Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Paraconsistent Logic
First published Tue Sep 24, 1996; substantive revision Fri May 18, 2018

Contemporary logical orthodoxy has it that, from contradictory premises, anything follows. A logical
consequence relation is explosive if according to it any arbitrary conclusion [Math Processing Error] is
entailed by any arbitrary contradiction [Math Processing Error], [Math Processing Error] (ex
contradictione quodlibet (ECQ)). Classical logic, and most standard ‘non-classical’ logics too such as
intuitionist logic, are explosive. Inconsistency, according to received wisdom, cannot be coherently
reasoned about.

Paraconsistent logic challenges this orthodoxy. A logical consequence relation is said to be paraconsistent
if it is not explosive. Thus, if a consequence relation is paraconsistent, then even in circumstances where
the available information is inconsistent, the consequence relation does not explode into triviality. Thus,
paraconsistent logic accommodates inconsistency in a controlled way that treats inconsistent information
as potentially informative.

The prefix ‘para’ in English has two meanings: ‘quasi’ (or ‘similar to, modelled on’) or ‘beyond’. When
the term ‘paraconsistent’ was coined by Miró Quesada at the Third Latin America Conference on
Mathematical Logic in 1976, he seems to have had the first meaning in mind. Many paraconsistent
logicians, however, have taken it to mean the second, which provided different reasons for the
development of paraconsistent logic as we will see below.

Paraconsistent logic is defined negatively: any logic is paraconsistent as long as it is not explosive. This
means there is no single set of open problems or programs in paraconsistent logic. As such, this entry is
not a complete survey of paraconsistent logic. The aim is to describe some philosophically salient features
of a diverse field.

1. Paraconsistency
1.1 Dialetheism
1.2 A Brief History of ex contradictione quodlibet
1.3 Modern History of Paraconsistent Logic
2. Motivations
2.1 Inconsistency without Triviality
2.1.1 Non-Trivial Theories
2.1.2 True Contradictions
2.1.3 Linguistics
2.2 Artificial Intelligence
2.2.1 Automated Reasoning
2.2.2 Belief Revision
2.3 Formal Semantics and Set Theory
2.3.1 Truth Theory
2.3.2 Set Theory
2.3.3 Mathematics in general
2.4 Arithmetic and Gödel’s Theorem
 2.5 Vagueness
3. Systems of Paraconsistent Logic
3.1 Discussive Logic
3.2 Non-Adjunctive Systems
3.3 Preservationism
3.4 Adaptive Logics
3.5 Logics of Formal Inconsistency
3.6 Many-Valued Logics
3.7 Relevant Logics
Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries

1. Paraconsistency
A logic is paraconsistent iff its logical consequence relation [Math Processing Error], either semantic or
proof theoretic) is not explosive. Paraconsistency is a property of a consequence relation. The argument ex
contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) is paraconsistently invalid: in general, it is not the case that [Math
Processing Error], [Math Processing Error].

The role often played by the notion of consistency in orthodox logics, namely, the most basic requirement
that any theory must meet, is relaxed to the notion of coherence: no theory can include every sentence
whatsoever if it is to be considered tenable. Simple consistency of a theory (no contradictions) is a special
case of absolute consistency, or non-triviality (not every sentence is a part of the theory). As we will see
below, many paraconsistent logics do validate the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), [Math Processing
Error], even though they invalidate ECQ.

Beyond the basic, definitional requirement that a paraconsistent consequence relation be non-explosive,
there is a huge divergence of paraconsistent logics. At this stage of development, well into the twenty-first
century, it seems fair to say that ‘paraconsistency’ does not single out one particular approach to logic, but
is rather a property that some logics have and others do not (like, say, compactness, or multiple
conclusions).

1.1 Dialetheism

In the literature, especially in the part of it that contains objections to paraconsistent logic, there has been
some tendency to confuse paraconsistency with dialetheism, the view that there are true contradictions
(see the entry on dialetheism). The view that a consequence relation should be paraconsistent does not
entail the view that there are true contradictions. Paraconsistency is a property of a consequence relation
whereas dialetheism is a view about truth. The fact that one can define a non-explosive consequence
relation does not mean that some sentences are true. The fact that one can construct a model where a
contradiction holds but not every sentence of the language holds (or where this is the case at some world)
does not mean that the contradiction is true per se. Hence paraconsistency must be distinguished from
dialetheism (though see Asmus 2012).

Now, if dialetheism is to be coherent, then a dialethiest’s preferred logic must be paraconsistent.

Dialetheism is the view that some contradiction is true, which is a distinct thesis from ‘trivialism’, the
view that everything whatsoever (including every contradiction) is true. A paraconsistent logician may
feel some pull towards dialetheism, but most paraconsistent logics are not ‘dialetheic’ logics. In a
discussion of paraconsistent logic, the primary focus is not the obtainability of contradictions but the
explosive nature of a consequence relation.

1.2 A Brief History of ex contradictione quodlibet

It is now standard to view ex contradictione quodlibet as valid. This contemporary view, however, should
be put in a historical perspective. It was towards the end of the nineteenth century, when the study of logic
achieved mathematical articulation, that an explosive logical theory became the standard. With the work
of logicians such as Boole, Frege, Russell and Hilbert, classical logic became the orthodox logical
account.

In antiquity, however, no one seems to have endorsed the validity of ECQ. Aristotle presented what is
sometimes called the connexive principle: “it is impossible that the same thing should be necessitated by
the being and by the not-being of the same thing” (Prior Analytic II 4 57b3). (Connexive logic has
recently been reinvigorated by Wansing; see the entry on connexive logic that has been developed based
on this principle.) This principle became a topic of debates in the Middle Ages or Medieval time. Though
the medieval debates seem to have been carried out in the context of conditionals, we can also see it as
debates about consequences. The principle was taken up by Boethius (480–524 or 525) and Abelard
(1079–1142), who considered two accounts of consequences. The first one is a familiar one: it is
impossible for the premises to be true but conclusion false. The first account is thus similar to the
contemporary notion of truth-preservation. The second one is less accepted recently: the sense of the
premises contains that of the conclusion. This account, as in relevant logics, does not permit an inference
whose conclusion is arbitrary. Abelard held that the first account fails to meet the connexive principle and
that the second account (the account of containment) captured Aristotle’s principle.

Abelard’s position was shown to face a difficulty by Alberic of Paris in the 1130s. Most medieval
logicians didn’t, however, abandon the account of validity based on containment or something similar
(see, for example, Martin 1987). But one way to handle the difficulty is to reject the connexive principle.
This approach, which has become most influential, was accepted by the followers of Adam Balsham or
Parvipontanus (or sometimes known as Adam of The Little Bridge [12th century]). The Parvipontanians
embraced the truth-preservation account of consequences and the ‘paradoxes’ that are associated with it.
In fact, it was a member of the Parvipontanians, William of Soissons, who discovered in the twelfth
century what we now call the C.I. Lewis (independent) argument for ECQ (see Martin 1986).

The containment account, however, did not disappear. John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) and his followers
accepted the containment account (see Martin 1996). The Cologne School of the late fifteenth century
argued against ECQ by rejecting disjunctive syllogism (see Sylvan 2000).

In the history of logic in Asia, there is a tendency (for example, in Jaina and Buddhist traditions) to
consider the possibility of statements being both true and false. Moreover, the logics developed by the
major Buddhist logicians, Dignāga (5th century) and Dharmakīrti (7th century) do not embrace ECQ.
Their logical account is, in fact, based on the ‘pervasion’ (Skt: vyāpti, Tib: khyab pa) relation among the
elements of an argument. Just like the containment account of Abelard, there must be a tighter connection
between the premises and conclusion than the truth-preservation account allows. For the logic of
Dharmakīrti and its subsequent development, see for example Dunne 2004 and Tillemans 1999.

1.3 Modern History of Paraconsistent Logic

In the twentieth century, alternatives to an explosive account of logical consequence occurred to different
people at different times and places independently of each other. They were often motivated by different
considerations. The earliest paraconsistent logics in the contemporary era seem to have been given by two
Russians. Starting about 1910, Vasil’év proposed a modified Aristotelian syllogistic including statements
of the form: [Math Processing Error] is both [Math Processing Error] and not [Math Processing Error].
In 1929, Orlov gave the first axiomatisation of the relevant logic [Math Processing Error] which is
paraconsistent. (On Vasil’év, see Arruda 1977 and Arruda 1989: 102f; on Orlov, see Anderson, Belnap, &
Dunn 1992: xvii.)

The work of Vasil’év or Orlov did not make any impact at the time. The first (formal) logician to have
developed paraconsistent logic was Jaśkowski in Poland, who was a student of Łukasiewicz, who himself
had envisaged paraconsistent logic in his critique of Aristotle on the LNC (Łukasiewicz 1951). Almost at
the same time, Halldén (1949) presented work on the logic of nonsense, but again this went mostly
unnoticed.

Paraconsistent logics were developed independently in South America by Florencio Asenjo and especially
Newton da Costa in their doctoral dissertations, in 1954 and 1963 respectively, with an emphasis on
mathematical applications (see Asenjo 1966, da Costa 1974). An active group of logicians has been
researching paraconsistent logic continuously ever since, especially in Campinas and São Paulo, Brazil,
with a focus on logics of formal inconsistency. Carnielli and Coniglio (2016) give a comprehensive recent
account of this work.

Paraconsistent logics in the forms of relevant logics were proposed in England by Smiley in 1959 and also
at about the same time, in a much more developed form, in the United States by Anderson and Belnap. An
active group of relevant logicians grew up in Pittsburgh including Dunn and Meyer. The development of
paraconsistent logics (in the form of relevant logics) was transported to Australia. R. Routley (later
Sylvan) and V. Routley (later Plumwood) discovered an intentional semantics for some of
Anderson/Belnap relevant logics. A school developed around them in Canberra which included Brady and
Mortensen, and later Priest who, together with R. Routley, incorporated dialetheism to the development.

Since the 1970s, the development of paraconsistent logic has been international. Some of the major
schools of thought are canvassed below, including adaptive logic (as in Batens 2001) and preservationism
(as in Schotch, Brown, & Jennings 2009). There is work being done in in Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, England, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand,
Poland, Scotland, Spain, the United States, and more. There has been a series of major international
conferences about paraconsistent logic. In 1997, the First World Congress on Paraconsistency was held at
the University of Ghent in Belgium. The Second World Congress was held in São Sebastião (São Paulo,
Brazil) in 2000, the Third in Toulous (France) in 2003 and the Fourth in Melbourne (Australia) in 2008. A
Fifth World Congress was held in Kolkata, India in 2013. Another major paraconsistency conference in
2014 was held in Munich (Andreas & Verdée 2016). See the bibliography section on World Congress
Proceedings.

2. Motivations
The reasons for paraconsistency that have been put forward are specific to the development of the
particular formal systems of paraconsistent logic. However, there are several general reasons for thinking
that logic should be paraconsistent. Before we summarise the systems of paraconsistent logic, we present
some motivations for paraconsisent logic.
2.1 Inconsistency without Triviality

A most telling reason for paraconsistent logic is, prima facie, the fact that there are theories which are
inconsistent but non-trivial. If we admit the existence of such theories, their underlying logics must be
paraconsistent (though see Michael 2016).

2.1.1 Non-Trivial Theories

Examples of inconsistent but non-trivial theories are easy to produce. One example can be derived from
the history of science. Consider Bohr’s theory of the atom. According to this, an electron orbits the
nucleus of the atom without radiating energy. However, according to Maxwell’s equations, which formed
an integral part of the theory, an electron which is accelerating in orbit must radiate energy. Hence Bohr’s
account of the behaviour of the atom was inconsistent. Yet, patently, not everything concerning the
behavior of electrons was inferred from it, nor should it have been. Hence, whatever inference mechanism
it was that underlay it, this must have been paraconsistent (Brown & Priest 2015).

2.1.2 True Contradictions

Despite the fact that dialetheism and paraconsistency must be distinguished, dialetheism can be a
motivation for paraconsistent logic. One candidate for a dialetheia (a true contradiction) is the liar
paradox. Consider the sentence: ‘This sentence is not true’. There are two options: either the sentence is
true or it is not. Suppose it is true. Then what it says is the case. Hence the sentence is not true. Suppose,
on the other hand, it is not true. This is what it says. Hence the sentence is true. In either case it is both
true and not true. (See the entry on dialetheism.)

2.1.3 Linguistics

Natural languages are another possible site of non-trivial inconsistency. In linguistics, it has been observed
that normal lexical features are preserved even in inconsistent contexts. For example, words like ‘near’
have spatial connotations that are not disturbed even when dealing with impossible objects (McGinnis
2013):

If I tell you that I painted a spherical cube brown, you take its exterior to be brown …, and if I
am inside it, you know I am not near it. (Chomsky 1995: 20)

Hence if natural language can be said to have a logic, paraconsistent logics could be a candidate for
formalizing it.

2.2 Artificial Intelligence

Paraconsistent logic is motivated not only by philosophical considerations, but also by its applications and
implications.

2.2.1 Automated Reasoning

One of the applications is automated reasoning (information processing). Consider a computer which
stores a large amount of information, as in Belnap 1992. While the computer stores the information, it is
also used to operate on it, and, crucially, to infer from it. Now it is quite common for the computer to
contain inconsistent information, because of mistakes by the data entry operators or because of multiple
sourcing. This is certainly a problem for database operations with theorem-provers, and so has drawn
much attention from computer scientists. Techniques for removing inconsistent information have been
investigated. Yet all have limited applicability, and, in any case, are not guaranteed to produce
consistency. (There is no algorithm for logical falsehood.) Hence, even if steps are taken to get rid of
contradictions when they are found, an underlying paraconsistent logic is desirable if hidden
contradictions are not to generate spurious answers to queries.

Nelson’s paraconsistent (four-valued) logic N4 has been specifically studied for applications in computer
science (Kamide & Wansing 2012). Annotated logics were proposed by Subrahmanian (1987) and then by
da Costa, Subrahmanian, and Vago (1991); these tools are now being extended to robotics, expert systems
for medical diagnosis, and engineering, with recent work gathered in the volumes edited by Abe, Akama,
and Nakamatsu (2015) and Akama (2016).

2.2.2 Belief Revision

Belief revision is the study of rationally revising bodies of belief in the light of new evidence. Notoriously,
people have inconsistent beliefs. They may even be rational in doing so. For example, there may be
apparently overwhelming evidence for both something and its negation. There may even be cases where it
is in principle impossible to eliminate such inconsistency. For example, consider the ‘paradox of the
preface’. A rational person, after thorough research, writes a book in which they claim [Math Processing
Error],…, [Math Processing Error]. But they are also aware that no book of any complexity contains
only truths. So they rationally believe [Math Processing Error] too. Hence, principles of rational belief
revision must work on inconsistent sets of beliefs. Standard accounts of belief revision, e.g. the AGM
theory (see the logic of belief revision), all fail to do this, since they are based on classical logic (Tanaka
2005). A more adequate account may be based on a paraconsistent logic; see Girard and Tanaka 2016.

2.3 Formal Semantics and Set Theory

Paraconsistency can be taken as a response to logical paradoxes in formal semantics and set theory.

2.3.1 Truth Theory

Semantics is the study that aims to spell out a theoretical understanding of meaning. Most accounts of
semantics insist that to spell out the meaning of a sentence is, in some sense, to spell out its truth-
conditions. Now, prima facie at least, truth is a predicate characterised by the Tarski T-scheme:

[Math Processing Error]

where [Math Processing Error] is a sentence and [Math Processing Error] is its name. But given any
standard means of self-reference, e.g., arithmetisation, one can construct a sentence, [Math Processing
Error], which says that [Math Processing Error]. The T-scheme gives that [Math Processing Error]. It
then follows that [Math Processing Error]. (This is, of course, just the liar paradox.) A full development
of a theory of truth in paraconsistent logic is given by Beall (2009).

2.3.2 Set Theory

The situation is similar in set theory. The naive, and intuitively correct, axioms of set theory are the
Comprehension Schema and Extensionality Principle:
[Math Processing Error]

where [Math Processing Error] does not occur free in [Math Processing Error]. As was discovered by
Russell, any theory that contains the Comprehension Schema is inconsistent. For putting ‘[Math
Processing Error]’ for [Math Processing Error] in the Comprehension Schema and instantiating the
existential quantifier to an arbitrary such object ‘[Math Processing Error]’ gives:

[Math Processing Error]

So, instantiating the universal quantifier to ‘[Math Processing Error]’ gives:

[Math Processing Error]

It then follows that [Math Processing Error].

The standard approaches to these problems of inconsistency are, by and large, ones of expedience. A
paraconsistent approach makes it possible to have theories of truth and sethood in which the
mathematically fundamental intuitions about these notions are respected. For example, as Brady (1989;
2006) has shown, contradictions may be allowed to arise in a paraconsistent set theory, but these need not
infect the whole theory.

There are several approaches to set theory with naive comprehension via paraconsistent logic. The
theories of ordinal and cardinal numbers are developed axiomatically using relevant logic in Weber
2010b, 2012. The possibility of adding a consistency operator to track non-paradoxical fragments of the
theory is considered in Omori 2015, taking a cue from the tradition of da Costa. Naive set theory using
adaptive logic is presented by Verdée (2013). Models for paraconsistent set theory are described by Libert
(2005).

2.3.3 Mathematics in general

According to da Costa (1974: 498),

It would be as interesting to study the inconsistent systems as, for instance, the non-euclidean
geometries: we would obtain a better idea of the nature of paradoxes, could have a better
insight on the connections amongst the various logical principles necessary to obtain
determinate results, etc. … It is not our aim to eliminate the inconsistencies, but to analyze
and study them.

For further developments of mathematics in paraconsistent logics, see entry on inconsistent mathematics.

2.4 Arithmetic and Gödel’s Theorem

Unlike formal semantics and set theory, there may not be any obvious arithmetical principles that give rise
to contradiction. Nonetheless, just like the classical non-standard models of arithmetic, there is a class of
inconsistent models of arithmetic (or more accurately models of inconsistent arithmetic) which have an
interesting and important mathematical structure.

One interesting implication of the existence of inconsistent models of arithmetic is that some of them are
finite (unlike the classical non-standard models). This means that there are some significant applications
in the metamathematical theorems. For example, the classical Löwenheim-Skolem theorem states that
[Math Processing Error] (Robinson’s arithmetic which is a fragment of Peano arithmetic) has models of
every infinite cardinality but has no finite models. But, [Math Processing Error] can be shown to have
models of finite size too by referring to the inconsistent models of arithmetic.

It is not only the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem but also other metamathematical theorems can be given a
paraconsistent treatment. In the case of other theorems, however, the negative results that are often shown
by the limitative theorems of metamathematics may no longer hold. One important such theorem is
Gödel’s theorem.

One version of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem states that for any consistent axiomatic theory of
arithmetic, which can be recognised to be sound, there will be an arithmetic truth—viz., its Gödel
sentence—not provable in it, but which can be established as true by intuitively correct reasoning. The
heart of Gödel’s theorem is, in fact, a paradox that concerns the sentence, [Math Processing Error], ‘This
sentence is not provable’. If [Math Processing Error] is provable, then it is true and so not provable. Thus
[Math Processing Error] is proved. Hence [Math Processing Error] is true and so unprovable. If an
underlying paraconsistent logic is used to formalise the arithmetic, and the theory therefore allowed to be
inconsistent, the Gödel sentence may well be provable in the theory (essentially by the above reasoning).
So a paraconsistent approach to arithmetic overcomes the limitations of arithmetic that are supposed (by
many) to follow from Gödel’s theorem. (For other ‘limitative’ theorems of metamathematics, see Priest
2002.)

2.5 Vagueness

From the start, paraconsistent logics were intended in part to deal with problems of vagueness and the
sorites paradox (Jaśkowski 1948 [1969]). Some empirical evidence suggest that vagueness in natural
language is a good candidate for paraconsistent treatment (Ripley 2011).

A few different paraconsistent approaches to vagueness have been suggested. Subvaluationism is the
logical dual to supervaluationism: if a claim is true on some acceptable sharpening of a vague predicate,
then it is true. Where the supervaluationist sees indeterminacy, or truth-value gaps, the subvaluationist
sees overdeterminacy, truth-value gluts. A subvaluation logic will, like its supervaluational dual, preserve
all classical tautologies, as long as the definition of validity is restricted to the non-glutty cases. Because it
is so structurally similar to supervaluationism, subvaluationism is also subject to most of the same
criticisms (Hyde 1997).

More broadly, (dialetheic) paraconsistency has been used in straightforward three-valued truth-functional
approaches to vagueness. The aim is to preserve both of the following intuitive claims:

1. Tolerance: For vague [Math Processing Error], it is not the case that [Math Processing Error] is
[Math Processing Error] but some very [Math Processing Error]-similar [Math Processing Error]
is not [Math Processing Error]
2. Cutoffs: For all [Math Processing Error], if some [Math Processing Error] is [Math Processing
Error] and some [Math Processing Error] is not, and there is an ordered [Math Processing Error]-
progression from [Math Processing Error] to [Math Processing Error], then there is some last
[Math Processing Error] and some first non-[Math Processing Error]

Again, the key to the analysis is to take cutoffs as sites for inconsistency, for objects both F and not F.
Then all tolerance claims (about vague F) are taken as true; but since, paraconsistently, the inference of
disjunctive syllogism is not generally valid, these claims do not imply absurdities like ‘everyone is bald’.
Paraconsistent models place a great deal of emphasis on cutoff points of vague predicates, attributing
much of the trouble with the sorties paradox to underlying inconsistency of vague predicates (Weber
2010a).

There is debate as to whether the sorties paradox is of a kind with the other well-known semantic and set
theoretic paradoxes, like Russell’s and the liar. If it is, then a paraconsistent approach to one would be as
natural as to the other.

3. Systems of Paraconsistent Logic

A number of formal techniques to invalidate ECQ have been devised. Most of the techniques have been
summarised elsewhere (Brown 2002, Priest 2002). As the interest in paraconsistent logic grew, different
techniques developed in different parts of the world. As a result, the development of the techniques has
somewhat a regional flavour (though there are, of course, exceptions, and the regional differences can be
over-exaggerated; see Tanaka 2003).

Most paraconsistent logicians do not propose a wholesale rejection of classical logic. They usually accept
the validity of classical inferences in consistent contexts. It is the need to isolate an inconsistency without
spreading everywhere that motivates the rejection of ECQ. Depending on how much revision one thinks is
needed, we have a technique for paraconsistency. The taxonomy given here is based on the degree of
revision to classical logic. Since the logical novelty can be seen at the propositional level, we will
concentrate on the propositional paraconsistent logics.

3.1 Discussive Logic

The first formal paraconsistent logic to have been developed was discussive (or discursive) logic by the
Polish logician Jaśkowski (1948). The thought behind discussive logic is that, in a discourse, each
participant puts forward some information, beliefs or opinions. Each assertion is true according to the
participant who puts it forward in a discourse. But what is true in a discourse on whole is the sum of
assertions put forward by participants. Each participant’s opinions may be self-consistent, yet may be
inconsistent with those of others. Jaśkowski formalised this idea in the form of discussive logic.

A formalisation of discussive logic is by means of modelling a discourse in a modal logic. For simplicity,
Jaśkowski chose S5. We think of each participant’s belief set as the set of sentences true at a world in an
S5 model [Math Processing Error]. Thus, a sentence [Math Processing Error] asserted by a participant in
a discourse is interpreted as “it is possible that [Math Processing Error]” or a sentence [Math Processing
Error] of S5. Then [Math Processing Error] holds in a discourse iff [Math Processing Error] is true at
some world in [Math Processing Error]. Since [Math Processing Error] may hold in one world but not in
another, both [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] may hold in a discourse. Indeed, one
should expect that participants disagree on some issue in a rational discourse. The idea, then, is that [Math
Processing Error] is a discussive consequence of [Math Processing Error] iff [Math Processing Error] is
an S5 consequence of [Math Processing Error].

To see that discussive logic is paraconsistent, consider an S5 model, [Math Processing Error], such that
[Math Processing Error] holds at [Math Processing Error], [Math Processing Error] holds at a different
world [Math Processing Error], but [Math Processing Error] does not hold at any world for some [Math
Processing Error]. Then both [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] hold, yet [Math
Processing Error] does not hold in [Math Processing Error]. Hence discussive logic invalidates ECQ.

However, there is no S5 model where [Math Processing Error] holds at some world. So an inference of
the form [Math Processing Error] is valid in discussive logic. This means that, in discussive logic,
adjunction [Math Processing Error] fails. But one can define a discussive conjunction, [Math Processing
Error], as [Math Processing Error] (or [Math Processing Error]. Then adjunction holds for [Math
Processing Error] (Jaśkowski 1949).

One difficulty is a formulation of a conditional. In S5, the inference from [Math Processing Error] and
[Math Processing Error] to [Math Processing Error] fails. Jaśkowski chose to introduce a connective
which he called discussive implication, [Math Processing Error], defined as [Math Processing Error].
This connective can be understood to mean that “if some participant states that [Math Processing Error],
then [Math Processing Error]”. As the inference from [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing
Error] to [Math Processing Error] is valid in S5, modus ponens for [Math Processing Error] holds in
discussive logic. A discussive bi-implication, [Math Processing Error], can also be defined as [Math
Processing Error] (or [Math Processing Error]. For some history of work on Jaśkowski’s logic and
axiomatizations thereof, see Omori and Alama (forthcoming).

3.2 Non-Adjunctive Systems

A non-adjunctive system is a system that does not validate adjunction (i.e., [Math Processing Error]. As
we saw above, discussive logic without a discussive conjunction is non-adjunctive. Another non-
adjunctive strategy was suggested by Rescher and Manor (1970). In effect, we can conjoin premises, but
only up to maximal consistency. Specifically, if [Math Processing Error] is a set of premises, a maximally
consistent subset is any consistent subset [Math Processing Error] such that if [Math Processing Error]
then [Math Processing Error] is inconsistent. Then we say that [Math Processing Error] is a consequence
of [Math Processing Error] iff [Math Processing Error] is a classical consequence of [Math Processing
Error] for some maximally consistent subset [Math Processing Error]. Then [Math Processing Error] but
[Math Processing Error].

3.3 Preservationism

In the non-adjunctive system of Rescher and Manor, a consequence relation is defined over some
maximally consistent subset of the premises. This can be seen as a way to ‘measure’ the level of
consistency in the premise set. The level of [Math Processing Error] is 1 since the maximally consistent
subset is the set itself. The level of [Math Processing Error], however, is 2: [Math Processing Error] and
[Math Processing Error].

If we define a consequence relation over some maximally consistent subset, then the relation can be
thought of as preserving the level of consistent fragments. This is the approach which has come to be
called preservationism. It was first developed by the Canadian logicians Ray Jennings and Peter Schotch.

To be more precise, a (finite) set of formulas, [Math Processing Error], can be partitioned into classically
consistent fragments whose union is [Math Processing Error]. Let [Math Processing Error] be the
classical consequence relation. A covering of [Math Processing Error] is a set [Math Processing Error],
where each member is consistent, and [Math Processing Error]. The level of [Math Processing Error], is
the least [Math Processing Error] such that [Math Processing Error] can be partitioned into [Math
Processing Error] sets if there is such [Math Processing Error], or [Math Processing Error] if there is no
such [Math Processing Error]. A consequence relation, called forcing, [Math Processing Error], is
defined as follows. [Math Processing Error] iff [Math Processing Error], or [Math Processing Error] and
for every covering of size [Math Processing Error] there is a [Math Processing Error] such that [Math
Processing Error]. If [Math Processing Error] or [Math Processing Error] then the forcing relation
coincides with classical consequence relation. In case where [Math Processing Error], there must be a
sentence of the form [Math Processing Error] and so the forcing relation explodes.

A chunking strategy has also been applied to capture the inferential mechanism underlying some theories
in science and mathematics. In mathematics, the best available theory concerning infinitesimals was
inconsistent. In the infinitesimal calculus of Leibniz and Newton, in the calculation of a derivative
infinitesimals had to be both zero and non-zero. In order to capture the inference mechanism underlying
the infinitesimal calculus of Leibniz and Newton (and Bohr’s theory of the atom), we need to add to the
chunking a mechanism that allows a limited amount of information to flow between the consistent
fragments of these inconsistent but non-trivial theories. That is, certain information from one chunk may
permeate into other chunks. The inference procedure underlying the theories must be Chunk and
Permeate.

Let [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] a permeability relation on [Math Processing
Error] such that [Math Processing Error] is a map from [Math Processing Error] to subsets of formulas
of the language. If [Math Processing Error], then any structure [Math Processing Error] is called a C&P
structure on [Math Processing Error]. If [Math Processing Error] is a C&P structure on [Math
Processing Error], we define the C&P consequences of [Math Processing Error] with respect to [Math
Processing Error], as follows. For each [Math Processing Error], a set of sentences, [Math Processing
Error], is defined by recursion on [Math Processing Error]:

[Math Processing Error]

That is, [Math Processing Error] comprises the consequences from [Math Processing Error] together
with the information that permeates into chunk [Math Processing Error] from the other chunk at level
[Math Processing Error]. We then collect up all finite stages:

[Math Processing Error]

The C&P consequences of [Math Processing Error] can be defined in terms of the sentences that can be
inferred in the designated chunk [Math Processing Error] when all appropriate information has been
allowed to flow along the permeability relations (see Brown & Priest 2004, 2015.)

3.4 Adaptive Logics

One may think not only that an inconsistency needs to be isolated but also that a serious need for the
consideration of inconsistencies is a rare occurrence. The thought may be that consistency is the norm
until proven otherwise: we should treat a sentence or a theory as consistently as possible. This is
essentially the motivation for adaptive logics, pioneered by Diderik Batens in Belgium.

An adaptive logic is a logic that adapts itself to the situation at the time of application of inference rules. It
models the dynamics of our reasoning. There are two senses in which reasoning is dynamic: external and
internal. Reasoning is externally dynamic if as new information becomes available expanding the premise
set, consequences inferred previously may have to be withdrawn. The external dynamics is thus the non-
monotonic character of some consequence relations: [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing
Error] for some [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error]. However, even if the premise-set
remains constant, some previously inferred conclusion may considered as not derivable at a later stage. As
our reasoning proceeds from a premise set, we may encounter a situation where we infer a consequence
provided that no abnormality, in particular no contradiction, obtains at some stage of the reasoning
process. If we are forced to infer a contradiction at a later stage, our reasoning has to adapt itself so that an
application of the previously used inference rule is withdrawn. In such a case, reasoning is internally
dynamic. Our reasoning may be internally dynamic if the set of valid inferences is not recursively
enumerable (i.e., there is no decision procedure that leads to ‘yes’ after finitely many steps if the inference
is indeed valid). It is the internal dynamics that adaptive logics are devised to capture.

In order to illustrate the idea behind adaptive logics, consider the premise set [Math Processing Error].
One may start reasoning with [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error], using the
Disjunctive Syllogism (DS) to infer [Math Processing Error], given that [Math Processing Error] does
not obtain. We then reason with [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error], to infer [Math
Processing Error] with the DS, given that [Math Processing Error] does not obtain. Now, we can apply
the DS to [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] to derive [Math Processing Error],
provided that [Math Processing Error] does not obtain. However, by conjoining [Math Processing Error]
and [Math Processing Error], we can obtain [Math Processing Error]. Hence we must withdraw the first
application of DS, and so the proof of [Math Processing Error] lapses. A consequence of this reasoning is
what cannot be defeated at any stage of the process.

A system of adaptive logic can generally be characterised as consisting of three elements:

1. A lower limit logic (LLL)

2. A set of abnormalities
3. An adaptive strategy

LLL is the part of an adaptive logic that is not subject to adaptation. It consists essentially of a number of
inferential rules (and/or axioms) that one is happy to accept regardless of the situation in a reasoning
process. A set of abnormalities is a set of formulas that are presupposed as not holding (or as absurd) at
the beginning of reasoning until they are shown to be otherwise. For many adaptive logics, a formula in
this set is of the form [Math Processing Error]. An adaptive strategy specifies a strategy of handling the
applications of inference rules based on the set of abnormalities. If LLL is extended with the requirement
that no abnormality is logically possible, one obtains the upper limit logic (ULL). ULL essentially
contains not only the inferential rules (and/or axioms) of LLL but also supplementary rules (and/or
axioms) that can be applied in the absence of abnormality, such as DS. By specifying these three elements,
one obtains a system of adaptive logic.

3.5 Logics of Formal Inconsistency

The approaches taken for motivating the systems of paraconsistent logic which we have so far seen isolate
inconsistency from consistent parts of the given theory. The aim is to retain as much classical machinery
as possible in developing a system of paraconsistent logic which, nonetheless, avoids explosion when
faced with a contradiction. One way to make this aim explicit is to extend the expressive power of our
language by encoding the metatheoretical notions of consistency (and inconsistency) in the object
language. The Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) are a family of paraconsistent logics that constitute
consistent fragments of classical logic yet which reject the explosion principle where a contradiction is
present. The investigation of this family of logics was initiated by Newton da Costa in Brazil.

An effect of encoding consistency (and inconsistency) in the object language is that we can explicitly
separate inconsistency from triviality. With a language rich enough to express inconsistency (and
consistency), we can study inconsistent theories without assuming that they are necessarily trivial. This
makes it explicit that the presence of a contradiction is a separate issue from the non-trivial nature of
paraconsistent inferences.
The thought behind LFIs is that we should respect classical logic as much as possible. It is only when
there is a contradiction that logic should deviate from it. This means that we can admit the validity of
ECQ in the absence of contradictions. In order to do so, we encode ‘consistency’ into our object language
by [Math Processing Error]. Then [Math Processing Error] is a consequence relation of an LFI iff

a. [Math Processing Error] and

b. [Math Processing Error].

Let [Math Processing Error] be the classical consequence (or derivability) relation and [Math Processing
Error] express the consistency of the set of formulas [Math Processing Error] such that if [Math
Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] then [Math Processing Error] where [Math Processing
Error] is any two place logical connective. Then we can capture derivability in the consistent context in
terms of the equivalence: [Math Processing Error] iff [Math Processing Error].

Now take the positive fragment of classical logic with modus ponens plus double negation elimination
[Math Processing Error] as an axiom and some axioms governing [Math Processing Error]:

[Math Processing Error]

Then [Math Processing Error] provides da Costa’s system [Math Processing Error]. If we let [Math
Processing Error] abbreviate the formula [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] the
formula [Math Processing Error], then we obtain [Math Processing Error] for each natural number
[Math Processing Error] greater than 1.

To obtain da Costa’s system [Math Processing Error], instead of the positive fragment of classical logic,
we start with positive intuitionist logic instead. [Math Processing Error] systems for finite [Math
Processing Error] do not rule out [Math Processing Error] from holding in a theory. By going up the
hierarchy to [Math Processing Error], [Math Processing Error] rules out this possibility. Note, however,
that [Math Processing Error] is not a LFC as it does not contain classical positive logic.

For the semantics for da Costa’s [Math Processing Error]-systems, see for example da Costa and Alves
1977 and Loparic 1977. For the state of the art, see Carnielli and Coniglio 2016.

3.6 Many-Valued Logics

Perhaps the simplest way of generating a paraconsistent logic, first proposed by Asenjo in his PhD
dissertation, is to use a many-valued logic. Classically, there are exactly two truth values. The many-
valued approach is to drop this classical assumption and allow more than two truth values. The simplest
strategy is to use three truth values: true (only), false (only) and both (true and false) for the evaluations of
formulas. The truth tables for logical connectives, except conditional, can be given as follows:

[Math Processing Error]

[Math Processing Error] [Math Processing Error]
[Math Processing Error] [Math Processing Error]
[Math Processing Error] [Math Processing Error]
 [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]

These tables are essentially those of Kleene’s and Łukasiewicz’s three valued logics where the middle
value is thought of as indeterminate or neither (true nor false).

For a conditional [Math Processing Error], following Kleene’s three valued logic, we might specify a
truth table as follows:

[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing

Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]
[Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing [Math Processing
Error] Error] Error] Error]

Let [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] be the designated values. These are the values
that are preserved in valid inferences. If we define a consequence relation in terms of preservation of these
designated values, then we have the paraconsistent logic LP (Priest 1979). In LP, ECQ is invalid. To see
this, we assign [Math Processing Error] to [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] to
[Math Processing Error]. Then [Math Processing Error] is also evaluated as [Math Processing Error]
and so both [Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] are designated. Yet [Math Processing
Error] is not evaluated as having a designated value. Hence ECQ is invalid in LP.

As we can see, LP invalidates ECQ by assigning a designated value, both true and false, to a
contradiction. Thus, LP departs from classical logic more so than the systems that we have seen
previously. But, more controversially, it is also naturally aligned with dialetheism. However, we can
interpret truth values not in an aletheic sense but in an epistemic sense: truth values (or designated values)
express epistemic or doxastic commitments (see for example Belnap 1992). Or we might think that the
value both is needed for a semantic reason: we might be required to express the contradictory nature of
some of our beliefs, assertions and so on (see Dunn 1976: 157). If this interpretative strategy is successful,
we can separate LP from necessarily falling under dialetheism.
One feature of LP which requires some attention is that in LP modus ponens comes out to be invalid. For
if [Math Processing Error] is both true and false but [Math Processing Error] false (only), then [Math
Processing Error] is both true and false and hence is designated. So both [Math Processing Error] and
[Math Processing Error] are designated, yet the conclusion [Math Processing Error] is not. Hence modus
ponens for [Math Processing Error] is invalid in LP. (One way to rectify the problem is to add an
appropriate conditional connective as we will see in the section on relevant logics.)

Another way to develop a many-valued paraconsistent logic is to think of an assignment of a truth value
not as a function but as a relation. Let [Math Processing Error] be the set of propositional parameters.
Then an evaluation, [Math Processing Error], is a subset of [Math Processing Error]. A proposition may
only relate to 1 (true), it may only relate to 0 (false), it may relate to both 1 and 0 or it may relate to
neither 1 nor 0. The evaluation is extended to a relation for all formulas by the following recursive
clauses:

[Math Processing Error]

If we define validity in terms of truth preservation under all relational evaluations then we obtain First
Degree Entailment (FDE) which is a fragment of relevant logics. These relational semantics for FDE are
due to Dunn 1976.

A different approach is explored through the idea of non-deterministic matrices, studied by Avron and his
collaborators (for example, Avron & Lev 2005).

3.7 Relevant Logics

The approaches to paraconsistency we have examined above all focus on the inevitable presence or the
truth of some contradictions. A rejection of ECQ, in these approaches, depends on an analysis of the
premises containing a contradiction. One might think that the real problem with ECQ is not to do with the
contradictory premises but to do with the lack of connection between the premises and the conclusion.
The thought is that the conclusion must be relevant to the premises in a valid inference.

Relevant logics were pioneered in order to study the relevance of the conclusion with respect to the
premises by Anderson and Belnap (1975) in Pittsburgh. Anderson and Belnap motivated the development
of relevant logics using natural deduction systems; yet they developed a family of relevant logics in
axiomatic systems. As development proceeded and was carried out also in Australia, more focus was
given to the semantics.

The semantics for relevant logics were developed by Fine (1974), Routley and Routley (1972), Routley
and Meyer (1993) and Urquhart (1972). (There are also algebraic semantics; see for example Dunn &
Restall 2002: 48ff.) Routley-Meyer semantics is based on possible-world semantics, which is the most
studied semantics for relevant logics, especially in Australia. In this semantics, conjunction and
disjunction behave in the usual way. But each world, [Math Processing Error], has an associate world,
[Math Processing Error], and negation is evaluated in terms of [Math Processing Error] is true at [Math
Processing Error] iff [Math Processing Error] is false, not at [Math Processing Error], but at [Math
Processing Error]. Thus, if [Math Processing Error] is true at [Math Processing Error], but false at
[Math Processing Error], then [Math Processing Error] is true at [Math Processing Error]. To obtain the
standard relevant logics, one needs to add the constraint that [Math Processing Error]. As is clear,
negation in these semantics is an intensional operator.

The primary concern with relevant logics is not so much with negation as with a conditional connective
[Math Processing Error] (satisfying modus ponens). In relevant logics, if [Math Processing Error] is a
logical truth, then [Math Processing Error] is relevant to [Math Processing Error], in the sense that
[Math Processing Error] and [Math Processing Error] share at least one propositional variable.

Semantics for the relevant conditional are obtained by furnishing each Routley-Meyer model with a
ternary relation. In the simplified semantics of Priest and Sylvan (1992) and Restall (1993, 1995), worlds
are divided into normal and non-normal. If [Math Processing Error] is a normal world, [Math Processing
Error] is true at [Math Processing Error] iff at all worlds where [Math Processing Error] is true, [Math
Processing Error] is true. If [Math Processing Error] is non-normal, [Math Processing Error] is true at
[Math Processing Error] iff for all [Math Processing Error], such that [Math Processing Error], if [Math
Processing Error] is true at [Math Processing Error] is true at [Math Processing Error]. If [Math
Processing Error] is true at [Math Processing Error] but not at [Math Processing Error] where [Math
Processing Error], then [Math Processing Error] is not true at [Math Processing Error]. Then one can
show that [Math Processing Error] is not a logical truth. (Validity is defined as truth preservation over
normal worlds.) This gives the basic relevant logic, [Math Processing Error]. Stronger logics, such as the
logic [Math Processing Error], are obtained by adding constraints on the ternary relation.

There are also versions of world-semantics for relevant logics based on Dunn’s relational semantics for
FDE. Then negation is extensional. A conditional connective, now needs to be given both truth and falsity
conditions. So we have: [Math Processing Error] is true at [Math Processing Error] iff for all [Math
Processing Error], such that [Math Processing Error], if [Math Processing Error] is true at [Math
Processing Error] is true at [Math Processing Error]; and [Math Processing Error] is false at [Math
Processing Error] iff for some [Math Processing Error], such that [Math Processing Error], if [Math
Processing Error] is true at [Math Processing Error] is false at [Math Processing Error]. Adding various
constraints on the ternary relation provides stronger logics. However, these logics are not the standard
relevant logics developed by Anderson and Belnap. To obtain the standard family of relevant logics, one
needs neighbourhood frames (see Mares 2004). Further details can be found in the entry on relevant
logics.

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Bibliography Sorted by Topic

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World Congress of Paraconsistency Volumes

[First Congress] Batens, Diderik, Chris Mortensen, Graham Priest, and Jean-Paul van Bendegem (eds.),
2000, Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic (Studies in Logic and Computation 8), Baldock, England:
Research Studies Press.
[Second Congress] Carnielli, Walter A., M. Coniglio, and Itala Maria Lof D’ottaviano (eds.), 2002,
Paraconsistency: the Logical Way to the Inconsistent (Lecture Notes in Pure and Applied
Mathematics: Volume 228), Boca Raton: CRC Press.
[Third Congress] Beziau, Jean-Yves, Walter A. Carnielli, and Dov M. Gabbay (eds.), 2007, Handbook of
Paraconsistency (Studies in Logic 9), London: College Publications.
[Fourth Congress] Tanaka, Koji, Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, and Francesco Paoli (eds.), 2013,
Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications (Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science 26),
Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7
[Fifth Congress] Beziau, Jean-Yves, Mihir Chakraborty, and Soma Dutta (eds.), 2015, New Directions in
 Paraconsistent Logic, Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-81-322-2719-9

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Acknowledgments

The editors and authors would like to thank Joy Britten for noticing an error in the example of adaptive
logic reasoning in Section 3.4, and to Hitoshi Omori for identification and discussion of an error in the
section on discussive logic Section 3.1.

Copyright © 2018 by
Graham Priest <[email protected]>
Koji Tanaka <[email protected]>
Zach Weber <[email protected]>

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