CASES DIGESTs #2

GR NO. 115686
1. G.R. No. 115686 December 2, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO MALABAGO y
VILLAESPIN, accused-appellant.

FACTS

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10 which imposed
the penalty of death on accused-appellant, Pedro Malabago y Villaespin, in Criminal Case No. 6598, wherein the
court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE as defined and penalized under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentenced the accused to DEATH for the terrible crime he has
committed and, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00 conformable to the recent
jurisprudence on the matter (People v. Sison, 189 SCRA 643).

In an information dated January 7, 1994, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of parricide committed as
follows: That in the evening, on or about the 5th day of January 1994, at Barangay Gulayon, Dipolog City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and
without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack and strike with a bolo
one Letecia R. Malabago, his lawfully wedded wife, hitting the latter on her face and neck, which caused the victim'
s instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim, in the amount of P30,000.00 as death
indemnity, and also moral and exemplary damages in the amounts to be established during the trial. Letecia was
found to have died of "cardio-respiratory arrest; shock hemorrhage, massive; hack wounds, multiple."

Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime. He claimed that on January 5, 1994, he was in the poblacion of
Dipolog City. He alleged he did not know who hacked his wife and had no means of finding the culprit because he
was placed in jail after her killing. He claimed through his son, Allandel, as defense witness, that Guillerma testified
against him because she was against their marriage. He was then jobless. The proceedings show that Guillerma,
together with her husband, Catalino, and appellant's and Letecia's three children, namely, Allandel, Aljun and Alex
later signed an affidavit of desistance and moved to dismiss the case against him.

The trial court upheld the prosecution and on May 10, 1994 convicted accused-appellant of parricide and sentenced
him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659.

ISSUES

Before us appellant assigns the following errors:

1. The sentence of death imposed by the trial court on the appellant is an unconstitutional penalty for being
violative of fundamental human rights and is, thus, null and void.
2. The judgment of conviction is null and void for having been rendered by a trial court ousted of jurisdiction
because of the grave violations of the appellant's rights to due process committed by no less that the presiding
judge himself as shown by his conduct at trial.
3. Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction, it nevertheless gravely erred in
convicting the appellant of parricide considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt as demonstrated by:

 The prosecution's failure to prove the legitimate marital relation between appellant and the victim;
 The prosecution's failure to prove the fact and cause of death;
 The prosecution's failure to establish the chain of custody over the alleged instrument of death;

4. Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction, it nevertheless gravely erred in
convicting the appellant when it arbitrarily and selectively gave full weight and credence only to Guillerma
Romano's inculpatory but inconsistent and inadmissible testimony and disregarded her exculpatory statements.
5. Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction, it nevertheless gravely erred in
peremptorily dismissing the appellant's defense of alibi as inherently weak.

6. Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the trial court nevertheless gravely erred in
appreciating the existence of treachery as an aggravating and qualifying circumstance.
7. Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the trial court nevertheless gravely erred in
refusing to consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the appellant, despite the
prosecution's failure to contradict and challenge the appellant's claim of this mitigator.
8. Assuming without conceding that it was not ousted of jurisdiction, the trial court nevertheless gravely erred in
awarding civil indemnity arising from the death of Letecia Malabago considering that the prosecution failed to
prove said death as a fact during trial.

RULINGS

The trial court's findings with modification was affirmed. The crime of parricide defined in Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 states:
Art. 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.

Parricide is committed when:

The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse,
the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of
a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such
proof is not objected to.

The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased is an admission against his penal interest. It is a
confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

Appellant alleges that the prosecution failed to establish the fact and cause of Letecia's death because Dr.
Dominador Celemin, the City Health Officer who signed the death certificate, did not personally examine her
cadaver. It is contended that the content of the death certificate issued by Dr. Celemin is hearsay.

Letecia's death certificate is not the only proof of her death. Appellant affirmed on cross examination that his wife
died as a result of the hacking.

Accused-appellant also claims that the trial court showed partiality to the prosecution by unduly interfering in the
presentation of evidence. By asking questions, the judge allegedly elicited prejudicial admissions from witnesses
without affording appellants counsel the right to examine them on their answers to the court, in violation of
appellant's constitutional right to due process and right against self-incrimination.

The records disclose that the questions the trial judge propounded were made mainly to clarify what the prosecution
and defense witnesses had testified on direct and cross examinations. The essential elements of the crime of
parricide like appellant's marriage to Letecia, the cause of Letecia's death and appellant's participation therein were
facts already established by the prosecution in its evidence in chief. Using his discretion, the trial judge questioned
the witnesses to clear up obscurities in their testimonies and sworn statements. The wise use of such discretion
cannot be assailed as a specie of bias.

The prosecution evidence is based solely on the testimony of Guillerma Romano. Nonetheless, her testimony is
clear, spontaneous and straightforward. Her inconsistencies are minor and inconsequential and they are not
incongruous with her credibility. Her testimony was not eroded even when she was presented by the defense as a
hostile witness. She admittedly signed the affidavit of desistance for the sake of her three grandchildren and this is
understandable in light of the circumstances of the case. Allandel and his brothers pled that she withdraw the
complaint because they did not want their father to be in prison. Deep in her heart, however, Guillerma wanted
justice for her daughter and thus, she testified for the prosecution. The fact that she objected to her daughter's
marriage to appellant is too flimsy a reason to impel her to testify against the father of her grandchildren.

The appellant's defense of alibi is weak and unconvincing. Appellant was positively identified as the one who
hacked his wife to death. Moreover, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on that
fateful evening. The poblacion of Dipolog City is merely four kilometers from Barangay Gulayon and this distance
may be traversed within a few minutes by motorized vehicle.

Be that as it may, it was found that the trial court erred in the following:

(a) Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. For treachery to be present, two conditions must
concur: (a) the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from
defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the
means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender.

It is true that appellant hacked his wife who was then unarmed and had no opportunity to defend herself.
However, the evidence does not show that appellant deliberately and consciously employed this particular mode
of attack to ensure the killing of the victim. The unembroidered facts reveal that appellant hacked his wife in the
midst of a sudden, unscripted heated argument. This precludes the idea that appellant priorly planned to kill his
wife. Indeed, appellant was not carrying his bolo at that time. The bolo was hanging in its usual place on one of
the posts of the sari-sari store. Treachery, to be appreciated, must spark an attack that is deliberate, sudden and
unexpected not where it is prefaced by an unforeseen heated argument with the victim standing face to face with
her assailant.

2. Disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Appellant testified that he voluntarily surrendered to the police when they fetched him at Dodong
Opulentisima's house. The prosecution did not dispute appellant's claim of voluntary surrender. Guillerma
herself testified that without any resistance, appellant went with the police when they fetched him at Dodong's
 house. Indeed, appellant did not escape after Dodong Opulentisima called the police. Instead, he voluntarily
placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities.

In the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of a mitigating circumstance the penalty imposable
to appellant is reclusion perpetua. Considering the death of the victim, a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 must be
awarded to her heirs.

In light of the above disquisitions, the Court need not resolve the alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, as
amended. Nonetheless, the Court expresses its appreciation to the scholarly arguments on the constitutional aspects
of R.A. No. 7659, as amended. Death not being the lis mota of the instant case, the Court has to await for a more
appropriate case to pass upon the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, as amended.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is affirmed with the modification that the penalty of death
imposed by the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10 on accused-appellant Pedro Malabago y Villaespin
in Criminal Case No. 6598 is reduced to reclusion perpetua. SO ORDERED.