Professional Documents
Culture Documents
HO 12 - Arts 100 - 113
HO 12 - Arts 100 - 113
Acts or omissions resulting in felonies produce two classes of injuries . The first injury is directed against the state and is
known as “social injury”. The offended party is the government or the collective right of our people. It is repaired through the
imposition of penalties. The second injury is directed to the private offended party and is known as “personal injury”. The injury
is caused to the victim of the crime who may have suffered damage, either to his person, to his property, or to his honor which is
compensated by way of indemnity which is civil in nature.
A person criminally liable is also civilly liable. The award of civil damages arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code,
subject to the provisions of Article 32, 33 and 34 of the New Civil Code. Procedural aspect of the civil liability of the accused, Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court governs. Section 1, Rule 111 provides that:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate,
or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees
therefore shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the others.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
Civil liability in the aforecited rule is predicted on the crime committed by the offender. If the civil liability arose from
crimes covered under Articles 32, 33 and 34 and 2176 of the New Civil Code, an independent civil action can be
instituted, either before or after the filing of the criminal case, provided that in the latter case, the offended party makes
an express reservation to file a separate civil action . When a civil action is filed as stated above, the same is suspended
upon filing of the criminal action, meaning, the trial is not to be done until the criminal case is resolved or decided. This
rule, however, is not applicable if the civil liability that is separately instituted, arises or originates from the provisions of
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code.
It is necessary, however that the civil liability under all said articles arise from the same act or omission of the accused.
When the civil liability arising from the crime is different from civil liability arising from the Civil Code, if civil liability is
already awarded in the criminal action, the offender cannot again claim civil liability arising from crime, and one arising
from quasi-delict.
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
BASIS: Obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of an act or omission, whether
done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of
the crime.1
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded : (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death
of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.2
The award of civil indemnity may be granted without any need of proof other than the death of the victim. 3
If the crime is one from which no civil liability may arise, like Illegal Possession of Firearm (P.D. 1866 as amended by
R.A. 8294), or illegal sale, transport or possession of prohibited drugs (R.A. 64225 as amended by R.A. 7659), the
convict incurs no civil liability.
The civil liability of the accused may be enforced in the criminal action or in a direct civil action. The choice is in the
offended party. If his preference is to prosecute the civil action in the criminal proceedings, he cannot be compelled to
institute a separate civil action instead.4
1) Actual Damages - crimes against persons, like crime of physical injuries – Whatever he spent for treatment of
wounds, doctor’s fees, medicines as well as salary or wages unearned.
2) Loss of Earning Capacity - an amount to be fixed by the court according to the circumstances of the deceased
related to his actual income at the time of death and his probable life expectancy
3) Moral Damages – In crimes like: Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal
or arbitrary detention or arrest, illegal search, libel, slander or any other form of defamation, malicious prosecution.
4) Exemplary Damages - Imposed when crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
5) Temperate Damages – Given in some circumstances when the actual damages proven is less and to commensurate
the loss of the victim or his/her family.
6) Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation — The actual amount thereof, but only when a separate civil action to
recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded.
If there is no damage caused by the commission of the crime, offender is not civilly liable.
In the case of People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,5 the Supreme Court laid down the rules as to the Civil Liabilities of the
accused, to wit:
1
People v. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 179278, Mar. 28, 2008 (550 SCRA 480)
2
Ingal v. People, G.R. No. 173282, Mar. 4, 2008 (547 SCRA 632)
3
People vs. Barriga, G.R. No. 178545, Sept. 29, 2008 (567 SCRA 65)
4
People vs. Guido, 57 Phil. 52
5
G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos (now Php 75,000.00) even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by
the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the descendant's inheritance by law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Dismissal of the information or the crime action does not affect the right of the offended party to institute or continue the
civil action already instituted arising from the offense, because such dismissal does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil one.
When accused is acquitted on ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted
In the case of Guaring, Jr. vs. CA,6 the Supreme Court held that: It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if
based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara,7 it was held:
. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111,
§2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. . . .
X x x
Furthermore, even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the
bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he
was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held: 8
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt 9 as only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature 10 as, for instance, in the felonies of
estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil
liability11; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted.12
6
G.R. No. 108395, Mar. 7, 1997
7
98 SCRA 723, 728 (1980)
8
Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 565-566 (1984).
9
PNB vs. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286
10
De Guzman vs. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People vs. Pantig, supra
11
See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code
12
Castro vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623
When during the trial what was established was only the civil aspect of the case and the same facts adduced did not
constitute a crime, civil liability is also awarded. 13
In the case of Pacheco vs. CA,14 the Supreme Court ruled that: An accused acquitted of a criminal charge may
nevertheless be held civilly liable in the same case where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. Based on the
records, they still have an outstanding obligation of P15,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Vicencio.
Exemption from criminal liability in favor of an imbecile or insane person, and a person under 15 yrs, or over 15 but
under 18 who acted without discernment and those acting under the impulse of irresistible force or under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury does not include exemption from civil liability.
Acquittal in the criminal action for negligence does not preclude the offended party from filing a civil action to recover
damages, based on the theory that the act is quasi-delict.
When the court found the accused guilty of criminal negligence but failed to enter judgment of civil liability, the private
prosecutor has a right to appeal for the purposes of the civil liability of the accused. The appellate court may remand the
case to the trial court for the latter to include in its judgment the civil liability of the accused
Where the accused was convicted in a criminal case but the court did not make any pronouncement on his civil liability,
such omission on the part of the court will not operate to prevent or bar the offended party to file a separate civil
action.15 Silence is the declaration that the same is reserved by the complainant and will not operate as res judicata.
Before expiration of the 15-day for appealing, the trial court can amend the judgment of conviction by adding a provision
for the civil liability of the accused, even if the convict has started serving the sentence.
An INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case
provided the right is reserved. Reservation is necessary in the following cases:
1. Any of the cases referred to in Art 32 (violation of ones fundamental rights).
2. Defamation, fraud and physical injury (bodily injury and not the crime of physical injury)(Art.33).
3. Civil action is against a member of a city or municipal police force for refusing or failing to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property(Art.34).
4. In an action for damage arising from fault or negligence and there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties (quasi-delict)(Art.2176).
When the civil aspect of the case is not reserved but is prosecuted in the criminal action, the offended party may, by
appropriate motion, pray or ask the trial court to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the property of the
accused as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be awarded in favor of the offended party upon the
termination of the case.
If the offended party in a criminal case is represented by a private prosecutor, he cannot file a separate civil action.
If the offended party is represented by a private prosecutor and the latter did not produce evidence to prove civil liability
and the case was resolved without the evidence to prove civil liability and the case was resolved without the court
disposing of the civil aspect of the case, the decision of the court shall operate as a bar to the recovery of civil liability. In
a criminal case, the presence of a private prosecutor is justified because of the civil aspect of the case. As a rule, the
moment the private prosecutor makes a manifestation that the offended party is reserving the civil aspect of the case, he
is immediately disqualified to appear as private prosecutor. 16
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability , unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist, i.e. death of the accused
pending trial.
In a criminal case, the civil liability of the employee is enforceable against the employer if the former is insolvent.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION – One which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
2. The resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action wherein the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. (Sec. 5, Rule 111, RRC)
13
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558
14
G.R. No. 126670, Dec. 2, 1999
15
Bachrach Motors, Inc. vs. Gamboa, 101 Phil. 1219
16
Roas vs. Dela Cruz, GR No. L-31134, February 13, 1960
For the principle to apply, it is essential that there be 2 cases involved, a civil and a criminal case. Prejudicial questions
may be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed.
CASES:
1) People vs. Guido, 57 Phil 52, G.R. No. L-37320, August 15, 1932
The civil liability of the accused may be enforced in the criminal action or in a direct civil action depending on
the choice of the private offended party.
2) Bachrach Motors vs. Gamboa, 101 Phil 1219, G.R. No. L-9729, April 24, 1957
Where the accused was convicted in a criminal case but the court did not make any pronouncement on his civil
liability, such omission on the part of the court will not operate to prevent or bar the offended party to file a
separate civil action.
3) Roas vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-31134, February 13, 1960
If the offended party is represented by a private prosecutor and the latter did not produce evidence to prove
civil liability and the case was resolved without the court disposing of the civil aspect of the case, the decision of
the court shall operate as a bar to the recovery of civil liability.
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control,
or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also
attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the
damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the
manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears
shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving
always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
General Rule: Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability.
Exception: No civil liability in par 4 and 7of art 12 . Par 1,2,3,5 and 6 are NOT exempt from civil liability although exempt
from criminal liability.
o Primarily devolve upon persons having legal authority or control over him, if at fault or negligent (except if proven
that they acted without fault or with due diligence).
o If no fault or negligence, or even with fault but is insolvent and there are no persons having legal authority over
them, the property of the insane, minor or imbecile not exempt from execution shall be held liable.
2. Guardians.
In actual practice, when a minor or an insane person is accused of a crime, the court will inquire who are the persons
exercising legal control upon the offender. When the names of such persons are made known to the court, they are
required to participate in the proceedings, not only to help the accused in his defense but also for said persons in
legal authority to protect their interests as persons primarily liable to pay the civil liability caused by the minor or
insane. They may, however, invoke the defense embodied under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which provides
that in order to escape civil liability, the persons primarily liable must prove that they observed all the diligence of a
god father of a family to prevent damages.
In the event that the minor or insane has no parents or guardian, the court will appoint a guardian ad litem to protect
the interests of the minor or insane. In such a case, the court will render judgment fixing the civil liability of the
minor or insane and under such a situation, the property of the minor shall be primarily liable in the payment of civil
liability.
Final release of a child based on good conduct does not remove his civil liability for damages.
d. No civil liability in justifying circumstances EXCEPT: par 4 of Art 11, the one benefited by the act is civilly liable.
Those who benefited by the act and court shall determine the proportionate amount for which each shall be liable. If
the government or majority of the inhabitants are liable, such will be determined by special laws or regulations.
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments . — In
default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or
some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses
from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified
in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
Elements of Par 1:
a. That the innkeeper of the establishment or his employee committed a violation of municipal ordinance or some general
or special police regulation.
b. A crime is committed in such establishment.
c. Person criminally liable is insolvent.
When the foregoing circumstances are present in the commission of the crime, the civil liability of the offender shall also
be the civil liability of the owners of the establishments. Such civil liability arises only if the person criminally liable is
insolvent because the nature of the liability of the innkeeper and the others is only subsidiary.
Elements of Par 2:
a. Guests notified in advance the innkeeper of the deposit of such goods within the inn.
b. Guests followed the directions of the innkeeper with respect to the care and vigilance over the such goods.
c. Such goods of the guest lodging therein were taken by robbery with force upon things or theft.
No civil liability in case of robbery w/ violence against or intimidation of person, unless committed by the innkeeper’s
employees.
Actual deposit of the things of the guest to the innkeeper is not necessary, it is enough that they were within the inn.
The Supreme Court ruled that even though the guest did not obey the rules and regulations prescribed by the
management for safekeeping of the valuables, this does not absolve management from the subsidiary civil liability .
Non-compliance with such rules and regulations by the guests will only be regarded as contributory negligence, but it
won’t absolve the management from civil liability.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons . — The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry
for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties.
Elements
a. Employer, teacher, person or corporation is engaged in any kind of industry.
b. Any of their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices of employees commits a felony while in the discharge of his duties
which are related to the business of his employer.
c. The said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability.
In the case of Yonaha vs. CA,17 the Supreme Court ruled that: To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to
have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits “while” in the
discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of
course, concludes the employer18 and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the
employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefore by
law.19
In the case of Basilio vs. CA,20 the Supreme Court declared that: There are two instances when the existence of an
employer-employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One, during the
criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances,
petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process.
Industry – Any department or branch of art, occupation or business; especially one which employs so much labor and
capital is a distinct branch of trade.
Hospitals are not engaged in industry; hence not subsidiarily liable for acts of nurses.
There is no need to file a civil action against the employer in order to enforce the subsidiary civil liability for the crime
committed by his employee, it is enough that the writ of execution is returned unsatisfied.
In the trial of the case, if the court will allow the participation of the employer to protect its civil liability, it cannot put up
the defense of diligence of a good father of a family. Such kind of defense is available only if the action is based or
predicated on quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Distinctions between the civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and his liability under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code:
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil liability arises from crime, while under Article 2180, the obligation
arises from quasi-delict.
The liability of the employer under the RPC is subsidiary, while under the Civil Code, it is direct and primary;
Under the RPC, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is clear from the
decision of conviction against the accused. Under the Civil Code, the complaint must be filed against the employer
because his liability is direct and primary.
The RPC requires previous conviction of the offender-employer. Such is not required under the Civil Code.
5. As to the availability of the defense of the “exercise of diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of employee.”
This defense is not available to defeat the employer’s subsidiary liability under the RPC. On the other hand, the Civil Code
allows such defense in favor of the employer.
17
G.R. No. 112346, Mar. 29, 1996
18
Ozoa vs. Vda. de Madula, 156 SCRA 779.
19
See Vda. De Paman vs. Señeris, 115 SCRA 709.
20
G.R. No. 113433, Mar. 17, 2000
Acquittal of the driver in the criminal case is not a bar to the prosecution of the civil action based on quasi-delict. The
source of obligation in the criminal case is Article 103, or obligations arising from crime, while the civil action is based on
Article 2176 or quasi-delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code provides that quasi-delicts and acts or omissions punishable by
law are two different sources of obligations.21
In the case of Martinez vs. Barredo,22 the Supreme Court ruled that: The employer cannot be said to have been
deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary
liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident
to and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal
action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of
the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his
employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. 23
Furthermore, in the case of Yusay vs. Adil,24 it was stated that: The employer is, in substance and in effect, a party to
the criminal case against his employee, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. Thus:
It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his
employee but in substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by
law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the
criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his
own fate because his failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is
convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to
court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court. It was not
without purpose that this Court sounded the following stern warning:
It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and
deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or
as a result of the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them benefit of counsel; and
consequently doing away with the practices of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the
American rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied. 25
CASES:
1) Lagazon vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 41380, Oct. 18, 1988
When the employee is convicted in a criminal action, the subsidiary liability of the employer may be enforced in
the same proceedings.
2) Rotea vs. Halili, 109 Phil 495, G.R. No. L-12030, Sept. 30, 1960
A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity is conclusive upon the
employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter’s subsidiary liability.
3) Virata vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. L-46179, Jan. 29, 1978
The acquittal of the driver in the criminal case is not a bar to the prosecution of the civil action based on Quasi
Delict.
Art. 104. What is included in civil liability . — The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103
of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
First remedy granted by law is no. 1, in case this is not possible no. 2.
RESTITUTION – In theft, the culprit is duty bound to return the property stolen.
REPARATION – In case of inability to return the property stolen, the culprit must pay the value of the property stolen.
In case of physical injuries, the reparation of the damage cause would consist in the payment of hospital bills and
doctor’s fees to the offended party.
21
Virata vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. L-46179, Jan. 29, 1978
22
G.R, No. L-49308, May 13, 1948 (81 Phil. 1).
23
Almeida et al., vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil., 178, affirmed in 218 U.S., 476; 54 Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. vs. Larion 45 Phil. 314,
320; Francisco vs. Onrubia, 46 Phil., 327; Province of Ilocos Sur vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil., 829; Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.
24
G.R. No. L-56612, Aug. 18, 1988 (164 SCRA 494)
25
Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670, 675.
CIVIL LIABILITIES PECUNIARY LIABILITIES
Includes reparation and indemnification Same
Includes restitution (return property taken), No restitution as the liabilities are to be paid out
nothing to pay in terms of money of the property of the offender
No fines and costs of proceedings Includes fines and costs of proceedings
Art. 105. Restitution. — How made. — The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible,
with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third person who has acquired it by
lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person, who may be liable to him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third person in the manner and
under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.
The convict cannot by way of restitution, give to the offended party a similar thing of the same amount, kind or species
and quality. The very thing should be returned.
If the property stolen while in the possession of the third party suffers deterioration due to his fault, the court will assess
the amount of the deterioration and, in addition to the return of the property, the culprit will be ordered to pay such
amount
General Rule: The owner of the property illegally taken by the offender can recover it from whomsoever is in
possession thereof. Thus, even if the property stolen was acquired by a 3 rd person by purchase w/o knowing that it has
been stolen, such property will be returned to the owner.
Restitution or restoration presupposes that the offended party was divested of property, and such property must be
returned. If the property is in the hands of a third party, the same shall nevertheless be taken away from him and
restored to the offended party, even though such third party may be a holder for value and a buyer in good faith of the
property, except when such third party buys the property from a public sale where the law protects the buyer.
If the thing is acquired by a person knowing that it was stolen, then he is an accessory and therefore criminally
liable(liable under the anti-fencing law)
The third party who acquired the stolen property may be reimbursed w/ the price paid therefor if it be acquired at (a) a
public sale and (b) in good faith
When the liability to return a thing arises from a contract , not from a criminal act, the court cannot order its return in the
criminal case.
Restitution may be ordered, even if accused is acquitted, provided the offense is proved and it is shown that the thing
belongs to someone else
The obligation of the offender transcends to his heirs, even if the offender dies, provided he died after judgment became
final, the heirs shall assume the burden of the civil liability, but this is only to the extent that they inherit property from
the deceased, if they do not inherit, they cannot inherit the obligations.
When crime is not against property, no restitution or reparation of the thing can be done
Some believed that this civil liability is true only in crimes against property, this is not correct. Regardless of the crime
committed, if the property is illegally taken from the offended party during the commission of the crime, the court may
direct the offender to restore or restitute such property to the offended party . It can only be done if the property is
brought within the jurisdiction of that court.
The court has authority to order the reinstatement of the accused acquitted of a crime punishable by the penalty of
perpetual or temporary disqualification
If the property cannot be restituted anymore , then the damage must be repaired, requiring the offender to pay the value
thereof, as determined by the court. That value includes the sentimental value to the offended party, not only the
replacement cost. But if what would be restored is brand new, then there will be an allowance for depreciation,
otherwise, the offended party is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of the offender.
Art. 106. Reparation. — How made. — The court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into
consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured party, and
reparation shall be made accordingly.
Reparation shall be
a) The price of the thing.
b) Its sentimental value.
In case of HUMAN LIFE, reparation of the damage cause is basically Php 75,000.00 value of human life, exclusive of
other forms of damages. This Php 75,000.00 may also increase whether such life was lost through intentional felony or
criminal negligence, whether the result of dolo or culpa. Also in the crime of RAPE, the damages awarded to the
offended woman is generally Php 75,000.00 for the damage to her honor. Supreme Court ruled that even if the offended
woman does not adduce evidence or such damage, court can take judicial notice of the fact that if a woman was raped,
she inevitably suffers damages.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of
the crime.26
ACTUAL DAMAGES must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to prove expenses
incurred as a result of the death of the victim or the physical injuries sustained by the victim. 27
If there is no evidence as to the value of the thing unrecovered, reparation cannot be made.
Payment by the insurance company does not relive the offender of his obligation to repair the damage caused.
Accused is liable for the damages caused as a result of the destruction of the property after the crime was committed
either because it was lost or destroyed by the accused himself or that of any other person or as a result of any other
cause or causes.
In kidnapping for Ransom cases “Actual damages may be awarded representing the amount of ransom paid.” 28
Art. 107. Indemnification — What is included. — Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not
only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the
crime.
Indemnification of consequential damages refers to the loss of earnings, loss of profits. This does not refer only to
consequential damages suffered by the offended party; this also includes consequential damages to third party who also
suffer because of the commission of the crime.
Contributory negligence on the part of the offended party reduces the civil liability of the offender.
The civil liability may be increased only if it will not require an aggravation of the decision in the criminal case on which it
is based.
In murder, the grant of civil indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of
appellant’s responsibility therefor. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the Court has pegged the amount at P75,000.29
In the case of People vs. Remollo,30 wherein the crime of rape with homicide was committed by the relative of the
victim, the Supreme Court in increasing the civil indemnity imposed upon the accused ruled that: Where the crime
resulted in the death of the victim, the civil indemnity granted by the Court has commonly been P50,000.00 (now Php
75,000.00), in the absence of unusual circumstances warranting a higher indemnity. In the instant case, we consider that
a heavier indemnity is appropriate, bearing in mind the tender age of the victim Maryjin Superal and the close blood
relationship (uncle and niece) that existed between appellant and the victim. These circumstances indicate an unusual
degree of moral depravity.
26
People vs. Anod, GR No. 186420, August 25, 2009
27
Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Lee, GR No. 166869, February 16, 2010
28
People vs. Solangon, G.R. No. 172693, Aug. 11, 2008 (561 SCRA 657)
29
People v. Ranin, Jr., G.R. No. 173023, June 25, 2008 (555 SCRA 297)
30
G.R. No. 104498, Oct. 22, 1993 (227 SCRA 375)
In addition:
1. Payment for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased.
MORAL DAMAGES
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Under Article 2206(3) the spouse, and the legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased resulting from a crime.31
Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to allow the
plaintiff to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone
due to the defendant’s culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. 32
The award of moral damages does not require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the heirs, since the
emotional wounds from the vicious killing of the victim cannot be denied. 33
The Supreme Court in awarding moral damages in favor of the victims family, stated in the case of People vs. Eling,
that: We also agree with the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. We award the same as the
circumstances surrounding the untimely and violent death, in accordance with human nature and experience, could have
brought nothing but emotional pain and anguish to the victim's family. 34
Moral damages “may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased.” 35
In citing the difference between actual damages and moral damages, the Supreme Court in the case of People vs.
Ranin, jr., ruled that: “The award of civil indemnity, on the other hand, is separate and distinct from the award of moral
damages which is based on a different jural foundation and assessed by the Court in the exercise of sound discretion.” 36
In the case of People vs. Maramara,37 the Supreme Court ruled that: As to the damages awarded, the trial court erred
in awarding moral damages in lieu of civil indemnity. Moral damages may not be awarded if there is no legal basis
therefor.38 Nor it may be imposed in substitution of civil indemnity. "The two awards — one for actual damages and the
other for moral damages — cannot be dealt with in the aggregate; neither being kindred terms nor governed by a
coincident set of rules, each must be separately identified and independently justified." 39
In the case of People vs. Garcia,40 the Supreme Court reiterated that: Indemnity for loss of earning capacity is
determinable under established jurisprudence based on the net earning capacity of the murder victim computed under
the formula:
Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim at the time of death) x (Gross Annual
Income less the Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses)
31
People vs. Bergante, G. R. Nos. 120369-70, February 27, 1998
32
Hernandez vs. Dolor, G.R. No. 160286, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 668.
33
People vs. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 179278, Mar. 28, 2008 (550 SCRA 480)Citing People v. Caraig, 448 Phil. 78, 98 (2003)
34
People vs. Eling, G.R. No. 178546, Apr. 30, 2008 (553 SCRA 724)
35
People vs. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995
36
People v. Ranin, Jr., G.R. No. 173023, June 25, 2008 (555 SCRA 297)
37
G.R. No. 110994, Oct. 22, 1999
38
People vs. Sequiño, 264 SCRA 79 [1996].
39
Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 348, 356 [1995].
40
G.R. No. 174479, June 17, 2008 (554 SCRA 616)
In explaining the grant of indemnity in the form of loss of earning capacity, the Supreme Court in the case of People vs.
Alvero, Jr.,41 stated that: The rule in this jurisdiction is that the measure of the loss or of the damage that dependents
and intestate heirs of the deceased may sustain by reason of the latter's death is not full amount of the deceased's
earnings, but the support they received or would have received from him had he not died. In Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals,42 this court said that:
At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that we are mainly concerned with the determination of the
losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the
deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support they
received or would have received from him had he had not died in consequence of the negligence of the
petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that support, we must reckon with the "necessary expenses
of his own living", which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that
earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily
his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary expense for his own
living. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of
that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net
earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses
necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of injury or death, is
gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn
money.43
In the case of People vs. Teehankee, Jr., the Supreme Court in granting the award for loss of earning capacity based
on the minimum wage at the time of the incident ruled that: In any event, what was proved on record is that after
graduating from high school, Maureen took up a short personality development course at the John Roberts Powers.
Maureen was employed at the John Roberts Powers at the time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just
received her first salary, for which reason she went out with her friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However,
neither the nature of her work nor her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to compute the award for
Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use the minimum wage prevailing as of the date of her death
(October 17, 1991).44
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Exemplary Damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances;
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, the court will decide whether they should be adjudicated.
Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, in addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may
be adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the future. The award for exemplary damages is designed
to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public
policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender. 45
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has been committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended
party." (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether
or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)46
In People vs. Aguila,47 the Supreme Court emphasized that insofar as the civil aspect of the crime is concerned,
exemplary damages of P25,000 are recoverable if there was present an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or
ordinary, in the commission of the crime.48
TEMPERATE DAMAGES
Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages “may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.” 49
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the award of temperate damages in the case of People vs. Barriga,50 is in this wise:
“However, in accordance with jurisprudence, the Court has to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in
41
G.R. No. 72319, June 30, 1993 (224 SCRA 16)
42
31 SCRA 511
43
People vs. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995
44
People vs. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995
45
People vs. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995
46
People vs. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995
47
G.R. No. 171017, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 642.
48
People v. Ranin, Jr., G.R. No. 173023, June 25, 2008 (555 SCRA 297)
49
Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Lee, GR No. 166869, February 16, 2010
50
G.R. No. 178545, Sept. 29, 2008 (567 SCRA 65)
lieu of the actual damages of a lesser amount. 51 As explained in People vs. Werba,52 to rule otherwise would be
anomalous and unfair because the victim's heirs who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages of an amount less
than P25,000.00 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts at all but would now be
entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages.”
ATTORNEYS FEES
Indemnification also includes the award of attorney’s fees. Private prosecutor is therefore entitled to the award of
attorney’s fees.
Art. 108. Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification for consequential
damages and actions to demand the same — Upon whom it devolves . — The obligation to make restoration or
reparation for damages and indemnification for consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the person
liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the person
injured.
The heirs of the person liable for a crime have no obligation to pay if restoration is not possible and the deceased left no
property.
Civil liability is possible only when the offender dies after final judgment.
If the death of the offender took place before any final judgment of conviction was rendered against him, the action for
restitution must necessarily be dismissed.
An action for damages by reason of wrongful death may be instituted by the heirs of the deceased against the
administrator or executor of the estate of the deceased offender. It cannot be brought by the administrator of the
victim’s estate.
In the case of People vs. Carpo, et. al.,53 the Supreme Court in discussing the power of an attorney to enter into a
compromise settlement regarding the civil aspect of a criminal case, stated that:
Article 1878 of the Civil Code and Sec. 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court set forth the attorney's
power to compromise. Under Art. 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary "to
compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to
waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired." On the other
hand, Sec. 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients
in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeal, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure, but they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of their clients' claims but the full amount in cash."
The requirements under both provisions are met when there is a clear mandate expressly given by the
principal to his lawyer specifically authorizing the performance of an act. It has not escaped our
attention that in the present case counsel for both parties had no special power of attorney from their
clients to enter into a compromise. However, insofar as Teresita was concerned, she was apprised of
the agreement and in fact had signed her name as instructed by the court, thereby tacitly ratifying the
same. As for accused-appellants, the aforecited dialogue between the court and counsel does not show
that they were ever consulted regarding the proposed settlement. In the absence of a special power of
attorney given by accused-appellants to their counsel, the latter can neither bind nor compromise his
clients' civil liability. Consequently, since Atty. Sanglay and Atty. Rafael had no specific power to
compromise the civil liability of all accused-appellants, its approval by the trial court which did not take
the precautionary measures to ensure the protection of the right of accused-appellants not to be
deprived of their property without due process of law, could not legalize it. For being violative of
existing law and jurisprudence, the settlement should not be given force and effect.
CASES: People vs. Sendaydiego, G.R. No. L-33252, Jan. 20, 1978 (81 SCRA 120)
Where civil liability was adjudged against a person sentenced to death, his heir or estate would still be liable
for the civil liability.
51
Citing the case of People v. Werba, G.R. No. 144599, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 482; citing People v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
139177, August 11, 2003, 408 SCRA 571.
52
G.R. No. 144599, June 9, 2004
53
G.R. No. 132676, April 4, 2001 (356 SCRA 248)
Art. 109. Share of each person civilly liable. — If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the
courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond.
In case of insolvency of the accomplices , the principal shall be subsidiarily liable for their share of the indemnity and in
case of the insolvency of the principal , the accomplices shall be subsidiarily liable, jointly and severally liable, for the
indemnity due from said principal.
When there are several offenders , the court in the exercise of its discretion shall determine what shall be the share of
each offender depending upon the degree of participation – as principal, accomplice or accessory. If within each class of
offender, there are more of them, such as more than one principal or more than one accomplice or accessory, the
liability in each class of offender shall be subsidiary. Anyone of them may be required to pay the civil liability pertaining
to such offender without prejudice to recovery from those whose share have been paid by another.
If all the principals are insolvent, the obligation shall devolve upon the accomplice(s) or accessory(s). But whoever pays
shall have the right of recovering the share of the obligation from those who did not pay but are civilly liable. In case the
accomplice and the principal cannot pay, the liability of those subsidiarily liable is absolute .
To relate with Article 38, when there is an order or preference of pecuniary (monetary) liability, therefore, restitution is
not included here.
The owners of taverns, inns, motels, hotels, where the crime is committed within their establishment due to
noncompliance with general police regulations , if the offender who is primarily liable cannot pay, the proprietor, or owner
is subsidiarily liable.
Felonies committed by employees, pupils, servants in the course of their employment, schooling or household chores.
The employer, master, teacher is subsidiarily liable civilly, while the offender is primarily liable.
Art. 110. Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felony — Preference in
payment. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and
accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their
quotas, and subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable.
The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the
accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the accessories.
Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by whom payment has
been made shall have a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective shares.
Illustration: Two principals, two accomplices and two accessories were convicted in a homicide case, and the indemnity
to the heirs of the victim was fixed at Php 6,000.00. The quota of the principals was fixed at Php 3,000.00; the
accomplices at Php 2,000.00 and the accessories at Php 1,000.00 and as between themselves, the liability of each was
½. If both principals were insolvent, their quota would be borne by the two accomplices whose liability would be Php
2,500.00 each for a total of Php 5,000.00, the quota of both principals and accomplices. If the accessories were
insolvent, the principals would bear their quota. Subsidiarily and in default of the principals, the accomplices would bear
the quota of the accessories.
Art. 111. Obligation to make restitution in certain cases . — Any person who has participated gratuitously in
the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such
participation.
This refers to a person who has participated gratuitously in the commission of a felony and he is bound to make
restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation
The third person must be innocent of the commission of the crime otherwise he would be liable as an accessory and this
article will not apply
Art. 112. Extinction of civil liability. — Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this
Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.
Civil liability is extinguished by:
1. Payment or performance
2. Loss of the thing due
3. Condonation or remission of the debt
4. Confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor
5. Compensation
6. Novation
Other causes of extinguishment of obligations: annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition and
prescription .
The civil liability from any of these is extinguished by the same causes enumerated above
The accused shall still be liable for the payment of the thing stolen even if it is lost or destroyed
Civil liability of the offender is extinguished in the same manner as civil obligation is extinguished but this is not
absolutely true. Under civil law, a civil obligation is extinguished upon loss of the thing due when the thing involved is
specific. This is not a ground applicable to extinction of civil liability in criminal case if the thing due is lost, the offender
shall repair the damages caused.
The judgment for civil liability prescribes in ten years. It may be enforced by writ of execution within the first five years
and by action for revival of judgment during the next five years. Insolvency is not a defense to an action to enforce
judgment.
Art. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. — Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in
the next preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the
crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of
liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of
sentence or any other reason.
Unless extinguished, civil liability subsists even if the offender has served sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or
other rights or has served the same, due to amnesty, pardon, commutation of the sentence or any other reason.
Under the law as amended, even if the subsidiary imprisonment is served for non-payment of fines, this pecuniary
liability of the defendant is not extinguished.
While amnesty wipes out all traces and vestiges of the crime, it does not extinguish the civil liability of the offender. A
pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
In the case of Cuison vs. CA,54 the Supreme Court ruled that: As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for
the recovery of indemnity.55 Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of
an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
54
G.R. No. 128540, April 15, 1998
55
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court