Good evening!

Thank you for submitting your digests for the 3rd batch. Tonight I will give the
last case digest assignments for PFR. Batch size is 5 case digests per person.

You can find the link to your assignments here:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1VYI7mB4oUTcTo6378aL0KZmdg3ZIBVcoQkQZ7YJ4l3I
/edit?usp=sharing

The working file is here:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UzPPEBa-OgoSZhRY74ctloxdyolcj1RA/view?usp=sharing

Deadline for the assignment is tG.R. No. 191185

GUILBEMER FRANCO, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.:

The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense's evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the
guilt of the accused - ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non que negat - he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove.1

Nature of the Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on CertiorarP. under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court where petitioner Guilberner Franco (Franco) assails the Decision3 dated
September 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31706, affirming
the Decision4 dated February 27, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 05-238613. The RTC convicted Franco of the crime of
Theft under an Information, which reads as follows:

That on or about November 3, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent or the owner thereof, take, steal and
carry away one (1) Nokia 3660 Model cellular phone worth Php 18,500.00 belonging to
BENJAMIN JOSEPH NAKAMOTO Y ERGUIZA to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in
the aforesaid amount of Php 18,500.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.5

On September 5, 2005, Franco, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.6

The Facts

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

On November 3, 2004 at around 11 :00 a.m., Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto (Nakamoto) went
to work out at the Body Shape Gym located at Malong Street, Tondo, Manila. After he
finished working out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth 'Pl 8,500.00 on the
altar where gym users usually put their valuables and proceeded to the comfort room
to change his clothes. After ten minutes, he returned to get his cell phone, but it
was already missing. Arnie Rosario (Rosario), who was also working out, informed
him that he saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto
requested everyone not to leave the gym, but upon verification from the logbook, he
found out that Franco had left within the time that he was in the shower.7

The gym's caretaker, Virgilio Ramos (Ramos), testified that he saw Franco in the
gym but he was not working out and was just going around the area. Tn fact, it was
just Franco's second time at the gym. Ramos even met him near the door and as
Franco did not log out, he was the one who indicated it in their logbook. When
Nakamoto mmounced that his cell phone was missing and asked that nobody leaves the
place, he put an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in the logbook to indicate
that he was the only one who left the gym after the cell phone was declared lost.

Nakamoto, together with Jeoffrey Masangkay, a police officer who was also working
out at the gym, tried to locate Franco within the gym's vicinity but they failed to
find him. They proceeded to the police station and while there, a report was
received from another police officer that somebody saw Franco along Coral Street,
which is near the gym and that he was holding a cell phone. They went to Coral
Street but he was already gone. A vendor told them that he saw a person who was
holding a cell phone, which was then ringing and that the person was trying to shut
it off. When they went to Franco's house, they were initially not allowed to come
in but were eventually let in by Franco's mother. They talked to Franco who denied
having taken the cell phone.9

Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement was arrived
thereat; hence, a criminal complaint for theft was filed against Franco before the
City Prosecutor's Office of Manila, docketed as LS. No. 04K-25849.10

In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost
his cell phone at around 1 :00 p.m., he and his witnesses could have confronted him
as at that time, he was still at the gym, having left only at around 2:45 p.m.11 He
also admitted to have taken a cap and cell phone from the altar but claimed these
to be his.12

Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision elated February 27, 2008, the RTC convicted Franco of theft, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds [Franco], GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of theft penalized in paragraph 1 of Article 309 in relation to
Article 308 of the Revised Penal

Code and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day as minimum to seven (7) years and four (4) months as
maximum and to pay the complainant Php 18,500.00.

SO ORDERED.13

The RTC did not find Franco's defense credible and ruled that his denial cannot be
given evidentiary value over the positive testimony of Rosario.14

Franco then appealed to the CA. 15

Ruling of the CA

In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found the elements of theft to have been duly
established. It relied heavily on the "positive testimony" of Rosario who declared
to have seen Franco take a cap and a cell phone from the altar. The CA likewise
gave credence to the testimony of Ramos who confirmed that it was only Franco who
left the gym immediately before Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was missing.
Ramos also presented the logbook and affirmed having put an asterisk opposite the
name "ELMER," which was entered by the accused upon logging in. The CA stated that
taken together, the foregoing circumstances are sufficient to support a moral
conviction that Franco is guilty, and at the same time, inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent. 16 The CA further ruled that the RTC cannot be
faulted for giving more weight to the testimony of Nakamoto17 and Rosario,18
considering that Franco foiled to show that they were impelled by an ill or
improper motive to falsely testify against him.19

In his petition for review, Franco presented the following issues for resolution,
to wit:

I.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTI0N
WITNESSES' INCONSISTENT AND IRRECONCILABLE TESTIMONIES.

II.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] AFFIRMING [FRANCO'S] CONVICTION FACT THAT THE SAME WAS
FABRICATIONS AND PRESUMPTIONS.1âwphi1

III.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE VALUE OF THE ALLEGEDLY STOLEN
CELLULAR PHONE WITHOUT SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCE.20

Ruling of the Court

Preliminarily, the Court restates the n1le that only errors of law and not of facts
are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court. This rule applies with greater force when the
factual findings of the CA are in full agreement with that of the RTC.21

The rule, however, is not ironclad. A departure therefrom may be warranted when it
is established that the RTC ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted
cogent facts and circumstances, which, if considered, will change the outcome of
the case. Considering that what is at stake here is liberty, the Court has
carefully reviewed the records of the case22 and finds that Franco should be
acquitted.

Failure of the prosecution to prove

JCranco's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt

The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which must rely on the
strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.23

In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things

beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or
the presence of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the
accused was the perpetrator of the crime.24 Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are: (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with
intent to gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person
or force upon things.25

The corpus delicti in theft has two elements, to wit: (I) that the property was
lost by the owner; and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. 26

In this case, the crucial issue is whether the prosecution has presented proof
beyond reasonable doubt to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. In affirming
Franco's conviction, the CA ruled that the elements were established. Moreover, the
RTC and the CA apparently relied heavily on circumstantial evidence.

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of

the Rules of Court provides that the following requisites must concur: (l) there
must be more than one circumstance to convict; (2) the facts on which the inference
of guilt is based must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the
third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain, which leads one to a fair nnd reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.27

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses - Nakamoto, the complainant; Ramos,
the gym's caretaker; and Rosario, nnother gym user.

Their testimonies established the following circumstances: (l) Nakamoto placed his
cell phone on the altar, 28 left and went to change his clothes, and after ten
minutes, returned to get his cell phone but the same was already missing;29 (2)
Rosario saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the same place;30 and (3) Ramos
saw Franco leave the gym at 1 : 15 p.m. and the latter failed to log out in the
logbook.31 The RTC and the CA wove these circumstances in order to arrive at the
"positive identification" of

Franco as the perpetrator. 32

A perusal of their testimonies, however, shows that certain facts have been
overlooked by both courts.

For one, it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the
altar. His lone testimony, however, cannot be considered a positive identification
of Franco as the perpetrator:

In People v. Pondivida,34 the Court held:

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not perse to

that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are
two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused
in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act
of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very
act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect
or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the
person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right
after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken
together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to
only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others. x x x.35 (Emphasis omitted and underscoring
ours)
Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive
identification. While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone
from the altar, it does not establish with certainty that what Franco feloniously
took, assuming that he did, was Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified
that Franco took "a cell phone." He stated:

Q: How did you know that the said cell phone was taken by the accused?

A: [W]e were then in a conversation when I asked him to spot or assist me with the
weights that I intended to carry. We were then situated in an area very near the
altar where his cap and cell phone were placed. After assisting me, he went to the
area and took the cell phone and the cap at the same time.

Q: [W]ho were you talking [sic] at that time?

A: Guilbemer Franco.

Q: 1t was also [G]uilbemer Franco who helped or spot you in the work out?

A: Yes, sir

Q: And after assisting you, what did Franco do?

A: He took the cell phone of Mr. Nakamoto and his cap at the same time and covered
the cell phone by his cap and left the place.

Q: Where was that cell phone of the private complainant placed at that time?

A: At the top of the altar where is [sic] cap is also located.

Q: How far was that altar from where you were working?

A: Only inches.

Q: It was directly in front of you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do when the accused took the cap as well as the cell phone of the
private complainant?

A: None, sir. I thought the cap and cell phone was his.

Q: How did you know that the cell phone belongs to the private complainant?

A: After Mr. Nakamoto came out from the shower, he went directly to the altar to
get his cell phone which was not there anymore and asked us where his cell phone
and I told him that I saw Mr. Franco get a cell phone from that area.36 (Emphasis
ours)

On cross-examination, Rosario also stated that he did not actually see Franco take
Nakamoto's cell phone37 but on re-direct, he clarified that he did not see the cell
phone of Nakamoto because he thought that the cell phone was owned by Franco.38

What was firmly established by Rosario's testimony is that Franco took a cell phone
from the altar. But Franco even admitted such fact.39

What stands out from Rosario's testimony is that he was unable to particularly
describe at first instance what or whose cell phone Franco took from the altar. He
only assumed that it was Nakamoto's at the time the latter announced that his cell
phone was missing. This was, in fact, observed by the RTC in the course of
Rosario's testimony, thus:

COURT: What you actually saw was, [G]uilbemer Franco was taking his cap together
with the cell phone placed beside the cap but you do not know that [the] cell phone
was Bj's or Nakamoto 's?

A: [Y]es, Your Honor.

COURT: You just presumed that the cell phone taken by Guilhemer Franco was his?

A: Yes, Ma'am.40 (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, it must be noted that save for Nakamoto's statement that he placed his
cell phone at the altar, no one saw him actually place his cell phone there. This
was confirmed by Rosario -

COURT:

Q: And on that day, you were able to see that Nakamoto on four incidents, when he
logged-in, during work-out and when he went inside the C.[R].?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Therefore, you did not sec Nakamoto place his cell phone at the

Altar·?

A: Yes, sir.41 (Emphasis ours)

Ramos, the gym caretaker, also testified that he did not see Franco take Nakamoto
's cell phone and only assumed that the cell phone on the altar was Nakamoto's,
thus -

Q: And do you know who owns that cell phone put [sic] over the altar?

A: Benjamin Nakamoto.

Q: How do you know that it belongs to Benjamin Nakamoto?

A: He is the only one who brings a cell phone to the gym.

x x x x

Q: [D]id you actually see him take the cell phone of Nakamoto?

A: l did not see him take the [cell] phone but as soon as the cell phone was lost,
he was the only one who left the gym.42

Neither can the prosecution's testimonial evidence fall under the second category
of positive identification, that is, Franco having been identified as the person or
one of the persons last seen immediately before and right after the commission of
the theft. Records show that there were other people in the gym before and after
Nakamoto lost his cell phone. In fact, Nakamoto himself suspected Rosario of having
taken his cell phone, thus:

ATTY. SANCHEZ:
Q: You said that you s1ayed inside the rest room for more or less 10 minutes?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After 10 minutes, you don't know whether aside from Franco somebody went out
from the gym because you were inside the c.r.?

A: Yes, sir.

x x x x

Q: As a matter of fact, one of your witness[es] who went near the place where your
cell phone was placed was this Arnie Rosario?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And it was only the accused and [Rosario] who were near the place

where you said you placed the cell phone?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You did not suspect [Rosario] have taken the cell phone'!

A: I also suspected, sir:43 - (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, the prosecution witnesses confirmed that the altar is the usual spot
where the gym users place their valuables. According to Rosario:

ATTY. SANCHEZ:

Q: And in that place, you said there was a Sto. Niño

A: At the Altar

Q: Those who work-out in that gym usually place their things jon

top ofl the altar.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Therefore, there were people who place their ('.ell phones on top

(of] the Altar?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Aside from Nakamoto, other people place their things on top

[of! the Altar?

A: Yes, sir.44 (Emphasis ours)

The prosecution's evidence does not rule out the following possibilities: one, that
what Franco took was his own cell phone; two, even on the assumption that Franco
stole a cell phone from the altar, that what he foloniously took was Nakamoto's
cell phone, considering the fact that at the time Nakamoto was inside the changing
room, other people may have placed their cell phone on the same spot; and three,
that some other person may have taken Nakamoto's cell phone.
It must be emphasized that "[c]ourts must judge the guilt or innocence of the
accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions."45
It is iniquitous to base Franco's guilt on the presumptions of the prosecution's
witnesses for the Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which being
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to
support a conviction.46

Franco also asserts that the logbook from which his time in and time out at the gym
was based was not identified during the trial and was only produced after Ramos
testified.47 Ramos testified that when Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was
missing and asked that nobody leaves the place, he put an asterisk opposite the
name of Franco in the logbook to indicate that he was the only one who left the gym
after the cell phone was declared lost.48

Under the Rules on Evidence, documents are either public or private. Private
documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.49 Section 20 of the same Rule, in turn, provides
that before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or
written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature of handwriting or the
maker.50

In this case, the foregoing rule was not followed. The testimony of Ramos shows
that the logbook, indeed, was not identified and authenticated during the course of
Ramos' testimony. At the time when Ramos was testifying, he merely referred to the
log in and log out time and the name of the person at page 104 of the logbook that
appears on line 22 of the entries for November 3, 2004. This was photocopied and
marked as Exhibit "C-1."51 Meanwhile, when Nakamoto was presented as rebuttal
witness, a page from the logbook was again marked as Exhibit "D."52 The logbook or
the particular page referred to by Ramos was neither identified nor confirmed by
him as the same logbook which he used to log the ins and outs of the gym users, or
that the writing and notations on said logbook was his. The prosecution contends,
meanwhile, that the RTC's evaluation of the witnesses' credibility may no longer be
questioned at this stage.53 The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the
assignment of value and weight to the testimony of a witness is best left to the
discretion of the RTC. But an exception to that rule shall be applied in this case
where certain facts of substance and value, if considered, may affect the result.54
In Lejano v. People,55 the Court stated:

A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job or deciding a
case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the
crime should not automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do
it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness
can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!"
without blinking an eye.56

The facts and circumstances proven by the prosecution, taken together, are not
sufficient to justify the unequivocal conclusion that Franco feloniously took
Nakamoto's cell phone. No other convincing evidence was presented by the
prosecution that would link him to the theft.57 The fact Franco took a cell phone
from· the altar does not necessarily point to the conclusion that it was Nakamoto's
cell phone that he took. In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the rule
is that the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. The
circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has
committed the offense charged.58

Franco, therefore, cannot be convicted of the crime charged in this case. There is
not enough evidence to do so. As a rule, in order to support a conviction on the
basis of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty. In this case, not all the facts on which the
inference of guilt is based were proved. The matter of what and whose cell phone
Franco took from the altar still remains uncertain.

Franco's defense of denial

The evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and not rely on the
weakness of the defense.59 In this case, Franco did not deny that he was at the
Body Shape Gym on November 3, 2004, at around l :00 p.m. and left the place at
around 2:45 p.m.60 He did not even deny that he took a cell phone from the altar
together with his cap. What he denied is that he took Nakamoto's cell phone and
instead, claimed that what he took is his own cell phone.61 Denial may be weak but
courts should not at once look at them with disfavor. There are situations where an
accused may really have no other defenses but denial, which, if established to be
the truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the
prosecution evidence itself. is weak.62

While it is true that denial partakes of the nature of negative and self-serving
evidence and is seldom given weight in law,63 the Court admits an exception
established by jurisprudence that the defense of denial assumes significance when
the prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 64 The exception applies in the case at hand. The prosecution failed to
produce sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional guarantee that Franco is
presumed to be innocent.

Value of the cell phone

It is also argued by Franco that the value of the cell phone must be duly proved
with reasonable degree of certainty. On the other hand, the people contended that
there has been a judicial admission of the same.65 This issue, however, is now moot
and academic considering Franco's acquittal.

Conclusion

The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to pass
the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant Franco's conviction.1avvphi1
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.66 Not only that,

where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.67

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Comi of Appeals dated
September 16, 2009 in CA-GR. CR No. 31706 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Guilbemer Franco is ACQUITTED of the crime of Theft charged in Criminal
Case No. 05-238613 because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of Court’s
Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution and the Divisions

Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 People v. Masalihit, 360 Phil. 332, 343 (1998).

2 Rollo, pp. 10-30.

3 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this

Court), with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Stephen C. Cruz
concurring; CA rollo, pp. 88-92.

4 Rendered by Presiding Judge Mercedes Posada-Lacap; records, pp. 62-66.

5 Id. at I.

6 Rollo, p. 34.

7 Id. at 33-34.

8 Records, pp. 64-65.

9 Id. at 63-64.

10 Rollo, p. 34; TSN, February 8, 2006, pp. 14-15.

11 Records, p. 9.
12 SN, January 29, 2007, p. 5.

13 Records, p. 66.

14 Id. al 65-66.

15 Id. at 70-71.

16 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

17 TSN, February 8, 2006, pp. 1-19.

18 TSN,April 19,2006,pp. l-15.

19 People v. PFC Malejana, 515 Phil. 584, 597 (2006).

20 Rollo, p. 17.

21 Boneng v. People, 363 Phil. 594, 600 (1999).

22 People v. Agulay, 588 Phil. 247, 263 (2008).

23 People v. Villanueva, 427 Phil. 102, 128 (2002).

24 People v. Santos, 388 Phil. 993, 1004 (2000).

25 People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 284, 291.

26 Tan v. People, 372 Phil. 93, 105 (1999).

27 People v. Ayola, 416 Phil. 861, 872 (200 I).

28 CA rollo, p. 88.

29 TSN, February 8, 2006, pp. 4-5.

30 Id. at 5; TSN April 19, 2006, p. 5.

31 TSN, August 28, 2006, pp. 6-7.

32 CA rollo, pp. 90-91.

33 Rollo, p. 66.

34 G.R. No. 188969, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA217.

35 Id. at 222, citing People v. Caliso, 675 Phil. 742, 755 (2011).

36 TSN, April 19, 2006, pp. 4-5.

37 Id. at 11.

38 Id. at 12.

39 TSN, January 29, 2007, pp. 5-9.

40 TSN, April 19, 2006, p. 12.

41 Id. at 10.
42 TSN, August 28, 2006, pp. 6-7.

43 TSN, February 8, 2006, p. 11.

44 TSN, April 19, 2006, p. IO.

45 People v. Anabe, 644 Phil. 261, 281 (2010).

46 People v. Timtiman, G.R. No. 101663, November 4, 1992, 215 SCRA 364, 373, citing
People v. Remorosa, G.R. No. 81768, August 7, 1991, 200 SCRA 350, 360.

47 Rollo, p. 48.

48 Id. at 54-55.

49 Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in

evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records or the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and

(c) Public records kept in the Philippines, or private documents required by law to
be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

50 Sanvicente v. People, 441 Phil. 139, 151 (2002).

51 TSN, August 28, 2006, pp. 7, 14.

52 TSN, March 19, 2007, p. 4.

53 Rollo, p. 66.

54 People v. Deunida, GR. Nos. 105199-200, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 520, 532.

55 652 Phil. 512 (20 10).

56 Id. at 581.

57 Rollo, p. 24.

58 People v. Anabe, supra note 45.

59 People v. Tan, 432 Phil. 171, 199 (2002).

60 Rollo, pp. 45-46.

61 TSN, January 29, 2007, pp. 5-6.

62 People v. Ladrillo, 377 Phil. 904, 917 (1999).

63 People v. Cañete, 364 Phil. 423, 435 (1999).

64 People v. Mejia, 612 Phil. 668, 687 (2009).

65 TSN, February 8, 2006, p. 6.

66 See People v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57 (1997).

67 Atienza v. People, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014, 716 SCRA 84, 104-105.

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