Bhim Rao
Bhim Rao
CHAPTER – I
In this chapter cases that came before the supreme court of India have
been discussed and analyzed by the researcher to get a clear picture of the
nature of judicial activism vis-à-vis social justice.
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again to the legislative and executive powers and limitations conferred on
the state under different provision of the Constituion.7
The Court’s verdict was nullified by the legislative action, for the
Parliament came with an amendment to the Constitution and introduce
Clause 4 to Article 15. This amendment is described as ‘a crushing response
to the challenge (the decision of the Court).8 This indeed marked a
portentous trend of the beginning of a subtle conflict between Legislature
and Judiciary.9 In CR Srinivasan v. state of Madras;10 the court rejected the
caste as the only criterion for reservation. This judgment also reflected the
spirit of ‘equality’ as envisaged in Article 14. In a similar vein Andhra High
Court held11 that any provision that prohibits backward classes to compete
with others was held to be violative of Article 15 and 29 (2)(b). It was also
directed that a minimum percentage for reservation should be fixed.
In M.R. Balaji and others v. State of Mysore and other14 the Court
was trying to keep a just balance between the conflicting interests of those
who would like to have as much reservation as possible and those might lose
their chance even if they are the deserving ones. The issue in this case is
about the admission to the Medical course. “According to the petitioners, but
for the reservations made by the impugned order, they would have been
entitled to the admission in the respective colleges for which they had
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applied.” The impugned Order was issued on 31-07-1962 and it reserved
seats for candidates belonging to the backward classes whose average of
student population was the same or just below State average. This resulted in
68 percent of seats available for admissions to the Engineering and Medical
Colleges and to the other technical institutions is reserved for backward
classes, more backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The classification of the socially backward classes of citizens made by the
State, proceeds on the consideration only of their castes without regard to
other factors, which are undoubtedly relevant. It was argued that this might
lead to a virtual reservation for nearly 90 per cent of the population, which
might come under different categories of backwardness. This would be at
the expense of those classes of people whose members may perform well but
may not get an opportunity.
After analyzing facts and probing the legal nuances, the Court came to
the conclusion that caste alone could not be the criterion for backwardness.
The Court also observed that reservation should not go beyond 50 per cent.
The Court said:
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In Chtiralekha v. State of Mysore15 the Supreme Court gave some
leeway to caste by saying that caste could be considered as one of the
relevant factors in determining social and educational backwardness. But at
the same time it was made clear that that terms ‘caste’ and ‘class’ are not
synonymous. The Court observed:
We do not intend to lay down any inflexible rule for the Government
to follow. The laying down of criteria for ascertainment of social and
educational backwardness of a class is complex problem depending upon
many circumstances, which may vary from state to state and even from place
to place in a State. But what we intend to emphasize is that under no
circumstance a ‘class’ can be equated to a ‘caste’ though the caste of an
individual or a group of individuals may be considered along with other
relevant factors in putting him in particular class. We would also like to
make it clear that if in a given situation caste is excluded in ascertaining a
class within the meaning of Art. 15 (4) of the Constitution, it does not vitiate
the classification if it satisfied other tests.
In P. Sagar v. State of A.P.18 the High Court reiterated the stand that
caste should not be the sole criterion for measuring backwardness. The
questions was whether the list of backward classes based solely on caste was
legal. The Court answered this question in the negative. It observed that the
impugned order infringed Article15(1).In B. Sayeed Ahamad v. State of
Mysore,19 the High Court felt that the occupation and income of the parent
fell very much within the category of backwardness. The same Court ruled
that family income could be the basis for deciding backwardness in Shetty v.
State of Mysore.20
The Supreme Court favored the decision of the state to use caste as
the basis for determining backwardness. It observed that if the entire caste
was socially and educationally backward, caste could be taken as the basis
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for identification of Backward Class and this is not violative of Article
15(4).
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In Kumari K.S. Jayasree v. State of Kerala31 the Supreme Court went
into the merit of the State Government’s Order dated 2 May 1966, that those
OBC candidates seeking admission to Medical Colleges and whose parent’
income is above Rs. 10,000 per annum would not come under reservation
benefits. The Court said:
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High Court, which dismissed the petition. Hence they approached the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Medical Council of
India prescribed 40% as the minimum and Universities could not reduce it
further. But the Court did not accept the argument. Citing earlier decisions,
the court observed that how the selection has to be made out of the eligible
candidates is a matter, which depends upon circumstances prevailing in a
particular state. In an earlier case M.P. v. Nivedita Jain.33 The State
Government fully deleted the prescription of the percentage of marks in the
selection examination. Through the case was worse than the present one the
Court upheld the Government decision. Here too, therefore, the Court upheld
the Order of the Government, which was in favour of reservation that could
not be encroached upon by general candidates.
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Caste candidates and 10% for Scheduled Tribe candidates. This Order was
challenged through a Writ petition before the Division Bench of the High
Court. The contention was that those unfilled seats should go to general
candidates and Order was no justifiable. The High Court accepted the
argument and ordered so. But in appeal the Supreme Court pointed out that
in the absence of any law to the contrary it was open to the State
Government to relax the rule prescribing the minimum qualifying marks to
ensure the interests of these category of students was protected and they
receive protection to the extent it was necessary for their upliftment.
But this line of inquiry need not detain us here in this case because the
case of the petitioners is not that there should be no reservation for the
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candidates belonging to the three special categories mentioned hereinabove
at the post-graduate level. Their contention is that candidates belonging to
the three special categories must be able to secure the minimum qualifying
marks in the admission tests in order to gain admission to post-graduate
medical courses. If they fail to secure even the minimum qualifying marks,
then the seats reserved for them should not be allowed to go waste but
should be made available to the candidates belonging to general category.
This contention must he upheld. Otherwise, to borrow the language used in
Dr. Jagdish Saran case (AIR 1980 SC 820), this will be a “national loss.”
In that view of the matter, this writ petition succeeds. This decision
contained in the letter dated 31-8-1995 addressed by the Principal Secretary.
Uttar Pradesh government to the Director General, Medical Education and
Training, Uttar Pradesh directing that there shall be no minimum qualifying
marks for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Other Backward Classes
candidates in the written examination for admission to postgraduate and
diploma courses is quashed. It is directed that if the seats reserved for
SC/SC/OBC candidates cannot be filled up on account of failure of the
candidates belonging to these categories to obtain the minimum qualifying
marks, then such seats should be made available to the candidates belonging
to the general category.
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Admission to Medical Colleges again became an issue in Rajiv
Mittal v. Maharshi Dayanand University.38 There were 49 seats in the open
category and 11 seats for reserved category for M.B.B.S. at Rohtak Medical
College. In the first counseling there were a few vacant seats in the general
category and hence second and third counseling were held and candidate
with serial number 60 was admitted. Sunil Yadav who belonged to the
backward community came with the rank of 62 in the merit list. There was
again one seat vacant in the general category. As candidates with 61, 62, 63,
64, and 65 did not join the general candidate with 66th rank was offered the
seat.
The High Court, allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No. 3 as
it held that it was “settled principle of law that a candidate from the reserved
class, if is entitled to get admission to a course of his own merit in the
general list, he must be treated on his merit and not accommodated against
the reserved vacancy”. It thereupon came to the conclusion that Sunil Yadav
should have been adjusted against the one seat in the general category which
had been offered to the appellant at the time of second counseling and that
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the reserved seat, which would be so vacating by Sunil Yadav, should be
offered and admission granted to respondent No.3.
But the Supreme Court did not agree with the finding of the High Court. The
apex Court observed:
On behalf of the appellant, it has been contended that the High Court
could not direct that Sunil Yadav should be considered as having been given
the general category seat in the second counseling when he had already
secured admission in the first counseling in the reserved category.
The Court, thus, set aside the judgment of the High Court, the result of
which would be that writ petition filed before the High Court would stand
dismissed.
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valid. According to the Court ‘quota’ and ‘reservation’ are different
concepts. Therefore the matter does not come under Article 15(4).
But the apex Court would quash any unreasonable fixing of quota.
This happened in the case of A.I.I.M.S. Student Union v. A.I.I.M.S.42 the rule
regarding admission to Post-Graduate Course in AIIMS was based on the
quota of Institutional reservation of 33 per cent coupled with 50 per cent
reservation discipline-wise. This was held super reservation and hence it
infringed the equality principle to Article 14.
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judges of the Supreme Court have attempted to answer about 25 questions
on India’s pursuit of affirmative action in higher educational institutions.
The Bench was disposing of certain public interest petitions challenging the
constitutionality of 93rd Constitution Amendment Act, enacted in 2005
inserting Article 15(5) of the Constitution. The petitioners also challenged
the validity of Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission)
Act, 2006, which provides reservation in admission to certain Central
Government run educational institution for students belonging to SC, ST and
other OBC categories.
Hearing the arguments from both the sides the Court pronounced this
monumental judgement on 10th April, 2008 which provides for the
following:
The 2006 Act is not illegal merely because a time limit is not
prescribed for reservation.
Employment
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by members falling within those categories, is brought
about only because he is a Brahmin and does not belong
to any of those categories. This ineligibility created by
the Communal G.O. does not appear us to be sanctioned
by cl. (4) of Article 16 and is an infringement of the
fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner as an
individual citizen under Article 16 (1) and (2). The
Communal G.O., in our opinion, is repugnant to the
provisions of Article 16 and is as such void and illegal.’
Again the Court in this case directed the government to “consider and
dispose of the petitioner's application for the post after taking it on file on its
merits and without applying the rule of communal rotation."
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the power to make reservation as contemplated by Article
16 (4) can be exercised only to make the inadequate
representation in the services adequate. If that be so both
"appointments" and "posts" to which the operative part of
Article 16 (4) refers and in respect of which the power to
make reservation has been conferred on the State must
necessarily be appointments and posts in the services. It
would be illogical and unreasonable to assume that for
making the representation adequate in the services under
the State a power should be given to the State to reserve
posts outside the cadre of services. Again the Court went
on to elaborate:
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The error from which the calculation of the High Court
suffers is that the number of vacancies available for the
Scheduled caste candidates was fixed according to the
number of candidates who qualified for the general seats.
The counter affidavit states expressly that the availability
of vacancies for reserved category was determined on the
basis that only seven candidates had qualified for the
general seats. This according to us is neither justified by
the Rules and administrative instructions nor indeed does
such a method of fixation of reserved vacancies disclose
any acceptable basis. 16 vacancies were advertised in the
first instance out of which 11 were for general candidates
and 5 for reserved candidates. Administration is not
found to fill all the vacancies, which are advertised. But
the availability of vacancies for the reserved categories
cannot be made to depend upon the accidental
circumstances of how many candidates have qualified for
general seats. In the first place that would be contrary to
the instructions ... Secondly such a method will lead to
the absurd and undesirable consequence that no candidate
of the reserved category will be appointed at all if only
one or two candidates from general category qualify in
the examination.
In this case, the State Govt. of Bihar directed that separate Directorate
should be created each for Indigenous Medicines; the Director being from
one of the systems of ,medicines namely Ayurvedic, Unani and
Homeopathic. When separate Directorate was created the Government
sanctioned the posts of two Deputy Directors for each of the two remaining
systems. The State Government had in accordance with the decision of the
Supreme Court prescribed a 50-point roster to implement the policy of
reservation to posts and appointments for members of the backward classes
under Art. 16(4). It was laid down that “if in any grade, there is only one
vacancy for the first time, then it will be deemed to be unreserved and for
the second time also, if there be only one vacancy, then it will be deemed to
be reserved”. Acting upon the roster the Joint Secretary to the Government,
General Administration Department (Personnel) made a proposal for
reservation of the post of Deputy Director (Homeopathic) for members of
the scheduled castes. He said that in the Directorate of Indigenous
Medicines, three posts had been sanctioned - (1) Director of Indigenous
Medicines' (2) Deputy Director (Homeopathic) and (3) Deputy Director
(Unani). All these Posts were Class I posts. He suggested that according to
the roster of appointments, out of these three posts the first, namely, that of
Director be treated as unreserved, the second should be treated as reserved
for scheduled caste candidate and the third should be unreserved. According
to him, all the posts could be grouped together from the point of view of
reservation.
The Supreme Court did not accept the arguments of the Bihar
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Government. The Court observed that though the Directorate of Indigenous
Medicines comprises of four posts, namely, that of the Director and three
Deputy Directors, which were Class I posts, the posts of Deputy Directors
would not constitute one “cadre”. They are members of the same Service but
do not belong to the same cadre. According to the 50 point roster, if in a
particular grade a single post falls vacant should, in the case of first vacancy,
be considered as unreserved i.e. general and on the second occasion when It
single post again falls vacant, the same must be treated as reserved.
Admittedly, the post of the Director is the highest post in the Directorate of
Indigenous Medicine with a higher pay scale while the posts of the Deputy
Directors carried a lower pay scale. The posts of the Director and those of
the Deputy Directors constitute different cadres of the Service, It is manifest
that the Post of the Director of Indigenous Medicines, which is the highest
post in the Directorate carried a higher grade or scale, could not possibly be
equated with those of the Deputy Directors on a lower grade or scale. In
view of this, according to the 50-point roster, if in a particular cadre, a single
post falls vacant, it should, in the case of first vacancy, be considered as
general. That being so, the State Government could not have directed
reservation of the Post of Deputy Director (Homeopathic) which was the
first vacancy in a particular cadre i.e. that of the Deputy Directors, for
candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes. Such reservation was not in
conformity with the principles laid down in the 50-point roster and was
impermissible under Art. 16(4) of the Constitution and clearly violative of
the guarantee enshrined in Art.l6 (1), Clause (4) of Art. 16 is by way of an
exception of the proviso to Art.16 (1). The reservation of the post of Deputy
Director (Homeopathic) would amount to 100% reservation which was
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impermissible under Art. 16(4) as otherwise it would render the guarantee of
equal opportunity in the matter of public employment under Art. 16(1)
wholly elusive and meaningless. If there is only one post in the cadre, there
can be no reservation under Art.16 (4) of the Constitution. The whole
concept of reservation for application of the 50-point roster is that there are
more than one post, and the reservation as laid down by the Supreme Court
can be up to 50 per cent. The three posts of Deputy Directors of
Homeopathic, Unani and Ayurvedic are distinct and separate as they pertain
to different disciplines and each one is an isolated post by itself carried in
the same cadre. There can be no grouping of isolated posts even if they· are
carried on the same scale.
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the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all
forms of exploitation.
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respondent No. 1 with his natural family and consequently he stood uprooted
from that family and transplanted in his adoptive family whose income alone
could be taken into account.
Thus the Court agreed with the Tribunal and thereby restored the
claim of respondent No.1 in P.S. Ghalaut v. State of Haryana and others.54
The Court was concerned with the Constitution of India, Art.16 (4) vis-a-vis
the Haryana Medical Education Service Rules (1965) regarding inter se
seniority. Public Service Commission showed general candidate as more
meritorious than reserved candidate. He shall be senior to reserved candidate
but applying roster points made the appointment. Thus the reserved
candidate steals seniority over general class candidate. The Supreme Court
observed that this was not arbitrary.
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mainly in the advertisement. The Court observed that if the subject wise is·
adopted in each service or post in each cadre in each faculty, discipline,
specialty or super-specialty, it not only be clear to the candidates who seek
recruitment but also there would be no overlapping in application of the rule
of reservation to the service or posts as specified and made applicable by the
relevant Act ... If there is any single post of professor or Reader or Lecturer
in each faculty, discipline, specialty or super-specialty, which can not be
reserved for reserved candidates, it should be clubbed and roster applied and
be made available to the reserved candidates in terms of the Section-3(5) of
U.P. Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
and Other Backward Classes) Act(1 of 1994) The Court said such an
interpretation would sub serve and elongate Constitutional objective and
public policy of socio-economic justice ... mandated and envisaged in
Articles 335 and 16 (4) read with Articles 14and 16(1), Preamble, Article 38
and 46 of the Constitution and all other cognate provisions.
In Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab57 the Court went into the question of
seniority of reserved candidates and general candidates. The Court was not
concerned with the reservation policy of the State' or with the validity of any
procedure fixing roster points for purpose of promotion of reserved
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candidates. The Court was dealing only with a limited question relating
mainly to seniority of the reserved candidates promoted at roster points.
According to the Court Articles 16 (4) and 16 (4A) open with a non-
obstinate clause for it begins, "Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State
from making any provision for reservation ... "and hence these Articles do
not confer any fundamental right. Hence they do not impose any
Constitutional duty and writ of mandamus could not be issued to provide for
reservation or for relaxation
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Scheduled Tribes candidate was selected for promotion on the basis of the
rule of rotation, it was held by the Tribunal that the promotion was violative
of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Reversing that order it was held
that:
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The Supreme Court has categorically held in 'Mandal case' that a
person, who belongs to a backward class and who becomes member of IAS,
IPS or any other All, India Service, his children cannot avail the benefit of
reservation. The States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have added further
conditions such as salary of rupees ten thousand or more per men sum, the
wife or husband to be graduate and one of them owning a house in an urban
area. So far as the professionals are concerned, an income of, Rs, 10 lakhs
per annum has been fixed as the criterion. It is further provided that the wife
or husband is at least a graduate and the family owns immovable property of
the value of at least rupees twenty lakhs. Similarly, the criteria regarding
traders, industrialists, agriculturists and others is wholly arbitrary apart from
being contrary to the guidelines laid down by Supreme Court in 'Mandal
case'.
Thus the Division bench declared that the creamy layer formula of
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both the states as invalid for being against the norms indicated by the Court
in Mandal case.
Sometimes the executive makes rules in such a way that this sabotage
the spirit of reservation. A case in point is Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes Officers Welfare Council v. State of U.P.67 The issue was the validity
of the memo prescribing norms for promotion in State Medical Health
Department. It was alleged that Department relaxed the criteria only when
general candidates were to be promoted. Separate list of candidates as per
roster was not prepared. Moreover it increased the minimum length of
services for promotion and the selection would be subject to efficiency test.
The Court held that the impugned Memo was issued malafide to deprive
SC/ST candidates of their chance of promotion. Hence the Memo was
quashed.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the application of roster for single
post cadre an appointment to carry forward rule is valid and constitutional
with a view to give adequate representation in public service to the reserved
category candidates, the opportunity given to them is not violative of
Articles 14 and 16(1).
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admission to main exam. It was argued that the object of R. 13 is only to
eliminate unduly long list of candidates. Rule 13 provides that the Public
Service Commission shall conduct competitive examination in two stages,
namely, Preliminary Examination and Main Examination. As per the
Scheme specified in Rule 7 and Schedule III, Preliminary Examinations are
conducted on the subjects as per the syllabus and aggregate marks are taken
into consideration to call the candidates for Main Examination. Marks
obtained in the Preliminary Examination by a candidate would not be
counted for the purpose of Main Examination to .determine the final order of
merit. The Rule provides that if the candidates belonging to the Scheduled
Caste/Scheduled Tribe could not reach the prescribed range of marks, there
could be 5% cut off from the last range worked out for the general
candidates and make the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidates
qualified for the Main examination. The writ petition was to get this
concession for the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). The argument was that
the reservation applicable to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe
candidates should be made available to OBCs and the latter be treated on par
with the former. The Court did not accept the argument. It held:
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Classes is to remove their social and educational
handicaps. Therefore, they are always treated dissimilar
and they do not form an integrated class with Dalits and
Tribes for the purpose of Article 16(4) or l5(4).
Obviously, therefore, proviso to Rule 13 confines the 5%
further cut-off marks in the Preliminary Examination
from the lowest range fixed for general candidates. So, it
is confined only to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes who could not secure total aggregate marks on par
with the general candidates. The Rule expressly confines
the benefit of the proviso to Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. By process of interpretation, OBCs,
cannot be declared alike the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, the contention, that the
doctrine of fusing "any Backward Class of citizen" in
Article 16(4), further classification of Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribunes and OBCs, as distinct classes for
the purpose of reservation and omission to extent the
same benefits to OBCs violates Articles 14 is devoid of
substance.
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In Suresh Chandra v. J.B. Agarwal it was held that In case of a
solitary isolated post on the basis of rule of rotation, the benefits and.
facilities should be extended to the reserved candidates, namely, Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The Supreme Court has observed that the fusion of posts are
constitutional arid permissible and also that the rules of rotation and roster
are to be applied. The advertisements are required to be issued so that the
reserved and the general category candidates would apply for the
consideration of their claims for recruitment in accordance therewith and sub
serve the socio-economic justice as envisaged in and mandated by Article 14
and 16(1) 16(4), 38, 46, 335, Preamble and other cognate provisions.
386
declared that a single post could not be reserved. The Court observed:
In State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah72 the Supreme Court held that,
appropriate Legislature or Governor can regulate the recruitment and
conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the State concerned. Proviso to that Article
permits the Governor of the State to fill up the gap, if there is no such
statutory provision governing the aforesaid topics. For that purpose, the
Governor may make rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of
service of persons appointed to such services and posts until provision in that
behalf is made by or under an Act of the competent legislature, which may
intervene and enact appropriate statutory provisions for the same.
Independently of general provisions of Article 309, the Constitution has
387
made special provisions for certain Services. Even if they may be part of
public services, still separate Constitutional schemes are envisaged for
regulating recruitment and conditions of services of officers governed by
such Services. Chapter VI of Part VI deals with the subordinate Courts. It is
in Chapter VI dealing with the Subordinate Courts provision is made for
appointment of District Judges under Article 233, recruitment of persons
other than the District Judges to the Judicial Services under Article 234 and
also Control of the High Court over the Subordinate Courts as laid down by
Article 235. Article 236 deals with the topic of 'Interpretation' and amongst
others, defines by sub-Article (b) the expression "judicial service" to mean a
service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of District
Judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of District Judge. It
becomes, therefore, obvious that the framers of the Constitution separately
dealt with ‘Judicial Service’ of the State and made exclusive provisions
regarding recruitment to the posts of District Judges and other civil judicial
posts inferior to the posts of the District Judge. Thus these provisions found
entirely in a different part of the Constitution stand on their own and quite
independent of Part XIV dealing with Services in general under the 'State'.
Therefore, Article 309, which, on its express terms, is made subject to other
provisions of the Constitution, does get circumscribed to the extent to which
from its general field of operation is carved out a separate and exclusive field
for operation by the relevant provisions of Articles dealing with Subordinate
Judiciary as found in Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution. The Court
further observed that a particular category of post forming the judicial wings
has been carved out in Chapter VI in Articles 233 to 235 so far as the
question of recruitment is concerned. When Article 309 itself uses the
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expression "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" it necessarily
means that if in the Constitution there is any other provision specifically
dealing with the topics mentioned in said Article 309, then Article 309 will
be subject to those provisions of the Constitution. Thus the judicial services
of the State is concerned Articles 233 to 237, would override any law made
by the appropriate legislature in exercise of power under Article 309 of the
Constitution. Appointment to the judicial service is carved out in the
Constitution itself.
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The cases pertaining to protective discrimination or reservation that
came up before the Supreme Court reveal following trends.
2. The nineties show the highest number of cases. This might be due to
the increasing awareness of the backward communities about their
constitutional rights. This was made possible especially by the impact
of Central Government’s decision to implement the recommendation
of the Mandal Commission Report.
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brethren live.
392
REFERENCES
393
22. AIR 1997 SC 1451.
23. AIR 1997 SC 303.
24. AIR 1997 SC 2133.
25. AIR 1997 SC 3687.
26. AIR 1998 SC 1767.
27. AIR 2000 SC 1296.
28. AIR 1973 All 295.
29. AIR 1973 All 592.
30. AIR 1972 SC 1375.
31. AIR 1975 SC 1.
32. Backwardness in law perhaps is different from backwardness in
economic development and educational attainments. Thus a political
solution was found when a new State was carved out of U.P. namely
Uttaranchal, now it is Uttarakhand.
33. AIR 1972 SC 2381.
34. AIR 1988 SC 481.
35. AIR 1981 SC 2945.
36. AIR 2001 SC 3006.
37. AIR 1995 SC 1421.
38. AIR 1996 SC 1378.
39. AIR 1997 SC 1120.
40. AIR 1998 SC 680.
41. AIR 1999 SC 2894.
42. AIR 2001 SC 717.
43. AIR 2001 SC 3006.
394
44. Judgement dated: 29.03.2007 Case: Civil No: Writ Petition (Civil)
265 of 2006.
45. (2008) 6 SCC 1.
46. AIR 2001 SC 3262.
47. AIR 2000 SC 72.
48. AIR 1951 SC 226.
49. AIR 1962 SC 36 This case can also be cited under ‘promotions’.
50. AIR 1984 SC 1831.
51. AIR 1988 SC 925.
52. AIR 1968 SC 1012.
53. AIR 1980 SC 1975.
54. AIR 1989 SC 139.
55. AIR 1994 SC 1528.
56. AIR 1996 SC 351.
57. AIR 1997 SC 1095.
58. AIR 2000 SC 450 One of the issues in this case was that of
promotion.
59. AIR 1999 SC 3471.
60. (1997) 6 SCC 129.
61. AIR 1997 SC 2101.
62. 1996 (9) JT (SC) 320.
63. (1974) 1 SCC 87, AIR 1974 SC 532.
64. (1996) 7 SCC 512, 1996 AIR SCW 2248.
65. (1996) 5 SCC 167.
66. (1995) Supp (1) SCC 432.
67. AIR 2009 SC 609.
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68. By seventy-seventh Amendment (1995) Article 16 (4A) was
introduced and Eighty-fifth Amendment (2000) added the phrase ‘in
matters of promotion, with consequential seniority’.
69. AIR 1997 SC 1451.
70. AIR 1997 SC 303.
71. AIR 1997 SC 2133.
72. AIR 1997 SC 3687.
396