Embodied Enactive Dance/Movement Therapy

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Embodied Enactive Dance/Movement Therapy
Article in American Journal of Dance Therapy · June 2011

DOI: 10.1007/s10465-011-9108-4
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ArticleTitle An Embodied Enactive Approach to Dance/Movement Therapy
Article Sub-Title
Article CopyRight American Dance Therapy Association
(This will be the copyright line in the final PDF)
Journal Name American Journal of Dance Therapy
Corresponding Author Family Name Koch
Particle
Given Name Sabine C.
Suffix
Division Institute of Psychology
Organization University of Heidelberg
Address Hauptstr. 47-51, Heidelberg, 69117, Germany
Email [email protected]
Author Family Name Fischman

Particle
Given Name Diana
Suffix
Division
Organization Programa de Entrenamiento en Danza Movimiento Terapia de Buenos Aires–
Brecha
Address Quesada 3468 C 1430 AXB, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Email [email protected]
Received
Schedule Revised
Accepted
Abstract Dance/movement therapy may be conceptualized as an embodied and enactive form of psychotherapy. The
embodied enactive approach looks at individuals as living systems characterized by plasticity and
permeability (moment-to-moment adaptations within the self and toward the environment), striving for
balance, autonomy, sense-making, embodiment, emergence, and experience. Enaction and embodiment
emphasize the roles that body motion and sensorimotor experience play in the formation of concepts and
abstract thinking. A theoretical framework and a perspective on professional practice in dance/movement
therapy are herein offered as influenced by interdisciplinary embodied and enactive approaches deriving from
cognitive sciences and phenomenology. The authors assert that dance/movement therapy, enaction, and
embodiment fruitfully contribute to one another.
Keywords (separated by '-') Enaction - Embodiment - Phenomenology - Dance/movement therapy theory - Dance/movement therapy
Footnote Information Sabine C. Koch and Diana Fischman equally and jointly contributed to the article.
Journal: 10465
Article: 9108
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Am J Dance Ther
DOI 10.1007/s10465-011-9108-4
2
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3 An Embodied Enactive Approach to Dance/Movement

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4 Therapy
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5 Sabine C. Koch • Diana Fischman
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6
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7 American Dance Therapy Association 2011
8 Abstract Dance/movement therapy may be conceptualized as an embodied and

9 enactive form of psychotherapy. The embodied enactive approach looks at individ-
10 uals as living systems characterized by plasticity and permeability (moment-to-
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11 moment adaptations within the self and toward the environment), striving for balance,
12 autonomy, sense-making, embodiment, emergence, and experience. Enaction and
13 embodiment emphasize the roles that body motion and sensorimotor experience play
14 in the formation of concepts and abstract thinking. A theoretical framework and a
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15 perspective on professional practice in dance/movement therapy are herein offered as

16 influenced by interdisciplinary embodied and enactive approaches deriving from
17 cognitive sciences and phenomenology. The authors assert that dance/movement
18 therapy, enaction, and embodiment fruitfully contribute to one another.
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19
20 Keywords Enaction Embodiment Phenomenology
21 Dance/movement therapy theory Dance/movement therapy
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22
23 From its very origin, the body–mind relation, interpersonal relations, and the
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24 relatedness of the person to the environment have been central to the clinical
25 practice of dance/movement therapy, in which movement and dance as essential
A1 Sabine C. Koch and Diana Fischman equally and jointly contributed to the article.
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A2 S. C. Koch (&)
A3 Institute of Psychology, University of Heidelberg, Hauptstr. 47-51, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany
A4 e-mail: [email protected]
A5 D. Fischman
A6 Programa de Entrenamiento en Danza Movimiento Terapia de Buenos Aires–Brecha,
A7 Quesada 3468 C 1430 AXB, Buenos Aires, Argentina
A8 e-mail: [email protected]
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Journal : Small-ext 10465 Dispatch : 9-4-2011 Pages : 16
Article No. : 9108 * LE * TYPESET
MS Code : AJOD-77 R CP R DISK
Am J Dance Ther
26 means of connectedness and communication are employed to promote the health

27 of individuals, groups, and communities. A current challenge for dance/movement
28 therapy as a field is to verbalize and develop its theoretical background (e.g., Cruz &
29 Barroll, 2004) in dialogue with its rich and elaborated clinical practice. One way of
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30 doing so is to embrace and contribute to existing theoretical traditions that are in

31 accord with dance/movement therapy principles.
32 Dance/movement therapy may be considered an enactive approach to psychother-
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33 apy. Enaction and embodiment are principles that match the theory and practice
34 of dance/movement therapy. They rest on a phenomenological conceptualization
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35 of the living body and its fundamental meaning (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), and on an
36 organismic rather than a computational understanding of our human condition (e.g.,
37 Lyon, 2006; Smith & Semin, 2004). Phenomenological and enactive theories have
38 been embraced recently by the cognitive and social sciences because many researchers
39 had noted that, in the past, their ways of approaching social phenomena had been too
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40 static, cognitive, molecular, and insufficiently experience-based.
41 More recently, phenomenological and enactive theories have been integrated
42 more closely with psychopathological and psychotherapeutic knowledge (Fuchs,
43 2005; Fuchs, & Schlimme, 2009), as well as with a number of body psychotherapy
44 approaches (Baer, 2000; Roehricht, 2000; Serlin, 1996), and the field of arts therapies
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45 (e.g., Buk, 2009; Winters, 2008; Koch, Morlinghaus, & Fuchs, 2007; Sheets-
46 Johnstone, 2010). The isolation of certain elements of dance/movement therapy, such
47 as kinesthetic empathy, body memory, or movement metaphor, have now been tied
48 to embodied and enactive theories and found their place in a broader scientific
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49 framework.
50 Embodied and enactive approaches offer an important theoretical frame of
51 reference for dance/movement therapy. We call this theoretical framework an
52 embodied enactive approach, in accordance with two scientific traditions that recently
53 have come together to emphasize the meaning of the body and movement for
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54 cognition, affect, and (inter-)action. The enactive approach dates back to the
55 biological- and systems-based theories of Maturana and Varela (1984), and the
56 embodied approach builds on a cognitive sciences background (e.g., Barsalou,
57 Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003), both going beyond the constructivist
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58 perspective. Both approaches use a phenomenological knowledge base and integrate

59 neuroscientific findings. The embodied approach gives greater emphasis to the
60 individual aspect, whereas the enactive approach emphasizes the interactional and
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61 environmental aspects of corporeal meaning, elements that had been marginalized by

62 the cognitive paradigm.
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63 Enaction and Dance/Movement Therapy
64 The field of dance/movement therapy has been evolving since its pioneers first
65 started working with groups and individuals in the 1940s. Dance/movement therapy
66 pioneers had preserved the communitarian, participative mode that dance and rituals
67 have had since the origin of primitive human groups (Dosamantes-Beaudry, 2003;
68 Sandel, Chaiklin, & Lohn, 1993). Every approach adopts a model of how the world
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69 is conceived and a perspective from which life and knowledge are considered
70 (Weltanschauung). The enactive approach, introduced by Varela, Thompson, and
71 Rosch (1991), has a striking affinity with the basic principles of dance/movement
72 therapy.
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73 Dance/movement therapy focuses on movement as nonverbal expression,

74 interaction, and communication (Levy, 1992). It is directly related to understanding
75 humans and making sense of our behaviors on a nonverbal level. Movement,
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76 posture, gesture, and action are the first modes of expression of individuals and
77 continue to be operative during our entire lives. Enaction, from the verb to enact or
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78 to start doing as well as to perform or to act (Varela, 2002), conceives of knowledge
79 as action in the world. The world emerges or is molded; it is not defined a priori.
80 Individuals know the world through their own actions, transforming themselves and
81 the world at the same time that the world transforms them (Najmanovich, 2005;
82 Varela et al., 1991). In this sense, enaction implies codetermination (Thompson,
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83 2007), and interbeing (Varela, 1999). Enactive cognition emerges from the dynamic
84 codetermination of self and other. The world is constantly being reconstructed by all
85 living creatures.
86 The term autopoiesis, introduced by the biologist Humberto Maturana (Maturana
87 & Varela, 1984, 1991), defines the nature of living systems as autonomous and
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88 operationally closed, i.e., the processes within them maintain their entireness and, at
89 the same time, are structurally coupled with their environment, embedded in a
90 dynamic of changes that can be named sensory-motor coupling (Maturana & Varela,
91 1984). This dynamic is continuous and considered to be the mode in which living
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92 systems operate by knowing and constructing the world. Maturana and Varela
93 (1984) understood this idea as a circular causality independent of what comes first,
94 ‘‘the chicken or the egg.’’ Maturana and Varela (1984) proposed that living systems
95 create their lives at the same time that they acknowledge and recognize a pre-
96 existent world.
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97 In dance/movement therapy, Laban (1987) as well as Bartenieff and Lewis

98 (1980) hold that movements or effort dynamics that have been developed by
99 different animal species, including humans, shape their body structure while
100 limiting and enabling an action repertoire, and in turn the body structure determines
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101 the species’ movement habits. Through the ages, human bodies have been shaped by
102 the effort habits they have developed in their relationship to the environment.
103 Following Maturana and Varela (1984), the subjective experience is indissolubly
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104 tied to its own structure.

105 As humans, we are epistemological knowledge-seeking beings. From the moment
106 of birth, we sense and make sense, and by doing so we create the worlds we live in
107 (Thompson, 2007; Frankl, 1953; Heider, 1958).
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108 Fischman (2009) stated:

109 Enaction entails an epistemology of complexity that considers knowledge to
110 be a constructive organic experience: In a single act, something is perceived,
111 created, or transformed. This perspective integrates action, perception,
112 emotion, and cognition. The term enaction synthesizes the effectiveness of
113 dance/movement therapy, as it works on the repertoire of the patient’s
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114 movement patterns, bringing them to a conscious level, and offers an

115 unprecedented opportunity to expand this range through new ‘‘intersubjective
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117 experiences.’’ (pp. 35–36)
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118 Embodiment and Dance/Movement Therapy
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119 Embodiment refers to bodily phenomena in which the body as a living organism,
120 body movement, and person–environment interaction play central roles in the
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121 explanation of perception, cognition, affect, attitudes, behavior, and their interre-
122 lations (Koch, 2006). Embodiment approaches assume that cognition and affect are
123 grounded in sensorimotor processes and that knowledge and memory always
124 include sensorimotor simulations; they are not mere abstract, amodal representa-
125 tions (Barsalou, 2008).
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126 Embodiment approaches developed at the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s
127 in anthropology (Csordas, 1988, 1990; Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987), robotics
128 (Brooks, 1991; Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007), philosophy (Clark, 1997; Gallagher, 2005;
129 Hurley, 1998), cognitive linguistics (Gibbs, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), and,
130 more recently, in psychology (Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman,
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131 Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Smith & Semin, 2004). Based on the phenomenological
132 tradition of Merleau-Ponty (1962) and on neuroscientific findings (Barsalou, 1999;
133 Damasio, 1994; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005), embodiment practices alert us to the basic
134 organismic processes and high plasticity of the living body. Embodiment approaches
135 have replaced the computer metaphor of the cognitive science paradigm with an
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136 organismic understanding of the human mind and condition (Smith & Semin, 2004).
137 This paradigmatic shift is echoed in the suggestion that embodiment can serve as a
138 unifying perspective for psychology (Schubert & Semin, 2009).
139 Embodiment research has demonstrated that body feedback from movement can
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140 influence affect (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988), attitudes (Caccioppo, Priester, &
141 Berntson, 1993; Maass & Russo, 2003; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Schubert, 2004),
142 and cognition (Mussweiler, 2006; Raab & Green, 2005), and that bodily ‘‘mapping’’
143 constantly occurs between humans (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1986;
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144 Buccino et al., 2001; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). With the term embodiment, we
145 refer to theories that understand movement to be an integral part of knowledge
146 (Barsalou et al., 2003) and memory (Casey, 1987; Fuchs, 2010; Sheets-Johnstone,
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147 2003). Semin and Caccioppo (2008)—working not from an enactive, but rather from
148 a cognitive sciences’ framework—outlined a model of social cognition that goes
149 beyond the traditional individual-centered analysis and conceptualizes social
150 cognition as grounded in neurophysiological processes, distributed across brains
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151 and bodies and manifested in the coregulation of behaviors. They introduced a
152 theoretical framework for the processes involved from joint perception to coregu-
153 lation in social interaction, following the principles of synchronization (Davis, 1982;
154 Hall & Bernieri, 2001), entrainment (Clayton, Sager, & Will, 2004; Condon &
155 Ogston, 1966), and coordination (e.g., Port & van Gelder, 1995).
156 Dance/movement therapy has been developed as a healing practice through the
157 use of movement and dance as a medium for enabling communication, assessing
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158 where it is blocked, and intervening on nonverbal and verbal levels. Intuition and
159 personal experience have led dancers, dance teachers, and physiologists to discover
160 the meaningful connections between motivation, motion, and emotion (Levy,
161 1992). How did this happen? The answer is: through experiencing (Dosamantes-
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162 Alperson, 1981). Pioneers in the field have described how dance was part of their
163 lives, how it promoted healing—a means of furthering well-being and self-
164 discovery—and did so with different populations (e.g., Frieder Watlock, 1983;
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165 Koch, 1981; Schmais & White, 1981; Whitehouse, 1956). Some of dance/
166 movement therapy’s basic assumptions can be listed as follows: (a) dance is
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167 communication; (b) body and mind influence each other reciprocally; (c) emotion
168 is expressed through movement; (d) art and aesthetic expression are resources for
169 health; (e) the therapeutic relationship promotes trust through mirroring, attune-
170 ment, and kinesthetic empathy; and (f) movement is presymbolic but paradoxically
171 full of meaning (Levy, 1992). On this basis, the client can develop meaning, relate,
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172 and heal through movement.
173 Embodiment theory holds that human meaning grows from our organic,
174 sensorimotor, and emotional transactions with the world. Our bodily-felt move-
175 ments lead us to discover the environment precisely according to the nature of our
176 anatomy. Meaning arises from a nonconscious preverbal level coupled with the
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177 perceptual recognition of other human beings, and given by intersubjective
178 interaction (Varela et al., 1991). Codetermination is linked to the recognition of
179 affect and emotion as cognitive modes. Phenomenological philosopher Mark
180 Johnson (2007) suggests looking at felt qualities, images, feelings, and emotions
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181 that ground our more abstract structures of meaning making: ‘‘It is our organic flesh
182 and blood, our structural bones, the ancient rhythm of our internal organs, and the
183 pulsing flow of our emotions that give us whatever meaning we can find and that
184 shape our very thinking’’ (p. 3).
185 Johnson (2007) synthesizes the basic assumptions of body-based meaning as
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186 follows: (a) there is no radical body/mind separation; (b) meaning is grounded in our
187 bodily experience; (c) reason is an embodied process; (d) imagination is tied to our
188 bodily processes and can also be a creative and transformative experience; (e) there
189 is no radical freedom; (f) reason and emotion are inextricably intertwined; and
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190 (g) human spirituality is embodied.

191 These assumptions all mirror basic dance/movement therapy principles. The
192 good news is that they are now grounded in scientific research (Homann, 2010;
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193 Winters, 2008), with complementary theories arising from different interdisciplin-
194 ary fields such as biology (Maturana & Varela, 1984, 1991), cognitive psychology
195 (Barsalou, 1999; Niedenthal, 2007), cognitive linguistics (Gibbs, 2005; Lakoff &
196 Johnson, 1980, 1999), phenomenological philosophy (Gallagher, 2005; Noë, 2004;
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197 Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, 2009, 2010; Thompson, 2007), neuroscience (Damasio,

198 1999; Gallese, 2003; Iacoboni et al. 1999), and developmental research (Lyons-
199 Ruth, 1999; Stern, 1985, 2002; Thelen & Smith, 1994). In this way, the embodied
200 enactive approach becomes a unified scientific, philosophical, aesthetic, and
201 potentially spiritual perspective with internal coherence.
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202 Participatory Sense-Making
203 In their seminal paper on participatory sense-making, De Jaegher and Di Paolo

204 (2007) identified five core ideas of the enactive paradigm. These are the interrelated
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205 concepts of autonomy, sense-making, embodiment, emergence, and experience (De

206 Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Di Paolo, Rohde, & De Jaegher, 2007; Thompson, 2007;
207 Thompson & Varela, 2001; Varela et al., 1991) that define the organizational
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208 properties of living systems. For humans—as ‘‘social animals’’—we may also talk
209 of a sixth core idea as that of intersubjectivity or participation (De Jaegher, 2010).
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210 Autonomy
211 One of these properties is the constitutive autonomy that living systems hold by
212 virtue of their self-generated identity as distinct entities, described above. ‘‘An
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213 autonomous system is defined as a system composed of several processes that
214 actively generate and sustain an identity under precarious conditions’’ (De Jaegher
215 & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 487). Autonomy is the precondition for intersubjectivity.
216 Emergence
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217 According to Thelen and Smith (Smith, 2006), emergence is the temporary but
218 coherent coming into existence of new forms through ongoing processes intrinsic to
219 the system. The coherence is generated in the relationships between the organic
220 components and the constraints and opportunities offered by the environment. In
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221 this way, walking or reaching can be understood as emerging from multiple
222 components interacting in real time. Thelen and Smith (1994) argued that crawling
223 is not based in the genes or wired in the nervous system. It self-organizes as a
224 solution to a problem (e.g., to move across the room, when the skeleton and muscles
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225 are not yet equipped for walking), later to be replaced by a more efficient solution.
226 Development is thus a series of evolving and dissolving patterns of different
227 dynamic stability (Smith, 2006).
228 On the interpersonal level, an enactive perspective holds that reality emerges as a
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229 coconstructed experience in which meaning is created at the same time that it is
230 perceived and acted upon. It involves what dance/movement therapy calls mirroring
231 and contagious behavior, interpersonal attunement, and clashing (unity and
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232 difference). It is related to encounter and disencounter. This perspective relinquishes

233 the objectification of the self and uncovers the uniqueness of the living person. It
234 understands consciousness as a mode of being, rather than a mental state.
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235 Sense-Making
236 ‘‘Reaffirming the implications of autonomy, sense-making is an inherently active

237 concept. (…) Sense-making is a relational and affect-laden process grounded in
238 biological organization’’ (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 488). For the enactive
239 perspective, the making of meaning is consensually constructed, and reality is
240 something we build by coming to agreements and shared values. By processes such
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241 as mirroring, contagion, and differentiation, humans build worlds in accordance

242 with their own body structure coupled with the environment. Through these
243 processes, the possibility of empathy as the understanding of another’s sensed
244 experience emerges. Phenomenology (Fuchs, 2000; Husserl, 1952; Merleau-Ponty,
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245 1962) investigates such subjective experience and can be seen as the basis of the
246 embodied enactive approaches (Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009; Gallagher, 2005).
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247 Embodiment
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248 For the enactive approach, cognition is embodied action. Varela et al. (1991), who
249 laid the groundwork for an enactive cognitive science, stated:
250 We explicitly call into question the assumption—prevalent throughout
251 cognitive science—that cognition consists of the representation of a world
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252 that is independent of our perceptual and cognitive capacities by a cognitive
253 system that exists independently of the world. We outline instead a view of
254 cognition as embodied action. (p. XX)
255 Embodiment is one of the principles of enaction, whereas the idea of enaction is not
256 necessarily included in embodiment approaches. Embodiment and enaction are not
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257 restricted to humans. Many social animals build up coherences of significance by
258 engaging in coordinated bodily activity (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007).
259 Experience
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260 Near the turn to the 21st century, Francisco Varela (1996) wrote:
261 Science and experience constrain and modify each other as in a dance. This is
262 where the potential for transformation lies. It is also the key for the difficulties
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263 this position has found within the scientific community. It requires us to leave
264 behind a certain image of how science is done, and to question a style of
265 training in science which is part of the very fabric of our cultural identity. (p. 1)
266 Dance/movement therapy advocates the role of experiencing rather than analyzing.
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267 Action lays the groundwork of our being in this world. Through movement
268 interaction, the dance/movement therapist and patient become conscious of the
269 patient’s ways of relating. Through experiencing, the patients become aware of their
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270 personal behavioral patterns at the same time they recognize new possibilities of
271 being with, enlarging their relational repertoire. Space and time—as the basic and
272 pervasive categories of movement—arise from experiencing. ‘‘Movements are at the
273 centre of mental activity: a sense-making agent’s movements—which include
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274 utterances—are the tools of her cognition’’ (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 489).
275 Authentic movement and improvisational methods (Adler, 2002) elicit free
276 associations in movement that guide the client to images, metaphors, and verbaliza-
277 tions that are helpful in the therapeutic process. Dyadic improvisation (Sandel et al.,
278 1993) introduces mirroring, reciprocity, attunement, and clashes. Themes such as
279 leading and following, closeness and distance, strength and weakness, approach and
280 avoidance, and degrees of tension and intensity emerge. Guided group improvisations
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281 bring forth group themes and group dynamics that can be worked with readily in the
282 therapeutic context (Fay, Chaiklin, & Chodorow, 2009).
283 What we can experience in movement—what Husserl (1954) calls kinesthetic
284 consciousness—is a challenge for our conceptualization and language. In order to
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285 reapproach this kinesthetic consciousness, we can (re)discover what it is like to

286 ‘‘learn one’s body by being it’’ (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, p. 360) and experience in
287 movement, phenomena beyond the domination of mind over matter. In this way, we
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288 can re-experience what was important in our prereflective, preverbal times, the
289 times not accessible to our conscious knowledge. We can go beyond the limits of
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290 our conscious memory and encounter the roots of our kinesthetic consciousness.
291 This experience makes use of the felt sense (Gendlin, 1997), and the methodology of
292 the authentic movement practitioners’ non-judgmental attitude (Adler, 2002), of
293 what Buddhists call pure attention (Varela et al. 1991), and phenomenologists call
294 epoche´ (from the Greek e9povg9 , suspension) which describes the method of
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295 bracketing, i.e., observing and describing with a nonjudgmental attitude toward the
296 experience (Husserl, 1954). It provides a methodological challenge to our
297 experimental and other quantitative scientific methods—which only become
298 meaningful if we have first reflected on our problems on the basis of our actual
299 authentic experience. In practice, preceding the use of experimental and quantitative
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300 methods, the experiential method can lead to an initial clarification of research
301 questions and creative hypothesis building.
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302 Relation to Clinical Concepts
303 First and foremost, enactivism is a confirmation of the practice of dance/movement

304 therapy in reference to the integration of body and mind through movement and
305 meaning. Enaction confirms that focalizing and implementing movement bound to
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306 verbal language in psychotherapy is a natural consequence of attempting to

307 understand human experience. Dance/movement therapy has shed light on
308 intersubjective, sensory–motor emotional cognition since its origin. It has acknowl-
309 edged cognition in its different expressive and evolving modes. Dance/movement
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310 therapy focuses on the foundation of meaning built through shared intersubjective
311 experiences, and thus makes us living, sensitive, and creative human beings.
312 Therapy means treatment of disease or disorders through some remedial,
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313 rehabilitating, or curative process. Trauma is a body wound or shock produced by

314 sudden physical injury as, for example, from violence or an accident or an experience
315 that produces psychological injury or pain (van der Kolk, 1994). Therapy works by
316 resignifying experience, allowing the re-establishment of the capacity to unfold the
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317 flow of life, melting the obstacles that have been blocking the free development of
318 the self and the self-other relations in the world (Fischman, 2009). Dance/movement
319 therapy focuses on the experience of movement sensing and on how movement makes
320 sense. The dance/movement therapist gets empathically involved in an intersubjec-
321 tive experience that is rooted in the body and works toward a resolution (Fischman,
322 2009).
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323 As a therapeutic mode, dance/movement therapy goes to the roots where ‘‘image
324 schemas,’’ as described by Johnson (1987), emerge. Following Lakoff and Johnson
325 (1980), concepts and language are grounded in body experiences via metaphors that
326 arise from sensory–motor experience. The therapeutic process implies revisiting the
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327 meaning of experiences that create behavioral patterns that are painful or work
328 against the person, the environment, or the whole organic system. By exploring
329 through body movement, sensing and making sense come together in a new setting.
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330 In this way, the therapeutic relationship facilitates the arousal of new patterns. New
331 meaning and a different way of being with emerge (Lyons-Ruth, 1999).
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332 As in pendular movement, dual concepts such as unity–multiplicity, analysis–
333 synthesis, anabolism–catabolism, science–art, emotion–reason, abstract–concrete,
334 and body–mind are opposite dimensions of the human experience which strive for
335 complementarity. Liking–disliking, approaching–withdrawing, opening–closing,
336 growing–shrinking are basic movement concepts expressing elemental hedonic
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337 experiences from which meaning emerges. Very disturbed patients who have suffered
338 trauma have difficulties finding such integration because what they went through was
339 lived as extreme organic system disorganization; they were consequently unable to
340 process these experiences. Harmony and confusion can be seen as necessary polarities
341 pervasive to human experience.
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342 An embodied enactive clinical perspective goes beyond a psychodynamic and a
343 cognitive-behavioral stance. Some of its ideas have in part been integrated only by
344 systemic therapy (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Framo, 1965; Minuchin, 1974). Embodi-
345 ment takes place directly as visible action in front of our eyes. The mechanisms of
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346 emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994), for example, cannot be
347 explained in terms of conscious cognitive processing. They result directly from the
348 flow of interaction, from our capacity to ‘‘map’’ expressions from other bodies to
349 our body, to match or mirror expressions, to resonate bodily; only then do they sink
350 into our cognitive-affective system. In 1903, Lipps said:
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351 …. perception and comprehension of certain sensory objects, namely those

352 which we represent afterwards as the body of another individual, is
353 immediately grasped by us … This grasp happens immediately and simulta-
354 neously with the perception, and that does not mean that we see it or apprehend
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355 it by means of the senses. We cannot do that since anger, friendliness, or

356 sadness cannot be perceived through the senses. (p. 713; translation by Jahoda,
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357 2005)
358 This perspective is reflected in the current research literature showing that facial
359 synchronization happens within a time window of 500 ms (Dimberg, Thunberg, &
360 Elmehed, 2000), suggesting that the emotional state of the other is directly simulated
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361 in the central nervous system of the observer (Adolphs, 2006; Semin & Cacioppo,
362 2008). Similar, automatic mechanisms could also be the basis of the finding that
363 facial features of spouses converge over time (Zajonc, Adelman, Murphey, &
364 Niedenthal, 1987). Such mirroring has important clinical implications: Rogers
365 (1951) called one of his verbal therapeutic technique ‘‘mirroring,’’ and dance/
366 movement therapy uses ‘‘movement mirroring as a technique to foster kinesthetic
367 empathy and/or to understand more deeply patients’ behaviors’’ (Adler 2002, 1970;
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368 Sandel, Chaiklin, & Lohn, 1993; Fischman, 2009; Homann, 2010; Winters, 2008).
369 Embodied enactive approaches offer a theoretical base for related research.
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370 How Does the Embodied, Enactive Perspective Contribute

371 to Dance/Movement Therapy?
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372 The psychotherapeutic aspects of dance/movement therapy are related to facilitating
373 the unfolding of each patient’s unique mode of relating. By experiencing with the
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374 patient, through mirroring, attuning, and creating structures for self-exploration
375 through movement, neither judging nor criticizing, the dance/movement therapist
376 understands and comprehends, linking present with past experience. In this way,
377 dance/movement therapy facilitates development, allowing the unfolding of
378 spontaneity of the self, creating new ways of being with another, co-constructing
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379 new meaning, and new, healthier realities. On a methodological level, the enactive
380 perspective allows us to set the unit of observation on the subindividual, the
381 individual, the dyadic/intersubjective or the embedded/environmental level, always
382 including the observer as a intrinsic part of the observed system. This has profound
383 implications, such as the view that there is no ‘‘objective objectivity.’’ Science thus
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384 can arrive only at contextual consensual community agreements about what is
385 considered reality.
386 Dualism and monism are two modes or moments of perception. Analysis and
387 synthesis are two necessary modes of organizing and categorizing experience. None
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388 of these work alone; they influence and determine each other. In individual and
389 community development there are, were, and will be moments of one or the other.
390 Sometimes it becomes difficult to hold the paradox of the simultaneous co-existence
391 of both ways of seeing. One of the poles often stands out and the other is neglected.
392 Perfect balance is utopia. Watzlawick (1988) reminds us of a third position, which is
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393 a creative one: from an apparent dilemma, something new can emerge that is neither
394 one nor the other pole but something completely new. He describes two kinds of
395 games he calls zero sum games and nonzero sum games. The first one implies a
396 winner and a loser; the second one is related to a creative unexpected resolution. [He
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397 illustrates his point with a story of an enemy confrontation: A group was surrounded
398 and had only a cow and some grain to survive. They decided to fill the cow with the
399 grain and throw it to their enemies. Since they threw a cow filled with all that grain,
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400 their enemies thought they must have an abundance of supplies. The enemies gave
401 up the siege and went back home. In this way, confrontation was avoided.]
402 The embodied perspective—by unifying body and mind, perception and action,
403 creativity and recognition, cognition and emotion—reminds us that our existence is
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404 related to our own way of experiencing. It underlines that we are actors in charge of
405 building our realities (i.e., the worlds we live in) out of who we are. Enaction
406 confronts us with our involvement, our responsibility as creators of our destinies;
407 our contribution as active participants in the ongoing situation. It also reminds us
408 that our destiny is not already written, is being co-constructed every second–
409 changing with each of our movement decisions and, at the same time, being
410 changed by them. This approach gives us back our power of transforming and being
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411 transformed and of affecting and being affected. It reminds us that we are
412 participants in the game of life. Possibilities of what can be achieved through
413 imagination come closer.
414 The embodied, enactive perspective is an empowering perspective because it
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415 takes humans away from the primacy of determination and repetition. The concepts
416 of to move and to be moved, clearly described in the phenomenology of Sheets-
417 Johnstone (1999) and in the authentic movement approach by Adler (2002), teach us
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418 that we humans have the capability to make decisions and that we are moved either
419 by inner forces or environmental, external ones which affect us and make us
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420 participate in the pursuit of our full human potential. Being conscious of our
421 movement—perceptual possibilities and limitation—allows us to work on widening
422 our resources to improve individual and community wellbeing. But we still cannot
423 avoid uncertainty, existential anguish, and trial and error. We are still limited mortal
424 beings, even though we are able to enlarge life and create different ways of
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425 surviving.
426 Conclusion
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427 Dance/movement therapy and embodied, enactive approaches mutually contribute
428 to expanding and differentiating each other’s fields. The embodied, enactive
429 approach provides an opportunity for dance/movement therapy to associate itself
430 with a scientific paradigm that has recently emerged as a body-based approach. It
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431 contributes empirical evidence to the fundamental meaning of the body and its
432 movements as instruments for perceiving, feeling, thinking, and (inter-)acting. Since
433 the principles of the enactive approach are so closely related to those of dance/
434 movement therapy, our field may greatly benefit from their scholarly research.
435 Embodied and enactive approaches strengthen the assumption of the body as the
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436 basis of thought and affect. They attribute scientific value to experience-based
437 approaches and validate major theoretical principles in dance/movement therapy,
438 other creative arts (e.g., art, music, or drama therapy), and body-oriented therapies.
439 In turn, dance/movement therapy, with its highly differentiated practice and wide
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440 applicability, can offer its well-developed assessments and experience-based

441 knowledge, derived from clinical work.
442 For cognitive science researchers, this partnership would mean critically rethinking
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443 some of their subject matter and testing the utility of their approaches in the domains of
444 health and health care delivery. For movement therapists, this means to diligently
445 and rigorously formulate their ideas and articulate their experiences in terms of
446 the embodied, enactive perspective and make them available to other scientific
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447 communities and outlets (Koch, 2006). The potential gain is improved clarity, better
448 visibility and a more explicit formulation of dance/movement therapy theory and
449 methodology in the light of a new, body-based research paradigm.
450 Much remains to be said with respect to embodiment, enaction, and dance/
451 movement therapy. Further elaboration is needed on how enaction in humans is an
452 inherently social dimension; how it develops in early interaction with the primary
453 caregivers, engendering basic emotions and patterns of intersubjective behavior
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454 (Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996; Stern, 1985; Winnicott, 1958); and how it relates to
455 present neuroscientific approaches (Damasio, 1999; Gallese, 2003), health-related
456 approaches (Antonovsky, 1979), and theoretical traditions in social psychology
457 (Heider, 1958; Lewin, 1951). More studies are also needed on the role of conceptual
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458 metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) and its relation to embodied
459 enactive approaches as well as to dance/movement therapy; on the role of aesthetics
460 in enaction as an almost uniquely human capacity; and on the relation of language
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461 and movement. Whereas embodiment and enaction aim to overcome the body–mind
462 split in Western philosophy—and stand for a holistic, integrative view—the
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463 limitations of our language often bring us back to a dissociation of body and mind.
464 This is partially due to the fact that language is discrete, whereas experience is
465 continuous (James, 1911/1979). Art and science need to define and negotiate how to
466 conceptualize and represent experience as an ongoing translational process.
467 In conclusion, dance/movement therapy’s original perspective, practice, and
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468 principles are compatible with enactive and embodied approaches. Enaction,
469 embodiment, and dance/movement therapy can mutually inform each other and
470 should take advantage of each other’s findings and perspectives. These perspectives
471 can grow together, not only because they are compatible, but also because they are
472 parts of the same continuum, just as mind and body—rather than being separate
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473 entities related to one another—constitute one inseparable living whole.
474 Acknowledgements We would like to thank Hanne De Jaegher, Sharon Chaiklin, Patrizia Pallaro and
475 an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on this manuscript. We would like to thank modern
476 technology, which enabled this intercontinental work. And most importantly, we would like to thank our
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477 families who had to bear many short weekends because of this joint writing project.
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686
687 Author Biographies
688
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689 Sabine C. Koch, PhD, MSW, MA, BC-DMT
690 Dr. Koch is a researcher and lecturer at the Psychology Department of the University of Heidelberg,
691 Germany. She is specialized in the Kestenberg Movement Profiling (KMP). Her present work focuses on
692 embodiment and the influence of movement on affect, attitudes and cognition. Her research interests
693 include psychosomatics, social psychology, nonverbal communication, gender, phenomenology, diag-
694 nostics, movement analysis, dance/movement therapy, body psychotherapy and creative arts therapies.
695 She chairs a national research project on the language of movement and dance and co-chairs a European
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696 research project on dance/movement therapy with autistic and schizophrenic populations.
697 Diana Fischman, PhD, BC-DMT

698 A Professor in Education Sciences, a licensed psychologist, and a Board Certified dance/movement
699 therapist, Dr. Fischman received her PhD in Psychology at the Universidad de Palermo, Argentina.
CT
700 Founder director of Brecha (Buenos Aires Dance Movement Therapy Training Program,
701 www.brecha.com.ar) and founder president of the Asociación Argentina de Danzaterapia, she works in
702 her private practice as a dance/movement psychotherapist with adults, families, couples and dance/
703 movement therapy trainees. She teaches at the Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina) and at the
704 Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (Spain) as well as in academic institutions in Brazil, Perú, México,
705 Portugal and the Czech Republic. She directs a research project on Movement Patterns, Social Interaction
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706 and Empathy at the Instituto Universitario Nacional del Arte IUNA—Universidad de Buenos Aires. She
707 is the co-author of The art and science of dance/movement therapy: Life is dance.
708
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Embodied Enactive Dance/Movement Therapy

Article in American Journal of Dance Therapy · June 2011

Sabine Koch Diana Fischman

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3 An Embodied Enactive Approach to Dance/Movement

8 Abstract Dance/movement therapy may be conceptualized as an embodied and

15 perspective on professional practice in dance/movement therapy are herein offered as

26 means of connectedness and communication are employed to promote the health

30 doing so is to embrace and contribute to existing theoretical traditions that are in

58 perspective. Both approaches use a phenomenological knowledge base and integrate

61 environmental aspects of corporeal meaning, elements that had been marginalized by

63 Enaction and Dance/Movement Therapy

73 Dance/movement therapy focuses on movement as nonverbal expression,

97 In dance/movement therapy, Laban (1987) as well as Bartenieff and Lewis

104 tied to its own structure.

108 Fischman (2009) stated:

114 movement patterns, bringing them to a conscious level, and offers an

118 Embodiment and Dance/Movement Therapy

190 (g) human spirituality is embodied.

197 Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, 2009, 2010; Thompson, 2007), neuroscience (Damasio,

202 Participatory Sense-Making

203 In their seminal paper on participatory sense-making, De Jaegher and Di Paolo

205 concepts of autonomy, sense-making, embodiment, emergence, and experience (De

232 difference). It is related to encounter and disencounter. This perspective relinquishes

236 ‘‘Reaffirming the implications of autonomy, sense-making is an inherently active

241 as mirroring, contagion, and differentiation, humans build worlds in accordance

285 reapproach this kinesthetic consciousness, we can (re)discover what it is like to

302 Relation to Clinical Concepts

303 First and foremost, enactivism is a confirmation of the practice of dance/movement

306 verbal language in psychotherapy is a natural consequence of attempting to

313 rehabilitating, or curative process. Trauma is a body wound or shock produced by

351 …. perception and comprehension of certain sensory objects, namely those

355 it by means of the senses. We cannot do that since anger, friendliness, or

370 How Does the Embodied, Enactive Perspective Contribute

440 applicability, can offer its well-developed assessments and experience-based

479 Adler, J. (Producer). (1970). Looking for me. [DVD]. http://www.berkeleymedia.com/catalog/berkeley

social cognition. Brain Research, 1079, 25–35.

536 Dosamates-Alperson, E. (1981). Experiencing in movement psychotherapy. American Journal of Dance

594 Western thought. New York: Basic Books.

609 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge.

665 Harvard University Press.

678 Chodorow (pp. 33–40). London: Jessica Kingsley.

697 Diana Fischman, PhD, BC-DMT

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