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Fabian V Desierto
Fabian V Desierto
Benitez issued
a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct
and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director
Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera
of their office.
II
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Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case
at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it
refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised
by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ
of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a
special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to
concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto
appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabuts
and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will
merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account
where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to
as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a
criminal action.
III
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very
allegations thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled
'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional
Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved the
latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among
other."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant
ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et
al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the
provisions of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially
reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has
complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with
any submission it should have presented. On the other hand,
petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to
this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman is
not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims
that what is proscribed is the passage of law "increasing" the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution,"
and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an
error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article
VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final
judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,"
said Section 27 does not increase this Court may provide," said
section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since,
by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition
for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are
only questions of law of which this Court already has of which this
Court already has jurisdiction.
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court
which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be
adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain
administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was
to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended
limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not
fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that
time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions
of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an
objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually
involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming
from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a
trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same.
On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule
45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts.
Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is
limited to jurisdictional questions.*
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot
validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction
of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition
which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The
Court of Appeals, el al. 23 was intended to give this Court a measure
of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court 24 cräläwvirtualibräry
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VI
SO ORDERED.