ERMITA v. CITY OF MANILA
ERMITA v. CITY OF MANILA
L-24693 July 31, 1967 motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant
and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being
arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in
vs.
such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent- every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
appellant. certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character;
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee. and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the
challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the
automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect
FERNANDO, J.: causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court
in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a
Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
attack against its validity.
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due
by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty.
explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be
corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite
"It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the
the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the
of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With
it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join
meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the
maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the
discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their
standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's
or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations
suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness
or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v.
General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has
been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such
a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an
act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us?
A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to
all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due
allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.