilege is granted adult offenders
under given conditions.