1. PNB v.

Garcia
G.R. No.182839, June 2, 2014
Brion, J.
Topic: Article 777 | Transmission of Successional Rights
Facts:
The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land acquired by respondent Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose
Sr.) during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987. Without the knowledge and
consent of his children (herein co-respondents), Jose Sr. executed SPAs authorizing spouses Rogelio and
Celedonia Garcia (spouses Garcia) to secure any loan from the petitioner bank, and to convey and transfer
the subject property by way of mortgage. Jose Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage are both inscribed on the
TCT of the subject property.

On maturity of the loan, spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite repeated
demands.

Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the said  Amendment against spouses Garcia and
PNB alleging that the property was conjugal, being acquired during the marriage of Jose Sr. to Ligaya and
they became owners pro indiviso upon the death of Ligaya on 1987.

PNB contends that the subject property was registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who was described in the as a
“widower” and not “married.”
Issue/s:

1. WON the subject property was conjugal;

2. WON the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage can be annulled entirely
Ruling:

1. Yes. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, their property relations
were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. Upon the death of Ligaya, the conjugal partnership
was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and
the heirs of the deceased, on the other. Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property
itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

2. No. The Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his
co-owners’ consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is
limited though only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division and
liquidation of the subject property. The conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved upon Ligaya’s
death and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which
states that “[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.”
Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children
(Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give their consent to the transaction.
 Ining v Vega
G.R. No. 174727. August 12, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J
Topic: General Provisions – Art 777
Facts:
Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a 3,120 square meters parcel of land (subject
property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana
Roldan and Gregoria Roldan Ining, who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R.
Vega (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega,
Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.

Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon
Tresvalles and Roberto Tajonera, are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof. Tresvalles and Tajonera
are transferees of the said property.

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir,
Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan for partition, recovery of ownership and
possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.

In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no
cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo
Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez, who in turn acquired the same from
Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.

The trial court found the deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to
Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained
part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited
the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romana’s share as the
latter’s successors.

However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s death in 1962 – or up to 1992 –
within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was
already barred by prescription. Under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, an action for partition and recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land is a real action over immovable property which prescribes in 30
years. Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria’s heirs
exclusively.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC. It declared 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan; as well as 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining. The trial court’s declaration of nullity of the
deeds of sale became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. There was no
prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-‐ownership of the property
with Leonardo.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the trial
court on the ground that Lucimo Francisco repudiated the co-ownership only on February 9, 1979

(2) Whether or not the appellate court erred in not upholding the decision of the trial court dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription and laches
Ruling/s:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.

Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the
property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the
property upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death.

Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s
son-in‐law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. One who is merely related by affinity to the
decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent's property.
Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the
decedent's heirs.

For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the
property has not been lost.

Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment in his pleadings – that
Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the property since 1943 – should be taken against him, is unavailing. In
1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to
Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered under
the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s ownership ceased only in 1962,
upon his death when the property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.

In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could
seek partition of the property at any time.

Calalang-Parulan v. Calalang
G.R. No. 184148, June 9, 2014
Villarama, Jr., J:
Topic: General Provisions
Facts:
Respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile and Carlito Calalang asserted ownership
over a certain parcel of land against petitioners Nora Calalang-Parulan situated in Balagtas, Bulacan. It was
allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio through succession as the
latter’s compulsory heirs. According to respondents, their father Pedro Calalang cnotracted two marriages. Th
first was with their mother Encarnacion. During the subsistence of the marriage, their parents acquired the
land from their maternal grandmother. Despite enjoying continuous possesion of the land, their parents failed
to register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira Caalanf, who gave birth to
petitioners herein. It was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent.
According to respondents, Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusve
ownership over the land since 1935. As a result, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued an OCT in favor of
Pedro Calalang only. Respondents assail that the sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed to
obtain their consent as co-owners of the same.
Petitioners argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the secod marriage with Elvira; and that the
OCT stated that it was issued in the name of “Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]”.
The trial court rendered a decision in for of respondents, ordering to reconvey to the latter their rightful share
to 3/4 of 1/2 of the land for each of the three plaintiff. It found that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by
teh spouses Pedro Calalang and Ernacion fro the arents of the latter. Thus, it wa part of the conjugal property
of the first marriage. When the marriage was dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion, the corresponding
shares to the property were acquired by the heirs of the decedent according to the laws of succession. On
apepal, however, the CA modified the decision and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive
owner of the subject parcel. However, the sale to Nora Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the
vendee was in bad faith and the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the
property.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that Pedro Calalang deprived respondents of their respective shares
when he alienated the disputed property to Nora Calalang-Parulan?

Ruling/s:
Yes. In declaring Pedro Calalang as the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property, the Court relied
on the fact that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more
than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the
first marriage. Consequently, as the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his
property in favor of Nora Calalang-Parulan. The CA, therefore, erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived
his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property when he alienated the same.
Art. 777 of the Civil Code provides that “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent”. Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on Dec. 27, 1989 that his heirs
acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the
time of the sale of the propert to Nora Calalang-Parulan, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed
upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the sale was
fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration, the respondents, therefore, have no right to
question the sale on the ground that their father deprived them of their shares.

Alvarez vs IAC
G.R. No. L-68053, May 7, 1990
Fernan
Topic: (General Provisions/Wills/Testamentary Capacity)
Facts:
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were
originally known as Lot 773 registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes.

Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio
and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib.   It is not
clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.

During the outbreak of World war II, the heirs of Aniceto were forced to leave the province and settle in
another place. From the Japanese occupation until peace time, they were not able to visit Lot 773. Upon their
return, they found out that Lot 773 was in possession of Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella, and Alvarez.
Fortunato Santiago was able to acquire a TCT registered in his name for the said lot and sold a portion of it to
Fuentebella. After Fuentebellas death, his wife sold his portion to Alvarez.

Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and
823. The RTC of Negros ruled in favor of the heirs of Aniceto, ordering Alvarez to reconvey the said lots.
However, execution was unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773 as Rodolfo Siaoson, who was in possession of
it, alleges that he bought the lot from Alvarez.

As the execution cannot be enforce against Siason as he was not a party to the case, Teodora Yanes, et. al
filed another complaint, this time including Siason, for recovery of property with damages and cancellation of
the TCT, alleging that the sale made by Alavarez to Siason was null and void. Siason filed a manifestation
stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable
consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties” as there was no
notice of lis pendens on the TCT.

The lower court ruled that was Siason a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration abnd ordered the
Heirs of Alvarez to pay the Yaneses the actual value of the land plus damages because the sale of Alvarez to
Siason was without court approval. The Heirs of Alvarez appealed to the IAC, but the IAC affirmed the lower
courts decision insofar as to the payment of P20,000 representing the value of the land.

Thus, this petition to the SC, contending that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B
made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of
his estate, after his death.
Issue/s:

Whether or not the Heirs of Alvarez are liable for the actual value arising from sale of Lot 773-A and 773-B.

Ruling/s:
Yes. Contention of the heirs is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the
general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. 

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from
the decedent.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their
father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the
property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved
into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable
in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.
With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the
deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Gevero v. IAC

G.R. No. 77029, August 30, 1990

Paras, J.

Topic: (General Provisions – Art. 777)

Facts:
The parcel of land under litigation, identified as Lot No. 2476, was acquired by purchase from the late Luis
Lancero on September 15, 1964 in favor of  Del Monte Development Corporation (DELCOR). Luis Lancero, in
turn acquired the same parcel of land from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by
Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No.
7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha  — ½  share
and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, ½ 
undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters. 

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children aforementioned. The
heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the
estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial
settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I,
inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot
2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial
settlement and partition in 1966. DELCOR filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet
title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the
land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.

The trial court declared DELCOR as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476. Petitioners
Gevero appealed to the IAC. Petitioners aver that the ½  share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in
Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to
Ricardos' proportionate share out of the undivided ½   of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters
listed in the Title and that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica,
because the Deed did not recite that she was deceased at the time it was executed. The appellate court
affirmed the decision appealed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied. 

Hence, the present petition.

Issue/s:
WoN the ½ share of interest of Teodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No.
7610 is included in the deed of sale

Ruling/s:
YES. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of
the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no
legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately
after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of
the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from
the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial
partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when
Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless
expressly excluded in the deed of sale.

Locsin VS. CA
G.R. No. 89783, February 19, 1992
Narvasa, C. J
Topic: Transmission of succession
Facts:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children (Mariano, Julian and Magdalena). His properties in Albay and
Sorsogon were divided among his children: (a) Coconut land of some 700 hectares in Sorsogon to
Magdalena; (b) 106 hectares of coconut land to Julian, Mariano, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
and (c) More than 40 hectares of coconut land in Bogtong, and 18 hectares of riceland in Daraga as well as
residential lots to Mariano.

The properties of Mariano were brought into his marriage. On his Last Will and Testament, Catalina
Juanica(wife), was named as the sole and universal heir to all his properties. The spouses also agreed that
should both of them die, their respective properties would return to their sides of the family. Upon Mariano’s
death, his will was probated in a special proceeding. 9 years after the death of Mariano, Catalina began
disposing their properties to their nieces and nephews.

After Catalina’s death in 1977, her will affirmed and ratified all the transfers she made during her lifetime in
favor of her husband’s, and her own, relatives. Said relatives all agreed not to submit it to the court for
probate since the properties were already conveyed to them during Catalina’s lifetime.
In 1989, some of Catalina’s nieces and nephews who had already received their legacies and hereditary
shares from their estate filed with the RTC an action to recover properties conveyed to the Locsin’s, alleging
that the conveyances were officious, without consideration, and intended to circumvent the laws on
succession. The trial court ruled in favor of the complainants. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
Issue/s:

WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC, allowing the recovery of the properties conveyed to
the Locsin’s?

Ruling/s:
YES. The CA and the trial court erred in holding that the private respondents are entitled to inherit the
properties which she had already disposed of more than 10 years before her death. Those properties no
longer formed part of the hereditary estate. The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. Even if those transfers were, one and all,
treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the
donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.

There is no basis for assuming that Catalina’s intention for transferring those properties was to circumvent the
laws on succession. All that the private respondents had was a mere expectancy which does not restrict
Catalina’s freedom to dispose of even her entire estate, subject to the limitations under Art. 750.

The lower courts capitalized on the fact that Catalina was 90 years of age when she died, which may lead to
her being unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband’s nephews. However, the facts presented
do not support this view. There was not the slightest suggestion in the record that Catalina was mentally
incompetent when she made the dispositions. The fact that she was transferring properties to the Locsin’s as
well as the private respondents negate the allegations of her incompetence.

The trial court should have already dismissed the action for recovery on the grounds of prescription. The
subject transactions had already prescribed after 4 years following its registration in the Registry of Property,
whether based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. Registration is a constructive
notice to the whole world. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside.

Opulencia vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 385,

G.R. No. 125835 July 30, 1998

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.

Topic: Succession; Probate Proceedings; Sales

Facts:

Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a
“CONTRACT TO SELL” of a lot in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meters. Plaintiffs paid a
downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under
the contract. Private respondents therefore prayed that petitioner be ordered to perform her contractual
obligations and to further pay damages, attorney’s fee and litigation expenses. However the petitioner put
forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate
of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of
the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that
realizing the nullity of the contract petitioner had offered to return the downpayment received from private
respondents, but the latter refused to accept it.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the Contract to Sell executed by the petitioner and private respondents without the requisite
probate court approval is valid.

Ruling/s:

No. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable,
because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or
administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the “lawful owner” and seller of the
subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the sale to be “difficulties in her living” conditions
and consequent “need of cash.” These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the
estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by
petitioner has no application to the instant case.

We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death.
Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of
judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to
sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner’s offer to sell is contingent on the “complete clearance of the
court on the Last Will and Testament of her father.” Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was
perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings,
the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is
subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate
proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in
a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that “the sale made
by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of
such administration.”

Petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private
respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial payment of the purchase price.
Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents
who have relied on them. Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party
from an unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of its consequences.

EMNACE vs. CA
G.R. No. 126334, November 23, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Topic: (General Provisions/Wills/Testamentary Capacity)
Facts:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern
known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. They decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement
of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia's
withdrawal from the partnership.

Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise, petitioner
failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an
accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's
heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership despite formal demand for payment
thereof.

Consequently, Tabanao's heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment
of shares, division of assets and damages. The following day, respondents filed an amended complaint,
incorporating the additional prayer that petitioner be ordered to "sell all (the partnership's) assets and
thereafter pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs" their corresponding share in the proceeds thereof.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, but the same was denied by the trial court.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, upon a finding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the trial court in issuing orders denying petitioner's motions to dismiss.

Petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since
she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
estate of the deceased to appear as party plaintiff, when there is no intestate case and filed by one who was
never appointed by the court as administratrix of the estates
Ruling/s: NO
Petitioner's objection is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in
their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his
rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment
Vicente Tabanao died.

A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix,
is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the
shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent.
They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill
his obligations. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
Rabadilla VS. CA
G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
Purisima, J.
Topic: Obligations not extinguished by death
Facts:
In a Codicil appended to the last will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, the
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner was instituted as a devisee of 511,855sqm of the parcel of land in
Bacolod. Said Codicil was duly probated and duly admitted in a special proceeding. Dr. Rabadilla died in
1983, leaving behind his wife and four children.

In 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint before the RTC against the
heirs of Dr. Rabadilla to enforce the provisions of the Codicil. She alleged that the petitioners violated the
conditions of the Codicil in that they failed to sell, lease, or mortgage Lot No. 1392 only to the nearest
descendants and sister of the testatrix, instead, they mortgaged the same to PNB.

During the pre-trial, the petitioner and the private respondents reached an agreement wherein the former
would deliver 100 piculs of sugar to the latter. However, only 50.80 piculs of sugar mas delivered. The RTC
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of the private respondents, albeit there was non-compliance of
the agreement, for being premature. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the petitioners
have failed to comply with the agreement under the Codicil. The court ordered for the reversion of Lot No.
1392.

Issue/s:

WON the CA erred in ordering the reversion of Lot No. 1392?

Ruling/s:
NO. The petitioner argued that Art. 882(Modal Institutions) of the NCC does not apply since there was no
modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution. That there can be no substitution since
the testatrix died single and without issue; that the substitute heir is not definite, as only referred to as “near
descendants” without definite identity or reference. This argument of the petitioner is bereft of merit.
As a general rule on succession, successional right are transmitted to the heirs at the moment of death of the
decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate descendants, in
relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. The petitioner, his
mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla succeed the latter by operation of law.

Under Art. 776 of the NCC, inheritance include all properties, rights and obligations, not extinguished by his
death. Whatever obligation of Dr. Rabadilla had under the Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. As provided for in the Codicil, Dr. Rabadilla was designated as the devisee of the lot and is
obliged to deliver usufruct thereof to the private respondents. Upon his death, the petitioner assumed this
obligation. Hence, the private respondent had a cause of action against him.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first
instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another
heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the
inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one
person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation. Under the Codicil, should Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions
imposed upon in the Codicil, the property shall be seized and transferred to the testatrix’s nearest
descendants. Art. 882 does apply to the case. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the
institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the
efficacy of his rights to the succession.

It was clear that Dr. Rabadilla was to inherit the property, however, it was likewise clear that the testatrix
imposed an obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to the private respondents. Suffice it to state that a Will is
a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his
death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the
wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

The petition was dismissed.

Tañedo vs. CA

G.R. No. 104482, January 22, 1996

 Panganiban, J.

Topic: (General Provisions – Art. 777)

Facts:
On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Tañedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest
brother, Ricardo Tañedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein, whereby Lazaro
conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, "one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No.
191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac", the said property being his "future inheritance" from his parents.

Upon the death of their father Matias, Lazaro executed an "Affidavit of Conformity" dated February 28, 1980
to "re-affirm respect, acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962."

On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents
covering his "undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 . . .". He acknowledged
therein his receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor

On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and
the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451

On July 16, 1982, Belinda Tañedo, et al, who are the children of Lazaro and petitioners herein, filed before
the trial court a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of
private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father

Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated December 29, 1980,
conveying to his ten children his allotted portion under the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of
Matias, which deed included the land in litigation (Lot 191).

Petitioners also presented in evidence a private writing purportedly prepared and signed by Matias dated
December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him
should be given to his (Lazaro's) children

The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to adduce a
preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated
January 13, 1981 was valid and that its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.

Issue/s:

Should the sale made by Lazaro to private respondents be declared void and invalid?

Ruling/s:

No. The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the assailed
Decision conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated future inheritance is null
and void."

But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "(n)o
contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law."
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of
any obligation between the parties.

Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962
sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from the same infirmity." Even private
respondents in their memorandum concede this.

However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are:

(a) the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided
inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently registered on June 7, 1982;
and

(b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same property.

These two documents were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of extra-
judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over said property.
In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with the infirmities of the 1962
sale.

Santos v Lumbao

G.R. No. 169129; March 28, 2007

Chico-Nazario, J

Topic: Art 1311

Facts:
Petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs
of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on October 1985. Respondents Spouses Lumbao are the
alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during
her lifetime.

Rita sold 100 sqm of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate to Spouses Lumbao. An additional 7 sqm was
added to the land as evidenced by a document denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa.”

After acquiring the property, spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house
which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present.

Spouses Lumbao made several demands upon Rita and thereafter upon herein petitioners for them to
execute necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title. They further alleged that prior to her
death, Rita informed respondent Spouses Lumbao that she could not deliver the title to the subject property
because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.

Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the
estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents. They sent a formal
demand letter to petitioners but the latter still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property.
Issue/s:
WON Spouses Santos must reconvey the subject property to Spouses Lumbao

Ruling/s:
Yes.

General rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in the
present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever
rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of
succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value
of the inheritance of the heirs.

Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-
interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.

Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what
rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them.
The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the
rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the
subject matter of the contract.

In the end, despite the death of the petitioners' mother, they are still bound to comply with the provisions of
the "Bilihan ng Lupa,". Consequently, they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-
square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners' mother.

NHA V. Almeida

G.R. No. 162784; June 22, 2007

Puno, C.J
 Topic: Succession (Art.774)
Facts:
The Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita several portions of land which are part of the
Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award was evidenced by an agreement to sell. LTA was
succeeded by DAR and thereafter, DAR was succeeded by the National Housing Authority (NHA).

Margarita had two children namely, Beatriz and Francisca. Beatriz predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Before the death of Margarita on October 27,1971, she executed a “Sinumpaang Salaysay” which recognizes
the agreement to sell entered into between her and NHA. A stipulation also includes a statement that the
lands which will be awarded to her will go to her daughter Francisca when “sakaling ako’y bawian na ng Dios
aking buhay.” The said document was made on Oct. 7, 1960.

On August 22, 1974, Francisca, the remaining child of the late Margarita executed a Deed of Self-
Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the
deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita.

The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the CFI. The
decision was rendered in their favor declaring the deed null and void.

During the trial of the case, Francisca filed an application with NHA to purchase the disputed lots which
respondent Almeida, one of the heirs of Beatriz, protested the application. NHA granted the application in
favor of Francisca. It based its decision on the Sinumpaang Salaysay that all rights and interest to the
disputed lots shall be transferred to Francisca. It considered the document as assignment of rights which
takes effect upon the execution of the document. The Office of the President affirmed the decision of NHA.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed was an assignment of rights in favor of Francisca.

Ruling/s:
No. We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted
that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her
words "sakaling ako'y bawian nang Dios ng aking buhay . . ." Hence, in such period, all the interests of the
person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her
heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:

“Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either
by his will or by operation of law.”
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an
existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was
neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties — Margarita Herrera and
NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of
her death either by will or by operation of law.

When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next
"person" likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price.

We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine.

PEOPLE vs. GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO

G.R. No. 8445 February 4, 1991
MEDIALDEA, J.:
Topic: Witness
Facts:
Pierre Pangan, a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of
robbery. In the course of the investigation, the policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of committing
such only if under the influence of drug. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor asked the police investigators if
something could be done to determine the source of the marijuana which has not only socially affected his son, but
other minors in the community like the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise investigated by operatives of the
Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against
him, and other cases. Manalo although a detention prisoner was touched by the appeal made to him by the
policeman and agreed to help in the identification of the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman
to help him in some cases pending against him.

With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division gave him four (4) marked
P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. Few minutes there after, Manalo returned with two (2) foils
of dried marijuana which lie allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police
investigators to give a statement on the manner and circumstances
Issue/s:
Whether or not Manalo should be disqualified as a witness
Ruling/s:
NO. Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from casually modifying or rejecting the trial court's
factual findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the testimony of
the witnesses are accorded with great respect on appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly and at
first hand observing and examining the testimonial and other proofs as they are presented at the trial and is
therefore better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof. The findings of the trial
court are entitled to great weight, and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had
overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and
heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. Hence, in the absence of
any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain substantial facts, said factual findings are entitled to great
weight, and indeed are binding even on this Court.

Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make
known their perception to others may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
 provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code
which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified
from being witnesses to a will."

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a
witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing several
criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. The testimony of a witness should
be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive, in the absence of
any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full
credence.

Appellant's contention that she was a victim of a "frame-up" is devoid of merit.1âwphi1 "Courts must be vigilant. A
handy defense in such cases is that it is a frame-up and that the police attempted to extort from the accused.
Extreme caution must be exercised in appreciating such defense. It is just as easy to concoct as a frame-up. At all
times the police, the prosecution and the Courts must be always on guard against these hazards in the
administration of criminal justice."

Torres & Lopez V. Lopez

G.R. No. 24569; February 26, 1926

Malcolm, J

Topic: Testamentary Capacity

Facts:
Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands. On February 25, 1924, leaving a considerable
estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of
Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the
grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of senile dementia and was under
guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited in the document in
conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the
document was obtained through fraud and deceit.

After a prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will declaring that Tomas was
physically and mentally incapacitated to take care of himself and manage his estate shows in a clear and
conclusive manner that at the time of signing the supposed will of Tomas Rodriguez did not possess such
mental capacity as was necessary to be able him to dispose of his property by the supposed will.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Tomas Rodriguez has testamentary capacity to consider the will valid;

Ruling/s:
 Yes. Tomas has testamentary capacity to constitute a will. Though there was a conflict of medical
opinions on the soundness of mind of the testator. Drs. Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera claimed that
testator had full understanding of the acts he was performing and that they were witness in the said
signing of the will. Rules of Court proscribes a requisite that the testator be of “sound mind.” A sound
mind is a disposing mind. With such, the court has adopted a definition of “testamentary capacity” as
the capacity to comprehend the nature of transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to
recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have
claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.

On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take a wide range in order
that all facts may be brought out which will assist in determining the question. The testimony of
subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testator's mental condition is entitled to great weight
where they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution of the will and of
the attending physician is also to be relied upon. The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only
when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that
the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document.

Aluad vs Aluad

GR No. 176943, Oct. 17, 2008

CARPIO MORALES, J

Topic: (General Provisions/Wills/Testamentary Capacity)

Facts:
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses
Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). Crispin was the owner of six lots in Capiz. After Crispin died, his
wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.

On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a Deed of Donation in favor of Maria covering all the six lots which
Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The Deed of Donation provided that such will become effective upon
the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor, the present donation shall
be deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who
should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.

Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising four (4) of
the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death.
Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership
and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido, alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the
latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.

The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which
held that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not,
comply with the formalities of a will.

Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review has been filed.

Issue/s:
a. Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos

b. Whether or not the Deed of Donation is valid.

Ruling/s:

a. NO, the donation is Donation Mortis Causa

The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) one of mortis causa, it having the following
characteristics:

It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;

That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad
nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and

That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.

The phrase in the Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other
interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s
mother during the former’s lifetime. Further the statement, “anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone
of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein
donated,” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For
the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.
The phrase, “anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it
would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor.

b. NO, the Deed is VOID.

The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it
was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and
transmitted no right to the petitioner's mother. But even assuming that the formalities were observed, since it was
not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of the lot to Zenaido
by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect to the
conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.

CONCHITA GLORIA AND MARIA LOURDES GLORIA-PAYDUAN, Petitioners, v. BUILDERS SAVINGS

AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
G.R.No. 202324, June 04, 2018
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
Topic: Testamentary Capacity
Facts:

Spouses Juan and herein petitioner Conchita Gloria (Conchita) are registered owners of a parcel of land
located in Kamuning, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35814 (TCT 35814).
Petitioner Maria Lourdes Gloria-Payduan (Lourdes) is their daughter.

On August 14, 1987, Juan passed away.

Conchita and Lourdes filed before the RTC a complaint against Builders Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(Builders Savings) for declaration of null and void real estate mortgage, promissory note, cancellation of
notation in the transfer certificate of title, and damages. Conchita and Lourdes claimed that Biag duped them
into surrendering TCT 35814 to him under the pretense that Biag would verify the title, which he claimed
might have been fraudulently transferred to another on account of a fire that gutted the Quezon City Registry
of Deeds; that Biag claimed that the title might need to be reconstituted; that Biag instead used the title to
mortgage the Kamuning property to respondent Builders Savings; that Conchita was fraudulently made to
sign the subject loan and mortgage documents by Biag, who deceived Conchita into believing that it was
actually Lourdes who requested that these documents be signed; that the subject Mortgage and Promissory
Note contained the signature not only of Conchita, but of Juan, who was by then already long deceased, as
mortgagor and co-maker; that at the time the loan and mortgage documents were supposedly executed,
Conchita was already sickly and senile, and could no longer leave her house; that Biag and Builders Savings
conspired in the execution of the forged loan and mortgage documents, that the forged loan and mortgage
documents were not signed/affirmed before a notary public; that on account of Biag and Builders Savings’
collusion, the subject property was foreclosed and sold at auction to the latter; and that the loan and
mortgage documents, as well as the foreclosure and sale proceedings, were null and void and should he
annulled.

Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner MARIA LOURDES GLORIA-PAYDUAN as coowner of subject property is a real
party of interest in the case.

Ruling/s:

Yes. The evidence reveals that Lourdes is the daughter of Juan and Conchita. There is on record a
CertiBcation of Birth 18 issued by the Lipa City OJce of the Local Civil Registrar indicating that Lourdes was
born to Juan and Conchita; this document was marked as Exhibit "H" during the proceedings below, and
remains uncontested.

Moreover, Lourdes categorically testiBed during trial that she was the natural child of Juan and Conchita,
thus:
Being the daughter of the deceased Juan and Conchita, Lourdes has an interest in the subject property as
heir to Juan and co-owner with Conchita. The fact that she was not judicially declared as heir is of no
moment, for, as correctly argued by petitioners, there was no need for a prior declaration of heirship before
heirs may commence an action arising from any right of their predecessor, such as one for annulment of
mortgage. "[N]o judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right
to the property of the deceased.

Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 of the Civil Code, from the
death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any
time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition
private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-
interest.