6 CHR Employees v. CHR
6 CHR Employees v. CHR
6 CHR Employees v. CHR
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the
upgrading or raising of salary grade of the following positions in the Commission:
The CHR forwarded said sta ng modi cation and upgrading scheme to
the Department of Budget and Management [DBM] with a request for its approval,
but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following
justification:
The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to
Director IV, SG-28, in the Central O ce in effect would elevate the services to
O ce and change the context from support to substantive without actual change
in functions.
In the absence of a speci c provision of law which may be used as a legal
basis to elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or regional o ce, and the
services to o ces, we reiterate our previous stand denying the upgrading of the
twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-27 or Director IV, SG-
28, in the Field Operations O ce (FOO) and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director
IV, SG-28 in the Central Office.
As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM
Secretary dated 10 December 1997, directing the latter to increase the number of
Plantilla positions in the CHR both Central and Regional O ces to implement the
Philippine Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine Human Rights
Plan and Barangay Rights Actions Center in accordance with existing laws.
(Emphasis in the original)
Being a member of the scal autonomy group does not vest the agency
with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of
the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective o ces and determine
the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Uni ed Position Classi cation and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand on
the matter. (Emphasis supplied)
Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC,
petitioner CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals a rmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central O ce and upheld the
validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassi cation scheme in the CHR on the
justi cation that such action is within the ambit of CHR's scal autonomy. The
fallo of the Court of Appeals decision provides:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered
DISMISSED and the questioned Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
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99-2800 dated December 16, 1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June 9,
2000, are hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.
Unfazed, the petitioner elevated its case to this Court and successfully obtained the
favorable action in its Decision dated 25 November 2004. In its Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Decision, the respondent de ned the assignment of errors 6
for resolution, namely:
I. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT
THE CHR ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY.
II. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE SPECIAL PROVISION OF
THE REP. ACT. (SIC) NO. 8522 DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION CHR AS
AMONG THOSE OFFICES TO WHICH THE SPECIAL PROVISION TO
FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES APPLY,
BUT MERELY STATES ITS COVERAGE TO INCLUDE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS AND OFFICES ENJOYING FISCAL AUTONOMY;
III. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CHR ALTHOUGH
ADMITTEDLY A CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION IS NONETHELESS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE GENUS OF THE OFFICES ACCORDED FISCAL
AUTONOMY BY CONSTITUTIONAL OR LEGISLATIVE FIAT.
IV. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DECIDING TO REINSTATE THE RULING
DATED 29 MARCH 1999 OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION —
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION;
V. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DECIDING TO DISALLOW THE COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION NO. A98-047 DATED SEPTEMBER 04,
1998, RESOLUTION NO. A98-055 DATED 19 OCTOBER 1998 AND
RESOLUTION NO. A98-062 DATED 17 NOVEMBER 1998 WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT.
Although this Court may have been persuaded to take a second look at this case
and partly modify the assailed Decision, such modi cation shall not materially affect the
dispositive portion thereof.
As already settled in the assailed Decision of this Court, the creation of respondent
may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional
commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly entitled "Constitutional
Commissions," identi es only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in
Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human Rights, which reads that —
Sec. 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent o ce called the
Commission on Human Rights.
Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
on constitutional commissions for its bene t. It must be able to present constitutional
and/or statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim of scal
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autonomy.
The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants scal autonomy only to
the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the scal autonomy of the Judiciary in Article VIII,
Section 3, reproduced below —
Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy scal autonomy. Appropriations for the
Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated
for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.
The O ce of the Ombudsman enjoys scal autonomy by virtue of Article XI, Section
14, of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that —
Sec. 14. The O ce of the Ombudsman shall enjoy scal autonomy. Its
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences stating that: (1) The
government entity shall enjoy scal autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation
shall be automatically and regularly released. The respondent anchors its claim to scal
autonomy on the fourth paragraph of Article XIII, Section 17, according to which —
Sec. 17. . . .
As compared to the previously quoted Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX, Part A, Section
5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution on the Judiciary, the constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman, respectively, Article XIII, Section 17(4)
on the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) evidently does not contain the rst
sentence on the express grant of scal autonomy, and reproduces only the second
sentence on the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations.
Question now arises as to the signi cance of such a difference in the way the said
provisions are worded.
To settle this ambiguity, a perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) is enlightening.
During the drafting of Article XIII, Section 17(4), of the 1987 Constitution, the
ConCom members had the following discussion 7 —
MR. BENGZON. I have another paragraph, Madam President. This could be
a separate section or another paragraph depending on what the committee
desires and what the Committee on Style would wish: "THE COMMISSION SHALL
ENJOY FISCAL AUTONOMY. THE APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF
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THE COMMISSION SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED." It
will align this Human Rights Commission with other commissions that we have
created in the Constitution in order to further insure the independence of the
Human Rights Commission. CcSEIH
THE PRESIDENT. So, will the Commissioner please read it now as it is?
MR. BENGZON. I will read the amendment as accepted. "THE APPROVED
ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY
AND REGULARLY RELEASED."
MR. BENGZON. It is not so much the fact that we want to elevate this into
a constitutional commission as it is more of an insurance that the independence
of the Human Rights Commission, even though it is not considered as a
constitutional commission as contemplated and as compared to the Civil Service
Commission, the COMELEC and COA, is maintained. And this is as elegant as the
other sentences. So, we submit the same to the body.
MR. SARMIENTO. The proposed amendment has been accepted by the
committee, but we have this objection from Commissioner Padilla. So, may we
throw the issue to the body?
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, just for clari cation. Does the
amendment of the honorable Commissioner Bengzon refer only to the release? I
was thinking that although I am very, very strongly in favor of this commission
and would give it one of the top priorities, there are other top priorities that we
may want to address ourselves to. For example, in the Committee on Human
Resources, we would like to give top priority to education; therefore, if this does
not refer only to an automatic and regular release but would refer to the matter of
priorities in the preparation of the budget, then I am afraid that we might already
be curtailing too much the discretion on the part of both the legislature and the
executive to determine the priorities that should be given at a given time.
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MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the sentence means what it says
and it is clear .
THE PRESIDENT. Will the Commissioner please read.
MR. BENGZ O N . It only refers to the release which should be
automatic and regular .
THE PRESIDENT. Please state it again so that we will be clari ed before
we take a vote.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you, Madam President.
MR. BENGZON. It will read: "THE APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS
OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY
RELEASED."
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of this particular section, please
raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their
hand.)
As many as are abstaining, please raise their hand. (Two Members raised
their hand.)
The results show 26 votes in favor, 4 against and 2 abstentions; the
amendment is approved. (Emphases supplied.)
The foregoing excerpt su ciently elucidates that the grant of scal autonomy is more
extensive than the mere automatic and regular release of approved annual
appropriations of the government entity. It is also worth stressing herein that in
Bengzon v. Drilon , this Court, ruling En Banc, only recognized the scal autonomy of the
Judiciary; the constitutional commissions, namely, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections; and the O ce of the
Ombudsman. Respondent is conspicuously left out of the enumeration.
Moreover, the ConCom had the following deliberations 1 2 on the meaning of the
scal autonomy extended to the constitutional commissions in what is to become later
Article IX, Part A, Section 5, of the 1987 Constitution —
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
This morning, I asked the proponent of this resolution what is included in
the term " scal autonomy." The answer I got is that it is for the automatic release
of the budget. I propose that the sentence "The Commissions shall enjoy scal
autonomy" be deleted but the second sentence shall remain. The reason is that it
is already redundant. Fiscal autonomy means the automatic release of
appropriations.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding O cer, may we answer the honorable
Commissioner.
MR. DE CASTRO. May I just say one sentence, Mr. Presiding O cer? If the
Committee's stand is that scal autonomy means the automatic release of the
appropriations, then I say that the rst sentence — "The Commissions shall enjoy
scal autonomy" — should be deleted because it is a repetition of the second
sentence.
Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). With that explanation, what is the
pleasure of Commissioner de Castro? Does he insist on his amendment?
MR. DE CASTRO. Is the Chairman changing his answer from this morning's
question? If he does, I will ask some more questions about fiscal autonomy.
Based on the preceding exchange, it can be derived that the rst sentence of Article IX,
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Part A, Section 5, of the 1987 Constitution, expressly granting scal autonomy to
constitutional commissions, does not have the same meaning as the second sentence,
directing the automatic and regular release of their approved annual appropriations,
hence, the resistance of Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod to the
suggested amendment of Constitutional Commissioner Crispino M. De Castro to just
delete the first sentence.
In addition, the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), to which respondent
avers membership, de ned the term " scal autonomy" in its Joint Resolution No. 49, dated
24 July 1998, as follows —
IV. Definition of Terms:
While the assailed Decision and the present Resolution may render the status of
respondent's membership in CFAG uncertain, the then Chairperson of respondent, Aurora
P. Navarrete-Recina, duly signed CFAG Joint Resolution No. 49, and respondent should be
held bound by the de nition of scal autonomy therein. CFAG Joint Resolution No. 49
categorically declares that scal autonomy means more than just the automatic and
regular release of approved appropriation, and also encompasses, among other things: (1)
budget preparation and implementation; (2) exibility in fund utilization of approved
appropriations; and (3) use of savings and disposition of receipts. Having agreed to such a
de nition of scal autonomy, respondent has done a complete turn-about herein and is
now contradicting itself by arguing that the automatic and regular release of its approved
annual appropriations is already tantamount to fiscal autonomy.
Consequently, this Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to
respondent a certain degree of scal autonomy through the privilege of having its
approved annual appropriations released automatically and regularly. However, it
withholds from respondent scal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to
the Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the O ce of the Ombudsman. Operative
herein is the rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, wherein
the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others. 1 3 The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature (or in this case, the
ConCom) would not have made speci c enumerations in a statute (or the Constitution)
had the intention not been to restrict its meaning and to con ne its terms to those
expressly mentioned. 1 4
The provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, on the scal autonomy of constitutional commissions, the O ce of the
Ombudsman, and the respondent, merely follow the phraseology used in the
corresponding provisions of the 1987 Constitution, thus —
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Book II, Chapter 5, Section 26. Fiscal Autonomy . — The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy scal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
While the Administrative Code of 1987 has no reference to the scal autonomy of the
Judiciary, it does have provisions on the scal autonomy of the constitutional
commissions and the O ce of the Ombudsman. It is very interesting to note that while
Book II, Chapter 5, Section 26 (on constitutional commissions) and Book V, Title 2,
Subtitle B, Section 4 (on the O ce of the Ombudsman) of the Code are entitled "Fiscal
Autonomy," Book V, Title 2, Subtitle A, Section 6 (on respondent) bears the title "Annual
Appropriations." Further, the provisions on the constitutional commissions and the
O ce of the Ombudsman in the Administrative Code of 1987, just like in the 1987
Constitution, are composed of two sentences: (1) The government entity shall enjoy
scal autonomy; and (2) Its approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and
regularly released. The provision on respondent in the same Code is limited only to the
second sentence. CHEDAc
Respondent asserts that it is granted fiscal autonomy by Book VI, Chapter 1, Section
1, paragraph 9, of the Administrative Code of 1987, which reads —
SEC. 1. Constitutional Policies on the Budget. —
As its title suggests, the afore-cited provision is supposed to merely re-state the
policies on budget as declared by the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, cannot grant or
extend to the respondent a privilege not found in the 1987 Constitution. Book VI of the
Administrative Code of 1987, under which the said provision is found, pertains to
National Government Budgeting. Respondent may have been included in the
enumeration of scally autonomous government entities because it does enjoy an
aspect of scal autonomy, that of the automatic and regular release of its approved
annual appropriations from the national budget. The general declaration of scal
autonomy of the respondent in Section 1, paragraph 9, of Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 on National Government Budgeting, must be quali ed and limited by
Section 6 of Book V, Title II, Subtitle A of the same C ode speci cally pertaining to
respondent. It should be borne in mind that the general rule is that a word, phrase or
provision should not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in relation to
other provisions of the law. 1 5
To reiterate, under the Constitution, as well as the Administrative Code of 1987,
respondent enjoys scal autonomy only to the extent that its approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released, but nothing more.
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On the main issue of whether or not the approval by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) is a condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading,
reclassi cation, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR, this Court
staunchly holds that as prescinding from the legal and jurisprudential yardsticks
discussed in length in the assailed Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must rst be
sought prior to implementation of any reclassi cation or upgrading of positions in
government.
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys scal autonomy, this Court shares
the stance of the DBM that the grant of scal autonomy notwithstanding, all government
o ces must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. This Court is of the
same mind with the DBM 1 6 on its standpoint, thus —
Being a member of the scal autonomy group does not vest the agency
with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of
the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective o ces and determine
the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Uni ed Position Classi cation and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
To drive home this point, in the special provision covering the Judiciary as quoted
above, the judiciary was not vested with the power to formulate and implement
organizational structures beyond the salary rates, allowances and other bene ts under the
compensation standardization laws. Stated differently, although the Judiciary is allowed to
reorganize, any such reorganization must, nevertheless, be in strict adherence to the Salary
Standardization Law. Ergo, any reorganization therein must be with the conformity of the
DBM inasmuch as it is the government arm tasked by law to implement the Salary
Standardization Law.
In Republic Act No. 9227, or "An Act Granting Additional Compensation in the Form
of Special Allowances for Justices, Judges and All Other Positions in the Judiciary with the
Equivalent Rank of Justices of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the Regional Trial Court,
and for Other Purposes," the grant of Special Allowances to members of the Judiciary did
not operate to exempt members thereof from the Salary Standardization Law. In Section 7
of Republic Act No. 9227, the Supreme Court and the DBM were speci cally tasked to
issue the necessary guidelines for the proper implementation of this Act in respect to
funds coming from the National Treasury. 1 7 Resultantly, the Supreme Court and the DBM
issued Joint Circular No. 2004-1 on 13 January 2004 which provided guidelines on the
funding source for the grant of this special allowance. Thus, although Administrative Order
No. 137, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 27 December 2005, extended to
the Chairman and Commissioners or Members of the CHR the same bene ts and
privileges enjoyed by members of constitutional commissions and the Judiciary in the
matter of rationalized rate of allowances and liberalized computation of retirement
bene ts and accumulated leave credits, it still does not exempt respondent from the
Salary Standardization Law.
This Court shall no longer belabor the point it has already delved upon in length in its
Decision that Congress has delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary
Standardization Law, which power is part of the system of checks and balances or system
of restraints in the Philippine government. This Court, thus, reiterates the point that the
DBM's exercise of such authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to
the 1987 Constitution, the paramount law of the land; the Salary Standardization Law; and
the Administrative Code of 1987.
In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization
Law of "providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay
upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and quali cation requirements
of the positions," the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a
thorough evaluation, that the reclassi cation and upgrading scheme proposed by the
respondent lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General
Appropriations Act (GAA), FY 1998, which the respondent heavily relies upon to justify its
reclassi cation scheme, explicitly provides that " no organizational unit or changes in key
positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President." Here,
the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management
O ce and a Public Affairs O ce in the CHR. Anent respondent’s proposal to upgrade
twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-28 to Director IV, SG-28, and three (3) positions of
Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in its Central O ce, the DBM denied the same as
this would change the context from support to substantive without actual change in
functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law's designated body to implement and administer a
uni ed compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative
government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of
Appeals, 1 8 the Court echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nation's coffers, the
Secretary of the DBM, as the President's alter ego, knows from where he speaks inasmuch
as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted upgrading or
creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in the entire government in general.
As the nal thrust, given this Court's previous pronouncement in the present
Resolution that the scal autonomy granted to the respondent by the 1987 Constitution
and the Administrative Code of 1987 shall be limited only to the automatic and regular
release of its approved annual appropriations, respondent is precluded from invoking the
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional O ces Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy in the
1998 GAA. The said Special Provisions read —
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional O ces Enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy
1. Organization Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary
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notwithstanding and within the limits of their respective appropriations as
authorized in this Act, the Constitutional Commissions and O ces enjoying scal
autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective o ces, to x and determine the salaries, allowances,
and other bene ts of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires,
make adjustments in the personal services itemization including, but not limited
to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective o ces:
PROVIDED, That the o cers and employees whose positions are affected by
such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and
separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective
o ces: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in
accordance with salary rates, allowances and other bene ts authorized under
compensation standardization laws.
It is unequivocal that the afore-quoted Special Provisions of the 1998 GAA refer to the
broad and extensive concept of scal autonomy. They already go beyond ensuring the
automatic and regular release of the approved annual appropriations, but already
enumerate the ways by which the named government entities can use their
appropriations to effect changes in their organizational structure and their savings for
certain o cial purposes. Even assuming arguendo that the said Special Provisions are
applicable to respondent, it should be noted that the last sentence in paragraph 1
quali es the power of a scally autonomous government entity to formulate and
implement changes in its organizational structure so that, ". . . the implementation
hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other bene ts
authorized under compensation standardization laws." And, as exhaustively expounded
in the assailed Decision and the herein Resolution, only the DBM has the authority and
the technical expertise to determine compliance by respondent to the provisions of the
Salary Standardization Law. TaHDAS
1. Penned by Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with Acting Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Dante O.
Tinga, concurring; Rollo, pp. 198-226.
2. Id. at 224-225.
3. Id. at 227-250.
4. Id. at 262-265.
5. Id. at 200-208.
6. Id. at 228-229.
7. Record of Constitutional Commission, Vol. IV, pp. 10-12 (28 August 1986).
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 11.
10. Id.
11. G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150.
12. RECORD OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, VOL. I, pp. 559-560 (15 July 1986).
13. Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, p. 222 (2003). See Centeno v. Villalon-
Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, 1 September 1994, 236 SCRA 197.
14. Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals , G.R. No. 48886-88, 21 July 1993, 224
SCRA 665, 670.
17. Sec. 7. Issuance of Implementing Guidelines. — The Supreme Court and the Department of
Budget and Management shall issue the necessary guidelines for the proper
implementation of this Act in respect to funds coming from the National Treasury within
ninety (90) days from approval hereof.
18. G.R. No. 113079, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 30, 40; citing Nestlé Philippines, Incorporated v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86738, 13 November 1991, 203 SCRA 504, 510-511.