G.R. No.

221697 : March 8, 2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, v.  COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

LEONEN, J.:

Case law: Political law

FACTS:

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. When
petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Juan City which was granted.

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.Desirous of being
with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the
wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American
citizen.She obtained U.S. Passport on 19 December 2001. 

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's
candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8
July 2004. 

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon
learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and eventually
expired. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. 

Petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of
the family's remaining household belongings. She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006. 

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon
City where they built their family home and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been
residing.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A.
No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.Under the same Act, she filed with
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions
for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. Consequently, the BI
issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006. She
also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport.

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the MTRCB.
Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20
October 2010,in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. From then on,
petitioner stopped using her American passport. 

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." On that day, she accomplished a
sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as
MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship. In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S.,
specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present. 

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States" effective 21 October 2010. 

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator
for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence
in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."Petitioner was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC,
the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to
the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. 

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

In a petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 221697, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution
finding that petitioner's COC contained material representations which are false. The instant Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is granted.

In a petition for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not
a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she
committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident
of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on
9 May 2016.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution.
On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari
with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen?

HELD: The fact of the petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable.

POLITICAL LAW: Citizenship

There are only two categories of citizens: natural-home and naturalized.

A natural-hom citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines "from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, a
naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born.

In Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this court ruled that if a person is not
naturalized, he or she is considered a natural-hom citizen of the Philippines:

[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration
of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: ... A citizen
who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.

Former Associate Justice Panganiban clarifies this concept in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson.
Naturalized citizens are "former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they
had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens.

A person who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship is generally required to file a verified petition. The
applicant must prove, among others, that he or she is of legal age, with good moral character, and has
the capacity to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has resided in the
Philippines for a significant period of time. The applicant must prove himself or herself not to be a threat
to the state, the public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs.

Petitioner did not undergo the naturalization process. She reacquired her Filipino citizenship through
Republic Act No. 9225.

The Commission on Elections contends that in availing herself of the benefits under Republic Act No.
9225, petitioner reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization, not natural-born citizenship, since she
had to perform several acts to perfect this citizenship. 326 Moreover, the earliest time Philippine residency
can be reestablished for those who reacquire Philippine citizenship under Republic No. 9225 its upon
reacquisition of citizenship.

Our jurisprudence holds otherwise. Those who avail themselves of the benefits under Republic Act No.
9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. Bengson ruled that repatriation involves the restoration of former
status or the recovery of one's original nationality:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

While Bengson involved Commonwealth Act No. 63, its ruling is still consistent with the declared policy
under the current system of reacquiring Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225. One's
status as a natural-born Filipino is immutable: "all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship. Republic Act No. 9225 requires certain solemnities, but these
requirements are only for the purpose of effecting the incidents of the citizenship that a naturalized
Filipino never lost. These requirements do not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship
commences only from the time they have been complied with.

To consider petitioner, a foundling, as not natural-born will have grave consequences. Naturalization
requires that petitioner is of legal age. While it is true that she could exert time and extraordinary
expense to find the parents who might have abandoned her, this will not apply to all foundlings. Thus,
this approach will concede that we will have a class of citizens who are stateless due to no fault of theirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner satisfies the 10-year residency requirement?

HELD: Petitioner's residency requirement is satisfied.

POLITICAL LAW: Residency requirement 

Applying these doctrinal principles, petitioner satisfied the residence requirement provided in Article VII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It was grave abuse of discretion for the Commission on Elections to
hold that she committed a material misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy for President.

The Commission on Elections committed a grievous error when it invoked the date petitioner's Philippine
citizenship was reacquired (i.e., July 7, 2006) as the earliest possible point when she could have
reestablished residence in the Philippines. This erroneous premise was the basis for summarily setting
aside all the evidence submitted by petitioner which pointed to the reestablishment of her residence at
any point prior to July 7, 2006. Thus, by this faulty premise, the Commission on Elections justified the
evasion of its legally enjoined and positive duty to treat petitioner's residence controversy as a factual
matter and to embark on a meticulous and comprehensive consideration of the evidence.

At the onset, the Commission on Elections flat-out precluded the timely reestablishment of petitioner's
residence in the Philippines because it held that "the earliest possible date that the respondent could
have re-established her residence in the Philippines is when she reacquired her Filipino Citizenship on July
2006. In doing so, it relied on this court's Decisions in Coquillia v. Commission on Elections,Japzon v.
Commission on Elections, and Caballero v. Commission on Elections.

In its assailed December 23, 2015 Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with respect
to the Petition filed by Elamparo, the Commission on Elections explained:

Foremost, the Commission is not convinced that the Second Division "chose to rely on a single piece of
evidence"- respondent's 2013 COC, to the exclusion of all others, in resolving the issue of residence. It
does not persuade us that as the Second Division "entirely omitted" to mention the evidence of
respondent enumerated in Respondent's Motion, it did not consider them at all. A judge is not bound to
mention in his decision every bit of evidence on record. He is presumed to have regularly discharged his
duty to consider and weigh all evidence formally offered by the parties which are admissible.
....

To indulge respondent, however, the Commission now looks, one by one on the pieces of evidence
allegedly ignored by the Second Division which are, along with their purpose for offer, are enumerated in
Respondent's Motion. Unfortunately, an examination of these evidence leads to but one crucial and fatal
conclusion: that all of them were executed before July 2006, and/or are offered to prove that she can
reckon her residency before July 2006 - the date of reacquisition by respondent of her Filipino citizenship.
This is fatal because, following the cases of Coquilla v. COMELEC, Japzon v. COMELEC, and Caballero v.
COMELEC, the earliest possible date that respondent could have re established her residence in the
Philippines is when she re-acquired her Filipino Citizenship on July 2006. Yes, on this finding, we affirm
the Second Division for the reasons that follow. 464

In its assailed December 23, 2015 Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with respect
to the petitions filed by Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez, the Commission on Elections explained:

As a US citizen and a foreigner, Respondent was allowed only temporary residence in the Philippines,
Respondent's alien citizenship remained a legal impediment which prevented her from establishing her
domicile in the Philippines. To establish permanent residence in the Philippines, it was necessary for
Respondent to secure prior authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ""BID"), such
as in the form of a permanent resident visa issued by the Republic of the Philippines showing that she
was authorized to permanently reside in the Philippines. This is the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court
in the case of Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections et al.

It is this dogmatic reliance on formal preconceived indicators that this court has repeatedly decried is
grave abuse of discretion. Worse, the Commission on Elections relied on the wrong formal indicators of
residence.

The Commission on Elections ignored the basic distinction between citizenship and residence. Likewise, it
erroneously considered a visa-a mere permission to enter-as a badge of residence, and equated an
immigrant with one who is domiciled in the Philippines. So too, the Commission on Elections'
indiscriminate reliance on Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero indicates a failure in properly appreciating the
factual nuances of those cases as against those of this case.

Citizenship and residency are distinct, mutually exclusive concepts. One is not a function of the other.
Residence is not necessarily contingent on citizenship. The loss or acquisition of one does not mean the
automatic loss or acquisition of the other. Change of domicile as a result of acquiring citizenship
elsewhere is neither inevitable nor inexorable.

Japzon v. Commission on Elections could not have been more emphatic: "reacquisition of . . . Philippine
citizenship . . . has no automatic impact or effect on residence/domicile."

Residence, as does citizenship, entreats a consideration of locus or geography. It is true that they may be
related or connected, but association is different from causation.

Caballero v. Commission on Elections was extremely careful in its syntax: "naturalization in a foreign