FIRST DIVISION Thereafter, a hearing was conducted but Puncia failed to appear

despite notice. 13
[G.R. No. 214399. June 28, 2016.] On October 18, 2011, Toyota sent Puncia a Notice of
Termination, 14 dismissing him on the ground of insubordination for
ARMANDO N. PUNCIA, petitioner, vs. TOYOTA his failure to attend the scheduled hearing and justify his absence. 15
SHAW/PASIG, INC. , respondent. This prompted Puncia to le a complaint 16 for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, unfair labor
practice, damages, and attorney's fees against Toyota and its of cers,
claiming, inter alia, that Toyota dismissed him after discovering that
DECISION he was a director of the Toyota-Shaw Pasig Workers Union-
Automotive Industry Worker's Alliance; and that he was terminated on
the ground of insubordination and not due to his failure to meet his
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p quota as contained in the Notice to Explain. 17
cAaDHT

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the In its defense, Toyota denied the harassment charges and
Decision 2 dated June 9, 2014 and the Resolution 3 dated September claimed that there was a valid cause to dismiss Puncia, considering his
23, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132615, failure to comply with the company's strict requirements on sales
which annulled and set aside the Decision 4 dated February 14, quota. It likewise stated that Puncia has consistently violated the
2013 and the Resolution 5 dated August 30, 2013 of the National company rules on attendance and timekeeping as several disciplinary
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CN. 10-15949- actions were already issued against him. 18
11/NLRC LAC No. 07-001991-12 and instead, reinstated the Decision
6 dated May 4, 2012 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) nding that respondent The LA Ruling
Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc. (Toyota) validly dismissed petitioner In a Decision 19 dated May 4, 2012, the LA dismissed Puncia's
Armando N. Puncia (Puncia) for just cause. complaint for lack of merit, but nevertheless, ordered Toyota to pay
The Facts Puncia his money claims consisting of his earned commissions, 13th
month pay for 2011, sick leave, and vacation leave benefits. 20
Puncia alleged that since 2004, he worked as a
messenger/collector for Toyota and was later on appointed on March The LA found that Puncia was dismissed not because of his
2, 2011 as a Marketing Professional 7 tasked to sell seven (7) vehicles involvement in the labor union, but was terminated for a just cause due
as monthly quota. 8 However, Puncia failed to comply and sold only to his inefficiency brought about by his numerous violations of the
one (1) vehicle for the month of July and none for August, 9 prompting company rules on attendance from 2006 to 2010 and his failure to
Toyota to send him a Notice to Explain. 10 In reply, 11 Puncia stated meet the required monthly quota. 21 This notwithstanding, the LA
that as a trainee, he was only required to sell three (3) vehicles per found Puncia entitled to his money claims, considering that Toyota
month; that the month of May has always been a lean month; and that failed to deny or rebut his entitlement thereto. 22
he was able to sell four (4) vehicles in the month of September. 12 Aggrieved, Puncia appealed 23 to the NLRC.

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 The NLRC Ruling In a Resolution 37 dated January 24, 2014, the CA-First
In a Decision 24 dated February 14, 2013, the NLRC reversed Division denied the motion for consolidation on the ground that CA-
the LA ruling and, accordingly, declared Puncia to have been illegally G.R. SP No. 132674 was already dismissed by the CA-Eleventh
dismissed by Toyota, thus, entitling him to reinstatement and Division. Thereafter, and while CA-G.R. SP No. 132674 remained
backwages. 25 The NLRC found that Toyota illegally dismissed Puncia dismissed, the CA-First Division promulgated the assailed Decision 38
from employment as there were no valid grounds to justify his dated June 9, 2014 (June 9, 2014 Decision) in CA-G.R. SP No.
termination. Moreover, the NLRC observed that Toyota failed to 132615 annulling and setting aside the NLRC ruling and reinstating
comply with the due process requirements as: first, the written notice that of the LA. It held that Toyota was able to present substantial
evidence in support of its contention that there was just cause in
served on the employee did not categorically indicate the specific
Puncia's dismissal from employment and that it was done in
ground for dismissal sufficient to have given Puncia a reasonable
opportunity to explain his side, since the Intra-Company compliance with due process, considering that: (a) Puncia's repeated
Communication 26 providing the company rules failed to explain in failure to meet his sales quota constitutes gross inef ciency and gross
detail that Puncia's de ciency merited the penalty of dismissal; 27 and neglect of duties; and (b) Puncia was afforded due process as he was
second, Puncia's dismissal was not based on the same grounds cited in able to submit a written explanation within the period given to him by
the Notice to Explain, since the ground indicated was Puncia's failure Toyota. 39
to meet the sales quota, which is different from the ground stated in Dissatis ed, Puncia led a motion for reconsideration, 40 which
the Notice of Termination, which is his unjustified absence during the the CA-First Division denied in the assailed Resolution 41 dated
scheduled hearing. 28 September 23, 2014 (September 23, 2014 Resolution).
Both parties led their separate motions for reconsideration, 29 Meanwhile, in a Resolution 42 dated July 22, 2014, the CA-
which were denied in a Resolution 30 dated August 30, 2013. Eleventh Division reconsidered its dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No.
Aggrieved, Toyota led a Petition for Certiorari 31 before the 132674, and accordingly, reinstated the same and ordered Toyota to
file its comment thereto.
CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 132615 and was raf ed to
the First Division (CA-First Division). In the same vein, Puncia filed In view of the foregoing, Puncia led the instant petition 43
his Petition for Certiorari 32 before the CA, which was docketed as mainly contending that the rulings in CA-G.R. SP No. 132615, i.e., the
CA-G.R. SP No. 132674 and was raf ed to the Eleventh Division assailed June 9, 2014 Decision and September 23, 2014 Resolution,
(CAEleventh Division). 33 should be set aside and the case be remanded back to the CA for
consolidation with CA-G.R. SP No. 132674 so that both cases will be
The CA Proceedings jointly decided on the merits. 44
In a Resolution 34 dated November 29, 2013, the CA-Eleventh
Division dismissed outright CA-G.R. SP No. 132674 on procedural For its part, 45 Toyota maintained that the CA-First Division
grounds. Consequently, Puncia led an Omnibus Motion (For correctly promulgated its June 9, 2014 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
Consolidation and Reconsideration of Order of November 29, 2013) 35 132615, considering that at the time of promulgation, there was no
and a Supplement to the Omnibus Motion, 36 seeking the consolidation other pending case before the CA involving the same issues and
of CAG.R. SP No. 132674 with CA-G.R. SP No. 132615. parties as CA-G.R. SP No. 132674 was dismissed by the CA-Eleventh

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 Division on November 29, 2013, and was only reinstated on July 22, parties by hearing the suits together. 55 However, it must be stressed
2014. 46 that an essential requisite of consolidation is that the several actions
which should be pending before the court, arise from the same act,
The Issues Before the Court
event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
The issues for the Court's resolution are (a) whether or not the largely or substantially on the same evidence. 56 As succinctly stated in
CA-First Division correctly promulgated its June 9, 2014 Decision in the rules, consolidation is allowed when there are similar actions
CA-G.R. SP No. 132615 without consolidating the same with CA- which are pending before the court 57 — for there is nothing to
G.R. SP No. 132674; and (b) whether or not Puncia was dismissed consolidate when a matter has already been resolved and the very
from employment for just cause. HCaDIS purpose of consolidation, to avoid con icting decisions and multiplicity
T of suits, rendered futile. The Court's pronouncement in Honoridez v.
Mahinay, 58 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
he Court's Ruling The
Petitioners attempt to revive the issues in Civil
petition is denied. Case No. CEB-16335 by moving for the consolidation of
At the outset, the Court notes that consolidation of cases is a the same with Civil Case No. CEB-23653. Under Section
procedure sanctioned by the Rules of Court for actions which involve 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, only pending actions
a common question of law or fact before the court. 47 It is a procedural involving a common question of law or fact may be
device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its consolidated. Obviously, petitioners cannot make out a
docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be case for consolidation in this case since Civil Case No.
dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to CEB-16335, the case which petitioners seek to consolidate
the parties. 48
with the case a quo, has long become nal and executory;
The rationale for consolidation is to have all cases, which are as such, it cannot be re-litigated in the instant proceedings
intimately related, acted upon by one branch of the court to avoid the without virtually impeaching the correctness of the
possibility of con icting decisions being rendered 49 and in effect, decision in the other case. Public policy abhors such
prevent confusion, unnecessary costs, 50 and delay. 51 It is an action eventuality. 59 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
sought to avoid multiplicity of suits; guard against oppression and
abuse; clear congested dockets; and to simplify the work of the trial In the instant case, while there were indeed two (2) separate
court in order to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to petitions led before the CA assailing the Decision dated February 14,
the parties-litigants. 52 2013 and the Resolution dated August 30, 2013 of the NLRC in NLRC
NCR CN. 10-15949-11/NLRC LAC No. 07001991-12, i.e., CA-G.R.
In order to determine whether consolidation is proper, the test is
to check whether the cases involve the resolution of common SP No. 132615 and CA-G.R. SP No. 132674, it must nevertheless be
questions of law, related facts, 53 or the same parties. 54 Consolidation stressed that CA-G.R. SP No. 132674 was dismissed by the
is proper whenever the subject matter involved and the relief CAEleventh Division as early as November 29, 2013 due to
demanded in the different suits make it expedient for the court to procedural grounds. This fact was even pointed out by the CA-First
determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the Division in its Resolution 60 dated January 24, 2014 when it held that

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 CA-G.R. SP No. 132674 could no longer be consolidated with CA- dismissal must be pursuant to either a just or an authorized cause
G.R. SP No. 132615 since the former case had already been dismissed. under Articles 297, 298 or 299 (formerly Articles 282, 283, and 284)
From that point until the CA-First Division's promulgation of the 65 of the Labor Code. Procedural due process, on the other hand,
assailed June 9, 2014 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 132615, no mandates that the employer must observe the twin requirements of
consolidation between CA-G.R. SP No. 132615 and CA-G.R. SP No. notice and hearing before a dismissal can be effected." 66 Thus, to
132674 could take place mainly because the latter case remained determine the validity of Puncia's dismissal, there is a need to discuss
dismissed during that time. In other words, when the CA-First whether there was indeed just cause for his termination.AHCETa

Division promulgated its ruling in CAG.R. SP No. 132615, it was the In the instant case, records reveal that as a Marketing
one and only case pending before the CA assailing the aforesaid Professional for Toyota, Puncia had a monthly sales quota of seven (7)
NLRC rulings. Therefore, the CA-First Division acted within the vehicles from March 2011 to June 2011. As he was having trouble
scope of its jurisdiction when it promulgated its ruling in CA-G.R. SP complying with said quota, Toyota even extended him a modicum of
No. 132615 without having the case consolidated with CA-G.R. SP leniency by lowering his monthly sales quota to just three (3) vehicles
No. 132674, notwithstanding the latter case's reinstatement after said for the months of July and August 2011; but even then, he still failed
promulgation. to comply. 67 In that six (6)-month span, Puncia miserably failed in
It should be emphasized that the consolidation of cases is aimed satisfying his monthly sales quota, only selling a measly ve (5)
to simplify the proceedings as it contributes to the swift dispensation vehicles out of the 34 he was required to sell over the course of said
of justice. 61 As such, it is addressed to the sound discretion of the period. Verily, Puncia's repeated failure to perform his duties — i.e.,
court and the latter's action in consolidation will not be disturbed in the reaching his monthly sales quota — for such a period of time falls
absence of manifest abuse of discretion tantamount to an evasion of a under the concept of gross inef ciency. In this regard, case law
positive duty or a refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, 62 which instructs that "gross inef ciency" is analogous to "gross neglect of
is absent in this case. duty," a just cause of dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor Code,
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court deems it appropriate for both involve speci c acts of omission on the part of the employee
to look into the issue of the validity of Puncia's dismissal so as to nally resulting in damage to the employer or to his business. 68 In Aliling v.
resolve the main controversy at hand. Feliciano, 69 the Court held that an employer is entitled to impose
productivity standards for its employees, and the latter's non-
In his petition, Puncia insists that the CA gravely erred in compliance therewith can lead to his termination from work, viz.:
upholding his dismissal, considering that the administrative
proceeding against him was due to his failure to meet his monthly [T]he practice of a company in laying off workers because
sales quota, but he was dismissed on the ground of gross they failed to make the work quota has been recognized in
insubordination. 63 On the other hand, Toyota maintains that the CA this jurisdiction. . . . . In the case at bar, the petitioners'
correctly declared failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them
constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the
Puncia's termination to be valid and in compliance with due process. 64
permanent or probationary status of their employment.
It is settled that "for a dismissal to be valid, the rule is that the Failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to ful ll
employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due reasonable work assignments due to inef ciency may
process requirements. Substantive due process requires that the constitute just cause for dismissal. Such inef ciency is
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 understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work circumstances, grounds have been
quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the established to justify his termination.
allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory
results. 70 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) The foregoing standards were then further re ned in Unilever
Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera 72 as follows:
Indisputably, Toyota complied with the substantive due process
To clarify, the following should be considered in
requirement as there was indeed just cause for Puncia's termination.
terminating the services of employees:
Anent the issue of procedural due process, Section 2 (I), Rule
XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code 71 (1) The first written notice to be served on the
provides for the required standard of procedural due process accorded employees should contain the speci c causes or grounds
to employees who stand to be terminated from work, to wit: for termination against them , and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their
Section 2. Standards of due process;
written explanation within a reasonable period.
requirements of notice. — In all cases of termination of
"Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means
employment, the following standards of due process shall
every kind of assistance that management must accord to
be substantially observed:
the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as de their defense. This should be construed as a period of at
ned in Article 282 [now Article 297] of the Labor Code: least ve (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give
(a) A written notice served on the the employees an opportunity to study the accusation
employee specifying the ground or grounds against them, consult a union of cial or lawyer, gather data
for termination, and giving to said and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise
employee reasonable opportunity within against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the
which to explain his side; employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and
defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of
(b) A hearing or conference during
the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the
which the employee concerned, with the
charge against the employees. A general description of the
assistance of counsel if the employee so
charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should speci
desires, is given opportunity to respond to
cally mention which company rules, if any, are violated
the charge, present his evidence, or rebut
and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being
the evidence presented against him; and
charged against the employees.
(c) A written notice of termination
(2) After serving the rst notice, the employers
served on the employee indicating that
should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference
upon due consideration of all the
wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to:

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 (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against afforded Puncia the opportunity to refute the charge of gross inef
them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; ciency against him, the latter was completely deprived of the same
and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the when he was dismissed for gross insubordination — a completely
management. During the hearing or conference, the different ground from what was stated in the Notice to Explain. As
employees are given the chance to defend themselves such, Puncia's right to procedural due process was violated.
personally, with the assistance of a representative or Hence, considering that Toyota had dismissed Puncia for a just
counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or cause, albeit failed to comply with the proper procedural requirements,
hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to the former should pay the latter nominal damages in the amount of
come to an amicable settlement. P30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence. 78
(3) After determining that termination of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
employment is justi ed, the employers shall serve the June 9, 2014 and the Resolution dated September 23, 2014 of the
employees a written notice of termination indicating that: Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
(1) all circumstances involving the charge against the 132615 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have respondent Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc. is ORDERED to indemnify
been established to justify the severance of their petitioner Armando N. Puncia nominal damages in the amount of
employment. 73 P30,000.00 for dismissing the latter in violation of his right to
(Emphases and underscoring supplied) ScHADI
procedural due process, but for a just cause.
In this case, at rst glance it seemed like Toyota afforded Puncia SO ORDERED.
procedural due process, considering that: (a) Puncia was given a Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Caguioa, JJ.,
Notice to Explain; 74 (b) Toyota scheduled a hearing on October 17, concur.
2011 regarding the charge stated in the Notice to Explain; 75 (c) on the
date of the hearing, Puncia was able to submit a letter 76 addressed to Footnotes
Toyota's vehicle sales manager explaining his side, albeit he failed to
attend said hearing; and (d) Toyota served a written Notice of 1. Rollo, pp. 10-30.
Termination 77 informing Puncia of his dismissal from work. 2. Id. at 34-46. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro
However, a closer look at the records reveals that in the Notice to with Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice
Explain, Puncia was being made to explain why no disciplinary action Manuel M. Barrios concurring.
should be imposed upon him for repeatedly failing to reach his
monthly sales quota, which act, as already adverted to earlier, 3. Id. at 48-49.
constitutes gross inef ciency. On the other hand, a reading of the
Notice of Termination shows that Puncia was dismissed not for the 4. Id. at 84-97. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Leonardo L.
ground stated in the Notice to Explain, but for gross insubordination Leonida with Commissioners Dolores M. Peralta-Beley and
on account of his non-appearance in the scheduled October 17, 2011 Mercedes R. Posada-Lacap concurring.
hearing without justi able reason. In other words, while Toyota
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 5. Id. at 100-108. Penned by Commissioner Mercedes R. Posada- 24. Id. at 84-97.
Lacap with Commissioner Dolores M. Peralta-Beley concurring,
25. Id. at 96.
and certi ed by Presiding Commissioner Herminio V. Suelo.
26. Id. at 319.
6. Id. at 58-65. Penned by Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam.
27. Id. at 90-91.
7. Id. at 35.
28. Id. at 94.
8. Id. at 37.
29. See Puncia's Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated March 6,
9. Id.
2013; id. at 152-156.
10. Dated October 15, 2011. Id. at 328. Toyota's motion for reconsideration is not attached to the rollo.
11. See letter-memorandum dated October 17, 2011; id. at 198. 30. Id. at 100-108.
12. Id. See also id. at 38. 31. Dated October 19, 2013. Id. at 376-411.
13. Id. at 37. 32. Dated November 13, 2013. Id. at 416-437.
14. Id. at 199. 33. See id. at 10-11.
15. Id. 34. Id. at 439. Issued by Division Clerk of Court Atty. Celedonia M.
Ogsimer.
16. Not attached to the rollo.
35. Dated December 26, 2013. Id. at 255-265.
17. Rollo, pp. 85-87.
36. Dated December 27, 2013. Id. at 344-345.
18. See Reply to Complainant's Position Paper dated March 14, 2012;
id. at 222-223 and Opposition to the Memorandum of Appeal dated 37. Id. at 440. Issued by Division Clerk of Court Atty. Anita Jamerlan
July 4, 2012; id. at 333-335. Rey.
19. Id. at 58-65. 38. Id. at 34-45.
20. Id. at 65. 39. See id. at 41-45.
21. Id. at 61-63. 40. Dated June 23, 2014; id. at 454-459.
22. Id. at 64. 41. Id. at 48-49.
23. See Memorandum of Appeal dated June 13, 2012; id. at 66-82.

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 42. Id. at 496-497. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. 54. Section 3 (a), Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of
with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Jane Aurora C. Appeals has forthrightlymandated the consolidation of related cases
Lantion concurring. assigned to different Justices, viz.:
43. Id. at 10-30. Section 3. Consolidation of Cases. — When related cases are assigned
to different Justices, they shall be consolidated and assigned to
44. See id. at 22 and 29.
one Justice.
45. See Comment dated April 28, 2015; id. at 354-373.
(a) Upon motion of a party with notice to the other party/ies, or at the
46. Id. at 361-363. instance of the Justice to whom any or the related cases is
assigned, upon notice to the parties, consolidation shall ensue
47. Rule 31, Section 1 of the RULES OF COURT states:
when the cases involve the same parties and/or related questions
Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common of fact and/or law. (Emphasis supplied)
question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order 55. Deutsche Bank AG v. CA, supra note 49, at 91.
a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may 56. Philippine National Bank v. Gotesco Tyan Ming Development,
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to Inc., 606 Phil. 806, 812 (2009), citing Teston v. Development
avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Bank of the Philippines, 511 Phil. 221, 229 (2005).

48. Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Excelsa Industries, Inc. , 685 57. RULES OF COURT, Rule 31, Section 1.
Phil. 694, 700 (2012).
58. 504 Phil. 204 (2005).
49. Deutsche Bank AG v. CA, 683 Phil. 80, 93 (2012), citing Benguet 59. Id. at 212-213.
Corporation, Inc. v. CA, 247-A Phil. 356 (1988).
60. Rollo, p. 440.
50. See Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law (Revised Edition), 1994 Ed.,
pp. 48-49. 61. See Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, 627 Phil. 341, 349 (2010).
51. RULES OF COURT, Rule 31, Section 1. 62. See Deutsche Bank AG v. CA, supra note 49, at 97-98.
52. Deutsche Bank AG v. CA, supra note 49, at 94-95. 63. See rollo, p. 27.
53. See Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law (Revised Edition), 1994 Ed., 64. See Comment dated April 28, 2015; id. at 355-356 and 363.
p. 48, citing Active Wood Products Co., Inc. v. CA, 260 Phil. 825,
65. See Department of Labor and Employment Department Advisory
830 (1990).
No. 01, Series of 2015,entitled "RENUMBERING OF THE

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 LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED,"
approved on April 21, 2015.
66. Alps Transportation v. Rodriguez, 711 Phil. 122, 129 (2013);
citations omitted.
67. See rollo, pp. 36-37.
68. See Aliling v. Feliciano, 686 Phil. 889, 910 (2012), citing Lim v.
NLRC, 328 Phil. 843 (1996).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 911, citing Leonardo v. NLRC, 389 Phil. 118, 126-127.
71. As amended by DOLE Department Order No. 009-97 entitled
"AMENDING THE RULESIMPLEMENTING BOOK V OF THE
LABOR CODE AS AMENDED" approved on May 1, 1997.
72. 710 Phil. 124 (2013).
73. Id. at 136-137, citing King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac,
553 Phil. 108, 115-116 (2007).
74. Rollo, p. 328.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 198.
77. Id. at 199.
78. See Sang-an v. Equator Knights Detective and Security Agency,
Inc., 703 Phil. 492, 503 (2013), citing Agabon v. NLRC, 485 Phil.
248 (2004).

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