Yu Hwa Ping V Ayala Land

4/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 832
G.R. No. 173120. July 26, 2017.*
SPOUSES YU HWA PING and MARY GAW, petitioners, vs.

AYALA LAND, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 173141. July 26, 2017.*
HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANDRES DIAZ and JOSEFA MIA,

petitioners, vs. AYALA LAND, INC., respondent.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Reconveyance; The remedy of the

landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another’s name is, after one (1) year from the date of the decree, not to set
aside the decree, as was done in this case, but, respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action
in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.—
The Court finds that the complaint of Spouses Yu is not barred by
prescription. While Section 38 of Act No. 496 states that the petition for
review to question a decree of registration must be filed within one (1) year
after entry of the decree, such provision is not the only remedy of an
aggrieved party who was deprived of land by fraudulent means. The remedy
of the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
428
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yu Hwa Ping vs. Ayala Land, Inc.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000169ee2cf8f6bf73b8e3003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/40
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously

registered in another’s name is, after one year from the date of the decree,
not to set aside the decree, as was done in this case, but, respecting the
decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary
action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property
has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.
Same; Same; Same; When the action for reconveyance is based on an
implied or constructive trust, the prescriptive period is ten (10) years, or it
is imprescriptible if the movant is in the actual, continuous and peaceful
possession of the property involved. On the other hand, when the action for
reconveyance is based on a void deed or contract the action is
imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the New Civil Code.—When the
action for reconveyance is based on an implied or constructive trust, the
prescriptive period is ten (10) years, or it is imprescriptible if the movant is
in the actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the property involved.
On the other hand, when the action for reconveyance is based on a void
deed or contract the action is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the New
Civil Code. As long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens
system is still in the name of the person who caused such registration, an
action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the
real owner.
Same; Same; Torrens System; Registering a piece of land under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership.—Accordingly, if the inclusion of the land in
the earlier registered title was a result of a mistake, then the latter registered
title will prevail. The ratio decidendi of this exception is to prevent a title
that was earlier registered, which erroneously contained a parcel of land that
should not have been included, from defeating a title that was later
registered but is legitimately entitled to the said land. It reinforced the
doctrine that “[r]egistering a piece of land under the Torrens System does
not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title
over the particular property described therein.”
Same; Same; Ownership; Although a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
429
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 429

favor of the person whose name appears therein, it is not a conclusive

proof of ownership.—Although a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person

whose name appears therein, it is not a conclusive proof of ownership. It is a
well-settled rule that ownership is different from a certificate of title. The
fact that a person was able to secure a title in his name does not operate to
vest ownership upon him of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at
the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for
another person by the registered owner.
Same; Same; Overlapping Boundaries; In Cambridge Realty and
Resources Corp. v. Eridanus Development, Inc., 557 SCRA 96 (2008), it was
ruled that a case of overlapping of boundaries or encroachment depends on
a reliable, if not accurate, verification survey; barring one, no overlapping
or encroachment may be proved successfully, for obvious reasons.—In
Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp. v. Eridanus Development, Inc., 557
SCRA 96 (2008), it was ruled that a case of overlapping of boundaries or
encroachment depends on a reliable, if not accurate, verification survey;
barring one, no overlapping or encroachment may be proved successfully,
for obvious reasons. The first step in the resolution of such cases is for the
court to direct the proper government agency concerned to conduct a
verification or relocation survey and submit a report to the court, or
constitute a panel of commissioners for the purpose. In that case, the Court
lamented that the trial court therein did not order the conduct of a
verification survey and the appointment of geodetic engineers as
commissioners, to wit: This is precisely the reason why the trial court
should have officially appointed a commissioner or panel of commissioners
and not leave the initiative to secure one to the parties: so that a thorough
investigation, study and analysis of the parties’ titles could be made in order
to provide, in a comprehensive report, the necessary information that will
guide it in resolving the case completely, and not
430

merely leave the determination of the case to a consideration of the

parties’ more often than not self-serving evidence.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is a fundamental rule that

the conclusion and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and cogent
reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine real
evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case.—The trial court was able to establish its findings
based on the verification survey it ordered, under the supervision of the
court-appointed commissioner. Hence, the trial court had the direct access to
the evidence presented by the parties as well as the verification reports and
survey plans submitted by the parties. It is a fundamental rule that the
conclusion and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight
on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons,
because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as
well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the
case.
Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Torrens Titles; The indefeasibility of
a Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of real property.—It is an enshrined principle in this
jurisdiction that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and
vested. The indefeasibility of a Torrens title should not be used as a means
to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith
must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an
exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive
notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the
registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Poblador, Bautista & Reyes for Ayala Land, Inc.
431
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 431

MENDOZA, J.:
These petitions for review on certiorari seek to reverse and set

aside the June 19, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 61593 and 70622, which reversed and set aside
its February 8, 2005 Amended Decision2 and reinstated its February

28, 2003 Decision,3 in a case for annulment of title and surveys,
recovery of possession and judicial confirmation of title.
The Antecedents
On March 17, 1921, petitioners Spouses Andres Diaz and Josefa

Mia (Spouses Diaz) submitted to the General Land Registration
Office for approval of the Director of Lands a survey plan
designated as Psu-25909, which covered a parcel of land located at
Sitio of Kay Monica, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal, with an
aggregate area of 460,626 square meters covered by Lot 1. On May
26, 1921, the Director of Lands approved survey plan Psu-25909.
On October 21, 1925, another survey plan was done covering Lot
3 of the same parcel of land designated as Psu-47035 for a certain
Dominador Mayuga. The said survey, however, stated that the lot
was situated at Sitio May Kokek, Barrio Almanza, Las Piñas, Rizal.
Then, on July 28, 1930, another survey was undertaken designated
as Psu-80886 for a certain Eduardo C. Guico (Guico). Again, the
survey indicated a different address that the lots were situated in
Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Rizal. Finally, on March 6,
1931, an additional survey plan was executed over the similar parcel
of land designated as Psu-80886/SWO-20609 for a certain Alberto
Yaptinchay (Yaptinchay). Psu-80886 and Psu-80886/
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 173120), pp. 1397-1437.

2 Id., at pp. 1178-1197.
3 Id., at pp. 1061-1121.
432

SWO-20609 covered Lot 2, with 158,494 square meters, and Lot

3, with 171,309 square meters, of the same land.
On May 9, 1950, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 was
issued in favor of Yaptinchay covering Lots 2 and 3 pursuant to Psu-
80886/SWO-20609. On May 11, 1950, OCT No. 244 was also issued
to Yaptinchay. On May 21, 1958, OCT No. 1609 covering Lot 3
pursuant to Psu-47035 was issued in favor of Dominador Mayuga.
On May 18, 1967, some of properties were sold to CPJ Corporation
resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No.

190713 in its name.
On February 16, 1968, petitioner Andres Diaz filed a petition for
original registration before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Pasay for Lot No. 1 of Psu-25909. On October 19, 1969, judgment
was rendered by the CFI of Pasay for the original registration of
Psu-25909 in favor of Andres Diaz. On May 19, 1970, OCT No.
8510 was issued in the name of Spouses Diaz. On May 21, 1970, the
Spouses Diaz subdivided their 460,626-square-meter property
covered by OCT No. 8510 into ten (10) lots, described as Lots No.
1-A to 1-J and conveyed to different third parties.
On May 17, 1971, CPJ Corporation, then owner of the land
covered by TCT No. 190713, which originated from OCT No. 242,
filed Land Registration Case No. N-24-M before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 166, against Spouses Diaz and
other named respondents (Diaz Case). It sought to review OCT No.
8510 in the names of Spouses Diaz on the ground that the interested
persons were not notified of the application.
On August 30, 1976 and December 4, 1976, Andres Diaz sold to
Librado Cabautan (Cabautan) the following parcels of land, which
originated from OCT No. 8510 under Psu-25909, to wit:
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VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 433

1. Lot 1-I, with an area of 190,000 square meters covered by the

new TCT No. 287416;
2. Lot 1-B, with an area of 135,000 square meters covered by the
new TCT No. 287411;
3. Lot 1-A with an area of 125,626 square meters covered by the
new TCT No. 287412; and
4. Lot 1-D, with an area of 10,000 square meters also covered by
the new TCT No. 287412.4
On March 12, 1993, petitioner Spouses Yu Hwa Ping and Mary
Gaw (Spouses Yu) acquired ownership over 67,813 square meters
representing the undivided half-portion of Lot 1-A originating from
OCT No. 8510 of Spouses Diaz. The said property was co-owned by
Spouses Diaz with Spouses Librado and Susana Cabautan resulting
from a civil case decided by the RTC of Makati on March 29, 1986.
On January 27, 1994, Spouses Yu acquired ownership over Lot
1-B originating from OCT No. 8510 of Spouses Diaz with an area of
135,000 square meters. Pursuant to the transfers of land to Spouses
Yu, TCT Nos. 39408 and 64549 were issued in their names.
On the other hand, on May 4, 1980, CPJ Corporation transferred

their interest in the subject properties to third persons. Later, in
1988, Ayala Corporation obtained the subject properties from
Goldenrod, Inc. and PESALA. In 1992, pursuant to the merger of
respondent Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) and Las Piñas Ventures, Inc., ALI
acquired all the subject properties, as follows:
1. Lot 3 which originated from OCT No. 1609 under Psu-47035
and covered by a new TCT No. 41325;
2. Lot 2 which originated from OCT No. 242 under Psu-
80886/SWO-20609 and covered by a new TCT No. 41263;
_______________
4 Id., at p. 1181.
434


80886/SWO-20609 and covered by a new TCT No. 41262;
and
80886/SWO-20609 and covered by a new TCT No. 41261.5
First RTC’s Ruling
Returning to the Diaz case, on December 13, 1995, the RTC of

Pasig City rendered a Decision6 against Spouses Diaz. It held that
OCT No. 8510 and all the transfer certificates issued thereunder
must be cancelled. The RTC of Pasig City opined that Spouses Diaz
committed fraud when they filed their application for original
registration of land without informing the interested parties therein
in violation of Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. It also held that
Spouses Diaz knew that CPJ Corporation had an appropriate interest
over the subject properties.
Aggrieved, Spouses Diaz elevated an appeal before the CA
docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 61593.
Meanwhile, sometime in August 1995, Spouses Yu visited their
lots. To their surprise, they discovered that ALI had already
clandestinely fenced the area and posted guards thereat and they
were prevented from entering and occupying the same.7 They also
discovered that the transfer of certificates of titles covering parcels
of land overlapping their claim were in the name of ALI under TCT
Nos. 41325, 41263, 41262, and 41261.
On December 4, 1996, Spouses Yu filed a complaint before the
RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 255, against ALI for declaration of
nullity of the TCTs issued in the name of the latter
_______________
5 Id., at p. 842.
6 Id., at pp. 130-144.
7 Id., at p. 157.
435
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 435

(Yu case). They also sought the recovery of possession of the

property covered by ALI’s title which overlapped their land alleging
that Spouses Diaz, their predecessors had open, uninterrupted and
adverse possession of the same from 1921 until it was transferred to
Cabautan in 1976. Spouses Yu averred that Cabautan possessed the
said land until it was sold to them in 1994.8 They likewise sought the
judicial confirmation of the validity of their titles.
Spouses Yu principally alleged that the titles of ALI originated
from OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609, which were covered by Psu-
80886 and Psu-47035. The said surveys were merely copied from
Psu-25909, which was prepared at an earlier date, and the Director
of Lands had no authority to approve one or more surveys by
different claimants over the same parcel of land.9 They asserted that
OCT No. 8510 and its transfer certificates, which covered the Psu-
25909, must be declared valid against the titles of ALI.
The RTC of Las Piñas ordered the conduct of a verification
survey to help in the just and proper disposition of the case. Engr.
Veronica Ardina-Remolar from the Bureau of Lands, the court-
appointed commissioner, supervised the verification survey, and the
parties sent their respective surveyors. After the verification survey
was completed and the parties presented all their pieces of evidence,
the case was submitted for resolution.
Second RTC’s Ruling
In its May 7, 2001 Decision,10 the RTC of Las Piñas ruled in

favor of Spouses Yu. It held that based on the verification survey
and the testimonies of the parties’ witnesses, OCT Nos. 242, 244,
and 1609 overlapped OCT No. 8510. The
_______________
8 Id., at p. 157.
9 Id., at p. 159.
10 Id., at pp. 679-715.
436

RTC of Las Piñas also pointed out, and extensively discussed, that
Psu-80886 and Psu-47035, which were the bases of OCT Nos. 242,
244, and 1609, were marred with numerous and blatant errors. It
opined that ALI did not offer any satisfactory explanation regarding
the glaring discrepancies of Psu-80886 and Psu-47035. On the other
hand, it observed that Psu-25909, the basis of OCT No. 8510, had no
irregularity in its preparation. Thus, the RTC of Las Piñas concluded
that the titles of ALI were void ab initio because their original titles
were secured through fraudulent surveys. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in that the

three transfer certificates issued in the name of Ayala Land, Inc. by the
Register of Deeds in the City of Las Piñas, namely, Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 41325, 41263 and 41262 all covering Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 6 of
survey plans PSU-47035, PSU-80886, Psu-80886/SWO-20609, the original
survey under PSU-47035 and decree of registration no. N-63394, and
Original Certificate of Title No. 1609 issue in favor of Dominador Mayuga,
including all other titles, survey and decrees pertaining thereto and from or
upon which the aforesaid titles emanate, are hereby declared spurious and
void ab initio. In the same vein, the Court upholds the validity of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. TCT Nos. T-64549 covering Lot 1-A in the name
of Mary Gaw, spouse of Yu Hwa Ping, and T-39408 covering Lot 1-B in the
name of Yu Hwa Ping (both originating from Original Certificate of Title
No. 8510) pursuant to plan PSU-25909 undertaken on March 17, 1921. The
defendant is also ordered to pay the plaintiffs temperate damages in the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) exemplary damages in the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.11
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11 Id., at pp. 714-715.
437
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 437

Unconvinced, ALI appealed to the CA, where the case was

docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 70622. Eventually, said appeal was
consolidated with the earlier appeal of Spouses Diaz in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 61593.
The CA’s Rulings
In its decision, dated June 19, 2003, the CA ruled in favor of ALI.
It held that in the Diaz case, the RTC of Pasig properly cancelled
OCT No. 8510 because Spouses Diaz committed fraud. It opined
that Spouses Diaz knew of CPJ Corporation’s interest over the
subject land but failed to inform it of their application.
With respect to the Yu case, the CA ruled that Spouses Yu could
no longer assert that the titles of ALI were invalid because the one-
year period to contest the title had prescribed. Hence, ALI’s titles
were incontestable. The CA underscored that the errors cited by the
RTC of Las Piñas in Psu-80886 and Psu-47035, upon which the
titles of ALI were based, were innocuous or already explained. It
also stressed that OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609, from which the
titles of ALI originated, were issued in 1950 and 1958; while the
OCT No. 8510, from which the titles of Spouses Yu originated, was
only issued in 1970. As the original titles of ALI predated that of
Spouses Yu, the CA concluded that the former titles were superior.
Undaunted, Spouses Yu and Spouses Diaz filed their motions for
reconsideration.
In its decision, dated February 8, 2005, the CA granted Spouses
Yu and Spouses Diaz’ motions for reconsideration. It opined that the
numerous errors in Psu-80886 and Psu-47035 were serious and these
affected the validity of the original titles upon which the surveys
were based. In contrast, the CA noted that Psu-25909, upon which
the original titles of Spouses Yu and Spouses Diaz were based, bore
all the hallmarks of verity.
438

The CA also emphasized that in Guico v. San Pedro,12 the Court

already recognized the defects surrounding Psu-80886. In that case,
the Court noted that the applicant-predecessor of Psu-80886 was not
able to submit the corresponding measurements of the land and he
failed to prove that he had occupied and cultivated the land
continuously since the filing of their application. The CA likewise
cited (1) the certification from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources-Land Management Bureau (DENR-LMB) that
Psu-80886 was included in the list of restricted plans because of the
doubtful signature of the surveyor, and (2) the memorandum, dated
August 3, 2000, from the Assistant Regional Director for Operations
of the DENR directing all personnel of the Land Survey Division
not to issue copies or technical descriptions of Psu-80886 and Psu-
47035.
The CA further wrote that the slavish adherence to the issue of
prescription and laches by ALI should not be countenanced. It
declared that the doctrine that registration done fraudulently is no
registration at all prevails over the rules on equity. With respect to
the Diaz case, the CA held that Spouses Diaz had no obligation to
inform CPJ Corporation and its successors about their registration
because the original titles of the latter, from which their transferred
titles were derived, were based on fraudulent surveys.
Undeterred, ALI filed a second motion for reconsideration.
In its assailed June 19, 2006 decision, the CA granted the second
motion for reconsideration in favor of ALI. It reversed and set aside
its February 8, 2005 decision and reinstated its February 28, 2003
decision. The CA held that Guico v. San Pedro did not categorically
declare that Psu-80886 was invalid and it even awarded some of the
lots to the applicant; and that the certification of DENR-LMB and
the memorandum of the Assistant Director of the DENR could not
be considered
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12 72 Phil. 415 (1941).
439
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 439

by the courts because these were not properly presented in evidence.
The CA reiterated its ruling that Spouses Yu could no longer

question the validity of the registrations of OCT Nos. 242, 244, and
1609 because the one-year reglementary period from the time of
registration had already expired and these titles were entitled to the
presumption of regularity. Thus, once a decree of registration was
made under the Torrens system, and the reglementary period had
lapsed, the title was perfected and could not be collaterally attacked.
The CA also stressed that the noted discrepancies in Psu-80886 and
Psu-47035 were immaterial to assail the validity of OCT Nos. 242,
244 and 1609, which were registered earlier than OCT No. 8510.
Hence, these petitions, anchored on the following:
Issues
I
WHETHER THE COMPLAINT OF SPOUSES YU IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION.
II
WHETHER THE VALIDITY OF THE SURVEYS OF OCT NOS. 242,
244 AND 1609 AS AGAINST OCT NO. 8510 CAN BE ASSAILED IN
THE PRESENT CASE.
III
WHETHER THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN PEDRO IS APPLICABLE
IN THE PRESENT CASE.
IV
WHETHER THE ALLEGED ERRORS IN PSU-80886 AND PSU-
47035 ARE OF SUCH DEGREE SO AS TO INVALIDATE OCT NOS.
242, 244 AND 1609 AND ITS TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF
TITLES.
440

In their Memorandum,13 the petitioners chiefly argue that the

complaint filed by Spouses Yu is not barred by the one-year
prescriptive period under Act No. 496 because an action to annul the
fraudulent registration of land is imprescriptible; that there are
several and conspicuous irregularities in Psu-80886 and Psu-47035
which cast doubt on the validity of OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609;
that Guico v. San Pedro did not categorically award Lot Nos. 2 and 3
covered by Psu-80886 to the applicant therein because he was still
required to submit an amended plan duly approved by the Director
of Lands; that the applicant in Guico v. San Pedro never submitted
any amended plan, hence, no lot was awarded under Psu-80886 and
its irregularity was affirmed by the Supreme Court; that the

registration of OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609 on a date earlier than
OCT No. 8510 did not render them as the superior titles; that in case
of two conflicting titles, the court must look into the source of the
titles; that the sources of the titles, Psu-80886 and Psu-47035, had
numerous errors that could not be satisfactorily explained by ALI;
and that Psu-25909 had the hallmark of regularity and it was
approved by the Director of Lands at an earlier date.
In its Memorandum,14 ALI essentially countered that in the June
19, 2006 decision, the CA properly disregarded the certification of
DENR-LMB and the memorandum of the Assistant Director of the
DENR because these were not presented in evidence; that Guico v.
San Pedro recognized the registrability of Lots No. 2 and 3 under
Psu-80886; that the RTC of Las Piñas did not have jurisdiction to
look beyond the details of the decrees of registration; that the
registration of a land under the Torrens system carries with it a
presumption of regularity; that in case of conflict between two
certificates of title, the senior and superior title must be given full
effect and validity; and that the alleged errors in the Psu-80886 and
Psu-47035 were sufficiently explained.
_______________
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 173141), pp. 414-554.

14 Id., at pp. 355-408.
441
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 441

The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds the petitions meritorious.

The present case essentially involves the issue: between the
registered titles of the petitioners and ALI, which is more superior?
Before the said issue can be discussed thoroughly, the Court must
first settle whether the actions instituted by the petitioners were filed
within the reglementary periods.
The actions were filed

within their respective
prescriptive periods
The Diaz case was a petition for review before the RTC of Pasig.
It assailed OCT No. 8510 in the names of Spouses Diaz on the
ground that the said title was issued through fraud because the
interested persons were not informed of their application for
registration. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, “any person deprived
of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by fraud [may] file in the competent Court of First Instance
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree
provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.”15
Here, OCT No. 8510 was issued in the name of Spouses Diaz on
May 21, 1970. On the other hand, the petition for review of CPJ
Corporation was filed on May 17, 1971. Thus, the said petition was
timely filed and the RTC of Pasig could tackle the issues raised
therein. When the RTC of Pasig ruled in favor of CPJ Corporation,
Spouses Diaz appealed to the CA. In the same manner, when they
received an unfavorable judgment from the CA, Spouses Diaz filed
a petition for review on certiorari before the Court. Accordingly, the
appeal of Spouses Diaz is proper and it can be adjudicated on the
merits.
_______________
15 See Rublico v. Orellana, 141 Phil. 181; 30 SCRA 511 (1969).
442

On the other hand, the Yu case began when they filed a complaint
before the RTC of Las Piñas against ALI for declaration of nullity of
the TCTs issued in the name of the latter because of the spurious,
manipulated and void surveys of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609.
They also sought the recovery of possession of the property covered
by ALI’s title that overlapped their land alleging that their
predecessors, Spouses Diaz, had open, uninterrupted and adverse
possession of the same from 1921 until it was transferred to
Cabautan in 1976. Spouses Yu also alleged that Cabautan possessed
the said land until it was sold to them in 1994.16 It was only in
August 1995 that they discovered that ALI clandestinely fenced
their property and prevented them from occupying the same. They
also sought the judicial confirmation of the validity of their titles.
ALI argues that the complaint of Yu is barred by prescription
because it was filed beyond the one-year period under Section 38 of
Act No. 496. On the other hand, Spouses Yu assert that their action
was imprescriptible because they sought to set aside the titles that
were obtained through void surveys and they assert that the principle
of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud
attended the issuance of the title.
The Court finds that the complaint of Spouses Yu is not barred by
prescription. While Section 38 of Act No. 496 states that the petition
for review to question a decree of registration must be filed within
one (1) year after entry of the decree, such provision is not the only
remedy of an aggrieved party who was deprived of land by
fraudulent means. The remedy of the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is, after
one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, as
was done in this case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible
and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property
_______________
16 Rollo (G.R. No. 173120), p. 157.
443
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 443

has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for
damages.17
Uy v. Court of Appeals18 remarkably explained the prescriptive
periods of an action for reconveyance depending on the ground
relied upon, to wit:
The law creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and
its title in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of PD
No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the
Civil Code, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title. This ten-year prescriptive period begins to
run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which
repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. An
exception to this rule is when the party seeking reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust is in actual, continuous and peaceful possession
of the property involved. Prescription does not commence to run against
him because the action would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title,
an action that is imprescriptible.
The foregoing cases on the prescriptibility of actions for reconveyance

apply when the action is based on fraud, or when the contract used as basis
for the action is voidable. Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, a contract
is voidable when the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. When the consent
is totally absent and not merely vitiated, the contract is void. An action for
reconveyance may also be based on a void contract. When the action for
reconveyance is based on a void contract, as when there was no consent on
the part of the alleged vendor, the action is imprescriptible. The
_______________
17 Philippine National Bank v. Jumamoy, 670 Phil. 472, 482; 655 SCRA 54, 64
(2011).
18 G.R. No. 173186, September 16, 2015, 770 SCRA 513.
444

property may be reconveyed to the true owner, notwithstanding the TCTs

already issued in another’s name. The issuance of a certificate of title in the
latter’s favor could not vest upon him or her ownership of the property;
neither could it validate the purchase thereof which is null and void.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our
land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he
actually has. Being null and void, the sale produces no legal effects
whatsoever.
Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is therefore
determined by the nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded on a
claim of the existence of an implied or constructive trust, or one based on
the existence of a void or inexistent contract. x x x x19
As discussed above, when the action for reconveyance is based

on an implied or constructive trust, the prescriptive period is ten (10)
years, or it is imprescriptible if the movant is in the actual,
continuous and peaceful possession of the property involved. On the
other hand, when the action for reconveyance is based on a void
deed or contract the action is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of
the New Civil Code.20 As long as the land wrongfully registered
under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who
caused such registration, an action in personam will lie to compel
him to reconvey the property to the real owner.21
22
In Hortizuela v. Tagufa, the complainant therein filed an action
for reconveyance and recovery of possession with damages for a
parcel of land which was wrongfully granted a pat-
_______________
19 Id.
20 N C C , Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
21 Daclag v. Macahilig, 599 Phil. 28, 31; 579 SCRA 556, 559-560 (2009).
22 Hortizuela v. Tagufa, G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015, 751 SCRA 371.
445
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 445

ent or decree issued in a registration proceedings in the name of a

third person. The CA and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court initially
dismissed the complaint because it allegedly questioned the validity
of the Torrens title in a collateral proceeding and it had prescribed.
When the case reached the Court, it ruled that the instituted
complaint had not prescribed because “in a complaint for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible and is not being questioned. What is being sought is
the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another’s name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right.
If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose
name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real
owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the
property.”23 It was eventually ruled therein that the action for
reconveyance was proper and the possession was recovered.
In this case, Spouses Yu sought to reconvey to them once and for
all the titles over the subject properties. To prove that they had a
superior right, they questioned the validity of the surveys which
were the bases of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609, the origin of ALI’s
TCTs. Moreover, they also sought to recover the possession that was
clandestinely taken away from them. Thus, as the subject matter of
this case is the ownership and possession of the subject properties,
Spouses Yu’s complaint is an action for reconveyance, which is not
prohibited by Section 38 of Act No. 496.
Moreover, a reading of Spouses Yu’s complaint reveals that they
are seeking to declare void ab initio the titles of ALI and their
predecessors-in-interest as these were based on spurious,
manipulated and void surveys.24 If successful, the original titles of
ALI’s predecessors-in-interest shall be declared void and, hence,

they had no valid object to convey. It would result to a void contract
or deed because the subject properties did
_______________
23 Id., at p. 382.
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 173120), p. 160.
446

not belong to the said predecessors-in-interest. Accordingly, the Yu

case involves an action for reconveyance based on a void deed or
contract which is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the New
Civil Code.
Further, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA in its
February 8, 2005 Amended Decision, to wit:
9. In light of the circumstances, we feel that a slavish adherence to the

doctrine being invoked by ALI with respect to alleged prescription and
laches, should not be countenanced. The said axioms do not possess
talismanic powers, the mere invocation of which will successfully defeat
any and all attempts by those who claim to be the real owners of property, to
set aright what had been done through fraud and imposition. Consistent with
the doctrine that registration done fraudulently is no registration at all, then
this court must not allow itself to be swayed by appeals to a strict
interpretation of what are, after all, principles based on equity. To rule
otherwise would be to reward deception and duplicity and place a premium
on procedural niceties at the expense of substantial justice.25
Neither can ALI be considered an innocent purchaser for value of

the subject properties. As discussed by the RTC of Las Piñas, when
ALI purchased the subject lots from their predecessors-in-interest in
1988, the titles bore notices of the pending cases and adverse claims
sufficient to place it on guard. In the TCTs of ALI, the notices of lis
pendens indicated therein were sufficient notice that the ownership
of the properties were being disputed. The trial court added that even
the certified true copy of Psu-80886 had markings that it had been
used in some other cases as early as March 7, 1959.26 Accordingly,
ALI is covered by the present action for reconveyance. As both the
Diaz and Yu cases were properly filed
_______________
25 Id., at p. 1195.
26 Id., at pp. 973-974.
447
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 447

and are not barred by prescription, these can be adjudicated by the

Court on the merits.
The Rule — that between

two (2) conflicting titles,
the title registered earlier
prevails — is Not Absolute
The June 19, 2006 and February 28, 2003 decisions of the CA
essentially ruled that ALI’s titles were superior to those of the
petitioners because OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609 were registered
earlier than OCT No. 8510. The CA emphasized that the general
rule was that in case of two certificates of title purporting to include
the same land, the earlier date prevails. This general rule was first
discussed in Legarda v. Saleeby,27 as follows:
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two
different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In
some jurisdictions, where the “torrens” system has been adopted, the
difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has
been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the
“Australian Torrens System,” at page 823, says: “The general rule is that in
the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate
be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate, x x x In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect
of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the person
_______________
27 31 Phil. 590 (1915).
448

who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof
x x x x.28
The said general rule has been repeated by the Court in its
subsequent decisions in Garcia v. Court of Appeals,29 MWSS v.
Court of Appeals,30 Spouses Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc.,31 and
recently in Jose Yulo Agricultural Corp. v. Spouses Davis.32
Nevertheless, the rule on superiority is not absolute. The same case
of Legarda v. Saleeby explains the exception to the rule, viz.:
Hogg adds however that, “if it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary
rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the
land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be
rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive.”33 [Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, if the inclusion of the land in the earlier registered

title was a result of a mistake, then the latter registered title will
prevail. The ratio decidendi of this exception is to prevent a title that
was earlier registered, which erroneously contained a parcel of land
that should not have been included, from defeating a title that was
later registered but is legitimately entitled to the said land. It
reinforced the doctrine that “[r]egistering a piece of land under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evi-
_______________
28 Id., at pp. 595-596.

29 184 Phil. 358; 95 SCRA 380 (1980).
30 290 Phil. 284; 215 SCRA 783 (1992).
31 625 Phil. 277; 611 SCRA 436 (2010).
32 G.R. No. 197709, August 3, 2015, 764 SCRA 589.
33 Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, supra note 27 at p. 595.
449
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 449

dence of ownership or title over the particular property described

therein.”34
In his book, Land Registration and Related Proceedings,35 Atty.
Amado D. Aquino further explained that the principle of according
superiority to a certificate of title earlier in date cannot, however,
apply if it was procured through fraud or was otherwise
jurisdictionally flawed. Thus, if there is a compelling and genuine
reason to set aside the rule on the superiority of earlier registered
title, the Court may look into the validity of the title bearing the
latter date of registration, taking into consideration the evidence
presented by the parties.
In Golloy v. Court of Appeals,36 there were two conflicting titles
with overlapping boundaries. The first title was registered on March
1, 1918, while the second title was registered on August 15, 1919.
Despite having been registered at a prior date, the Court did not
allow the earlier registered title of the respondents to prevail because
of the continuing possession of the petitioners therein and the laches
committed by the respondents. Hence, the holder of an earlier
registered title does not, in all instances, absolutely triumph over a
holder of a latter registered title.
In this case, the petitioners assail the numerous and serious
defects in the surveys of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609, which cast
doubt on the inclusion of the subject lands in ALI’s titles.
Accordingly, the Court must delve into the merits of their
contentions to determine whether the subject properties are truly and
genuinely included in ALI’s title. Merely relying on the date of
registration of the original titles is insufficient because it is the
surveys therein that are being assailed. It is only through a judicious
scrutiny of the evidence presented may the Court determine whether
to apply the general rule or
_______________
34 Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, 451 Phil. 368, 377; 403
SCRA 291, 297-298 (2003).
35 2007 ed., pp. 140-141.
36 255 Phil. 26; 173 SCRA 26 (1989).
450

the exception in the superiority of titles with an earlier registration

date.
The survey of the registered

land may be scrutinized by
the courts when compelling
reasons exist
In its June 19, 2006 decision, the CA emphasized that OCT Nos.
242, 244, and 1609 carry with it the presumption of regularity and
that the surveys therein were presumably undertaken by qualified
surveyors before the issuance of the titles. In effect, the appellate
court declares that the surveys of these titles should no longer be
inspected.
The Court does not agree.
Although a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein,37 it is not a conclusive proof of
ownership. It is a well-settled rule that ownership is different from a
certificate of title. The fact that a person was able to secure a title in
his name does not operate to vest ownership upon him of the subject
land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does
not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership
or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a
shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a
particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be co-owned with per-
_______________
37 Heirs of Jose Maligaso, Sr. v. Encinas, 688 Phil. 516, 523; 674 SCRA 215, 221
(2012).
451
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 451

sons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for
another person by the registered owner.38
Hence, the Court may inquire into the validity of the ownership
of a property by scrutinizing the movant’s evidence of title and the
basis of such title. When there is compelling proof that there is
doubt on the validity of the sources or basis of such title, then an
examination is proper. Thus, the surveys of the certificates of title
are not immune from judicial scrutiny, in light of the genuine and
legitimate reasons for its analysis.
In Dizon v. Rodriguez39 and Republic v. Ayala y Cia,40 the Court
confronted the validity of the surveys conducted on the lands to
determine whether the title was properly subdivided. It was ruled
therein that subdivision plan Psd-27941 was erroneous because it
was “prepared not in accordance with the technical descriptions in
TCT No. T-722 but in disregard of it, support the conclusion reached
by both the lower court and the Court of Appeals that Lots 49 and 1
are actually part of the territorial waters and belong to the State.”41
Accordingly, the sole method for the Court to determine the validity
of the title was to dissect the survey upon which it was sourced. As a
result, it was discovered that the registered titles therein contained
areas which belong to the sea and foreshore lands.
Here, only a direct review of the surveys of OCT Nos. 242, 244,
and 1609, as well as OCT No. 8510 can resolve the issue on the
validity of these titles. The findings of the RTC of Las Piñas and the
CA differ with respect to the cited errors in the surveys. The Court is
convinced that through a rigorous study of the affected surveys, the
valid owners of the subject properties are can be finally adjudicated.
_______________
38 Wee v. Mardo, G.R. No. 202414, June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 242, 256-257.
39 Dizon v. Rodriguez, 121 Phil. 681; 13 SCRA 704 (1965).
40 121 Phil. 1052; 14 SCRA 259 (1965).
41 Dizon v. Rodriguez, supra at p. 686; p. 709.
452

Finally, after resolving the various preliminary issues, the Court

can now tackle the crux of these petitions — the validity of Psu-
25909, Psu-47035, Psu-80886, and Psu-80886/SWO-20609. The
resolution of this issue will decisively determine the true and rightful
owner of the subject properties.
Psu-47035, Psu-80886 and

Psu-80886/SWO-20609 con-
tain numerous and serious
irregularities which cast
doubt on the validity of
OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609
At the onset, the present case poses an issue on the validity of

registered and overlapping titles based on their surveys. The Court
must commend the RTC of Las Piñas for taking the correct
procedure in resolving such issue.
In Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp. v. Eridanus
Development, Inc.,42 it was ruled that a case of overlapping of
boundaries or encroachment depends on a reliable, if not accurate,
verification survey; barring one, no overlapping or encroachment
may be proved successfully, for obvious reasons. The first step in the
resolution of such cases is for the court to direct the proper
government agency concerned to conduct a verification or relocation
survey and submit a report to the court, or constitute a panel of
commissioners for the purpose. In that case, the Court lamented that
the trial court therein did not order the conduct of a verification
survey and the appointment of geodetic engineers as commissioners,
to wit:
This is precisely the reason why the trial court should have officially
appointed a commissioner or panel of commissioners and not leave the
initiative to secure one to the parties: so that a thorough investigation, study
and analysis of the parties’ titles could be made in order
_______________
42 579 Phil. 375; 557 SCRA 96 (2008).
453
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 453

to provide, in a comprehensive report, the necessary information that will

guide it in resolving the case completely, and not merely leave the
determination of the case to a consideration of the parties’ more often than
not self-serving evidence.43
Similarly, in Chua v. B.E. San Diego, Inc.,44 the Court ruled that
in overlapping boundary disputes, the verification survey must be
actually conducted on the very land itself. In that case, the

verification survey conducted it was merely based on the technical
description of the defective titles. The opinion of the surveyor
lacked authoritativeness because his verification survey was not
made on the land itself.
In this case, the RTC of Las Piñas issued an Order,45 dated
December 5, 1997, which directed the parties to conduct a
verification survey pursuant to the prescribed rules. Engr. Veronica
Ardina-Remolar (Remolar) from the Bureau of Lands of the DENR
was the court-appointed commissioner who supervised and
coordinated the verification survey. Engrs. Rolando Nathaniel Pada
(Pada) and Alexander Ocampo (Ocampo) were the geodetic
engineers for Spouses Yu; while Engr. Lucal Francisco (Francisco)
was the geodetic engineer for ALI. They conducted actual
verification survey on April 5, 6, 7 and 16, 1998 and June 8, 1998.
Afterwards, Engr. Remolar submitted her Report,46 dated November
4, 1998, to the trial court which stated that there were overlapping
areas in the contested surveys. Likewise, Engrs. Pada and Francisco
submitted their Verification Reports and Survey Plans,47 which were
approved by the DENR. Then, the parties presented their respective
witnesses.
_______________
43 Id., at p. 401; p. 123.

44 708 Phil. 386; 695 SCRA 408 (2013).
45 Rollo (G.R. No. 173120), pp. 287-293.
46 Id., at pp. 294-295.
47 Id., at pp. 296-308.
454

The RTC of Las Piñas had a technical and accurate understanding

and appreciation of the overlapping surveys of Psu-25909, Psu-
47035, Psu-80886, and Psu-80886/SWO-20609. In its decision,
dated May 7, 2001, it ruled in favor of Spouses Yu and it discussed
extensively its observations and findings regarding the overlapping
areas, to wit:
From the evidence on record, it appears that the following plans were
made on the dates and by the surveyor specified herein:
Survey No. PSU-25909 March 17, 1921 A.N. Feliciano
Survey No. PSU-47035 October 21, 1925 A.N. Feliciano

Survey No. PSU-80886 July 28, 1930 A.N. Feliciano
Survey No. SWO-20609 March 6, 1931 A.N. Feliciano
Plan PSU-25909 (Exhibit “F”) invoked by the plaintiffs and authenticity
of which is certified by appropriate government custodians including
Engineer Remolar, the court-designated commissioner, appears to have been
prepared on March 17, 1921 for one Andres Diaz and recites the following
entries:
“THE ORIGINAL FIELD NOTES, COMPUTATIONS AND
PLAN OF THIS SURVERY EXECUTED BY A.N. FELICIANO
HAVE BEEN CHECKED AND VERIFIED IN THIS OFFICE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 1858 TO 1865, ACT 2711
AND ARE HEREBY APPROVED MAY 26, 1921.”
-and-
“This is to certify that this is a true and correct plan of Psu-25909
as traced from the mounted paper of plan Psu-25909 which is on file
at T.R.S. Lands Management Sector, N.C.R.
455
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 455

“This true copy of the plan is requested by the Chief, Technical

Records Section as contained in a letter dated February 15, 1989.
TEODORICO C. CALISTERIO
Chief, Topographic 7 Special Maps Section
Traced by: F. SUMAGUE
Checked by: A.O. VENZON (Sgd.) 4/28/89
Thus, the Court holds that plan PSU-25909 (Exhibit “F”) is a true
copy of an official document on file with the Bureau of Lands and is,
therefore, entitled to great weight and appreciation, there being no
irregularity demonstrated in the preparation thereof.
On the other hand, an examination of Plan PSU-47035 (Exhibit “G”)
invites suspicion thereto. As observed by Engineer Pada in his verification
survey report, the photocopy of plan PSU-47035 submitted by the defendant
shows that the plan appears to have done for one Estanislao Mayuga, while
in the certified true copy of the pertinent decree (Exhibit “HH”/Exhibit 20),
it appears that the same was done for a certain Dominador Mayuga. Viewing
this discrepancy in the light of the fact that the plan for PSU-47035 was
undertaken on October 21, 1925 or more than four years after the survey for
plan PSU-25909 was done, the same discrepancy leads the Court to
conclude that PSU-47035 is spurious and void.
The third plan enumerated above, plan PSU-80886 (Exhibit “II”/Exhibit
29), prepared on July 28, 1930 or more than five years since plan PSU-
25909 was done for Andres Diaz, also invites suspicion. An examination of
the same reveals that the lower right hand corner of the plan, which bears
the serial number PSU-80886, is manifestly different from the main
document in terms of the intensity of its contrast, and that the change in the
intensity of the shading is abrupt as one examines the document starting
from the lower right hand corner to anywhere else in the same document.
Also, it is worth observing that the main document, minus the lower right
hand corner mentioned, does not indicate anything to even
456

suggest that it pertains to plan PSU-80886. For these reasons, the contention
of the plaintiffs that this lower right hand corner of the plan appears to be a
spurious attachment to the main document to make the main document it
look like it is actually plan PSU-80886, has merit.
Another discrepancy invites further suspicion under the circumstances.
The main document bears what appears to be the actual signature of the
surveyor, Mr. A.N. Feliciano while the lower right hand corner of the plan
mentions only the name “Serafin P. Hidalgo — Director of Lands” with the
prefix “Sgd.” But without any actual signature. An interesting query arises:
Why would the document bear an actual signature of the surveyor without
bearing the signature of the Director of Lands which in essence is the more
important signature for authentication purposes?
Still another discrepancy is with respect to a monument appearing in
PSU-80886 (Exhibit “II”). At the upper off-right portion thereof are entries
referring to a monument more specifically described as B.L.L.M. No. 4.
According to Engineer Pada, citing a certified document taken from the
Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, this monument was established only on November 27, 1937
(TSN, March 24, 2000, pp. 18-20) which is more than seven years after
PSU-80886 was undertaken. How a monument which was established only
in November 1937 can actually exist in a plan made on July 28, 1930 is
absolutely incredible.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds good reason to consider PSU-
80886 (Exhibit “II” and 29), relied upon by the defendant, spurious and void
as well.
The fourth and last plan mentioned is SWO-20609, done on March 6,
1931.
It is admitted by the geodetic engineer of the defendant that a specific
work order (SWO) coexists with a survey plan, and that in particular, SWO-
20609 was undertaken in view of alleged errors in plan PSU-80886 (TSN,
February 16, 2001, pp. 31-32). Therefore, SWO-
457
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 457

20609 must be evaluated in relation to plan PSU-80886. From this

perspective, the Court also notes that SWO-20609 is attended with
discrepancies thus rendering it devoid of any credence.
For the record, in PSU-80886 (Exhibit “II”/Exhibits 29 and 30), the land
concerned appears to have been surveyed for one Eduardo C. Guico while in
PSU-80886/SWO-20609 (Exhibit “H”/Exhibit 35), the same land appears to
have been surveyed for one Alberto Yaptinchay. In addition, it is evident in
PSU-80886 (Exhibits 29 and 30) that vital entries regarding the total area of
the property covered by the document bear many erasures, particularly two
erasures as to the total area in terms of number and one erasure as to that
total area in terms of unit of measurement.
The Court likewise notes with suspicion the fact that all four survey
plans were purportedly undertaken by one and the same surveyor, a Mr. A.N.
Feliciano. It seems extremely unusual why the same A.N. Feliciano, who
surveyed the same property for Andres Diaz in 1921, would do so again in
1925 with different results, and again in 1930 once more with different
results, and still one more time in 1931 with still different results. The only
reasonable and logical conclusion under these telling circumstances is that
the second, third and last surveys corresponding to PSU-47035, PSU-80886
and PSU-80886/SWO-20609 are all spurious and void, too.
The Court went through the record of the case and no satisfactory
explanation has been offered by the defendant regarding these discrepancies.
Even the documentary evidence presented by the defendant offers no
plausible reason for the Court to reject the contentions of the plaintiffs. This
all the more strengthens the view of the Court to effect that PSU-47035,
PSU-80886 and PSU-80886/SWO-20609 are spurious and void ab initio.
This view is also strengthened by the credentials of Engineer Pada whom
the Court considers as a very credible witness.
458

All in all, the Court is convinced that the title of the plaintiffs to the
properties in dispute is superior over those invoked by the defendant.48
[Emphases supplied]
The findings of the RTC of Las Piñas were affirmed by the CA in

its February 8, 2005 decision. It agreed that there are indeed glaring
errors in the surveys relied upon by ALI. These errors could not be
merely disregarded as they affect the authenticity and validity of
OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609.
Conclusion
After a judicious study of the case, the Court agrees with the
findings of the RTC of Las Piñas and the CA in its February 8, 2005
decision.
First, Psu-25909 was conducted by a certain A.N. Feliciano in
favor of Andres Diaz and was approved on May 26, 1921.
Curiously, the subsequent surveys of Psu-47035 for a certain
Dominador Mayuga, Psu-80886 for a certain Guico and Psu-
80886/SWO-20609 for a certain Yaptinchay were also conducted by
A.N. Feliciano. It is dubious how the same surveyor or agrimensor
conducted Psu-47035, Psu-80886 and Psu-80886/SWO-20609 even
though an earlier survey on Psu-25909, which the surveyor should
obviously be aware, was already conducted on the same parcel of
land. Engr. Pada, witness of Spouses Yu, also observed this
irregularity and stated that this practice is not the standard norm in
conducting surveys.
Second, even though a single entity conducted the surveys, the
lands therein were described to be located in different places. Psu-
25909, the earliest dated survey, indicated its location at Sitio of Kay
Monica, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal, while Psu-47035
and Psu-80886 stated their locations at Sitio May Kokek, Barrio
Almanza, Las Piñas,
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 710-713.
459
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 459

Rizal, and Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Rizal, respectively.

Again, Engr. Pada observed this peculiarity and pointed out that the
subject properties should have had the same address. ALI did not
provide an explanation to the discrepancies in the stated addresses.

Thus, it led the CA to believe that the same surveyor indicated
different locations to prevent the discovery of the questionable
surveys over the same parcel of land.
Third, there is a discrepancy as to who requested the survey of
Psu-47035. The photocopy of Psu-47035 as submitted by ALI
shows that it was done for a certain Estanislao Mayuga. On the other
hand, the certified true copy of Psu-47035 depicts that it was made
for Dominador Mayuga. Once more, Engr. Pada noticed this
discrepancy on the said survey. ALI, however, did not give any
justification on the diverging detail, which raises question as to the
authenticity and genuineness of Psu-47035.
Fourth, Psu-80886 does not contain the signature of then
Director of Lands, Serafin P. Hidalgo; rather, the prefix “Sgd.” was
simply indicated therein. As properly observed by the CA in its
February 8, 2005 decision, any person can place the said prefix and
it does not show that the Director of Lands actually signed and gave
his imprimatur to Psu-80886. The absence of the approval of the
Director of Lands on Psu-80886 added doubt to its legitimacy. The
excuse proffered by ALI — that Psu-80886 is regular and valid
simply because land registration proceedings were undertaken — is
insufficient to cure the crucial defect in the survey.
In University of the Philippines v. Rosario,49 it was held that
“[n]o plan or survey may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands. The
submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character. Unless a plan and its technical description are duly
approved by the Director of Lands, the same are of no
_______________
49 407 Phil. 924; 355 SCRA 591 (2001).
460

value.” Hence, the lack of approval by the Director of Lands of Psu-

80886 casts doubt on its legality. It also affects the jurisdictional
facts before the land registration courts which relied on Psu-80886
for registration.
Fifth, Psu-80886 was issued on July 28, 1930 but it referred to a
specific monument described as B.L.L.M No. 4. According to the
LMB-DENR, the said monument was only established on November
27, 1937, more than seven years after Psu-80886 was issued.50 This
discrepancy was duly noted in the findings of the verification report
and it was affirmed by the testimony of Engr. Pada. Thus, both the
RTC of Las Piñas and the CA in its February 8, 2005 decision
properly observed that it was highly irregular for Psu-80886 to refer
to B.L.L.M No. 4 because the said monument existed seven years
later.
Sixth, ALI attempted to explain this anomaly by stating that Psu-
80886 was amended by Psu-80886/SWO-20609, a Special Work
Order, in view of the discrepancies of the former. While Psu-
80886/SWO-20609 is dated March 6, 1931, ALI insists that it was
actually conducted in 1937 and approved in 1940. However, in its
February 8, 2005 decision, the CA noted that said testimony
crumbled under cross-examination as ALI’s witness, Engr. Felino
Cortez (Cortez), could not reaffirm the said justification for Psu-
80886’s manifest error of including a latter dated monument. Also,
the Court observed that ALI’s other witness, Engr. Percival Bacani,
testified that he does not know why B.L.L.M No. 4 was used in
preparing Psu-80886 even though the said monument appears on all
the titles.51 Moreover, the alleged explanation provided by ALI to
justify the existence of B.L.L.M No. 4 in Psu-80886 was not
indicated at all in the verification report and survey plan they
submitted before the RTC of Las Piñas. Accordingly, ALI did not
resolve the uncertainty surrounding
_______________
50 TSN, March 24, 2000, pp. 18-20.

51 TSN, November 24, 2000, pp. 4-9.
461
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 461

the reference to B.L.L.M No. 4 by Psu-80886 and it seriously

damages the validity of the said survey.
Seventh, ALI explained that Psu-80886/SWO-20609 was
undertaken to correct a discrepancy in Psu-80886. Its witness, Engr.
Cortez, confirmed that Psu-80886/SWO-20609 was commenced to
resolve the mistake in the timeline. He added that the timeline
published in the notice of initial hearing in the Official Gazette for
Psu-80886 was different from the approved plan in Psu-
80886/SWO-20609. He also noted some difference in the area of
Psu-80886 compared to Psu-80886/SWO-20609.52 These admissions
show that Psu-80886 was flawed from the very beginning.

Yaptinchay merely requested the conduct of Psu-80886/SWO-20609
in order to resurrect or salvage the erroneous Psu-80886 and to
wrongfully acquire OCT No. 242. It does not, however, erase the fact
that Psu-80886, from which ALI’s titles originated, is marred with
irregularities. This is a badge of fraud that further runs counter to the
legitimacy of the surveys that ALI relied upon.
Eighth, the RTC of Las Piñas continuously observed the
irregularities in Psu-80886. It stated that “the total area of the
property covered by the document bear many erasures, particularly
two erasures as to the total area in terms of number and one erasure
as to that total area in terms of unit of measurement.”53 Manifestly,
no explanation was provided why it was necessary to make erasures
of the crucial data in the survey regarding the total area.
Ninth, the RTC of Las Piñas continued its observations regarding
Psu-80886’s anomalies. It added that “[a]n examination of the same
reveals that the lower right hand corner of the plan, which bears the
serial number PSU-80886, is manifestly different from the main
document in terms of the intensity of its contrast, and that the
change in the intensity of the shading is abrupt as one examines the
document starting
_______________
52 TSN, February 16, 2001, pp. 40-41.

53 Rollo (G.R. No. 173120), p. 712.
462

from the lower right hand corner to anywhere else in the same
document. Also, it is worth observing that the main document,
minus the lower right hand corner mentioned, does not indicate
anything to even suggest that it pertains to plan PSU-80886. For
these reasons, the contention of the plaintiffs that this lower right
hand corner of the plan appears to be a spurious attachment to the
main document to make the main document it look like it is actually
plan PSU-80886, has merit.”54 These observations were based on the
firsthand examination of the surveys, verification reports, and
witnesses by the RTC of Las Piñas.
Tenth, as correctly emphasized by the CA in its February 8, 2005
decision, the Supreme Court had previously noted the defects
surrounding Psu-80886 in the case of Guico v. San Pedro. The said
case involved the application of registration of Guico of a tract of

land covered by Psu-80886, subdivided into eleven (11) lots, filed on
November 4, 1930 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (CFI).
The said land originated from Pedro Lopez de Leon, covered by
Psu-16400. It was transferred to his son, Mariano Lopez de Leon,
and then one-third portion thereof was conveyed to Guico. Several
oppositors appeared therein to assail Guico’s application. On August
19, 1935, the CFI ruled that only Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 10 may
be registered in the name of Guico.
On appeal, the CA disposed the case in this wise:
Adjudicamos a Eduardo C. Guico los lotes 2 y 3 de su plano y las

porciones que quedan de las adjudicadas a el por el Juzgado inferior y que
no estan comprendidos en los terrenos reclamados por Valeriano Miranda,
Nicasio san Pedro, Jose Dollenton, Gregorio Arciaga, Donato Navarro,
Leon Navarro, Dionisio Dollenton, Basilio Navarro, Bernardo Mellama y
Lorenzo Dollenton, debiendo al efecto presentar un plano enmendado
debidamente aprobado por el Director de Terrenos, confirmado
_______________
54 Id., at p. 711.
463
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 463

asi la decision apelada en lo que estuvira conforme, y revocandola en lo

que no estuviera.55
When translated, the text reads:
We adjudicate to Eduardo C. Guico Lots 2 and 3 of his plant and the

portions that remain adjudicated to him by the lower court and that are not
included in the lands claimed by Valeriano Miranda, Nicasio San Pedro,
Jose Dollenton, Gregorio Arciaga, Donato Navarro, Leon Navarro, Dionisio
Dollenton, Basilio Navarro, Bernardo Mellama, and Lorenzo Dollenton,
under the obligation to present an amended properly approved plan to
the Director of Lands, confirming therefore the appealed decision what
is consistent with this and revoking it on what is not.56 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
Undeterred, Guico filed an appeal before the Supreme Court

alleging that the CA erred in declaring that there was no imperfect
title in favor of Pedro Lopez de Leon, his predecessor-in-interest.
In its decision, dated June 20, 1941, the Court dismissed the
appeal of Guico and affirmed the CA ruling. It was held that “la
solicitud de Pedro Lopez de Leon composicion con el Estado no fue
aprobada porque no pudo hacerse la medicion correspondiente.” Its
translation stated that the application of Pedro Lopez de Leon
regarding the composition of the estate was not approved because he
was not able to submit the corresponding measurements, referring to
Psu-16400, from which Psu-80886 was derived.
In addition, the Supreme Court noted that “while abundant proof
is offered concerning the filing of the application for composition
title by the original possessor, the records nowhere exhibits
compliance with the operative requirement of
_______________
55 Guico v. San Pedro, supra note 12 at p. 417.

56 Rollo (G.R. No. 173120), p. 1418.
464

said Section 45(a) of Act. No. 2874, that such applicants or grantees
and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously
since the filing of their applications.”57
Consequently, the Court observed two major irregularities in the
application of Guico under Psu-80886, (1) his predecessor-in-
interest did not submit any valid measurement of the estate from
which Psu-80886 was derived; and (2) that the applicant or his
grantees failed to occupy or cultivate the subject land continuously.
These findings are substantial and significant as these affect the
validity of Psu-80886.
ALI insisted that Guico v. San Pedro should actually be
construed in their favor because the Court affirmed the ruling of the
CA which awarded Lot Nos. 2 and 3 to Guico, hence, Psu-80886
was valid.
The Court is not persuaded.
A reading of the dispositive portion of the CA decision in Guico
v. San Pedro does not categorically state that Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were
absolutely and completely awarded to Guico. The award of the said
lots was subject to the vital and primordial condition or obligation to
present to the court an amended, properly approved, plan to the

Director of Lands. Evidently, the Court was not satisfied with Psu-
80886 because it lacked the requisites for a valid survey. Thus, it
required Guico to secure an amended and correctly approved plan,
signed by the Director of Lands. The purpose of this new plan was
to confirm that the appealed decision was consistent with the facts
established therein. The records, however, did not show that Guico
indeed secured an amended and properly approved plan. Psu-
80886/SWO-20609 obviously was not the required amended order
because a special work order is different from an amended survey.58
Moreover, the said special
_______________
57 Guico v. San Pedro, supra note 12 at p. 419.

58 See Sections 605 and 579 of DENR-LMB Administrative Order No. 4 or the
Manuel for Land Survey of the Philippines for the definitions of a special work order
and an amended survey.
465
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 465

work order was initiated by Yaptinchay, and not Guico. The

insufficiency of Psu-80886 is evident in this decision.
Thus, as Guico did not subject Psu-80886 to a valid amended
approved plan, he was not awarded Lot Nos. 2 and 3 for registration.
It can be seen from the OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609; that Guico
never secured their registration because the Court discovered the
anomalous Psu-80886. The Court’s pronouncement in Guico v. San
Pedro, although promulgated more than half a century ago, must be
respected in accordance with the rule on judicial adherence.
Lastly, the Court also agrees with the finding of the CA in its
February 8, 2005 decision that Psu-25909 bears all the hallmarks of
verity. It was established that Andres Diaz was the very first
claimant of the subject property and was the proponent of Psu-
25909. The said survey clearly contained the signature of the
surveyor and the Director of Lands, as can be seen on its face. In
stark contrast with Psu-80886, which contained alterations and
erasures, Psu-25909 has none. The original of Psu-25909 was
likewise on file with the Bureau of Lands and a microfilm
reproduction was readily obtained from the file of the said office,
unlike in Psu-80886 and Psu-47909.
The RTC of Las Piñas shared this examination. It ruled that Psu-
25909 was a true copy of an official document on file with the
Bureau of Lands. It also gave great weight and appreciation to the
said survey because no irregularity was demonstrated in the
preparation thereof. The trial court added that Engr. Remolar, as the
appropriate government custodian and court-appointed
commissioner, certified the authenticity of Psu-25909.
In fine, the Court finds that there are numerous defects in Psu-
47909, Psu-80886 and Psu-80886/SWO-20609, which are all
hallmarks of fraud, viz.:
1. That A.N. Feliciano conducted all the surveys even though he
should have known that the
466

earlier dated survey Psu-25909, already covered the same

parcel of land;
2. That Psu-47909, Psu-80886 and Psu-25909 covered the same
parcel of land and were conducted by the same surveyor but
each survey stated a different location;
3. That the photocopy of Psu-47035, as submitted by ALI, shows
that it was done for a certain Estanislao Mayuga but the
certified true copy of Psu-47035 depicted that it was made for
Dominador Mayuga;
4. That Psu-80886 did not contain the signature of then Director
of Lands, Serafin P. Hidalgo, and it is well-settled rule that no
plan or survey may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands;
5. That Psu-80886 was issued on July 28, 1930 but it referred to a
specific monument described as B.L.L.M No.4, which was
only established on November 27, 1937;
6. That ALI attempted to explain this anomaly by stating that
Psu-80886 was amended by Psu-80886/SWO-20609, which
was done in 1937. On cross-examination, however, the
witness of ALI was unable to reaffirm that the special work
order was rightly performed in 1937 and the said explanation
was not reflected in the verification report and survey plan of
ALI;
7. That Psu-80886/SWO-20609 was undertaken to correct a
discrepancy in Psu-80886, which was an admission that the
latter survey, from which the titles of ALI originated, was
defective;
467
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 467

8. That the total area of the property covered by Psu-80886

contained many erasures, which were not satisfactorily
explained;
9. That there was a difference in the intensity of the lower right
portion of Psu-80886 which showed that it may simply have
been an attachment to the main document; and
10. That in Guico v. San Pedro, the Court found that irregularities
surround Psu-80886 because its predecessor-in-interest did not
submit the corresponding measurement of his survey and the
applicant or his grantees failed to occupy and cultivate the
subject land continuously. Further, Lot Nos. 2 and 3 of Psu-
80886 were not awarded to Guico because the records do not
show that he submitted the required amended properly
approved plan by the Director of Lands.
In contrast, Psu-25909 bore all the hallmarks of verity
because it contains the signatures of the surveyor and the
Director of Lands, and it did not contain any erasure or
alterations thereon. Likewise, a duly authenticated copy of Psu-
25909 is readily available in the Bureau of Lands.
The foregoing anomalies surrounding Psu-47909, Psu-80886,
and Psu-80886/SWO-20609 were similarly observed by the RTC of
Las Piñas. The trial court was able to establish its findings based on
the verification survey it ordered, under the supervision of the court-
appointed commissioner. Hence, the trial court had the direct access
to the evidence presented by the parties as well as the verification
reports and survey plans submitted by the parties. It is a fundamental
rule that the conclusion and findings of fact by the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except
for strong and cogent reasons, because the trial court is in a better
468

position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the

demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case.59
Even without considering (1) the certification from the DENR-

LMB that Psu-80886 is included in the list of restricted plans
because of the doubtful signature of the surveyor, and (2) the
memorandum, dated August 3, 2000, from the Assistant Regional
Director of the DENR directing all personnel of the Land Survey
Division not to issue copies or technical descriptions of Psu-80886
and Psu-47035, there were numerous defects on the surveys that
affected their validity. The exclusion of these documents did not
alter the finding of the Court that the surveys were spurious and
must be set aside.
Further, the Court cannot subscribe to the finding of the CA in its
June 19, 2006 decision that the numerous defects in Psu-47909, Psu-
80886 and Psu-80886/SWO-20609 are “not enough to deprive the
assailed decree of registration of its conclusive effect, neither are
they sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that the survey was
definitely, certainly, conclusively spurious.”60 The Court cannot
close its eyes to the blatant defects on the surveys upon which the
original titles of ALI were derived simply because its titles were
registered. To allow these certificates of title in the registration
books, even though these were sourced from invalid surveys, would
tarnish and damage the Torrens system of registration, rather than
uphold its integrity.
It is an enshrined principle in this jurisdiction that registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title merely
confirms or records title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of a Torrens title should not be used as a means to
perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good
faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration
would be an exercise in
_______________
59 Ban v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 229 Phil. 159, 163; 145 SCRA 133, 137
(1986).
60 Rollo (G.R. No. 173120), p. 1430.
469
VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 469

futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud,

notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a
constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal
principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the
person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere

trustee.61
When a land registration decree is marred by severe irregularity
that discredits the integrity of the Torrens system, the Court will not
think twice in striking down such illegal title in order to protect the
public against unscrupulous and illicit land ownership. Thus, due to
the numerous, blatant and unjustifiable errors in Psu-47909, Psu-
80886, and Psu-80886/SWO-20609, these must be declared void.
Likewise, OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609, their transfer certificates,
and instruments of conveyances that relied on the anomalous
surveys, must be absolutely declared void ab initio.
With respect to the Diaz case, the Court agrees with the CA in its
February 8, 2005 decision that Spouses Diaz did not commit fraud.
As Psu-47909, Psu-80886 and Psu-80886/SWO-20609 are void,
then OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609 are also void ab initio. The
transfer certificates in the hands of third parties, including CPJ
Corporation and ALI, are likewise void. Accordingly, Spouses Diaz
had no obligation to inform CPJ Corporation of their application for
registration and they could not be held guilty of fraud.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The June 19,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 61593
& 70622 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 8,
2005 Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
61 Reyes v. Montemayor, 614 Phil. 256; 596 SCRA 61 (2009).
470

Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Leonen and Martires, JJ.,

concur.
Petitions granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—An action or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a

certificate of title when its objective is to nullify the same, thereby
challenging the judgment pursuant to which the certificate of title
was decreed. (Bagayas vs. Bagayas, 706 SCRA 73 [2013])
The purpose of adopting a Torrens System in our jurisdiction is
to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and

recognized. (Cagatao vs. Almonte, 707 SCRA 172 [2013])
——o0o——
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Yu Hwa Ping V Ayala Land

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4/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 832

G.R. No. 173120. July 26, 2017.*

SPOUSES YU HWA PING and MARY GAW, petitioners, vs.

G.R. No. 173141. July 26, 2017.*

HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANDRES DIAZ and JOSEFA MIA,

Civil Law; Land Registration; Reconveyance; The remedy of the

428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 429

favor of the person whose name appears therein, it is not a conclusive

indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

merely leave the determination of the case to a consideration of the

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is a fundamental rule that

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 431

These petitions for review on certiorari seek to reverse and set

its February 8, 2005 Amended Decision2 and reinstated its February

On March 17, 1921, petitioners Spouses Andres Diaz and Josefa

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 173120), pp. 1397-1437.

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SWO-20609 covered Lot 2, with 158,494 square meters, and Lot

resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No.

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 433

1. Lot 1-I, with an area of 190,000 square meters covered by the

On the other hand, on May 4, 1980, CPJ Corporation transferred

434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3. Lot 3 which originated from OCT No. 242 under Psu-

First RTC’s Ruling

Returning to the Diaz case, on December 13, 1995, the RTC of

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 435

(Yu case). They also sought the recovery of possession of the

Second RTC’s Ruling

In its May 7, 2001 Decision,10 the RTC of Las Piñas ruled in

436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in that the

11 Id., at pp. 714-715.

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 437

Unconvinced, ALI appealed to the CA, where the case was

The CA’s Rulings

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Yu Hwa Ping vs. Ayala Land, Inc.

The CA also emphasized that in Guico v. San Pedro,12 the Court

12 72 Phil. 415 (1941).

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 439

by the courts because these were not properly presented in evidence.

The CA reiterated its ruling that Spouses Yu could no longer

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In their Memorandum,13 the petitioners chiefly argue that the

its irregularity was affirmed by the Supreme Court; that the

13 Rollo (G.R. No. 173141), pp. 414-554.

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 441

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds the petitions meritorious.

The actions were filed

15 See Rublico v. Orellana, 141 Phil. 181; 30 SCRA 511 (1969).

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

16 Rollo (G.R. No. 173120), p. 157.

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 443

The foregoing cases on the prescriptibility of actions for reconveyance

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

property may be reconveyed to the true owner, notwithstanding the TCTs

As discussed above, when the action for reconveyance is based