Intellectual Property Association of The Philippines vs. Ochoa, 797 SCRA 134, G.R. No. 204605 July 19, 2016
Intellectual Property Association of The Philippines vs. Ochoa, 797 SCRA 134, G.R. No. 204605 July 19, 2016
The IPAP has insisted that Article 2 of the Madrid Protocol means A. The issue of legal standing to sue, or locus standi
that foreign trademark applicants may file their applications (Yes, but only because of last paragraph: paramount importanceto the
through the International Bureau or the WIPO, and their public; transcendental significance to the people)
applications will be automatically granted trademark protection
without the need for designating their resident agents in the The IPAP argues in its reply that it has the locus standi to file the
country. present case by virtue of its being an association whose members
stand to be injured as a result of the enforcement of the Madrid
Moreover, the IPAP has submitted that the procedure outlined in Protocol in the Philippines; that the injury pertains to the
the Guide to the International Registration of Marks relating to acceptance and approval of applications submitted through
representation before the International Bureau is the following, to the Madrid Protocol without local representation as required by
wit: Section 125 of the IP Code; 20 and that such will diminish the rights
granted by the IP Code to Intellectual Property Law practitioners
Rule 3(1)(a) 09.02 References in the Regulations, Administrative like the members of the IPAP.21
Instructions or in this Guide to representation relate only to
representation before the International Bureau. The questions of The argument of the IPAP is untenable.
the need for a representative before the Office of origin or the
Office of a designated Contracting Party (for example, in the event Legal standing refers to "a right of appearance in a court of justice
of a refusal of protection issued by such an Office), who may act as on a given question." According to Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
a representative in such cases and the method of appointment, International Air Terminals Co., Inc., standing is "a peculiar concept
are outside the scope of the Agreement, Protocol and Regulations in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought
and are governed by the law and practice of the Contracting Party by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a
concerned. law or any other government act but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."
which procedure is in conflict with that under Section 125 of the IP
Code, and constitutes in effect an amendment of the local law by The Court has frequently felt the need to dwell on the issue of
the Executive Department. standing in public or constitutional litigations to sift the worthy
from the unworthy public law litigants seeking redress or relief.
The IPAP has prayed that the implementation of the Madrid The following elucidation in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
Protocol in the Philippines be restrained in order to prevent future offers the general understanding of the context of legal standing,
wrongs considering that the IP AP and its constituency have a or locus standi for that purpose, viz.:
clear and unmistakable right not to be deprived of the rights
granted them by the IP Code and existing local laws. In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened
with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due
In its comment in behalf of the respondents, the Office of the to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the
Solicitor General (OSG) has stated that the IPAP does not have intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in
the locus standi to challenge the accession to the Madrid order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public
Protocol; that the IPAP cannot invoke the Court's original officials and offices involved in public service. It is required,
jurisdiction absent a showing of any grave abuse of discretion on therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the
the part of the respondents; that the President's ratification of outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v.
the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement is valid because Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:
the Madrid Protocol is only procedural, does not create
substantive rights, and does not require the amendment of the IP The question on legal standing is whether such parties have
Code; that the IPAP is not entitled to the restraining order or "'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
injunction because it suffers no damage from the ratification by controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
the President, and there is also no urgency for such relief; and the sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
IPAP has no clear unmistakable right to the relief sought. 18 largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions," Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a
Issues person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
The following issues are to be resolved, namely: any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
I. Whether or not the IP AP has locus standi to challenge the
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
President's ratification of the Madrid Protocol;
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he
is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
II. Whether or not the President's ratification of the Madrid burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
Protocol is valid and constitutional; and of.
III. Whether or not the Madrid Protocol is in conflict with the IP It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court
Code. adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a
petitioner in a public action had locus standi. There, the Court
Ruling of the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute
must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a concurrence with the Madrid Protocol; that the Madrid
result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate, Protocol involves changes of national policy, and its being of a
Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la Fuente, Anti- permanent character requires the Senate's concurrence, pursuant
Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, which states that "no
of Public Works. treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus the Senate."
standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the
Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, Before going further, we have to distinguish between treaties and
in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized the approach when international agreements, which require the Senate's
the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable concurrence, on one hand, and executive agreements, which may
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury be validly entered into without the Senate's concurrence.
test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Executive Order No. 459, Series of 1997, notes the following
Dinglasan. definitions, to wit:
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Sec. 2. Definition of Terms.
Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to
their "farreaching implications,'; even if the petitioner had no a. International agreement - shall refer to a contract or
personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino v. understanding, regardless of nomenclature, entered into between
Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable the Philippines and another government in written form and
cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or instrument or in two or more related instruments.
validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.
b. Treaties - international agreements entered into by the
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for Philippines which require legislative concurrence after executive
challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or ratification. This term may include compacts like conventions,
legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents declarations, covenants and acts.
the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as
adversely affected by the action complained against as are others,
c. Executive Agreements - similar to treaties except that they do
it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that
not require legislative concurrence.
he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the
vindication ofa public right.
The Court has highlighted the difference between treaties and
executive agreements in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
The injury that the IPAP will allegedly suffer from the
Trading, thusly:
implementation of the Madrid Protocol is imaginary, incidental
and speculative as opposed to a direct and material injury
required by the foregoing tenets on locus standi. Additionally, as International agreements involving political issues or changes of
the OSG points out in the comment, the IPAP has misinterpreted national policy and those involving international arrangements of
Section 125 of the IP Code on the issue of representation. The a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But
provision only states that a foreign trademark applicant "shall international agreements embodying adjustments of detail
designate by a written document filed in the office, the name and carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and
address of a Philippine resident who may be served notices or those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature
process in proceedings affecting the mark;" it does not grant usually take the form of executive agreements.
anyone in particular the right to represent the foreign trademark
applicant. Hence, the IPAP cannot justly claim that it will suffer In the Philippines, the DFA, by virtue of Section 9, Executive Order
irreparable injury or diminution of rights granted to it by Section No. 459, is initially given the power to determine whether an
125 of the IP Code from the implementation of the Madrid agreement is to be treated as a treaty or as an executive
Protocol. agreement. To determine the issue of whether DFA Secretary Del
Rosario gravely abused his discretion in making his determination
Nonetheless, the IPAP also emphasizes that the paramount public relative to the Madrid Protocol, we review the jurisprudence on
interest involved has transcendental importance because its the nature of executive agreements, as well as the subject matters
petition asserts that the Executive Department has overstepped to be covered by executive agreements.
the bounds of its authority by thereby cutting into another
branch's functions and responsibilities. The assertion of the IPAP The pronouncement in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
may be valid on this score. There is little question that the issues Trading is instructive, to wit:
raised herein against the implementation of the Madrid
Protocol are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, we x x x The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our
recognize IPAP's locus standi to bring the present challenge. fundamental law in the making of "treaties" (Constitution of the
Indeed, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude towards locus Philippines; Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are, however, distinct
standi whenever the issue presented for consideration has and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly
transcendental significance to the people, or whenever the issues entered into without such concurrence.
raised are of paramount importance to the public.
SO ORDERED.