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Puncia v. Toyota Shaw Pasig Inc.
Puncia v. Toyota Shaw Pasig Inc.
despite notice. 13
[G.R. No. 214399. June 28, 2016.] On October 18, 2011, Toyota sent Puncia a Notice of
Termination, 14 dismissing him on the ground of insubordination for
ARMANDO N. PUNCIA, petitioner, vs. TOYOTA his failure to attend the scheduled hearing and justify his absence. 15
SHAW/PASIG, INC. , respondent. This prompted Puncia to le a complaint 16 for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, unfair labor
practice, damages, and attorney's fees against Toyota and its of cers,
claiming, inter alia, that Toyota dismissed him after discovering that
DECISION he was a director of the Toyota-Shaw Pasig Workers Union-
Automotive Industry Worker's Alliance; and that he was terminated on
the ground of insubordination and not due to his failure to meet his
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p quota as contained in the Notice to Explain. 17
cAaDHT
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the In its defense, Toyota denied the harassment charges and
Decision 2 dated June 9, 2014 and the Resolution 3 dated September claimed that there was a valid cause to dismiss Puncia, considering his
23, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132615, failure to comply with the company's strict requirements on sales
which annulled and set aside the Decision 4 dated February 14, quota. It likewise stated that Puncia has consistently violated the
2013 and the Resolution 5 dated August 30, 2013 of the National company rules on attendance and timekeeping as several disciplinary
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CN. 10-15949- actions were already issued against him. 18
11/NLRC LAC No. 07-001991-12 and instead, reinstated the Decision
6 dated May 4, 2012 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) nding that respondent The LA Ruling
Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc. (Toyota) validly dismissed petitioner In a Decision 19 dated May 4, 2012, the LA dismissed Puncia's
Armando N. Puncia (Puncia) for just cause. complaint for lack of merit, but nevertheless, ordered Toyota to pay
The Facts Puncia his money claims consisting of his earned commissions, 13th
month pay for 2011, sick leave, and vacation leave benefits. 20
Puncia alleged that since 2004, he worked as a
messenger/collector for Toyota and was later on appointed on March The LA found that Puncia was dismissed not because of his
2, 2011 as a Marketing Professional 7 tasked to sell seven (7) vehicles involvement in the labor union, but was terminated for a just cause due
as monthly quota. 8 However, Puncia failed to comply and sold only to his inefficiency brought about by his numerous violations of the
one (1) vehicle for the month of July and none for August, 9 prompting company rules on attendance from 2006 to 2010 and his failure to
Toyota to send him a Notice to Explain. 10 In reply, 11 Puncia stated meet the required monthly quota. 21 This notwithstanding, the LA
that as a trainee, he was only required to sell three (3) vehicles per found Puncia entitled to his money claims, considering that Toyota
month; that the month of May has always been a lean month; and that failed to deny or rebut his entitlement thereto. 22
he was able to sell four (4) vehicles in the month of September. 12 Aggrieved, Puncia appealed 23 to the NLRC.
Division promulgated its ruling in CAG.R. SP No. 132615, it was the In the instant case, records reveal that as a Marketing
one and only case pending before the CA assailing the aforesaid Professional for Toyota, Puncia had a monthly sales quota of seven (7)
NLRC rulings. Therefore, the CA-First Division acted within the vehicles from March 2011 to June 2011. As he was having trouble
scope of its jurisdiction when it promulgated its ruling in CA-G.R. SP complying with said quota, Toyota even extended him a modicum of
No. 132615 without having the case consolidated with CA-G.R. SP leniency by lowering his monthly sales quota to just three (3) vehicles
No. 132674, notwithstanding the latter case's reinstatement after said for the months of July and August 2011; but even then, he still failed
promulgation. to comply. 67 In that six (6)-month span, Puncia miserably failed in
It should be emphasized that the consolidation of cases is aimed satisfying his monthly sales quota, only selling a measly ve (5)
to simplify the proceedings as it contributes to the swift dispensation vehicles out of the 34 he was required to sell over the course of said
of justice. 61 As such, it is addressed to the sound discretion of the period. Verily, Puncia's repeated failure to perform his duties — i.e.,
court and the latter's action in consolidation will not be disturbed in the reaching his monthly sales quota — for such a period of time falls
absence of manifest abuse of discretion tantamount to an evasion of a under the concept of gross inef ciency. In this regard, case law
positive duty or a refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, 62 which instructs that "gross inef ciency" is analogous to "gross neglect of
is absent in this case. duty," a just cause of dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor Code,
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court deems it appropriate for both involve speci c acts of omission on the part of the employee
to look into the issue of the validity of Puncia's dismissal so as to nally resulting in damage to the employer or to his business. 68 In Aliling v.
resolve the main controversy at hand. Feliciano, 69 the Court held that an employer is entitled to impose
productivity standards for its employees, and the latter's non-
In his petition, Puncia insists that the CA gravely erred in compliance therewith can lead to his termination from work, viz.:
upholding his dismissal, considering that the administrative
proceeding against him was due to his failure to meet his monthly [T]he practice of a company in laying off workers because
sales quota, but he was dismissed on the ground of gross they failed to make the work quota has been recognized in
insubordination. 63 On the other hand, Toyota maintains that the CA this jurisdiction. . . . . In the case at bar, the petitioners'
correctly declared failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them
constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the
Puncia's termination to be valid and in compliance with due process. 64
permanent or probationary status of their employment.
It is settled that "for a dismissal to be valid, the rule is that the Failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to ful ll
employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due reasonable work assignments due to inef ciency may
process requirements. Substantive due process requires that the constitute just cause for dismissal. Such inef ciency is
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work circumstances, grounds have been
quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the established to justify his termination.
allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory
results. 70 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) The foregoing standards were then further re ned in Unilever
Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera 72 as follows:
Indisputably, Toyota complied with the substantive due process
To clarify, the following should be considered in
requirement as there was indeed just cause for Puncia's termination.
terminating the services of employees:
Anent the issue of procedural due process, Section 2 (I), Rule
XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code 71 (1) The first written notice to be served on the
provides for the required standard of procedural due process accorded employees should contain the speci c causes or grounds
to employees who stand to be terminated from work, to wit: for termination against them , and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their
Section 2. Standards of due process;
written explanation within a reasonable period.
requirements of notice. — In all cases of termination of
"Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means
employment, the following standards of due process shall
every kind of assistance that management must accord to
be substantially observed:
the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as de their defense. This should be construed as a period of at
ned in Article 282 [now Article 297] of the Labor Code: least ve (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give
(a) A written notice served on the the employees an opportunity to study the accusation
employee specifying the ground or grounds against them, consult a union of cial or lawyer, gather data
for termination, and giving to said and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise
employee reasonable opportunity within against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the
which to explain his side; employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and
defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of
(b) A hearing or conference during
the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the
which the employee concerned, with the
charge against the employees. A general description of the
assistance of counsel if the employee so
charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should speci
desires, is given opportunity to respond to
cally mention which company rules, if any, are violated
the charge, present his evidence, or rebut
and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being
the evidence presented against him; and
charged against the employees.
(c) A written notice of termination
(2) After serving the rst notice, the employers
served on the employee indicating that
should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference
upon due consideration of all the
wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to:
48. Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Excelsa Industries, Inc. , 685 57. RULES OF COURT, Rule 31, Section 1.
Phil. 694, 700 (2012).
58. 504 Phil. 204 (2005).
49. Deutsche Bank AG v. CA, 683 Phil. 80, 93 (2012), citing Benguet 59. Id. at 212-213.
Corporation, Inc. v. CA, 247-A Phil. 356 (1988).
60. Rollo, p. 440.
50. See Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law (Revised Edition), 1994 Ed.,
pp. 48-49. 61. See Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, 627 Phil. 341, 349 (2010).
51. RULES OF COURT, Rule 31, Section 1. 62. See Deutsche Bank AG v. CA, supra note 49, at 97-98.
52. Deutsche Bank AG v. CA, supra note 49, at 94-95. 63. See rollo, p. 27.
53. See Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law (Revised Edition), 1994 Ed., 64. See Comment dated April 28, 2015; id. at 355-356 and 363.
p. 48, citing Active Wood Products Co., Inc. v. CA, 260 Phil. 825,
65. See Department of Labor and Employment Department Advisory
830 (1990).
No. 01, Series of 2015,entitled "RENUMBERING OF THE